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Part One of Montesquieu's Idea of Justice comprises a survey 
of the currency in philosophical, ethical and aesthetic debate 
during the second half of the 1?th. century of the terms rapport 
and convenance, which are central to the enigmatic definition 
given to justice by Montesquieu in Lettres Persanes LXXXIII# In 
this survey, attention is concentrated on the way in which the 
connotations of these terms fluctuate with the divergent develop­
ment of the methodological and speculative outgrowths of Cartesianism 
into two schools of thought, materialist and idealist, often widely 
at variance in their views of the nature and organization of the 
universe.
In Part Two, Montesquieu's definition of justice is set against 
this background whose doctrinal conflicts because of the characteris­
tic associations of its key terms it may be taken to reflect, just 
as it may be held to epitomize, by virtue of its elaboration in the 
opening chapter of De l'Esprit des Lois and its close terminological 
affinities with the definition of law there given, an undoubtedly 
related conflict between the implications of causal determinism 
and the aspirations of idealist metaphysics surviving at the heart 
of Montesquieu's outlook, and, remaining unresolved, often said to 
impair the coherence if not the validity of his theory of society.
The reconstitution of the philosophical matrix of the 
definition which is now undertaken, drawing largely on the frag­
mentary evidence of Montesquieu's notebooks and his minor works.
demonstrates however by clarifying his intellectual allegiances 
and his methodological procedures that, far from internal inconsis­
tency, his idea of justice represents a fruitful interpenetration 
of the philosophical currents of his time. The union within it of 
the epistemological assumptions of contemporary empiricism contained 
in the notion of relationship with the transcendent if elusive ideal 
of fitness, summarizes in a single formula his double achievement 
of dignifying his scientific thesis with serious moral aspirations, 
while at the same time founding this idealism on a solid empirical 
groundwork. Montesquieu's idea of justice holds the key to establishing 
the unity of his thought and also offers his posterity an escape 
from the blind alley of determinism.
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INTRODUCTION
In Letter LXXXIII of the Lettres Persanes Montesquieu 
sets out to define justice:
*La justice est un rapport de convenance, qui se trouve 
réellement entre deux choses: ce rapport est toujours le
même, quelque être qui le considère, soit que ce soit dieu, 
soit que ce soit un ange, ou enfin que ce soit un homme.
Justice is a relationship of suitability actually existing 
between two things, a relationship which remains the same 
whoever considers it, whether God, angel or man.
Justice a relationship of suitab^ility existing between 
things? It is difficult to conceive of an odder 
pronouncement from a trained and practising magistrate, and 
even odder to discover it in the pages of a work largely 
devoted to the comparative study of morals and manners.
The imposing abstractions of Letter LXXXIII, the soaring 
metaphysical vision of a necessary geometrical structure of 
moral relationships linking all beings together, are a far 
cry from the homespun didacticism of the Fable of the 
Troglodytes, the allegorical but transparently simple and 
straightforward answer to Mirza's enquiries into Usbek’s 
thinking on the quality of justice in men. Usbek has now 
obviously progressed beyond mere human virtue to the 
contemplation of a justice, which if it is still a quality
(1) Nagel I, p. 169; Pleiade I, p. 256.
7seems to invest the whole nature of things; but how or why 
he does not tell us. The Troglodytes* justice consists 
plainly enough in patriotism and mutual consideration; while 
the what and wherefore of a relationship of suitability are 
left disquietingly vague. In De 1*Esprit des Lois 
Montesquieu forestalls complaints on a similar score;
*il ne faut pas toujours tellement épuiser un sujet, qu*on 
ne laisse rien à faire au lecteur. *^^
It is up to us to fathom Usbek’s words and to put his theory 
into perspective. To do so we must not only investigate the 
philosophical and moral traditions and related terminology 
which could have been familiar territory for Montesquieu, 
but also piece together from the whole body of his works the 
incomplete and scattered jigsaw puzzle which represents his 
personal philosophy.
The core of Montesquieu’s definition of justice is made 
up of two elements: the idea of relationship, and the idea of
suitability, of which the first possesses structural and 
cognitive associations, and the second functions descriptively 
or normatively depending on whichever of two broad 
philosophical streams, naturalistic or idealistic, is 
selected as the framework of Montesquieu’s thinking. Both 
elements have a special significance in the context of the 
history of ideas during the 17th. and early 18th. centuries.
(1) Bk. XI, ok.20: Nagel I, p.249; Pleiade II, p.430.
8but the origin of their association with justice can be 
traced back at the same time to some of the earliest Greek 
thinking on the subject.
Using the analogy of mathematical correspondence 
between opposite terms, the Pythagoreans produced a theory 
of limit and proportion in society, thereby moving towards 
a more refined definition of the ordered relationship 
between persons that had always been implied in the idea of 
requital central to the primitive law of talion. In Book V 
of the Ethics Aristotle elaborated and systematized the 
Pythagorean theory, again drawing a parallel with 
mathematics. The starting point of his discussion is justice 
in its general aspect, justice as the sum of human virtue, 
defined as obedience in every respect to the laws of 
society. He soon passes to justice in its particular 
distributive and corrective applications, reaching the 
conclusion that justice is response to the awareness of 
proportion in human relationships, a proportion which 
reflects the degrees of merit in each party. There is no 
indication in the Ethics however that such a proportion is 
necessary or essential in the sense that it corresponds to 
the pre-ordained order of things. On the contrary, Aristotle 
emphasizes that men commonly understand a variety of things
(1) See G. del Vecchio, Justice: an Historical and
Philosophical Essay. Edinburgh University Press, 1952.
when they speak of merit, and seems to consider that 
differences of merit have no qualitative significance, only 
quantitative :
’Justice, then, is the expression of a proportion. For 
proportion is not merely a property of numerical quantity, 
but of quantity as such.’^^ ^
One has to look elsewhere, to the Rhetorica, for the 
association of justice with a principle of universal validity:
’In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in 
accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even 
if there is neither communication nor agreement between them. 
This is what Antigone in Sophocles evidently means, when she 
declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices,
as being naturally just......  And as Empedocles says in
regard to not killing that which has life, for this is not 
right for some and wrong for others. 'But a universal 
precept, ’which extends without break throughout the wide 
ruling sky and the boundless earth.
and the precise metaphysical significance of this principle 
in the wider framework of Aristotelian thought is a matter 
for speculation in view of his general opposition to 
Platonic idealism.
As far as the strictly inter-personal bearing of justice 
is concerned, the Scholastics added little to Aristotle. 
Aquinas contents himself in the Summa Theologica with a 
generalized restatement of the idea that it expresses pro­
portion:
(1) Op.cit., Bk.V, ch.3; translated by J.A.K. Thomson, 
Penguin, 1955, p.146.
(2) Rhejorica, 1373 b. ; London, Loeb series, 1926, pp. 139-14-6
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'(Justitia) importât aequalitatem quamdam, ut ipsum nomen 
demonstrat: dicuntur enim vulgariter ea quae adequantur,
justari, *
However they were naturally concerned to endow their theory 
of justice with the metaphysical dimension lacking in the 
Master. The proportion which justice expresses had for them 
a significance beyond mere quantitative distribution of 
virtue in the social sphere, for it reflected the operation 
of a transcendent principle. This they represented as the 
expression and fulfilment of a transcendent and omnipotent 
Will, in which justice was fused with wisdom, and goodness 
with pity:
’Impossibile est Deum velle nisi quod ratio suae 
sapientiae habet. Quae quidem est sicut lex justitiae, 
secundum quam ejus voluntas recta et justa est. Unde quod 
secundum suam voluntatem facit, juste facit; sicut et nos 
quod secundum legem facimus, juste facimus. Sed nos quidem 
secundum legem alicujus superioris, Deus autern sibi ipsi est 
lex.'(2)
Linking justice with such a metaphysical principle opened 
the way for the kind of definition which Montesquieu was to 
produce. Once the nature of things is seen to be clearly 
determined by an omnipotent and omniscient force, then one 
can begin to represent its moral structure in terms of 
relationships of suitability which actually exist between 
things. Such relationships are so described because they 
conform to the norm fixed by transcendent authority.
(1) Op.cit., lia, 2ae, Quaest.57, Art.lc.
(2) Ibid., la, Quaest.21, Art.l, ad.2.
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This is not to say that the large dose of theology 
which the Scholastics injected into moral thinking immobil­
ized the vigorously pos^itivist strain of juridical theory 
cultivated by Aristotle. On the contrary, the definitive 
form that it received at the professionally experienced 
hands of Roman jurisconsults passed unchanged into the main­
stream of European culture. Its basic formula;
'Justitia est constans et perpétua voluntas suum cuique 
tribuendi *,
remains still today the prototype of most dictionary 
definitions for example.
Moreover, scepticism towards the universalist doctrine 
of natural justice which usually accompanied metaphysical 
conceptions of its source constituted an equally resilient 
tradition, endorsed by believers and non-believers alike.
In the 16th. century Thrasymachus is resurrected by Montaigne 
in the Essais^^^ and nearer to Montesquieu’s day, by Pascal 
in his Pensées.
’Sur quoi fondera-t-il l ’économie du monde qu’il veut 
gouverner? Sera-ce sur la justice? il 1/ignore. Certaine­
ment s’il la connaissait il n ’aurait pas établi cette 
maxime, la plus générale de toutes celles qui sont çarmi les 
hommes, que chacun suive les moeurs de son pays. L*éclat de 
la véritable équité aurait assujetti tous les^peuples. Et 
les législateurs n ’auraient pas pris pour modèle, au lieu de 
cette justice constante, les fantaisies étalés caprices des 
perses et allemands. On la verrait plantes par tous les 
états du monde, et dans tous les temps, au lieu qu’on ne^  
voit rien de juste ou d ’injuste qui ne change de qualité - i
(1) In Book III, ch.13, De l ’Expérience.
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en changeant de climat, trois degrés d'élévation du pôle 
renversent toute la jurisprudence, un méridien décide de la 
vérité. En peu d'années de possession les lois fondamentales 
changent, le droit a ses époques, l'entrée de Saturne au 
Lion nous marque l'origine d'un tel crime. Plaisante 
justice qu'une rivière borne, vérité au-deça des Pyrénées, 
erreur au-delà.
Pascal it is true, not least in his attitude to reason, 
swam against the tide of the 17th. century, a time when the 
human mind began to assert its self-sufficiency and its 
independence of divine patronage and guidance in such fields 
of knowledge as politics and jurisprudence as well as in 
the physical sciences. Descartes provided it not only with 
critical weapons for use against authority, but also with a 
general method suitable for all kinds of research, and the 
means by which a whole body of rational philosophy embracing 
mathematics, the natural sciences and metaphysics could be 
constituted. Mathematics provided him with the clue to this 
general method: he perceived that science in general could
be approached in a similar way as a study of the relation­
ships between things. Baillet, his biographer, recounts how 
he made his discovery:
* il abandonna l'étude particulière de 1^ *arithmétique et
de la géométrie, pour se donner tout entier à la recherche 
de cette science générale, mais vraie et infaillible, que 
les Grecs ont nommée judicieusement mathesis ...... et ^
.....  il jugea qu'il y avait une science générale destinee
à expliquer toutes les questions que l'on pouvait faire 
touchant les rapports, les proportions et les mesures, en
(1) Pensées 294 (Brunschvicg numeration), éditions du Seuil, 
Paris, 1962; p.63.
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les considérant^comme détachées de toute matière, et que 
cette science générale pouvait à très juste titre porter le 
nom de mathématique universelle, puisqu'elle renferme tout 
ce qui peut faire mériter ce nom de science et de mathématique 
particulier aux autres connaissances.
The idea of a universal algebra was first expressed in the 
Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, written about 1628,^2) but 
Descartes comments upon it directly in the better known 
Discours de la Méthode;
'Mais ce qui me contentait le plus de cette méthode 
était que, par elle j'étais assuré d'user en tout de ma 
raison, sinon parfaitement, au moins le mieux qu'il fût en 
mon pouvoir; outre que je sentais, en la pratiquant, que 
mon esprit s'accoutumait peu à peu à concevoir plus nettement 
et plus distinctement ses objets; et que, ne l'ayant point 
assujetti à aucune matière particulière, je me promettais de 
l'appliquer aussi utilement aux difficultés des autres 
sciences que j'avais fait à celles de l'algèbre.
From this insight combined with the application of the 
criterion of evidence, drawn also from mathematics and 
reinforced by the experience of the cogito, Descartes was 
able to construct a new and purely rational explanation of 
the physical world. It is true that he did not replace 
analytical and deductive processes by more empirical 
procedures, though he was prepared to experiment in order to 
discover the questions that needed to be answered. He 
continued moreover to subordinate the natural sciences to 
metaphysics, in which many arbitrary principles went unquest­
ioned; but the first and greatest step had been taken.
(1) La Vie de M. Descartes, Paris 1691; Part I, ch.2, sec.6, 
p.114.
(2) The Regulae were first published in the Opuscula posthuma 
physica et mathematica, Amsterdam, 1701.
(3) Op.cit., (1637), Part II; Paris, Gamier, I960, p.52.
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It was in the same spirit of pioneering rationalism 
that Hugo Grotius asserted a few years prior to the Regulae 
in the preface to his De Jure Belli ac Pacis that the pro­
positions of natural law would retain their validity even if 
we were to assume that there was no God,^^ an assertion 
which could be read as a premature reply to Pascal's scep­
ticism about justice. And Grotius's substitution of the 
authority of reason as revealed in natural law for the 
authority of divine command as expressed in revelation and 
orthodox tradition, together with Descartes's contribution 
to the philosophy and techniques of science itself, hold two 
of the keys to the genesis of Montesquieu's definition of 
justice. For the essence of Cartesian method was the 
application of the idea that all knowledge consists in the 
perception of relationships. Since there was never any doubt 
that the form of intelligence corresponded exactly to the 
nature of reality, it was permissible, not to say perfectly 
logical to represent its structure in terms of relationships 
also. Thus when Montesquieu defines justice as 'un rapport 
de convenance qui se trouve réellement entre deux choses', 
he is treating it as a structural element of moral reality, 
and could equally be signalling the belief that ethics can 
be subjected to a scientific approach as much as physics, in 
anticipation of his approach to concrete social phenomena in 
the Lois,where he actually produces a science of society.
(1) The work was first published in Paris in 1625.
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V/hen he qualifies his definition, adding 'ce rapport est 
toujours le même, quelque être qui le considère, soit que 
ce soit dieu, soit que ce soit un ange, ou enfin que ce soit
un homme', he is treading in the steps of Grotius by suggest­
ing that the principle which informs the moral structure of 
the world, which determines the fitness of relationships of 
justice, while undoubtedly transcendent, is nevertheless in 
some way independent of the arbitrary will of any super­
natural or intelligent being. The relationships of justice 
are unalterable by God, men or angels*
But the nature of their independence is never precisely 
indicated, which raises the possibility of a third key to 
the significance of Montesquieu's definition. Since God is, 
as it were, made to stand down, and the relationships of 
justice are described as really existing between things, it 
could be that Montesquieu was putting into necessarily 
ambiguous words a theory inspired by the kind of rational­
istic materialism usually attributed to Spinoza. The 
suitability of the relationships between things could amount 
to nothing more than the compossibility of phenomena which
a doctrine of reason immanent in nature implies.
The viability of this particular interpretation is one 
of the things which a study of the significance attached in 
the works of contemporaries and near contemporaries to the
1 6
specialized vocabulary used by Montesquieu in his definition, 
in conjunction with a reconstruction, as far as surviving 
texts allow, of his personal philosophy, should help to 
decide. More generally it is hoped that this double 
investigation, in showing the extent to which Montesquieu's 
ideas about justice crystallize the moral thought of a 
generation, will also reveal how far they surpass it.
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PART ONE.
MONTESQUIEU'S DEFINITION OF JUSTICE;
PRECURSORS AND PARALLELS
1 8
CHAPTER ONE.
LEXICOGRAPHERS
19
A detailed examination of dictionary definitions reveals 
the general significance of the terms rapport and convenance 
during the second half of the 17th. century. So far we have 
thought of rapport above all as a structural principle and 
of convenance as a normative idea; and in the main these 
conceptions are shared by the compilers of dictionaries.
The meaning of rapport, as might be expected with such a 
basic term, underwent little change over the period, and was 
consistently associated with the ideas of convenance and 
bienséance, the relationship between which will be considered 
l a t e r . A t  the beginning of the century, the following 
illustration is given in the Thresor de la Langue francoyse;
'Le rapport et bienséance des parties l'une à l'autre, 
convenance et accordance; convenientia partium.'^g)
Convenance and rapport are intimately associated in their 
Latin root; one recalls that conveni^meant not only to be 
in conformity with, but also to assemble together. Towards 
the end of the century, the Grand Dictionnaire de l'Académie 
Française defines rapport as; 'convenance, ressemblance, 
conformité', and adds the following illustration;
'On dit, "par rapport du petit au grand, du grand au petit", 
pour dire, "en gardant la proportion qu'il y a de l'un à 
l'autre"•’(5)
(1) Bélow pp^ Zl-27*
(2) Thresor de la Langue francoyse, 1606, edited by Jean Nicot; 
at *rapport*. ^
(3) Op.cit. 2e. édition revue et corrigée, Amsterdam, 1696.
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Rapport is undoubtedly concerned with the structure or 
composition of things, but there never seems the slightest 
doubt in the minds of the compilers, of Jean Nicot or of 
Thomas Corneille, that relationships are ever anything but 
proper and symmetrical. Thus Corneille's contemporary and 
rival Antoine Furetière writes in his Dictionnaire Universel;
'La proportion n'est autre chose que le rapport que des
quantités ont les unes avec les autres..... La symétrie est
un rapport que toutes les parties d'un bâtiment ou d'un 
tableau doivent avoir entre elles et avec leur tout. On dit 
en ce sens que du fini à l'infini il n'y a aucun rapport ni 
proportion. '
He also goes on to mention the traditional teleological 
associations of the term;
'..... se dit aussi en Morale de la relation des choses à
leur fin. Toutes les actions d'un Chrétien doivent être 
faites par rapport à Dieu. Un mondain ne fait rien que par 
rapport à lui-même. Le mérite d'une action est considéré 
par le rapport qu'elle a à sa fin bonne ou mauvaise.'
The history of the term convenance is more complex, 
associated as it was on the one hand with rapport and on the 
other with bienséance. We have just noted the definition of 
relationship given in the Thresor de la Langue francoyse;
'Le rapport et bienséance des parties l'une à l'autre, 
convenance et accordance.' Now the definition of bienséance 
which is given there is almost the same;
(1) Op.cit.. La Haye, 1690; at 'rapport'
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*La bienséance et rapport des parties l'une avec l'autre; 
convenientia rerum, decentia.'
As time passed the meaning of bienséance became much more 
specialized; gradually it came to be the simple equivalent 
of decentia, and was no longer the synonym of rapport.
But these definitions have a common term; convenance, which 
seems almost to combine the meanings of both. It is 
certainly impossible to talk of conformity without thinking 
of some kind of relationship, whereas it is not the case 
that relationship always implies conformity. Similarly pro­
priety, or bienséance always suggests conformity with a 
certain standard or accepted convention.
The obvious conclusion is that Convenance was already 
at the beginning of the 17th. century a very general term, 
almost as general as raison, and signifying some widely 
accepted, but ill-defined criterion. However, this con­
clusion is not borr^ out by the entries in the Thresor.
Related to the Latin verb convenio were several nouns ; 
convenientia, conventio, and conventum among them, whose 
meanings ranged from agreement in the abstract, to a material 
compact, and even to an actual assembly. Some of these 
meanings seem to have coalesced in the French word convenance, 
although this sounds closest to the most general of the Latin 
terms, convenientia. Thus, in the Thresor particular 
attention is paid to such definitions as marriage compact.
2 2
written or verbal agreement: *11 fait convenance et accord
avec eux par le moyen d'une grande somme d'argent.' The most 
general significance is attached to the adjective convenable, 
•propre ou sortable à quelque chose'; while the meanings of 
convenir are closer in feeling to bienséance: 'Cela ne
convient pas à un homme de telle dignité que tu es.'
The picture has changed considerably by the end of the 
century. In the Academy's Grand Dictionnaire des Arts et 
des Sciences, there is a long elaboration of Nicot's article 
in the Thresor on the matrimonial significance of the word,^^ 
but elsewhere the discussion concentrates on its more 
abstract meanings. Generally speaking the terms convenance 
and bienséance still share common ground, though the latter 
is becoming more specialized, and convenance is moving 
towards the wider significance of rapport. The Grand 
Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, gives bienséance and 
décence as synonyms of Convenance, but Furétière in the 
Dictionnaire Universel does not. It is easy to see why their 
meanings overlap: there is little difference between the
ideas of fitting something well and simply fitting; the extra 
ingredient of bienséance, the adverb well, since it must 
ultimately depend on personal judgement, although that judge­
ment may be shared by many people, probably accounts never­
theless for its gradual restriction to areas of experience
(1) Grand Dictionnaire des Arts et des Sciences, 2nd. éd., 
Amsterdam 1696, art. Convenancer.
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where personal factors dominate, such as social intercourse 
and art. It does not necessarily follow from this however, 
that bienséance ceased to be regarded as an independent 
criterion, just as much as convenance was, or that they did 
not remain closely connected in people's minds.
In Furetière's Dictionary the notion of proper relation­
ship is clearly expressed in his definition of bienséance :
'ce qui convient à une chose'; nothing could be simpler, but 
this is modified in such a way as to show the important 
aesthetic significance that the term had acquired: 'qui lui 
donne de la grâce, de l'agrément', and also its intimate 
connection with honnêteté :
'Il est de la bienséance de se tenir découvert et en une 
posture honnête devant les Grands et les Dames, la bienséance 
exige de nous plusieurs devoirs et civilités. Il faut en 
toutes choses observer les bienséances.'
This is the traditional notion that Jean Nicot included in 
his definition of Convenir in the Thresor de la Langue 
francoyse, and there one also finds the notion of utility, 
which Furétière attaches to bienséance. In English we have 
the word convenience, which is obviously similar to convenance, 
and related to the Latin convenientia, and which we associate 
almost exclusively with material advantage and personal 
comfort. This is exactly the meaning of bienséance in the 
17th. century:
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'•«••oSe dit aussi de ce qui est commode, utile et avantageux.
Il a acheté cette maison, cette terre, parce qu'elle était 
à sa bienséance, dans son voisinage. On a dans ce quartier 
toutes choses à sa bienséance: l'église, le marché etc.,...'^j
Or again in the Grand Dictionnaire de l'Académie française:* " " — " ■■ ' ' i
'On dit qu'une chose est à la bienséance de quelqu'un, pour 
dire qu'il lui conviendrait de l'avoir à cause de quelque
convenance particulière; telle province est fort à la
bienséance de ce Irince-là.'^g)
The association which this utili^rian meaning has with pur­
posive activity is basically the same as that which the social 
significance of the word has with the teleological notion 
that the individual must fulfil his rôle in society. And 
this in turn can be reduced to the idea that everything must 
fulfil its own nature, and the related notion that the 
attributes of things must accord with their essence. At this 
point the line of demarcation between bienséance and convenance 
is very blurred indeed: it is virtually impossible to
distinguish for example between these two illustrations which 
Furetière gives: 'II est bienséant a une fille d'etre modeste, 
de rougir,' and: 'L'amour, la galantrie n'est pas une chose 
convenante à un v i e i l l a r d . Bienséant is perhaps a shade 
more emotive, and convenant a more neutral adjective, but 
that is all.
(1) Furetiere, Dictionnaire Universel, La Haye, 1690; art. 
Bienséance.
(2) Op.cit., art. Seoir. ^
(3; Dictionnaire Universel, arts. Bienseance and Convenance.
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A comprehensive review of all the definitions of 
bienséance and convenance given in both Furetiere and the 
Academy*s Dictionnaire, tends however to enlarge and under­
line this distinction. Thus although such illustrations as 
'II s'est charge d'une commission qui n'est point convenable 
à sa dignité', are connected with the notion of honnêteté, 
in general the simple idea of relationship is more closely 
associated with convenance than with bienséance. In Furetiere 
for example, we also find the following definition of 
convenance :
'Termé relatif. Proportion, rapport, ressemblance que deux 
choses ont ensemble. Le blanc et le noir, le chaud et le 
froid, n'ont aucune convenance ensemble. Ces deux étoffes 
ont tant de convenance, se ressemblent si fort qu'on les 
prend l'une pour l 'autre.
The definition of the Grand Dictionnaire is similar:
'Rapport, conformité. Ces choses-là n'ont point de convenance 
l'une avec l'autre. Quelle convenance y a-t-il entre des 
choses si différentes? Pour bien discourir des choses, il en 
faut observer les convenances et les différences.'^2)
And harking back to the old idea of talion there is: 'La
grandeur du crime demande une punition convenable ^^ ^ a 
maxim whose implications escaped the attention of most magi­
strates of the day. For us however it provides a simple 
illustration of the idea of convenance expressed in juridical 
terms; and with regard to the problem of distinguishing
(1) Op.cit., art. Convenance.
(2) Grand Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, art, 
'Convenance'.
( 3 ) Ibid.
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"between bienséance and convenance, it shows how much more 
versatile the latter is, since it would be strange to talk 
of ’une punition bienséante* in any context. The Granâ 
Dictionnaire is also very explicit on the subject of 
bienséance ;
'Convenance de ce qui se dit, de ce qui se fait par rapport 
aux personnes, à l'âge, au sexe, aux temps, aux lieux, etc.* 
Cela choque la bienséance, n'est pas dans la bienséance, 
garder la bienséance,.*, observer les bienséances, les règles, 
les lois de la bienséance.'
Its social significance, and the way it came to be used as 
an independent abstract criterion, something akin to 
politesse or honnêteté are clearly shown in this definition.
In conclusion we may say then that bienséance denotes 
a standard of social behaviour, or as we shall see later an 
artistic criterion; it is not yet as narrowly defined as in 
modern French, where it rarely signifies more than conformity 
with social convention, although by the end of the 17th. 
century its development lies clearly in that direction. Thus 
as a normative principle it implies reference to something 
arbitrary rather than rational; as we mentioned above, it 
sometimes appears to call upon factors which we would call 
emotional.^2) Convenance on the other hand is a much wider 
term implying a relationship of conformity or of proportion, 
which may be used in a social context, but is not restricted
(1) Op.cit., art. Seoir.
(2) See above p*2+.
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to the subject of manners. Indeed, when considered in 
isolation, its unlimited nature makes of it a kind of meta­
physical entity controlling every possible relationship in 
the universe, and as such a criterion superior to bienséance 
or any other.
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CHAPTER TWO.
METAPHYSICIANS.
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The dictionary compilers of the 17th, century were not 
concerned primarily with the philosophical meaning of 
convenance ; for them the term meant little more than a 
relationship of conformity, something not quite so simple as 
rapport, but that is all. We must look elsewhere for the 
notion that it is the quality which constitutes the relation­
ship between the real and the ideal, which is the force that 
it possesses in Montesquieu's definition of justice.
As soon as one begins to consider Montesquieu and 
philosophy, the name which springs immediately to mind is 
that of the great Oratorian philosopher Malebranche. This is 
not just because of the echoes of the Recherche de la Vérité 
or the Traité de Morale which found their way into 
Montesquieu's work; but also because much evidence points to 
the fact that Malebranche was a considerable influence in 
his education. Montesquieu was born in 1689, and Malebranche 
died in 1715: during the whole of the period from the
publication of the first volume of the Recherche de la Vérité 
in 1674 until his death, Malebranche was involved in disputes 
on all sides arising out of misunderstanding and criticism of 
this work. 2^) Although he was by all accounts a gentle and 
retiring person, his creative activity was almost entirely 
governed by the bitter attacks which he had to answer. Relig­
ious disputes between Protestants and Catholics, between
(1) For details of Malebranche's life and controversies, see 
Le P. André, La Vie du R.P. Malebranche...avec l'Histoire 
de ses Ouvrages, publ. by Ingold, 1881, Bibliothèque 
Oratorienne vol. VIII.
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Jesuits and Jansenists continued unabated during the last 
quarter of the century, but all alike found time to criticize 
the Oratorian. Perhaps they saw and feared in his work the 
shadow of Spinoza, and seized the opportunity to attack it 
where it seemed to be openly published, rather than waste 
their efforts on the numerous pamphlets and fragments which 
circulated s e c r e t l y , B u t  while these did their work slowly 
and surely, Malebranche and his controversies dominated 
intellectual discussion during the greater part of the period, 
and this is important for us because it includes the time of 
Montesquieu's childhood and youth, and particularly the years 
he spent from 1700-1705 at the famous Oratorian college at 
Juilly. Eclecticism was the hallmark of Oratorian thinking, 
but he could hardly escape the influence of their most famous 
son, especially when the latter was constantly the subject of 
public debate. Added to this was the influence of personal 
acquaintances, such as the mathematician and scientist 
Dortous de Mairan, who was the pupil of Malebranche, and who 
later became Montesquieu's colleague in the Academy of Bordeaux; 
and Father Pierre-Nicolas Besmolets, the librarian of the 
Paris Oratory, who introduced him to Paris circles while he
was studying law there from 1709-1713•(2)
(1) See P. Verniere, Spinoza et la Pensée française avant la 
révolution, 1954, Part I, ch.5.
(2) For details of Montesquieu's acquaintance with Mairan, see 
R. Shackleton, Montesquieu, A critical Biography, Oxford, 
1961; ch.I, section 5; and P. Barrière, Un grand Provincial, 
..Montesquieu, Bordeaux, 1946; part 1, ch.V, section i.
And for Desmolets, Shackleton, op.cit., ch.I, section 3.
3 1
Malebranche* S influence was not limited to France ; his 
philosophy was read and discussed in Italy, Holland, Germany, 
England and Ireland. He corresponded with Leibniz;;; in 
Ireland his ideas were taken up by Browne, King and above all 
B e r k e l e y ; M i c h e l  Levassor, a former Oratorian priest, 
translated the Recherche de la Vérité into E n g l i s h ; a n d  
such men as the Abbé Bernardo Lama, whom Montesquieu met in 
Paris during his first stay there, travelled from Italy to 
sit at the feet of the m a s t e r , W h e r e v e r  Montesquieu was 
to pass later during his travels, the works of Malebranche 
would already be known and debated.
It is difficult to decide between the impressions which 
Malebranche's works leave with the reader; on the one hand 
they are pervaded by a deep religious feeling that amounts 
almost to mysticism, and indeed there is no question that he 
was anything but a sincere and orthodox Christian; but on 
the other, one is conscious, as many of his contemporaries 
were, that this mysticism arises from the divinisation of 
reason. As the perfection of reason, God loses his 
personality; he ceases to be the Christian figure of a being 
of perfect goodness and charity. Like Fenelon's idea of 
mystical union with God without the support of revelation or
(1) See A.A. Luce, 'Malebranche et le Trinity College de 
Dublin', in the Revue Philosophique de la France et de 
1'Etranger, 1938, vol.CXXV.
(2) See F. Bouillier, Histoire de la Philosophie cartésienne, 
Paris 1868, ch.17.
(3) See Shackleton, op.cit., ch.I, section 3.
(4) Montesquieu recorded his travels,in the notebooks Voyages, 
published Nagel, vol.II, and Pléiade, vol.I._____________
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o f any external media at all, Malebranche's insistence on 
the conception of God as pure intelligence undermined in a 
serious way the whole fabric of traditional dogma and the 
established authority of the Church* Small wonder that the 
Traite de la Nature et de la Grâce which transformed grace 
into a kind of general law operating in a way similar to the 
order of nature, was awarded the not uncommon distinction of 
being placed on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1690.
The title of his first book. La Recherche de la Vérité 
is most significant. His philosophical career began accord­
ing to Father Andre's b i o g r a p h y , w h e n  he discovered a 
copy of Descartes' Traité de l'Homme, and conceived the 
notion that the metaphysics of St. Augustine completed Cartesian 
physics by elucidating certain problems such as the nature 
of ideas, and of eternal truth. But the Traité de l'Homme 
which introduced him to Cartesian philosophy, is a long 
mechanical explanation of the human body, and from this he 
retained above all the idea that truth is mathematical, that 
it is expressed in the form of a relationship, and that 
reason consists in the apprehension of this relationship.
This was the real starting point of Descartes in the Regulae 
ad Directionem Ingenii, and it remains the starting point of 
all Malebranche's works too:
(1) See above ^ 2^,n. 1
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'Lorsque tu vois que 2 fois 2 sont 4 et que 2 fois 2 ne sont 
pas 5 tu vois des vérités: car c'est une vérité que 2 fois
2 sont 4 ou que 2 fois 2 ne sont pas 5* Mais que vois tu 
alors sinon im rapçort d'égalité entre 2 fois 2 et 4, ou un 
rapport d'inégalité entre 2 fois 2 et 5? Ainsi les vérités 
ne sont que des rapports: mais des rapports réels et
intelligibles* Car si un homme s'imaginait voir un rapport 
d'égalité entre 2 fois 2 et 5 ou un rapport d'inégalité 
entre 2 fois 2 et 4, il verrait une fausseté: il verrait un
rapport qui ne serait point, ou plutôt il croirait voir ce
qu'effectivement il ne voit point. Car il n'y a que le réel 
qui soit visible, que la vérité qui soit intelligible: le
faux ne le fut jamais: il peut etre cru, mais prends-y garde,
un rapport qui n'est point ne peut être vu*'
With Malebranche it is the notion of reason as the vision of à 
real relationship (un rapport qui n'est point ne peut être 
vu), which becomes, rather than Descartes's cogito or the 
subjective experience of consciousness, the basis of his 
metaphysics and morals. The vision of God becomes a vision 
of Reason, of relationships of perfection, which man may 
comprehend because of their mathematical nature, while his 
own perceptions remain obscure and confused:
'Nos sentiments sont confus. Ce ne sont que les modalités 
de notre âme qui ne peuvent nous éclairer. Mais ^ les idées 
que la raison nous découvre sont lumineuses: l'évidence les
accompagne. Il suffit de les considérer avec attention pour 
en découvrir les rapports et s'instruire solidement de la 
vérité. * ç2 )
Since the idea of relationship, rather than the notion of 
intuition, dominates his conception of reason, the quality 
of convenance which we have seen to be closely linked with
(1) Méditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques, 4th. éd., Lyon, 
1707, IV, para, iv, pp. 54-55.
(2) Entretiens Métaphysiques, 1688, III, para.17, pp.109-110.
the idea of relationship, though less often mentioned, is an 
active force behind much of his thinking.
Malebranche sees relationship as a structural fact in 
spatial analysis, but more important, in its rational embodi­
ment, as a metaphysical reality. In his works he calls reason 
by many names: 'le Verbe', 'la Sagesse éternelle', 'la Loi
inviolable', and in his theology. Christ becomes its embodi­
ment, no doubt on sound scriptural grounds. This transcendent 
Law contains the order of creation and it is consubstantial 
with God, whose will is subject to it:
'Sache que je suis la Loi éternelle. Loi que Dieu consulte 
sans cesse, et qu'il suit inviolablement. Car je suis la 
sagesse de mon Père, et il m'aime non comme un homme aime son 
enfant, a cause que son enfant lui ressemble, mais il m'aime 
par la nécessité de sa nature comme un fils qui lui est 
consubstantiel et auquel il communique toute sa substance
The eternal law consists in relationships of perfection and 
relationships of size: the latter constitute eternal,
necessary truths, mathematical in nature; and the former 
universal order:
'Or il y a cette difference entre les rapports de grandeur et 
les rapports de perfection, que les rapports de grandeur sont 
des vérités toutes pures, abstraites,^métaphysiques, et que 
les rapports de perfection sont des vérités et en^même temps 
des Lois immuables et nécessaires: ce sont les règles
inviolables de tous les mouvements des esprits. Ainsi ces 
vérités sont l'ordre que Dieu même consulte dans toutes ses 
opérations. Car aimant toutes choses à proportion qu'elles 
sont aimables, les différents degrés de perfection règlent 
les différents degrés^ de son amour, et la subordination qu'il
établit entre ses creatures.'^2)
(1) Meditations Chrétiennes, III, para.21, p.47.
(2) Ibid, IV, para.8, pp. 57-58.
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The perfections which are in God represent all possible 
creatures, and these perfections, though infinite in them­
selves, are not equal. Thus the conception of a kind of 
hierarchy of archetypal ideas in the Divine understanding 
emerges. This can be seen as the metaphysical structure of 
reality.
But what of the question of creation? Aquinas had also
a.
seen in the Divine being^hierarchy of ideas which were the 
prototypes of created things, reflecting in their diverse 
imperfection the manifold perfections of the Creator, However, 
for him God was not only perfect goodness but also pure act, 
and therefore order of goodness was also order of being. He 
did not see reason as the ultimate reality; it entered into 
the world order only in so far as man was a rational animal, 
that was his essence and his justification lay in fulfilling 
his rational nature. For Malebranche the problem is 
different, since his conceptions are not teleological. The 
universal order is necessary not arbitrary, and the perfec­
tions which subsist in God are absolute although they are 
unequal, their inequality being demonstrated by comparison 
with the relationship of inequality which exists between an 
infinity of single units and an infinity of groups of ten 
units. How then does creation come about? Malebranche has 
to link the material order to the order of reason by means 
of the Divine Will. Thus the natural law is arbitrary, but 
dependent on necessary universal law:
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'Ainsi Dieu a deux sortes de lois qui le règlent dans sa
conduite. L'une est éternelle et nécessaire, et c'est 1'___
les autres sont arbitraires, et ce sont les lois générales de 
la Nature et de la Grâce. Mais Dieu n'a établi ces dernières
ordre ; 
que parce que l'ordre demande qu'il agisse ainsi. De sorte 
que c'est l'ordre eternel, immuable, nécessaire......qui est
la loi que mon père consulte toujours, qu'il aime 
invinciblement, qu'il suit inviolablement, et par laquelle il 
a fait et conserve toutes choses.
Malebranche sees a necessary relationship between the virtual 
order of perfections in the Divine substance and the totality 
#of creation, but unlike St. Augustine for instance, he does 
not conceive of a distinct correspondence between Divine action 
and purpose.^2) God's will is subject to the norm of universal 
reason, thus action and purpose, creation and conservation 
become very difficult to distinguish. This position is far 
removed from that of Descartes, who like Augustin^ saw will 
as the source of universal order;
'.....il (Dieu) s'est déterminé à faire les choses qui sont 
au monde, pour cette raison, comme il est dit dans la 
Genèse, 'elles sont très bonnes', c'est-à-dire que la raison 
de leur bonté dépend de ce qu'il les a ainsi voulu faire.
It was precisely this break with orthodox Cartesianism, 
and the apparent similarity between Malebranche's conception 
of universal reason and thedoctrines of Spinoza, which struck 
his contemporaries.Arnauld seized upon the scarcely 
comprehensible distinction between the 'étendue réelle de
(1) Méditations Chrétiennes, VII, para.\8, pp. 138-139.
(2) For a detailed comparison of the Ma]ÿranchian and Augustinian 
standpoints, see M. Gueroult, Malebranche; Les cinq AbTmes
de la Providence, Paris, 1939, Vol.II, ch.2.
(3) Deâcag'teëL. Réponse aux Vies. Objections, 8 ,
(4) See P. Vernibre, Spinoza et la Pensée française avant la 
révolution, Paris, 1954; Part I, ch.5.
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l'univers' and the 'étendue intelligible' in both the Traité 
des vraies et des fausses idées (1683) and in his Défense 
d'Arnauld contre la Réponse de Malebranche (1684); and it 
was later the same accusation of spinozism which formed the 
basis of Malebranche*s quarrel with the Jesuits. It appears 
from his correspondence with his pupil Dortous de Mairan, 
that he was in fact acquainted with Spinoza's Ethica, and it 
was Mairan who later administered the coup de grâce, by 
declaring himself unable to distinguish between 'étendue 
réelle' and 'étendue intelligible' in his master's system;
'II est clair que votre étendue intelligible n'est autre que 
l'etendue substance dont l'étendue créée ou matérielle n'est 
que le simple mode.'^ 2.)
In his book on Spinozism in France, Paul Verniere suggests 
that the ninth Meditation Chrétienne, is in fact a refutation 
of Spinoza, since Arnauld's criticisms had not yet been 
published, and Malebranche's attempts to defend his position 
cannot be seen as a reply to them. ^ 2) I^ he Meditations 
Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques were indeed completed in 1682, 
though the first four were composed by 1676; frbm the fifth 
onwards scattered remarks suggest that Malebranche had become 
conscious of certain disquieting similarities between his 
doctrine and the dangerous ideas of Baruch Spinoza. In the
(1) Letters from Mairan of Sept. 17, and Nov^ 19. 1713 in 
V. Cousin, Fragments de Philosophie Cartésienne, 1845, 
p.272;292.
(2)0p.cito part I, ch.5.
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following passage for example he struggles to define his 
idea of the will of God, without on the one hand being forced 
to declare its independence with regard to Divine Reason, and 
on the other, striving to exclude the possibility that material 
extension is simply a mode of this Reason;
'Afin que Dieu pût anéantir ce corps, il faudrait que Dieu 
put vouloir que ce corps ne fût point; il faudrait que Dieu 
fut capable d'avoir une volonté dont le néant serait le terme. 
Or le néant n'a rien de bon ni rien d'aimable. Dieu ne peut 
donc l'aimer ou le vouloir d'une volonté positive. Dieu peut 
anéantir son ouvrage, parce qu'il peut cesser de vouloir que 
cet ouvrage subsiste; car les volontés de Dieu, 
quoiqu'éternelles et immuables ne sont point nécessaires; 
elles sont arbitraires à l'égard des êtres crées. Le monde 
n'est point une émanation nécessaire de la Divinité. Dieu 
peut d'une volonté éternelle et immuable le créer pour un 
temps. Mais Dieu ne peut avoir une volonté positive et
pratique de le détruire   Ainsi puisque les corps
existent à cause que Dieu veut qu'ils soient; puisqu'ils ne 
cessent point d'être h cause que Dieu ne cesse point de 
vouloir qu'ils soient, il est évident que la création et la 
conservation ne sont en Dieu qu'une même action.
One has only to recall the much repeated notion that creation 
and conservation are effected by means of the eternal and 
necessary law of reason to realise the fineness of his 
distinctions. The strikingly intimate connection which exists 
in his system between the Divine substance and the act of 
creation, between the relationships contained within this 
substance and their material determination, cannot be over­
looked. But over and above the complications arising from 
his conception of necessary reason, the very form of this
(1) Méditations Chrétiennes, V, para.7, pp.79-80.
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conception, its exclusively geometrical cast, could not help 
but draw him towards a philosophy of immanence, as at least 
one modern commentator has noted:
*Le système des idees ou l'ordre da la raison s'identifie, 
en effet, chez Malebranche, avec l'essence de Dieu, 
puisqu'on^Dieu la raison est une seule et même chose avec 
son acte eternel, et que, dans l'homme, la vision des idées
qui est la forme immanente du rationnel, relations qui 
trouvent leur détermination dans l'étendue intelligible. Il 
est facile de voir que de cette façon Malebranche se rapproche 
d'un rationalisme de 1 'immanence.'
Clearly however, whatever the implications of his 
doctrines, Malebranche himself insisted on the transcendence 
of reason. Thus, while he maintained that the eternal truths 
constituting part of the Divine substance could only consist 
in adequate relationships:
'si un homme s'imaginait voir un rapport d'égalité entre 2
fois 2 et 5........il verrait une fausseté: il verrait un
rapport que ne serait point, out plutôt il croirait voir ce 
qu'effectivement il ne voit point.'
at the same time, he denied the possibility of adequate 
relationships between the other part of this substance, made 
up of the archetypal ideas of perfection, and the material 
creation with which it is nevertheless connected. Where 
Spinoza saw a necessary identity, Malebranche saw only a 
virtual relationship, which could be completed only by the 
action of a creative will:
(1) A. Banfi, 'Malebranche et l'Italie', Revue philosophique 
de la France et de 1'Etranger. 1938, vol.CXXV, p.253.
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entre 2 fois 2 et 4 est une vérité'
entre ies’ti?:rciiisroreS^?roeriyreri^ s^^^ie^r"'n ont pu commencer avant que ces êtres fussent produits: car
entre des choses qui ne sont point: 
un néant considéré comme tel, ne peut être double ou triple 
d un autre néant, ni même lui être positivement égal,'^^^
An adequate relationship exists in creation by virtue of the 
operation of the Divine will, which is in turn dependent on 
eternal reason.
Malebranche*s reasoning goes full circle, but if we 
disregard the problem presented by his explanation of 
creation, we see that it is in his vision of the created 
universe that the idea of adequate relationships, of convenance 
between the real and the ideal, plays its greatest part. An 
adequate relationship between God who is the sum of perfect­
ions, and the finite creation, is established by the mediation 
of universal reason incarnate in the 'Word', controlling the 
operation of the laws of nature and of g r a c e . T h r o u g h  
this agency the universal order of justice is revealed to men, 
for God is
'la justice mêine, la loi éternelle, la règle immuable, puisque 
cette loi éternelle n'est que l'ordre immuable des 
perfections qu'il renferme dans l'infinité et la simplicité 
de son essence.
(1) Méditations Chrétiennes, IV, para.5, p.55.
(2) Doctrine elaborated particularly in the Traité de la 
Nature et de la Grâce of 1679^
(3) Entretien d'un philosophe chrétien avec un philosophe 
chinois sur l'existence et la nature de Dieu, 1708; 
ed. A. Le Moine, Paris, 1936, p.81*
.4 1
Virtue, he explains in the Traite de Morale, consiste in 
recognition and love of this universal order of justice.
The idea of a transcendent ideal to which men may conform is 
essential to his moral thought.
If we and one or two of his contemporaries like Mairan, 
see in Malebranche the germ of a conception of immanent 
reason, the majority of his critics were content to make 
the accusation of Spinozism against him, simply on the grounds 
of his use of Cartesian geometry; very few of them had 
anything but a second-hand knowledge of the Dutch philosopher's 
work, and for most of them he was simply the notorious 
atheist of the age. They feared most a rejection of tradi­
tional standards, and a re-examination of accepted patterns 
of thought.
(1) F irst 'p u tU ske i in  1694.
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Thus the very fact that Malebranche elevated reason to a 
supreme position in his philosophical system, a position 
above that of faith or of authority, was sufficient confir­
mation of their darkest suspicions, and ample justification 
for the accusation levelled against him.^^ Among the 
critics representing the party of social and religious 
orthodoxy, and probably most powerful among them, was Bossuet. 
One of the few things he shared with the Jansenist Arnauld 
was his dislike for the doctrines of the Traité de la Nature 
et la Grâce, though his reasons were not so narrowly 
theological. The following passage taken from a letter to 
one of Malebranche's disciples is a typical expression of 
his fears with regard to the Oratorian's philosophy:
'Un autre inconvénient gagne insensiblement les esprits.
Car, sous prétexte qu'ail ne^faut admettre que ce qu'on entend 
clairement, ce qui, réduit à certaines bor^s, est très 
véritable, chacun se donne la liberté de dire: J'entends
ceci, et je n'entends pas cela; et sur ce seul fondement, on 
approuve et on rejette tout ce qu'on veut sans songer qu'outre 
nos idées claires et distinctes, il y en a de confuses et 
générales qui ne laissent pas d'enfermer des vérités si 
essentielles, qu'on renverserait tout en les niant. Il 
s'introduit, sous ce prétexte, une liberté de juger qui fait 
que, sans égard à la tradition, on^avance témérairement tout 
ce qu'on pense. Et jamais cet excès n'a paru, à mon avis, 
davantage que dans le nouveau système, car j'y trouve a la 
fois les inconvénients de toutes les sectes, et en particulier 
ceux du pélagianisme.'^2^
(1) Malebranche was quite explicit in his attitude to faith : 
'L'évidence, l'intelligence est préférable à la foi; car la 
foi passera, mais l'intelligence subsistera éternellement.' 
Traité de Morale, 11,11; and in the second part of the 
Traité he writes: 'Il ne fautpas forcer les hommes à agir 
contre leur conscience.'(IX,13*)
(2) Correspondance; vol.III,pp.372-373; Letter of 21 May 1687 
to M. d'Allenlans.
4 3
A sincere reconciliation took place between the two 
ecclesiastics in 1697; and indeed it would be misleading to 
represent Bossuet as an outright opponent of Cartesianism as 
such. He disliked the use of reason as a critical weapon 
directed against established beliefs and institutions, but 
he was himself a rationalist in the 17th. if not the 18th. 
century sense of the word. Even when attacking the Cartesians 
he admits that the clear idea, v/hen dissociated from the claims 
of individualism, is a reliable guide to truth, in some if not 
all fields of enquiry. The unfinished Politique tirée de 
l'Ecriture Sainte, composed for the benefit of his pupil the 
Dauphin, is a fine example of the deductive method applied in 
literature; each book is divided into articles, in each of 
which the opening proposition is clearly demonstrated;
'l'ordre qui est observé est géométrique', observed the Abbé 
Bossuet in the Preface to the 1709 e d i t i o n . N o t  surprisingly, 
the core of the whole work is the exposition of 'maximes de 
droite raison'. As tutor of the Dauphin he also undertook 
certain anatomical studies, which at some time were incorpo­
rated in the treatise De la Connaissance de Dieu et de 
Soi-même. This work, a short introduction to all branches of 
philosophy which was not published until after his death, 
also reveals a certain rationalism not totally unrelated to 
Cartesian thought, at least in its original form. They meet
(1) Bossuet, Politique tirée de l'Ecriture Sainte, Paris, 1709, 
Préface, XX.
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for instance in a common acceptance of reason as a normative 
principle, which in human experience takes on the role of 
conscience. But whereas Descartes’ attitude to social and 
moral factors, as revealed in the third part of the Discours 
de la Méthode, is temporary and governed by practical 
considerations, Bossuet conceives of the established social 
and political structure as something permanent and sanctioned 
by reason. He is not a relativist in this or anything else; 
rather, like the great dramatists of the age, he seeks to convey 
the permanent and universal in human experience. Like most 
conservative minds however, he found this embodied in the 
contemporary state of things, although his endorsement of the 
status quo was limited to a degree by the constant emphasis 
he placed on the notion of responsibility in public life, a 
quality which he never failed to demonstrate in his own career 
as bishop of Meaux. Undoubtedly his concern for peace and 
stability was also connected with a realistic appreciation 
of the unidealistic nature of human motivation: conscience
and conscientiousness can moderate the effects of passion and 
interest, but these remain 'les deux grands ressorts de la 
vie humaine* he felt, like Montesquieu after him, that 
any change was most likely to be a change for the worse.
(1) Sermon sur la Justice, in Oeuvres Oratoires de Bossuet, 
ed. J. Lebarq, Paris, 1922; vol.V, p.170.
(2) In La Politique de Bossuet, Paris, 1867; ch.Ill,
J.P. Nourrisson discusses the relationship between the 
principles of reason and utility in Bossuet's thought.
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These are his concerns then: peace, stability, respon­
sibility in government, moderation in society; our concern 
is to show how he used the idea of reason and more particu­
larly the criterion of convenance to demonstrate their 
necessity. As we have already mentioned, much of his writing 
reveals strong Cartesian affinities; here and there one even 
finds similarities with Malebranche. The treatise De la 
Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même opens with a character­
istic attempt to define reason and to describe its function.
It is ’la lumière que Dieu nous a donnée pour nous conduire’, 
and its function is not only, in the form of moral conscience, 
to turn man from evil, but also to recognise the proportion 
and order in things, to discover by comparison the relation­
ships binding things together. Bossuet has a very clear 
understanding of the discursive function of reason in spite of 
his antipathy to its use as a critical instrument and his 
conception of it as an intuitive moral faculty:
’Le rapport de la raison et de l ’ordre est extrême. L ’ordre 
ne peut être remis dans les choses que par la raison, ni être 
entendu que par elle. Il est ami de la raison, et son 
propre objet.
The scientific function of reason could hardly be better 
expressed, though whether Bossuet understood by order an 
artificial order imposed from without, or the natural order of
(l) De la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même, Paris, 1722, 
ch.I, section 8, p.39
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things is a matter for speculation. Bossuet even goes as 
far towards Malebranche as to suggest that the eternal truths 
of reason subsist in God:
’L ’intelligence a pour objet des vérités éternelles, qui ne 
sont autre chose que Dieu même, où elles sont toujours 
subsistantes et toujours parfaitement entendues*;
and also that these truths constitute the eternal law and 
primordial pattern of the universe:
’II faut reconnaître une sagesse éternelle, où toute loi, 
tout ordre, toute proportion ait sa raison primitive
Moreover it is in the contemplation of universal reason that 
man discovers the moral law:
Là elle (l’âme humaine) découvre les règles de la justice, 
de la bienséance, de la société, ou pour mieux parler, de la 
fraternité humaine, et sait que si dans tout le monde, parce 
qu’il est fait par raison, rien ne se fait que de convenable, 
elle qui entend la raison, doit bien plus se gouverner par 
les lois^de la convenance.....O’est sur cela qu’elle fonde 
les Sociétés et les Républiques, et qu’elle reprime 
1 ’inhumanité et la barbarie.
There is no clearer statement of the relationship in contem­
porary thought between the primitive metaphysical order of 
reason and the temporal moral and structural criterion of 
convenance. One begins to wonder whether Bossuet did not 
transform the necessity of writing an introduction to con­
temporary philosophy, presumably for the benefit of his royal
(1) Op.cit., ch.IV, section 5, p. 277.
(2) Ibid., ch.V, section 6, p. 54J-
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pupil, into an opportunity to rewrite Malebranche’s Recherche 
de la Vérité in more orthodox terms, and if the resulting 
work does not form a hidden link between Malebranche*s con­
ception of order which only suggests the idea of convenance, 
and Montesquieu’s definition of justice as ’Un rapport de 
convenance
Although what we have seen so far of Bossuet’s system 
suggests that he conceived of reason alone as a sufficient 
moral criterion, and as the metaphysical principle on which 
all creation depends, the picture painted by these short 
quotations is to a large extent misleading. He did indeed 
see reason as a necessary principle, but he associated it 
with a teleological view of the universe, and that is the 
point where he parted company with Malebranche. One must 
take care not to be deceived by the effortless grace of his 
writing which conceals a fairly superficial presentation of 
ideas; instead of delving deep, turning them over again and 
again, constantly checking and qualifying them as Malebranche 
did, he outlines them smoothly following a single line of 
thought, so that their full significance is not immediately 
clear. Thus although certain passages prompt comparisons with 
other thinkers he is known to have opposed, they cannot be
(l) The first part of the Recherche was published in 1674, and 
Bossuet was tutor to the Dauphin from 1670-1681, so there 
is some possibility of a connection with Malebranche.
As far as Montesquieu is concerned it must be bornf in mind 
that the work was not published until 1722, after the 
Lettres Pebsanes.
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taken at their face value. A passage from the Sermon sur la 
Divinité de Jesus-Ghrist might suggest for instance that he 
had a very similar conception to that of Malebranche concern­
ing the nature of Christ and the function of revelation:
'Celui-là doit être plus qu'homme, qui, à travers de tant de 
coutumes et de tant d'erreurs, de tant de passions compliquées 
et de tant de fantaisies bizarres, a su démêler au juste et 
fixer précisément la règle des moeurs. Réformer ainsi le 
genre humain, c'est donner à l'homme la vie raisonnable; c'est 
une seconde création, plus noble en quelque façon que la 
première. Quiconque sera le chef de cette réformation
salutaire doit avoir à son secours la même sagesse qui a formé
l'homme la première fois.'^2)
We imagine that Bossuet also had a vision of Christ as reason
and mediator between God and his creation, whereas, as a true
moralist rather than a metaphysician, he is pointing here to 
an ideal of human behaviour, la vie raisonnable, and using the 
message of revelation as an indication of the nature of Christ, 
We cannot even be sure that la vie raisonnable does not in 
fact stand for the old traditional ideal of moderation.
We can be sure however, by reference to the Discours sur 
l'Histoire Universelle, that Bossuet in no way considered
Ltf
Christ as universal reason to^ultimately responsible for the
existence as well as the order of the universe, as Malebranche 
had done. 2^) The creation and maintenance of the universe is 
totally dependent on the Divine Will. Bossuet had just as
(1) Oeuvres Oratoires; ed. Lebarq, Paris, 1922, vol.V, p.586.
(2) See above p.40, note 2. for Malebranche; and Bossuet, 
Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle, Paris, 1681, Part II.
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little intention of courting the idea of an immanent reason, 
as he had of embracing a completely mechanistic interpretation 
of the operation of natural laws in the physical world. He 
saw in the rational structure of the world not just the 
operation of cause and effect, but the ordered development of 
things towards a given end:
'Ainsi sous le nom de nature nous entendons une sagesse 
profonde, qui développe avec ordre et selon de justes règles, 
tous les mouvements que nous voyons.
Bossuet goes to much greater lengths than many another thinker 
of rationalist sympathies to accommodate the teleological 
world view of Scholasticism. Thus although the whole of the 
Traité de la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même hinges on the 
notion of convenance, it becomes clear that Bossuet is not so 
much concerned with conformity between a transcendent eternal 
order of reason and the extended universe, or between physical 
cause and effect, as with the notion of proportion between 
the actual state of things and their place in the Divine plan:
'Tout ce qui montre de l'ordre, des proportions bien prises, 
et des moyens propres à faire de certains effets, montre aussi 
une fin expresse; par conséquent un dessein formel une 
intelligence bien réglée, et un art parfait.
C'est ce qui se remarque dans toute la nature. Nous 
voyons tant de justesse dans ses mouvements, et tant de 
convenance entre ses parties, que nous ne pouvons nier qu'il 
n'y ait de l'art. Car s'il en faut pour remarquer ce concert 
et cette justesse, à plus forte raison pour l'établir. C'est 
pourquoi nous ne voyons rien dans l'Univers que nous ne 
soyons portés à demander pourquoi il se fait, tant nous sentons 
naturellement que tout a sa fin.*^2)
(1) De la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même; ch.IV, section 1 
, , P.2?0.
(2) Ibid.
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As regards the highly controversial question of animal 
souls, 2^ ) he used this idea of conformity with a given nature 
to refute those who claimed that the similarities in anatomy 
and behaviour between man and animals suggested that intel­
ligence was also a faculty common to both. Bossuet stands 
firmly by the notion that man is an intelligent animal, and 
that only he is conscious of the conformity in his own 
actions•^2)
Indeed man is a creature *d*un grand dessein, et d'une 
sagesse p r o f o n d e ' . Chapter IV of the Traite de la 
Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même contains a long section 
on the beauty, proportion and functional unity of the human 
body and mind. Just as the human race has its place in the 
universal scheme of things, so also each individual has his 
station in life, his rights and his duties, governed by the 
principle of justice:
'La justice est la vertu principale et le commun ornement 
des personnes publiques et des particuliers; elle commande 
dans les uns, elle obéit dans les autres; elle renferme 
chacun dans ses limites; elle oppose une barrière invincible 
aux violences et aux entreprises; et ce n'est pas sans raison 
que le Sage lui donne la gloire de soutenir les trônes et 
d'affermir les empires, puisque en effet elle affermit non 
seulement celui des princes sur leurs sujets, mais encore 
celui de la raison sur les passions, et celui de Dieu sur la 
raison méme.'^^^
(1) See H. Hastings, Man and Beast in French Thought, Baltimore, 
1936; and L.G. Rosenfield, From Beast Machine to Man Machine, 
New York, 1941•
(2) De la Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même. ch.V, section 1, 
Ibid, ch.IV, section 1, p.2.4-9.
Sermon sur la Justice, 1566; Oeuvres Oratoires de Bossuet, 
ed. Lebarq, vol.V, p.161.
8 Î
5 1
The established structure of society is as much part of the 
Divine plan as are the universal laws of motion; but this 
sanction of authoritarian government and of an hierarchical 
society is tempered in Bossuet by an insistence on the uni­
versality and evidence of the principles of natural law.
The laws of primitive reason are accessible to all through 
the medium of moral c o n s c i e n c e . I n  addition, Bossuet 
associates the restraining influence of conscience with the 
classical ideal of moderation;
'Que chacun, en se tenant dans ses limites, s'exerce de tout 
son pouvoir dans la vaste étendue de la charité.
Not only is man's station in society regulated by the laws 
of justice, but within that station he must strive to conform 
to an ideal of mediocrity. According to the Sermon sur la 
Justice this is the quality which distinguishes the just man; 
in this way the general idea of convenance links Bossuet's 
abstract ideal of justice, which is in itself an expression 
of the grand universal plan, to the social concepts of 
Bienséance and Honnêteté. The most important point however 
is that Bossuet's notion of convenance is linked above all 
with a teleological view of the universe.
(1) Politique tirée de l'Ecriture Sainte, Paris 1709, I, 
iv, 2-4.
(2) Sermon sur nos Dispositions à l'égard des nécessités de 
la Vie, Oeuvres Oratoires, ed. Lebarq. Paris, 1916, 
vol.III, p.308.
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Like Malebranche, Bossuet was one of the figures of 
Montesquieu's early years, whose general outlook must have 
been familiar to him. The future author of the Considerations 
sur la Grandeur et Décadence des Romains would know of him 
not only as one of the ablest ecclesiastics of his day and 
a prominent figure in political and social life, but was 
surely acquainted at least with his Discours sur l'Histoire 
Universelle if not with other of his works.
Yet another outstanding contributor to the philosophical 
and scientific discussions of the end of the century was 
Leibniz.,. although his influence was perhaps not as widespread. 
There is some evidence to suggest that Montesquieu was 
acquainted with the Théodicée before the writing of the 
Lettres Persanes, and among his friends, the Abbé Antonio 
Conti was a correspondent of L e i b n i z . M o n t e s q u i e u  relates 
his opinion of certain of Leibniz's historical theories in a 
letter to the Baron de Stain, and his esteem for the 
philosopher does not seem very great:
'J'ai toujours regardé cette idée de M. de Leibniz comme une 
chimère d'un homme dont l'esprit accoutumé aux systèmes en
(1) See Shackleton, Montesquieu, p.62. The influence of 
Leibniz in Letter LXIX of the Lettres Persanes which 
deals with the problem of divine foreknowledge and human 
liberty, was suggested by Elie Carcassone in his edition 
of the work (Belles Lettres, 1929). We shall deal later 
with Leibniz's influence on Montesquieu's theory of 
justice in Letter LXXXIII, proposed by A.S. Crisafulli 
in 'Parallels to ideas in the Lettres Persanes', Modern
Language Association of America, Sept. 1937, p.773 seq.
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trouve partout, et même dans les choses qui en sont le moins 
susceptibles, a peu près comme les graveurs voient des 
figures sur toutes les m u r a i l l e s ^
During his travels, Montesquieu was also presented in 
Vienna to Prince Eugene of Savoy, at whose request Leibniz 
had composed the Monadologi^(2) Leibniz's influence in 
France during the first half of the 18th. century may have 
been limited, but it seems unlikely that Montesquieu, in spite 
of his opinion, entirely escaped it; and we certainly cannot 
afford to disregard his contribution to the vast pool of 
philosophical ideas which was formed at this time, and from 
which Montesquieu was later to draw extensively.
To the many Leibniz was at the end of the 17th. century 
a great name; and to the few who themselves aspired to some 
standing in the learned world, he was a scholarly genius who 
had mastered every field of study from historical research 
to physics, pioneering new techniques, and formulating new 
theories in most of them. He was also a man of vision and 
humanity. During this period of violent religious conflict, 
he inspired and led a movement for reunion between the
(1) Correspondance, Nagel III, p.934; Montesquieu au Baron de 
Stain, 17th. October, 1729. Montesquieu possessed the 
2nd. edition of the Théodicée, 1714; Catalogue de la Brêde, 
p.32, No.403, He later acquired P. Desmaizeaux*s Recueil 
de Diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie containing Leibniz * s 
critical essays on Shaftesbury; Catalogue, p.112, No.1532.
(2) See J.B. de Secondât, Mémoire pour servir à l'éloge 
historique de M. de Montesquieu, publ. in L.Vian, Histoire 
de Montesquieu d'après des documents nouveaux et inédits, 
Paris, 1879, pp.399-400.
(3) For the extent of Leibniz's influence, see Barber, Leibniz 
in France, part II, ch.6.
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Catholic and Reformed Churches, entering after 1691 into 
prolonged and difficult négociations with Bossuet, which 
continued almost until the latter*s d e a t h . W i t h  Malebranche 
he debated the question of the laws of movement, and succeeded 
in pursuading him to abandon the principles of Descartes in 
favour of his own. Indeed his correspondents were many and 
distinguished, although his philosophical ideas were less 
widely known and argued than his discoveries in the field of 
mathematics, and his research in diplomatic history and 
jurisprudence. The Monadologie for instance, remained 
unpublished for several years after his death; when he was, 
so as to speak, rediscovered in mid-century, it was often 
through the medium of Wolff that his theories were examined, 
and sometimes through the medium of hearsay. Pope for instance 
had never read anything by Leibniz when he embarked on the 
Essay on Man, but had worked from a patchwork of ideas presented 
to him by Bolingbroke; yet its optimistic view of life was 
often attributed to Leibniz's i n f l u e n c e . I t  is no wonder 
that such misrepresentations and second-hand versions of his 
system eventually provoked the bitter satire of Candi de.
However, these later discussions are of less importance 
to us than the actual contribution which the Theodicee made
(1) See Barber, Op.cit.. Part I, ch.l; and P. Hazard, La Crise 
de la Conscience Européenne, Paris, 1935, Part II, ch.5.
(2) Barber, Op.cit.,Part 11,^7, and A.W. Evans, Warburton 
and the Warburtonians, Oxford, 1932, ch.3.
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to contemporary thought, and in particular to the elaboration 
of the notion of convenance. One of the inadequacies which 
Leibniz found in Cartesianism was its attempt to explain the 
whole of experience in terms of geometry; this not only 
failed to account fully for the nature of substance by 
reducing it to simple extension, but also ignored the complex­
ity of perception. This does not mean that he rejected 
Cartesianism in its entirety; on the contrary there is some 
ground for arguing, as Brunschvicg does, that Leibniz presents 
us in some ways with *un dogmatisme de la raison*.gjln the 
Discours sur la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison he does 
indeed write:
*La raison consistant dans l'enchaînement des vérités a droit 
de lier entre elles celles que l'expérience lui a fournies, 
pour en tirer des conclusions mixtes, mais la raison pure et 
nue, distinguée de l'expérience n'a à faire qu'à des vérités 
indépendantes des sens.*^2)
But he opens the Discourse with a statement which sets him 
clearly apart from the kind of rationalism expounded by 
Malebranche;
'Je suppose que deux vérités ne sauraient se contredire: que
l'objet de la foi est la vérité que Dieu a révélée d'une 
manière extraordinaire, et que la Raison est l'enchaînement 
des vérités. mais particulièrement (lorsqu'elle est comparée 
avec la foi; de celles où l'esprit humain peut atteindre
(1) L. Brunschvicg, Le Progrès de la Conscience dans la 
Philosophie Occidentale, Paris, 192f; ch.10, p.248.
(2) Op.cit., parà I.
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naturellement, sans être aidé des lumières de la foi.*^^
The different spheres of reason and faith are then distinct 
though complementary, and there is no question of reason 
displacing faith in the perception of religious truth.
Equally significant is the place vhiich Leibniz gives to 
experience in the discovery of what he calls positive truths, 
namely those relating to the physical world. His empiricism 
is by no means complete; indeed he would probably have found 
a method which rejected all data except that accessible to 
the senses as much a betrayal of reality as the abstractions 
of geometry. But he does allow experiment some role in the 
processes of science, and this enables him to make a bold 
distinction between the physical and supernatural orders, so 
avoiding the equivocations into which Malebranche was forced 
when obliged to define exactly his concept of an all-embracing 
reason. Thus, while he does guarantee the validity and inde­
pendence of that order of truth found in mathematics, affirm­
ing its metaphysical necessity, and dissociating it from the 
action of the Divine will, he is able to take up a position 
somewhat closer to that of St. Augustine, where the connection 
between the transcendent and the created orders is provided 
by the operation of will without the sanction of necessary 
reason.
(1) Op.cit.
57
Absolute metaphysical necessity does not condition God's 
choice, for necessary truths depend solely on his understand­
ing, and are its inner o b j e c t ; b u t  moral necessity does. 
Leibniz conceives of an infinite number of possible universes 
existing as archetypal ideas in the divine intelligence; now 
of these only one can be actual, and therefore he must ask 
what principle determines divine choice. The answer is the 
principle of convenance. The only sufficient reason he can 
find is in the degree of perfection that each of the possible 
worlds possesses; thus, assuming that each has the right to 
aspire to existence in proportion to its potential perfection, 
the best among them becomes the object of the divine choice. 
God can do everything; but he wills to do the best, to create 
a world which as one harmonious system is best. 2^)
The idea of fitness is again linked to the notion of 
hierarchy; but unlike Malebranche, Leibniz conceives of a 
scale of archetypes, differentiated by their relative degrees 
of perfection, not a scale of relationships of perfection, 
absolute in themselves, and unequal in a mathematical sense 
only. In this, although he is dealing in worlds and not in 
things or persons, Leibniz is much closer to the Scholastic 
conception of a hierarchical order in creation, and obviously 
less disposed to found his system on geometric concepts.
(1 ) Theodicee (1710), arts.180-184.
(2) Monadoiogie (1714), arts.53-54.
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His notion of conformity is teleological: for convenance
consists in the measure of perfection that links the possible 
with the actual, the final cause with creation. It is the 
world which best conforms in the harmony of its organization, 
in its parts and as a whole, to the divine intention, which 
is brought into existence. Thus in Leibniz's system the 
principle of convenance operates on two levels: there is
conformity between the possible and the actual; and there is
conformity between the constituent parts of the whole. It
is associated with compossibility as well as with possibility.
To all intents and purposes then, the principle of 
convenance is for Leibniz the same thing as the principle of
sufficient reason, and both are distinct from the principles
of mathematical reason. They depend on certain qualitative 
considerations to do with perfection, which are partly 
inaccessible to the human mind, although we may with just­
ification associate them with the infinite goodness and 
wisdom of God, There is a distinction between the order of 
eternal truths and the order of contingent truths, between 
the principles of mathematical reason and the principles of 
sufficient reason, just as, on the human level, the principle 
of contradiction is distinct from the principle of reasoned 
a c t i o n . I n  the Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec 
la Raison Leibniz highlights this distinction:
(l) Monadoiogie. arts.31-32; Theodicee, arts,44, 196.
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'Or les vérités de la raison sont de deux sortes. Les 
unes sont ce qu'on appelle les vérités éternelles, qui sont 
absolument nécessaires, en sorte que l'opposé implique 
contradiction; et telles sont les vérités dont la nécessité 
est logique, métaphysique ou géométrique, qu'on ne saurait 
nier sans pouvoir être mené à des absurdités. Il y en a 
d'autres qu'on peut appeler positives, parce qu’elles sont 
les lois qu'il a plu à Dieu de donner à la nature, ou parce 
qu'elles en dépendent. Nous les apprenons, ou par l'expérience, 
c'est-à-dire a posteriori; ou par la raison, et a priori, 
c'est-à-dire par des considérations de la convenance qui les 
ont fait choisir. Cette convenance a aussi ses règles et ses 
raisons; mais c'est le choix libre de Dieu, et non pas une 
nécessité géométrique, qui fait préférer le convenable et le 
porte à l'existence. Ainsi on peut dire que la nécessité 
physique est fondée sur la nécessité morale, c'est-à-dire sur 
le choix du Sage, digne de sa sagesse; et que l'une aussi 
bien que l'autre doit être distinguée de la nécessité 
géométrique. Cette nécessité physique est ce qui fait l'ordre
de la nature, et consiste dans les règles du mouvement et
dans quelques autres lois générales qu'il a plu à Dieu de
donner aux choses en leur donnant l'être.
Thus the reason of things, and the reason of divine action 
is more closely associated through the principle of moral 
necessity with the conception of God as a being of infinite 
goodness and reason, than as the repository of metaphysical 
truth. And when the contrast of the natural order with this 
perfect goodness accentuates the problem of evil, this too 
is seen to possess its convenance, and to contribute to the 
ultimate perfection of the divine plan. Writing of William 
King's Essay on the Origin of Evil,^^) Leibniz explains his 
view of the relationship between evil and divine wisdom:
(1) Op.cit., parà.II.
(2) See below p p . .
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*Je m'imagine que l'habile auteur de cet extrait, 
lorsqu'il a cru qu'on pourrait résoudre la difficulté, a eu 
dans l'esprit quelque chose d'approchant en cela de mes 
principes; et s'il avait voulu s'expliquer dans cet endroit, 
il aurait répondu apparement comme M. Régis, que les lois 
que Dieu a établies, étaient les plus excellentes qu'on 
pouvait établir; et il aurait reconnu en même temps, que Dieu 
ne pouvait manquer d'établir des lois et de suivre des 
règles, parce que les lois et les règles sont ce qui fait 
l'ordre et la beauté, qu'agir sans regies serait agir sans 
raison; et que c'est parce que Dieu a fait agir toute sa 
bonté, que l'exercice de sa toute-puissance a été conforme 
aux lois de la sagesse, pour obtenir le plus de bien qu'il 
était possible d'atteindre: enfin, que l'existence de
certains inconvénients particuliers qui nous frappent, est 
une marque certaine que le meilleur plan ne permettait pas 
qu'on les évitât, et qu'ils servent à l'accomplissement du 
bien total * '
Evil is a purely human experience; in the universal scheme of 
things it disappears into the order and beauty of the best of 
all possible worlds.
Spinoza had seen evil as a perception arising from the 
limitations of human judgement; for him it was a false notion 
that tended to disappear with the development of scientific 
knowledge. For Leibniz however, the link between the scient­
ific and the metaphysical orders is less straightforward: 
it is true that we may discover the natural law by experiment 
or by considering the structural conformity of things; but 
the nature of the principles determining the act of creation, 
though deemed to constitute a sufficient reason for action, 
is ultimately inaccessible to human thought:
(1) Théodicée, art.359; Leibniz actually refers to an extract 
of King's work in the Journal des Savants.
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’Une vérité est au-dessus de la raison quand notre 
esprit ne la saurait comprendre: et telle est, à mon avis,
la Sainte Trinité; tels sont les miracles réservés a Lieu 
seul, comme par exemple, la création; tel est le choix de 
l'ordre de l'Univers, qui dépend de l'harmonie universelle, 
et de la connaissance distincte d'une infinité de choses 
à la fois.'^2)
The main guarantee we have of the goodness of the natural 
order is in fact the goodness of God; this is the force which 
determines and supports all created things, and its prin­
ciples are not to he discovered solely by the application of 
mathematical analysis, as the principles of divine reason are 
in Malebranche's system, but by probing beyond the sequence 
of mechanical causation in a search for internal teleological 
forces.
For this reason, it is hardly surprising that Leibniz 
does not formulate an exclusively mathematical doctrine of 
justice. As a jurisconsult, he naturally produced works 
dealing specifically with jurisprudence, discussing its pro­
blems under the particular headings of commutative and 
distributive justice, seen as right in the narrow sense of 
the strict ground of a jural claim, and right as equity.
But as regards the philosophy of law he was strictly on the 
side of the rationalists; that is to say he followed the path
(1) Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, 
para. XXIII.
(2) See for instance the Preface to the 1st. vol. of the Oodex 
Juris Gentium Diplomaticus, trans. R. Latta, in his critical 
edition of the Monadology, Oxford, 1898, pp.281-296.
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marked out by Grotius, whose declaration in the Preface of 
De Jure Belli ac Pacis that the propositions of natural law 
would remain valid even if one were to assume there was no 
God, published the determination of political science to free 
itself from the apron strings of theology. Like Grotius, he 
likened jurisprudence to mathematics, on the grounds that 
both were deductive sciences, independent of experience, whose 
principles embodied eternal and necessary truth:
'II en est de même de la justice. Si c'est un terme 
fixe qui a quelque signification déterminée, en un mot, si ce 
n'est pas un simple son, vide de sens, comme blitiri, ce 
terme ou ce mot justice aura quelque définition ou notion 
intelligible. Et de toute définition on peut tirer des 
conséquences certaines, en employant les règles incontestables 
de la logique. Et c'est justement ce qu'on fait, en 
fabriquant les sciences nécessaires et démonstratives qui ne 
dépendent point des faits, mais uniquement de la raison, 
comme sont la logique, la métaphysique, l'arithmétique, la 
géométrie, la science des mouvements et aussi la science de 
droit, qui ne sont point fondées sur les expériences et faits 
et servent plutôt â rendre raison des faits et à les régler 
par avance, ce qui aurait lieu à l'égard du droit, quand il 
n'y aurait point de loi au monde.
This being the case, he reasoned that the justice of
God was essentially the same as the justice of men, though of
course differing in its degree of perfection, and that it was
not simply the expression of the Divine will. Those who 
stubbornly described it as purely arbitrary, might as well 
declare baldly that might is right, that if the devil were
(1) Méditation sur la Notion commune de la Justice, published 
in Mitteilungen aus Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften 
by G. Mollat, Leipzig, 1893, p.47.
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to succeed God in Heaven, his law would be as just, or worst 
of all, that God and his angels would not recognize that 
1,4,9,16,25 are the squares of 1,2,3,4,51^^
But although Leibniz drew this general parallel between 
justice and mathematical proportion, he chose to define it, 
not in structural but in dynamic terms, as 'ce qui est 
conforme à sagesse et bonté jointe ensemble',^2) terms of 
the perfection which must be the object of the mind and will 
of intelligent substances. This definition conforms to the 
teleological character of his metaphysics in general. Thus 
as far as morals are concerned, beyond the jus strictum of 
doing no harm to others, beyond the demands of equity and 
equality, of giving each his just deserts, all of which can 
be reduced according to Leibniz to the status of mere political 
strategies nourished by fear and self-interest, there exists 
another level of justice.
Since it is impossible to conceive of God standing in 
any relationship of equity or equality with his creatures, 
perfection alone is the principle and rule of divine justice:
'On ne peut envisager en Dieu d'autre motif que celui de 
la perfection ou, si vous voulez, de son plaisir. Supposé 
selon ma définition que le plaisir n'est autre chose que le 
sentiment de la perfection, il n'a rien à attendre de dehors, 
au contraire tout dépend de lui. Mais son bonheur ne serait 
point suprême, s'il ne se portait au bien et à la perfection 
autant qu'il est possible.
(1) Op.cit., pp. 40-47.
(2) Méditation sur la Notion commune de la Justice, 
ed.cit, (p.an.3), p.48.
(3) Ibid., p.60.
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and the imitation of this perfection in accordance with the 
limitations of human attributes, is the highest level of 
human justice, the level at which it contains all other virtues.
'On peut dire que cette sérénité d ’esprit qui trouverait 
le plus grand plaisir dans la vertu et le plus grand mal dans 
le vice, c’est-à-dire dans la perfection ou imperfection de 
la volonté, serait le plus grand bien dont l ’homme est 
capable ici bas, quand même il n'y aurait rien à attendre au 
delà de cette vie. Car que peut-on préférer à cette harmonie 
intérieure, à ce plaisir continuel des plus purs et des plus 
grands dont on est toujours le maître et dont on ne se saurait 
laisser?* ^ ^
Similarly, since the perfection of divine justice is 
expressed in the sum of universal harmony, human injustice or 
wrongdoing can be seen as an infraction of this harmony, which 
is redressed partly by the distribution of rewards and 
punishments.^2) This is the idea which reappears in the 
Théodicée, in a passage which some scholars have isolated as 
a possible source of Montesquieu’s definition of justice, 
where Leibniz uses the phrase rapport de convenance, recalling 
the terminology of his theory of sufficient reason, to describe 
the basis of divine justice:
*11 y a pourtant une espèce de justice et une certaine sorte
de récompenses et de punitions, qui..... n'a point pour but
l'amendement, ni l'exemple ni même la réparation du mal.
Cette justice n'est fondée que dans la convenance, qui demande 
une certaine satisfaction pour l'expiation d'une mauvaise 
action. Les Sociniens, Hobbes et quelques autres n'admettent 
point cette justice punitive, qui est proprement vindicative, 
et que Dieu s'est réservée en bien des rencontres: mais qu'il
ne laisse pas de'communiquer à ceux qui ont droit de gouverner
(1) Op.cit., p.61.
(2) Op.cit., p.64.
(3) See below
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les autres, et qu'il exerce par leur moyen, pourvu qu'ils 
agissent par raison, et non par passion. Les Sociniens la 
croient être sans fondement; mais elle est toujours fondée 
dans un rapport de convenance, qui contente non seulement 
l'offensé, mais encore les sages qui la voient, comme une 
belle musique ou bien une bonne architecture contente les 
esprits bien faits. Et le sage législateur ayant menacé, 
et ayant, pour ainsi dire, promis un châtiment, il est de sa 
constance de ne pas laisser l'action entièrement impunie, 
quand même la peine ne servirait plus à corriger personne.
Mais quand il n'aurait rien promis, c'est assez qu'il y a 
une convenance qui l'aurait pu porter à faire cette promesse; 
puisqu'aussi bien le sage ne promet que ce qui est convenable.
The introduction here of the notion of relationship might 
lead one to believe that his theory of justice did after all 
depend on a geometric conception of the order of reality; and 
it is indeed true that Leibniz never rejected mathematical 
analysis as the essential tool of science. But the juxta­
position here of intelligence of the relationship of fitness 
to the notion of the object and purposes of the wise legis­
lator, in fact brings us back yet again to a conception of 
convenance as the final cause of things.
Among Montesquieu's friends, Maupertuis, although 
primarily a mathematician and scientist, brought out a 
criticism of Leibniz in the form of Letters published in 
Dresden in 1752. Here the theory of monads is scrutinized 
and attacked from an empirical s t a n d p o i n t . t h e  Academy 
of Berlin, of which he was President, Maupertuis was a
(1) Théodicée, art.73.
(2) See W.H, Barber, Leibniz in France from Arnauld to Voltaire, 
Oxford, 1955, part II, ch.9, ii.
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leading opponent of the Wolffians; nevertheless, in other 
works he shows a much deeper understanding of Leibniz than 
most of his fellow countrymen evinced, and a definite commit­
ment to metaphysical optimism. Two of these works, the Essai 
de Philosophie Morale, and the Essai de Cosmologie, came to 
the notice of his friend Montesquieu,who, writing to 
Cerati, describes the first with some amusement at the 
author's paradoxical behaviour:
'M. de Maupertuis, qui a cru toute sa vie, et qui peut-être 
a prouvé qu'il n'était point heureux, vient de publier un 
petit écrit sur le bonheur. C'est l'ouvrage d'un homme 
d'esprit et on y trouve du raisonnement et des grâces.
The question of influence does not arise here, for these 
works date from the middle of the century and the end of 
Montesquieu's life; but it is interesting to examine 
Maupertuis's optimism, not only because it expresses his 
acceptance of Leibniz's idea of the best possible world, but 
also because, like Montesquieu, Maupertuis seems to have 
been also influenced in his thinking by Malebranche. They 
both drew on a common pool of ideas, and we find in these 
works more examples of the ever changing combinations of ideas 
in which the notion of conformity plays a basic part.
(1) See Correspondance, Nagel III, letter 515, Montesquieu to 
Mgr. Cerati, 11 Nov., 1749; and letter 622, I4me. d'Aiguillon 
to Montesquieu, 1 Nov. 1751. There are many letters between 
Montesquieu and Maupertuis in the Correspondance, (283,294, 
297,3C4,354,366,38C,381,515,536,583), and Maupertuis paid 
tribute to the President in his Eloge de Montesquieu,
Berlin, 1755.
(2) Nagel III, p.1265.
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The Essai de Philosophie Morale sets out to prove that 
the chief spiritual pleasures of life are the practice of 
justice and the contemplation of truth. Like Montesquieu in 
the Traité des Devoirs, Maupertuis equates the former with 
the performance of one's duties; while the latter consists 
in the feeling of satisfaction induced by the clarity of 
one's perceptions. Reacting strangely against materialism, 
he claims that liberty is the inalienable possession of man, 
and his weapon against natural forces. Maupertuis's con­
ception of God has Malebranchian affinities: 'Dieu est l'ordre
éternel, le créateur de l'univers, l'être tout puissant, tout 
sage et tout bon.'^^ And again like Montesquieu, he under­
takes a comparison of Stoicism and Christianity.
The Essai de Cosmologie represents a much more serious 
attempt to formulate a complete system; and here the notion 
of convenance enters into its own. In his Preface, Maupertuis 
again rejects the position of the materialists and followers 
of Spinoza, this time declaring his support for a teleological 
conception of the universe. His debt to Leibniz is evident 
in his determination to avoid geometric proofs of the 
existence of God, on the grounds that they are basically 
indifferent to man; if proof is necessary, then it is found 
in the conformity of the whole of nature:
(1) Essai de Philosophie Morale, Berlin, 1749; in Oeuvres 
Complètes de Maupertuis, Lyons, 1768; vol.I, p.235.
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'C'est ainsi que, malgré quelques parties de l'univers dans 
lesquelles on n'apperçoit pas bien l'ordre et la convenance, 
le tout en présente assez pour qu'on ne puisse douter de 
l'existence d'un Créateur tout puissant et tout sage.'^^
Maupertuis thinks it best to look beyond the unity of the 
species, or the obvious design of certain parts of the body 
to fulfil- certain needs, for proof of a divine plan however, 
since the powerful argument of spontaneous natural combina­
tion can be brought against such theories:
'.....ne pourrait-on pas dire que dans la combinaison 
fortuite des productions de la nature, comme il n'y avait 
que celles où se trouvaient certains rapports de convenance, 
qui pussent subsister, il n'est pas merveilleux que cette 
convenance se trouve dans toutes les espèces qui actuellement 
existent?'
Accordingly, he joins to the idea of the order and fitness 
of universal design, a theory which is related to Malebranche's 
doctrine of the 'simplicité des voies', or the simplicity of 
the laws involved in the creation and conservation of the 
universe. In mechanics he enunciated the theory of least 
action; and applying this to metaphysics he produced the 
theory of economy of means in creation. Thus the idea of 
fitness, of convenance, is associated in his thought not only 
with structural harmony, as it was with Leibniz, but also 
with the idea of economy in design; and the laws governing 
the harmony and simplicity of the design are held to con­
stitute the natural laws known to man:
(1) Op,cit.. Avant-propos; in Oeuvres Complètes, vol.I, p.xx,
(2) Ibid., part I, p.10.
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'Chaque espèce, pour l'universalité des choses, avait des 
avantages qui lui étaient propres; et comme de leur 
assemblage résultait la beauté de l'univers, de même de leur 
communication en résultait la science.
This idea of economy represents a new utilitarian application 
of the notion of convenance.
It is interesting to note in passing that Maupertuis 
uses the phrase 'rapport de convenance' in his exposition of 
the materialist argument against the idea of fitness in things 
as proof of a divine plan; possibly he remembered the phrase 
from the Théodicée or even from the Lettres Persanes; but on 
the whole it seems much more likely that it was a topical 
phrase, much used in scientific and philosophical discussions 
by materialists and theists alike, both sides admitting 
that there was a conformity in nature, but modifying the 
precise significance of the term to suit their philosophical 
standpoint.
We have already seen that the place occupied by the 
notion of convenance differs widely from system to system, 
even in a small group of thinkers of similar persuasions.
In Leibniz and Bossuet it is associated primarily with a 
teleological view of the universe; for both of them, the 
pattern of things is invested with the quality of fitness, and 
this pattern is the expression of a final cause. But while
(1) Op.cit., part I, p.73.
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Leibniz makes fitness the equivalent of the principle of 
sufficient reason, thus linking it with the ideas of inten­
tion and of creative action, rather than with a mathematical 
interpretation of rational truth, Bossuet on the other hand, 
content with broader outlines, continues to associate it 
with a quasi- geometrical interpretation of reason, and simply 
subjects rational truth to the operation of the divine will. 
Malebranche differs from both his contemporaries. Mathematical 
reason as the expression of eternal truth dominates his whole 
vision; hence the idea of absolute relationships between the 
essences of things is stressed, rather than the notion of 
fitness in the material structure of the universe; although in 
the field of morals, the ideal of perfection which the 
abstractions of spatial analysis are said to represent, is 
put forward as the moral criterion to which men must conform.
7 1
CHAPTER THREE.
MORALISTS AND OTHERS
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The majority of thinkers at the turn of the 17th, cen­
tury were more concerned with the problems of human behaviour 
than with metaphysics, although the search for moral criteria 
often led them to formulate some kind of system, more or less 
coherent. Although for reasons of the influence he exerted, 
we have put Bossuet in the august company of Malebranche and 
Leibniz, he is really a case in point. Ris flights in the 
realm of systematic theology were mostly undertaken for 
practical ends: to bolster up the political regime, or to
persuade his aristocratic readers that privilege entailed 
responsibility. He was not primarily concerned with defini­
tions of justice for instance, but with its execution in 
the social framework of the day; thus the notions of 
honnêteté and bienséance have a very important part to play 
in his thinking, and the idea of fitness in the structure of 
things is an essential but secondary concept.
To the moralist it was also always abundantly clear 
that it was never sufficient to analyse the nature of things, 
and then to content oneself with characterizing this nature 
as fitness or convenance. Conformity as such might mean a lot 
within the framework of an abstract system: that 2 plus 2
equals 4 constitutes a relationship of equality is all very 
well in mathematics, but the problem is to interpret this 
conformity in the terms of human relationships. Unless one
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has a ready made set of precepts, a table of the law, or an 
accepted code of behaviour at hand to build into the abstract 
framework, one is bound to invent some subjective answer to 
the question of the nature of this conformity. One is brought 
face to face with the problem of what constitutes the natural 
law, and the related difficulty of deciding how we apprehend 
its precepts, whether reason alone is sufficient, or whether 
one must introduce the notion of conscience.
For the thinker who adopts an a priori system based on 
mathematical abstractions, this problem can be particularly 
acute; the difficulties are less obvious if one starts from 
more empirical bases. If for instance, pleasure and pain are 
established as moral principles, one may go on to affirm that 
the moral code consists in performing those actions which are 
pleasurable, and avoiding those that are not; although the 
burden of proving that what one enjoys doing is what one 
ought to do remains. The energies of the 18th. century were 
to be almost completely devoted to debating the relative 
merits of rational and non-rational criteria, and to evalu­
ating the kind of behaviour which they seemed to authorize.
We are mainly concerned with those moralists who inherited 
the notion of convenance and its various mechanistic and 
teleological associations, and used it to demonstrate what in
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their view constituted honest action and social behaviour.
We must examine how they answered the question 'which actions 
are fitting, and how is this fitness revealed?'
So far we have dealt with three major figures of the 
close of the 17th. century, Malebranche, Bossuet and Leibniz, 
all of whom utilized in some way the idea of fitness, and 
helped to establish its position as a basic notion in the 
thought of several generations. Montesquieu was likely to 
have had some acquaintance with the work of all three. There 
were however innumerable writers of lesser standing, some 
perhaps also familiar to Montesquieu, who also used the idea, 
and whose works confirm its wide acceptance as a moral and 
aesthetic criterion.
Moralists are essentially concerned with the relationships 
of people in society, and to a lesser degree with their 
attitude to their material surroundings, the way in which they 
exploit them. This second concern is aggravated by scientific 
progress, a phenomenon scarcely familiar to the 17th. century, 
but whose potential contribution to human happiness was cer­
tainly appreciated by D e s c a r t e s . T h e  main ethical concerns 
of the 17th. century were however social; and beyond the normal 
problems of distributive justice, or the attitudes of
(1) Discours de la Méthode, part VI. The Cartesians also
introduced the problem of vivisection into the debate on 
animal souls.
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epicureanism, material factors were most involved where such 
considerations touched the sphere of aesthetics. Today it 
is platitudinous to remark that art and society are insepar­
able; every age and social group has expressed its pattern 
of existence and its ideals in material form or in the arti­
ficial worlds of literature, though not all have produced an 
accompanying body of aesthetic theory. France in the 17th, 
century produced both art and theory. Because ethics and 
aesthetics both reflect social values, they naturally employ 
similar criteria; and the concrete problems of artistic 
expression: questions of medium, form and technique are also
directly affected by subject matter. This study must there­
fore take into account at least some aspects of the field of 
aesthetics in the 17th, century, where it throws light on 
the notion of convenance.
Looking at morals first, we can see that certain stand­
points are already implied by the philosophical attitudes to 
reason which we have examined. Where it is associated with 
a teleological view of the universe, the established social 
structure is likely to be a major criterion governing human 
relationships; where an immanentist conception of reason is 
put forward, then the fulfilment of natural forms is likely 
to be the accepted norm, though both these criteria may 
depend upon the respective sanctions of the Divine will or
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the Divine reason. In the first case one will talk of the 
fitness of things, or the fitness of human behaviour, as part 
of the perfection of all creation; in the second, one will 
think of conformity with nature as one *s only ideal,
hot surprisingly, the 17th, and early 18th, centuries 
produced an enormous number of variations and combinations 
of these two basic attitudes, and very few of them were 
supported by a consistent philosophical outlook. They were 
usually an amalgam of traditional ideas, Christian ethics, 
and borrowed philosophical theories. Nevertheless, certain 
broad trends can be discerned in the evolution of the idea 
of what constitutes honesty and goodness. Generally the honnête 
homme of the mid 17th, century is regarded as the epitome of 
the homme raisonnable, But whether the characteristic of 
reasonableness confered on him the quality of goodness, and 
conversely, whether this same characteristic necessarily 
implied recognition on his part of the sophisticated arguments 
of philosophers, are different matters. For care must be 
taken not to confuse reasonableness with rationality; very 
often it signified respect for good sense, and affection for 
the ideal of moderation, rather than a willingness to submit 
to the findings of discursive reason. The real rationalists, 
as is often pointed out, were those like Pontenelle and Bayle 
who took the method of Cartesianism and used it rigorously
(1) M, Magendie, La Politesse mondaine et les theories de 
l'honnêteté en France, Paris, 1925; part V, ch,9, p«791
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to destroy the tissue of prejudice and ignorance blinding men 
to the real nature of things, Nor was the gentleman's
idea of reason necessarily the same as Descartes's, although 
he might sympathize with the philosopher's pragmatism in 
morals, his acceptance of the middle course as a rough guide 
and so on. In some ways Descartes's idea of intuitive reason 
was in fact very close to the 18th. century notion of sentiment 
intérieur; while Pascal more obviously, rejected and despised 
reason as a tool of morals, prefering sentiment. )  Ibe 
mondain was probably unfamiliar with the notion of sensibility 
as such, but it was equally part of his ideal, if we are to 
believe the Chevalier de Mere, that he should be unfamiliar 
with the actual processes of reasoning;
'Le bon gout se fonde toujours sur des raisons très solides, 
mais le plus souvent sans raisonner.
Reason in the 17th, century was a signpost pointing in a 
dozen different directions: the path of the aristocrat was
different from that of the bourgeois, and both of these were 
different again from those of the philosopher or the 
theologian.
Yet a major and a fairly reliable distinction can be 
made between the religious and the non-religious moral
(1) They are the 'rationaux' of Hazard's Crise de la Conscience 
européenne : the men whom Bayle himself opposes in the 
Réponses aux questions d'un provincial, ch,CXXXIV, to
the 'religionnaires'.
(2) Pensées, 282,
(3) Discours de la Conversation,
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traditions, both of which were continuous. The difference 
between the honnête homme and the homme de bien in the mind of 
the later 17th. century is summarized in the definitions which 
La Bruyère provides in Les Caractères;
'L'honnête homme tient le milieu entre l'habile homme et 
l'homme de bien, quoique dans une distance inégale de ses deux 
extrêmes.
La distance qu'il y a de l'honnête homme à l'habile homme 
s'affaiblit de jour à autre, et est sur le point de 
disparaître.....
L'honnête homme est celui qui ne vole pas sur les grands 
chemins, et qui ne tue personne, et dont les vices enfin ne 
sont pas scandaleux......
L'homme de bien est celui qui n'est ni un saint ni un 
dévot, et qui s'est borné à n'avoir que de la vertu.
The religious conception of the good man is clearly far 
removed from the mixture of pessimism and vanity which informed 
the outlook of some of the mondains when they set themselves 
to moralize. La Bruyère is disillusioned, but he is on the 
side of Christianity and of virtue; he does not conclude like 
La Rochefoucauld that:
'Les vertus se perdent dans l'intérêt comme les fleuves se 
perdent dans la mer.*^2)
And he is also obviously far removed from the ideals of the 
Chevalier de Mere:
'A mon sens la plus grande preuve qu'on a de l'esprit, et 
qu'on l'a bienfait, c'est de bien vivre et de se conduire 
toujours comme on doit. Cela consiste k prendre en toutes
(1) 'Des Jugements', para.55. 
) Maxi](2; ximes, ed, F,C. Green, Cambridge, 1945; No,171.
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les rencontres le parti le plus honnête, et à le soutenir; 
et le parti le plus honnête est celui qui paraît le plus 
conforme à l'état de vie ou l'on se trouve.
There is some truth in the claim that the moral ideal of 
the 17th. century represented a reconciliation between 
Classical pagan and Christian traditions, but it often seems 
that it is the notion of the homme de bien, with its echoes 
of the ideal of moderation, which embodies this reconciliation. 
There is very little ground for arguing that the ideal of 
charity was a prominent motive in the behaviour of the honnête 
homme, the fashionable aristocrat, or that it figured largely 
in the written theory that grew up around this ideal type. 2^) 
The aristocrat's prepossession with status and prestige, his 
delicate appreciation of the susceptibilities of the ego would 
seem difficult to reconcile with a sincere concern for the 
good of others. It is possible to argue on the contrary that 
these traits are more closely connected with an aesthetic 
than with a moral criterion, if by moral criterion we mean a 
rule of virtuous behaviour. The simplest conclusion is that 
the moral code connected with the figure of the honnête homme 
had little to do with Christian conceptions. The renunciation 
for self, rather than of self, which is preached in the 
Princesse de Clëves for example, has a closer connection with 
the Stoic than with the Christian conception of virtue*
(1) Discours de l'Esprit, Paris, 1677, p.31.
(2) D. Parodi suggests however in an article, 'L'honnête homme 
et l'idéal moral du 17e. et du 18e. siècle'. Revue 
pédagogique, LXXVIII, that the honnête homme is profoundly 
Christian.
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The notion of the honnête homme belongs to the secular 
tradition in morals, and as Magendie points out, this was an 
ideal subscribed to by tv/o classes in society. Side by side 
with the aristocratic interpretation and equally inspired by 
Classical concepts, was a middle-class interpretation,
In Mere the gentleman guards his honour and his self-esteem; 
in Charron, he pursues the ideal of probity, with a scrupulous 
concern for the just evaluation of personal merit, and an equal 
conviction that happiness is an end in itself.
It is this naturalistic tradition which begins to dominate 
at the end of the 17th. century, as the bastions of doctrinal 
orthodoxy break under the onslaught of critical reason. The 
psychological pessimism which characterized the attitudes of 
polite society tended to disappear, and disguised in treatises 
on oracles and comets or hidden among the erudite notes of 
Bayle's dictionary, the new ideals were published. The natural 
instincts are good; pleasure not virtue is the object of 
existence; freedom of conscience not doctrinal conformity is 
the moral basis of the state; self-interest is the cement 
of society; reason is the tool of progress. Where the mondains 
had been content to conform, if not to believe, the new men 
actively dissent. They have a materialistic ideal of happi­
ness, and a mechanistic view of nature. They wish to clear
(1) La Politesse mondaine, p.892.
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away the confusion and lethargy created by centuries of 
superstitious respect for tradition and legend, and by 
rigorous application of rational methods, to cure the evils 
of society, rectify the injustices of a rigid class system, 
and gain material benefits with the development of scientific 
knowledge. The new rationalists reject the possibility of 
metaphysical knowledge, and seek a compromise with empiricism, 
In the Pensées diverses sur la Oomète, Bayle declares that 
a society of atheists would be as virtuous as a society of 
Christians; and in the Preface to his translation of 
Pufendorf's Droit de la Nature et des Gens, the jurisconsult 
Jean Barbeyrac affirms the superiority of secular ethics; thus 
it is not just physics but also morals which are severed 
from theology,
But the claims of religion did not lack defenders, 
although the religious camp was split by internal conflicts. 
Pamphlets and treatises poured through the presses in defence 
of Christianity, coming from the hand of Catholics and 
Protestants alike. Some shared common ground, a willingness 
to reconcile reason with revelation, and an equal debt to 
Malebranche. At all costs the ethics of the Gospel, if not 
the details of miracles and the workings of providence, must
(1) Pensées diverses sur la Comète, 1682; vol.II, art,161; 
Barbeyrac, translation of Pufendorf's Droit de la Nature 
et des Gens, Amsterdam, 1706.
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be reconciled with the dictates of natural reason, so that 
the ground might be cut from beneath the feet of the liber­
tines and atheists. What ingenuity was displayed by the 
Abbadies, the Jaquelots, the lamys and the Thomassins in 
inventing rational explanations and justifications for textual 
discrepancies and unlikely happenings, which in the light of 
the critical treatment of Spinoza and Simon, now seemed to 
litter the Bible! Even Bossuet, while uttering salutary 
warnings about the dangers of falling over backwards to 
accommodate rationalism, threw his weight behind the idea of 
a natural Christianity, consisting in a universal natural law, 
accessible to reason and prevailing before the advent of 
revealed r e l i g i o n . T h e r e  were a few dissenters in both 
factions, the Catholic bishop Huet, and the erudite orientalist 
Veyssière de la Croze, an ex-Benedictine converted to 
Protestantism, who understood more fully the nature of the 
illusion under which the rational apologists laboured. They 
perceived the essential conflict between the rational 
demonstration of religious truths and their content, between a 
logical method and the a priori notions which it sets out to 
justify, but must eventually reject. They turned instead to 
the ideas and methods of Pascal, founding religion on sentiment 
and questioning rational speculation. Like the English critics
G>of Samuel Clarke, who in the Essay on the Being and Attributes 
of God did for Newton's system what Malebranche had done for
(l) Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle, part 1, 4th. epoch.
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Cartesianism, they realised that to demonstrate how closely 
rational precepts coincided with Christian ethics, was the 
best way to prove that revelation was superfluous.
The weakness of the Christian party lay not only in 
their line of defence however, but also in their internal 
divisions. The crushing of Jansenism, and the Revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes left the Catholic and the Reformed 
Churches at each others throats; orthodox apologists were 
as concerned with eradicating heresy as with combatting free- 
thought, while the Calvinists, in exile and embittered, not 
unnaturally regarded their persecutors as an equally 
dangerous enemy, Bossuet and Jurieu not only attacked Bayle, 
but each other; and there were countless doctrinal disputes 
within each separate faction, especially among the Protestants, 
who by their very nature were less closed to radical ideas, 
and who now by the fact of their exile in Holland, England 
and the non-Catholic states of Germany, were coming into 
close contact with new and disturbing trends of thought.
There were men like Jean Le Clerc, Élie Saurin, and Jean 
La Placette in Holland who moved away from orthodox 
Protestantism, disputing the authority of those parts of 
Scripture in conflict with reason, and declaring moral
(1) For a detailed study of Christlap apologetics during this 
period, see A. Monod, De Pascal a Chateaubriand, Paris, 
1916; chaps. 1-7, from which most of the details of this 
outline have been taken. Also A. Sayous, Histoire de la 
Littérature française a l'étranger, vol.I, Bk.l, 
chaps.5,6; Bk.2, ch.5.
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conscience to be the basis of faith, and who were con­
sequently accused of Socijiianism and other heresies by their 
reformed brethren. In England Pierre Coste, and Pierre 
Desmaizeaux were the friends and translators of Locke and 
Shaftesbury and many other prominent figures in scientific 
and philosophical circles; they played an outstanding part 
in the dissemination of English thought, of Deism and the 
ideas of the Latitudinarians, in Prance.^^) This state of 
ideological conflict was accompanied not surprisingly by an 
increase in mysticism, ever a sure retreat from the problems 
of belief or action, ^ 2) -^.dd to these divisions in belief
and purpose, the fact that Bayle and other leading thinkers 
were at least nominally adherents of one or other religious 
body, and the failure of the eirenic movement in the face of 
Bossuet*s intransigence, and the picture of insecurity and 
confusion among the defenders of Christianity is completed.
This great upsurge of discussion and re-evaluation of 
the relative merits of the religious and secular traditions 
in ethics laid the foundations of a new conception of the 
honnête homme, the conception which in the middle of the 
century, Diderot crystallizes in the Encyclopédie:
(1) See Paul Hazard, La Crise de la Conscience européenne. 
Part I, ch.3.
(2) For an outline of some of the mystical works published at 
the end of the 17th. century, see E.R. Briggs, 'Mysticism 
and Rationalism in the debate upon eternal punishment', 
in Studies on Voltaire and the 18th. century, XXIV/XXVII, 
1963.
(3) For the eirenic movement, see Hazard, part II, ch.5.
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'Il me semble que l'homme de bien est celui qui satisfait 
exactement aux préceptes de la religion; l'homme d'honneur, 
celui qui suit rigoureusement les lois et les usages de la 
société; et 1'honnête homme, celui qui ne perd de vue dans 
aucune de ses actions les principes de l'équité naturelle..,..
......l'honnête homme rend la justice même a son ennemi*
l'honnête homme est de tout pays; l'homme de bien et 1'homme 
d'honneur ne doivent point faire des choses que l'honnête 
homme ne se permet pas.'^j
The honnête homme is still the ideal type, but no longer the 
gentleman, rather the honest man in the fundamental sense of 
the word. The term does not change, but its significance is 
completely transformed. It is still strictly dissociated 
from the ideal of the good man, but has clearly lost its 
class connections, is thoroughly secularized, and plainly held 
to denote the most admirable kind of human being.
During the period which saw this reorientation of 
attitude, there was however a renewal of interest in the old 
idea of the gentleman, a kind of reactionary movement 
apparently led by religious interests, and centering round 
the republication of the works of Balthazar Gracian, a 
Spanish Jesuit who had died in 1658. Between 1637 and 1657 
he had brought out several works, in which he attempted to 
construct the perfect model of the hero, a kind of Spanish 
and to some extent desecularized version of the Cortegiano, 
which had earned him the disfavour of his order. Yet after 
years of obscurity, these works were suddenly translated and
(1) Encyclopédie, vol.II, 1751, p.244
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published all over Europe. Paul Hazard, examining this 
phenomenon, describes how as many as fifteen different 
versions of Grecian appeared in franco alone between 1685 
and 1716.^^\ The republication of Grecian was accompanied 
by a whole new body of literature concerned with the idea of 
the honnête homme, and not just with the current moral dis­
putes. The debate on the incompatibility of the qualities 
of the gentleman, notably the quality of probity with the 
Christian ideal of charity is renewed and continued in a 
spate of works between 1680 and I'/OO. On one side men like 
Jacques Esprit and the jesuit Bourdaloue condemn the purely 
negative quality of the aristocratic ideal, the moral 
inadequacy revealed in such remarks as that of Hérê:
'il est plus aisé de dire les choses qu'il faut fuir que 
celles que l'on doit suivre.
On the other side there are those like Jean Pic in his 
Devoirs de la Vie civile, who attempt to reconcile the pagan 
and the Christian ideals by falling back on St. Paul and 
St. Augustine as authorities, and again utilizing the idea 
of reason as moderator of the passions. The main participants
(1) La crise de la conscience européenne, part III, ch.?.
(2) Lettres, 16Ô~2,~ vi~. J. Esprit was a former Oratorian, and 
wrote La fausseté des vertus humaines, 16?8, while 
Bourdaloue attacks the ideal of probity in the sermon
De la religion et de la probité. For details of further 
works, see A. Leveque, 'L'honnete homme et l'homme de bien 
au XVlIe siècle', in IhM.L.A., Sept. 1957, vol. L:{XII, 
pp.621-632. Lêvëque p^ys particular attention to the 
period following 1660, which Magendie does not cover.
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in the debate seem to have been men of religious convictions, 
although works were produced during the period by representa­
tives of the aristocratic tradition proper, the Chevalier 
Trotti de la Chétardie’s Instructions pour un jeune seigneur 
for example.
This is in outline the pattern of moral debate during 
the last decades of the 17th. century. As regards the parti­
cular part played in its literature by the special notion 
of go live nance, the positions of the theist on the one hand, 
and the atheist on the other, immediately suggest two possible 
attitudes to the idea of conformity or fitness. The theist 
will see the purpose of life as striving to fulfil the 
Christian moral code, in the pursuit of eternal happiness.
His ideal is that state of fitness that is achieved by con­
formity with God-given laws. The deist or the atheist mean­
while will understand the attainment of earthly happiness 
as the purpose of life; his ideal will be the fulfilment of 
his own nature, though his concern with the laws governing 
the organization of matter and the life of men in society 
will be no less, in spite of the fact that he sees their
(1) Paris, 1683.
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origin, not in the arbitrary will of God, but in an indepen­
dent supernatural reason, or simply in the nature of matter 
itself. His ideal will be conformity with nature. Are 
these generalizations born out in detail?
One of the disciples of Malebranche whose works may at 
some time have come to the notice of Montesquieu, was Henri 
Lelevel. He was an Oratorian and tutor to the Due de 
Saint-Simon, and he wrote several works on philosophy, morals, 
history and education. He appears to have been a major figure 
in the defence and dissemination of Malebranchian ideas, 
seconding Malebranche in his disputes with Arnauld and Regis, 
and giving a series of lectures in Paris, some of which were 
collected and published as Conferences sur l'Ordre Naturel 
et sur l'Histoire Universelle, (Paris, 1 6 9 8 ) . Montesquieu 
is most likely to have seen his Philosophie Moderne par 
demandes et par réponses, (Toulouse, 1698), which is a com­
plete manual of Malebranchian philosophy set out in question 
and answer form, and intended for use in schools and in 
fashionable circles, and which may have penetrated as far as 
Juilly.^2) It is clear from his works on philosophy that he 
had very little new to offer, though he does move away from 
Malebranche a little, by presenting God as the final cause, 
and describing the relationships established in the universe 
as contributing to the proposed object of the Creator.
(1) See P« Bouillier, Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne, 
Paris, 1868, vol.II, ch.13.
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Notes to p. 8S continued;
(2) Lelevel makes some interesting points with regard to 
the relationship between the character of a nation 
and its laws, which bring to mind Montesquieu’s 
theory of the 'esprit général* set out in Book XIX 
of the Lois. The following is the most striking; 
'Comme le bon effet des lois dépend de la proportion 
qu'elles ont avec le génie de ceux à qui on les 
impose, il faut consulter ce génie dans toutes celles 
qu’on fait; et même en certains cas il faut, comme si 
l'on n'avait point de raison à consulter, n'avoir 
égard qu'à la faiblesse des hommes.' La Philosophie 
Moderne, III, 14, p.176.
(3) Conférences sur l'Ordre Naturel, Paris, 1698, VIII.
90
As far as ethics are concerned, his Malehranchianism is 
correct down to the last word; Law and order are identical; 
reason is the common bond of men, and so on. Everything is 
straightforward, and in one passage he sets out very clearly 
the basic terms of the religious ideal of behaviour; confor­
mity with the Divine law.
'On peut considérer la sagesse de Dieu ou comme la lumière 
sur laquelle il forme tous ses desseins et règle toute sa 
conduite, comme une lumière par laquelle il nous éclaire et 
le reste des intelligences; ou comme l'ordre même qui se 
trouve dans sa manière d'agir. Nos devoirs en conséquence 
de la conduite que Dieu tient dans le gouvernement du monde, 
sont d'y accommoder la nôtre, de ne rien négliger pour éviter 
les maux qui nous menacent, de travailler pour avoir les 
choses nécessaires à la vie, de voir sans émotion la 
prospérité des méchants, et les adversités des gens de bien,'^^
One of the best known arbiters of taste and good breeding 
during the second half of the 17th. century was Father René 
Rapin, the author of Réflexions sur la Poétique d'Aristote. 
Together with Bouhours, Fleury, and Menestrier, he was a fre­
quenter of the salon of Guillaume de Lamoignon, President of 
the Parlement de Paris. This group was generally conservative 
in outlook, they combined a moderate eclecticism with a firm
(1) La Philosophie Moderne, Toulouse, 1698; III, p.97. The
Stoic note sounded in this passage is misleading. Lelevel 
did not share the Oratorian enthusiasm for Greek philosophy; 
he belonged in fact to the group mentioned above, p.f , 
who opposed any reconciliation with pagan ideals, and he 
wrote a work against them. Le discernement de la vraie et 
de la fausse morale, ou l'on fait voir le faux des Offices 
de Oicéron, Paris, 1695.
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conviction in the value of the Anciens, of classical models 
in literature, and of Aristotle in philosophy. Thus, while 
Lelevel was a partisan of the Modernes, Rapin may he taken as 
a representative of the older, less critical, conformist 
branch within the religious tradition. He was a Jesuit, a 
member of the order which had long cared for the education of 
the aristocracy, and his works are for the most part designed 
for their consumption. They aim to present an easy digest of 
the subject in question, mixed with lighter touches, 'maximes 
de morale et traits d'histoire', to make for greater enjoy­
ment. They are the kind of works which Montesquieu would 
certainly have known from an early For us their con­
tribution to aesthetics is perhaps most important, but where 
Rapin deals with morals he does reflect certain widely 
accepted values. In the Réflexions sur la Philosophie 
ancienne et moderne, (Paris, 1676), he deals in the section 
on morals, with the ideal of 'convenance à la nature'. While 
he condemns Stoicism in general, from which he claims, this 
ideal has been borrowed by contemporary society, he suggests 
that it may be interpreted for practical ends as 'conformité 
a la droite raison'. We have here then the idea that the 
dictates of right reason are immediately intelligible to each 
individual; that reason is an independent moral criterion.
(1) Montesquieu refers to Rapin's Reflexions sur la
Philosophie ancienne et moderne in an early entry in the 
Spicilège, 205, see Nagel II, p.743.
92
and that conformity with it must be the aim of the honnête 
homme. All this in a work which condemns Descartes for his 
geometric method, and proclaims that the utility of philosophy 
lies only in the support that it affords religion. In the 
matter of morals, every man is, at least nominally, a rational 
idealist.
However, further investigation reveals a modified pic­
ture. It is not really an ideal of true honesty which lies 
closest to Rapin's heart, but the old aristocratic and 
individualistic ideal of the hero, the remnant of feudalism 
and Italian i n f l u e n c e . I t  is an ideal in which the manner 
of an action counts more than its intrinsic value; the ideal 
of politesse where morals and aesthetics overlap to a large 
extent. But the notion of fitness has its place here also, 
as we shall see.
For the same ideal is to be found in Gracian, the 
Spanish moralist who suddenly achieved popularity at the end 
of the century, and whose work Montesquieu may also have 
known.^2) Here the idea of politesse is actually advanced as 
an artistic criterion; it corresponds to the ordered 
disposition of the parts of a painting, or to the ordered
(1) See particularly Rapin's Du Grand et du Sublime dans les 
Moeurs, Paris, 1686.
(2) A copy of Graciân's L'Homme Universel is listed in the 
Catalogue of the library at La Brède, No.2389,^p.170.
See also Montesquieu's Discourse, De la Consideration et 
de la Reputation, Nagel III, p.2061 Graciân is mentioned 
briefly.
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way in which any work is executed, Graciân talks of the 
'liaison convenable' which must be established between the 
objects depicted in any artistic creation, and which results 
in 'l'élégant assemblage, d'où résultent la Politesse et le 
bel Ordre qui charme dans tous les ouvrages de l'art'.
This criterion of politesse corresponds in the sphere of 
social behaviour to the idea of manière ; the proper way in 
which all actions must be executed. This is the quality 
which dominates all other considerations;
'La vérité a de la Force; la Raison a du pouvoir; la 
Justice a de l'autorité. Mais que tout cela perd de son 
avantage, s'il n'est revêtu de la Manière qui convient; et 
si la Manière qui convient est jointe à tout cela, qu'elle 
en rehausse le prix.'^2)
Here the emphasis is on order, which may be regarded as the 
material expression of reason, although this is probably 
not the way that Gracian would have looked at it. In art 
as in social relationships there must be conformity between 
the object and the manner in which it is depicted, or 
between the action and the manner in which it is performed; 
to borrow Montesquieu's words, there must be a 'rapport de 
convenance', whereby the demands of order are given tangible 
expression.
(1) L'Homme Universel, trad. J. de Courbeville, Rotterdam, 
1729, ch.18, p.175.
(2) Graciân, L'Homme Universel, ch.22,I, ^.225.
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As might he expected, very similar notions are to he 
found in the works of the abbé Jean Pic, one of the moralists 
who contributed to the renewed debate on Classical ideals 
of behaviour which took place at the end of the 17th. cen­
tury. Without adopting completely Gracian's heroic and
individualistic creed. Pic likewise stresses that virtue in 
society consists in more than simple conformity with a moral 
code. The rules of good manners and of bienséance, must be 
observed.^2) So far so good; it seems that his main object 
in the Devoirs de la Vie Civile, is simply to establish 
what Montesquieu was later to advance in a fragment of the 
Traité des Devoirs, namely that in a civilized society, the 
rules of convention serve to make life more agreable.^^)
Pic contends moreover that the code of honnêteté must not be 
restricted to one particular social group; an equal con­
sideration is every man's due. And he attacks prejudice and 
interest as the sources of anti-social behaviour. But 
if we turn to another of his works, the Discours sur la 
Bienséance (Paris, 1688), we find that bienséance denotes 
something more than a standard of social behaviour. It does
(1) See above,YY" BO-87-
(2) Les Devoirs de la Vie Civile, Amsterdam, 1687; part III, 
ch.5, 'Le parfait mérite ne dépend point^de l'observation 
des lois rigoureuses que les hommes ont^établies. C'est 
de l'observation des devoirs de la société.
(3) See Pensée 1270, (Bkn.619). M. possessed 1682. ed. of 
Pic's Devoirs ; Catalogue No.669, p.50.
(4) Les Devoirs de la Vie Civile, part III, chaps.6,8,13.
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not signify simply conformity with accepted social con­
ventions; its definition goes beyond Rapin’s suggested ideal 
of conformity with right reason, and comes closer to the 
notion of decorum found in Cicero’s De Officiis: the
individual must strive to fit his outward person to his 
inner being. Thus bienséance here signifies conformity with 
nature in its fullest sense: conformity of behaviour with
personality, with social condition, as well as with the 
dictates of reason:
'La bienséance consiste en des actions et en des 
manières où l'on ne remarque rien qui ne réponde précisément 
a ce que l'on est, et ce n'est point assez pour en remplir 
tous les devoirs, que de conformer nos actions à la raison 
et à l'honnêteté; mais il faut encore conformer notre air 
et nos manières aux actions que la raison et l'honnêteté 
nous font faire.
For Pic bienséance is the sum of all virtue and the source 
of the good life:
'La bienséance ne preside pas seulement sur toutes les autres 
vertus en nous les faisant pratiquer; elle contribue encore 
à les perfectionner en nous les faisant pratiquer exactement 
et avec application. Je ne parle point ici de cette 
bienséance du monde qui ne nous porte à nos devoirs que pour 
sauver les apparences, et pour surprendre l'approbation des 
hommes; je parle de celle qui nous fait être vertueux, et 
non de celle qui nous le fait paraître; de celle qui vient 
des sentiments; qui ne nous engage pas moins à être honnêtes 
et vertueux pour nous-mêmes, qu'elle nous y engage pour les 
autres; ep qui ne nous fait pas tant consulter, pour nous 
déterminer à bien faire, les agréments qui nous en peuvent 
revenir du côté des hommes, que le témoignage secret de
notre conscience.'^2)
1) Discours sur la Bienséance, Paris, 1688, p.11.
2) Ibid., p.76.
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Clearly the ideal of charity is also at the hack of his mind. 
Pic writes of bienséance, as Montesquieu writes of justice, 
or even Rousseau of amour-propre: he is looking for a
source of inspiration, a motive force, as well as for an 
ideal of conduct,
All these theoreticians set out to formulate their 
ideal of individual behaviour with the notion that man must 
conform to a universal criterion already firmly implanted 
in their minds. This is also eminently characteristic of 
the Protestant apologists during this period; their moral 
theory emerges, not in limited attempts to portray a model 
type of man, but through the two great debates with 
Catholicism and with naturalism. They are rather more con­
cerned with ethics as a subject bordering on philosophy 
and theology, with combatting aspects of one system by 
borrowing points from another, than with a narrow treatment 
of the individual. Most of them were rationalists, at least / 
in the sense that Rapin and Pic may be considered rationalists.
(l) Although propriety seems a far less subjective basis for 
moral theory than self-respect, the idea of esteem is 
common to both, and it is interesting to compare what 
Rousseau has to say in Émile, IV: 'Etendons 1'amour-
propre sur les autres êtres, nous le transformerons en 
vertu, et il n'y a point de coeur d'homme dans lequel 
cette vertu n'ait sa racine..... Plus on généralise cet 
intérêt, plus il devient équitable; et 1'amour du genre 
humain n'est autre chose en nous que l'amour de la 
justice.'
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In his book on apologetics Monod calls them rationaux or 
hommes de juste milieu, in order to distinguish them from 
the rationalists proper, like Bayle and Fontenelle; but 
some, Jean Le Clerc springs immediately to mind, were far 
more radical than this implies, refusing to accept the 
primacy of faith when it conflicted with reason, or, if 
allowing any small part to mystery, insisting that reason 
alone could provide adequate proof of the truth of religion.
The readiness with which Protestantism in general 
accepted Cartesianism has often been noted. As we have 
already mentioned, there were many historical and political 
factors which encouraged such a development. )  They were 
linked by a common rejection of traditional authority among 
other things; and although the main protestant bodies sub­
scribed to the canons of orthodoxy laid down by the Synod of 
Dordrecht in 1618, from the middle of the century onwards, 
there was a growing number of sects, Arminians, Cocceians, 
Socinians and the like, especially in the Low Countries, who, 
inspired by theological currents from Eastern Europe, pro­
claimed the necessity of a continuing reformation based on 
the inalienable freedom of the individual conscience guided 
by r ea s o n . C a r t e s i a n i s m  to them was a welcome ally, and
(1) Monod, De Pascal à Chateaubriand, ch.V, p.158. For 
Le Clerc see also A. Barnes, Jean Le Clerc et la 
République des Lettres, Paris, 1938.
(2) See above,-fp.85-84-•
(3) For the influence of Cartesianism on theology in Holland, 
see C.L. Thijssen-Schoute, 'Le Cartésianisme aux Pays-Bas', 
article in Descartes et le Cartésianisme Hollandais,
C. Serrurier etc., Paris, i9bU.
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circumstance fostered the relationship when Descartes and 
his disciples, themselves the victims of orthodox intolerance, 
were driven from France to work and teach in Protestant 
countries. Thus it was that as early as 1638 courses in the 
new philosophy were being held in the University of Utrecht; 
and Holland became with the growing tide of repression in 
France, the power-house of rationalism in Europe.
Geneva, where theologically the situation was more
stable, was later to follow the same path into the rationalist
fold. In both centres philosophical liberalism paved the 
a.
way to^revolution in theological attitudes. In Geneva it 
was the teaching of Robert Ghouet which was perhaps most 
important in bringing this about. Though orthodox in 
matters of religion, he applied the methods of Cartesianism 
rigorously in the field of natural science; and it is sig­
nificant that several of the outstanding Protestant con­
tributors to the religious debate studied with him. Bayle, 
Basnage, Le Clerc and Bernard all followed his courses in 
G e n e v a . S o  it was that philosophy began to break down 
the doctrinal bonds which had held Protestant consciences 
in check, just as the Casuists had loosened those of 
Catholicism.
(1) See A. Sayous, Histoire de la Littérature française à 
1'étranger, Paris, 1853î p.158; and A. Barnes, Jean 
Le Clerc et la République des Lettres, Paris, 1938, p.38.
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In Geneva, Chouet's mantle was inherited by 
J.A. Turrettini, professor of ecclesiastical history and 
later of theology at the university. Utilizing the main 
features of Cartesian doctrine; the self-evidence and 
simplicity of first principles and so on, and many of the 
ideas already put forward by jurisconsults like Grotius and 
Pufendorf, he taught that the first principles of morals 
constitute a universal natural law known to all men and 
revealed in Scripture. All points of dogma which conflict 
with this fundamental law, or are not clearly related to 
it, are superfluous, if not positively h a r m f u l . T h e  
natural law is the law of reason; and in demonstrating his 
theories Turrettini almost inevitably fell back upon the 
notion of convenance, the idea that the rational order behind 
the universe is expressed in the visible fitness of its 
parts, which in the mind forms the basis of the rules 
governing conduct;
'Nihil sunt igitur Leges Naturales, nisi Rationis ipsius 
dictamina, quae ex ipso rerum ordine et convenientia tamquam 
ex fonte deducuntur, suamque sepum demonstrationem et 
confirmationem ferunt•’(2)
(1) Turrettini*s main theological work was the Traité de la 
vérité de la Religion Chrétienne, trans. J. Vernet,
Geneva, 1750. Volume II of this edition contains the 
Pensées sur la Religion, which outline the main points 
of his doctrine.
(2) 'De Theologia Naturali', in Cogitationes et Dissertationes 
Theologicae, Geneva, 17574 dissertatio VIII, part I, sec. II, 
art. IÔ7 p. 252.
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This short formula is a classic expression of the 
belief of the rational idealists. But its concision saves 
it from the pitfalls which awaited many of the rationalist 
theologians as soon as they began to elaborate their 
theories. The most dangerous of these was that into which 
Malebranche almost fell, namely of formulating theories of 
reason and of nature which add up to a philosophy of 
immanence, and thereby earn the stigma of Spinozism.^^
We have already mentioned in our brief discussion of his 
disciple Henri Lelevel, how the idea of G-od as Pinal Cause 
is here i n t r o d u c e d . T h e  most likely reason for this 
departure from the main tenets of Majjbranchianism, was a 
desire to avoid at all costs any suggestion that the material 
universe is simply a mode of reason. How one of the 
Protestant disciples of Malebranche who showed less caution 
than Lelevel, was Elie Saurin.
Saurin, pastor of the Walloon church in Utrecht, was 
at the centre of the main dispute that split the Reformed 
churches in Holland. He was Jurieu's opponent in the battle 
over religious tolerance which spread into the very ranks 
of those whom persecution had driven from their homeland.
Like Isaac d ’Huisseau he was as concerned to find a middle 
ground in religious doctrine, upon which there could be
(1) See above pp. 56-39*
(2) See above p.98.
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general agreement, as to establish the political conditions 
in which civil and religious freedom could flourish.
To this end he was prepared to sacrifice less important 
dogmas, and this earned him the accusation of pelagianism 
from Jurieu.^2) Ibe quarrel was only ended by the inter­
vention of the Êtats-G-^néraux in 1696. While Jurieu’s 
accusation of pelagianism seems unfounded, his concern at 
the implications of some of Saurin's doctrines is more 
understandable. The pastor of Utrecht was undoubtedly a 
thoroughgoing rationalist and perhaps even a latitudinarian. 
For in the Traité de l ’Amour de Dieu, which he declared to 
be an exposition of his metaphysics, he openly admitted the 
influence of Malebranche and of Geulinx in his thinking.
The latter was almost unknown outside the Low Countries, 
but it is perhaps significant that he is now generally 
regarded as the intermediary between Malebranche and Spinoza.
Disregarding the kind of precautions taken by Lelevel, 
Saurin boldly declares God to be reason, justice, power, 
virtue, and wisdom, the first and only cause of the natural
(1) Saurin’s political thought is contained in the Reflexions 
sur les Droits de la Conscience, Utrecht 1697; for an out­
line of this aspect of the quarrel see G. Dodge, The 
Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion, 
Columbia, 1947. Isaac d ’Huisseauywas a leading figure
in the eirenic movement; his La reunion du Christianisme, 
1669 was a major contribution to its literature.
(2) Jurieu attacked him in his Defense de la Doctrine de
1 ’Église, 1695, and La réligion du Latitudinaire, 1696.
(3) See Van der Haeghen. 1886; II, 6; Geulinx, étude de sa vie.
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o r d e r . V i r t u e  like reason is an independent and 
transcendent force. The Decalogue is the sum of revealed 
law, hut its principles may he discovered by the operation 
of reason alone, for the relations between men are governed 
by the eternal law, which consists in the relations of 
perfection between essences that are seen in God.^g) Lav; 
is defined as a relationship. So far we are given a plain 
account of Malebranche*s main doctrines; but soon diver­
gences begin to appear. In the Ethica, Geulinx had seen 
God as the sole cause of all things, and logically this 
included evil; Malebranche however had gone to great lengths, 
elaborating his theory of the simplicity of the laws 
involved in the creation and conservation of the universe, 
and carefully distinguishing between these natural laws and 
the eternal laws of reason, in order to avoid this conclusion, 
But Saurin leans towards Geulinx; he makes no distinction 
between the eternal law of reason and the natural law;
’Dieu est la premiere Raison et la première Loi. Son^essence 
est la règle du droit naturel, et sa volonté est la règle 
du droit positif.
If natural law is to be seen as the essence of God, it is 
quite possible to deduce from this that the extended universe 
is simply a mode of that essence. Saurin has no hesitation 
in positing a necessary correspondence between the real and
(1) Traité de l ’Amour de Dieu, Amsterdam, 1701; I, 2.
(2) Ibid., III, 6.
(3) Ibid., I, 8, f.99.
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the ideal, even in the moral order; in his system the 
existence of God is not required as a guarantee of the order 
of reality, as it was for the orthodox C a r t e s i a n * I n d e e d
reason and love of reason are before God,
*1’amour de la raison et de la Justice, de la vertu et 
de la perfection est le premier amour, l ’amour primitif, le 
principe et la règle de tout autre amour, même de l ’amour 
de Dieu.’
Virtue is love of reason, and charity love of justice. This
is no more than Geulinx advanced; ’virtus est rectae
rationis amor unicus’;^^) whereas he is prepared to 
reject the pursuit of happiness and the demands of amour- 
propre as contrary to the fulfilment of the dictates of 
reason, emphasizing the virtues of humility and self-forget­
fulness,^^^ Saurin on the contrary, declares that virtue is 
love of that which is in accordance with our nature, since 
that nature is ordained by reason.
(1) Op.cit.. I, 5: ’Si ce que nous appelions vertu, mérite,
perfection n ’était rien de réel, on ne pourrait s’en 
former aucune idée; comme on n ’aurait aucune idée de 
l ’étendue, si l ’essence de l ’étendue était un pur néant*’ 
cf. Discours de la Méthode, part IV, ’Cela même que j’ai
tantét pris pour une règle, à savoir que les choses que
nous concevons très clairement.....sont toutes vraies, 
n ’est assuré qu’à cause que Dieu est ou existe.’
(2) Traité de l ’Amour de Dieu, I, 8.
(3) Ethica, I, ii, 4.
(4) See Van der Haeghen, Geulinx, étude sur sa vie, sa 
philosophie, et ses ouvrages, part II, ch.é.
(5) Traite de l'Amour de Dieu, III, 6.
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Thus we are again presented with the ideal of convenance 
à la nature, arrived at this time by taking the premisses 
of rationalism to their logical conclusion, in a way 
reminiscent of Spinoza. Of course, whether this phrase 
continues to signify conformity with a rational ideal, or 
really implies the fulfilment of ones capacities as a human 
animal, depends largely on the interpretation of the term 
nature. Clearly in the 17th. century, it could be almost 
synonymous with reason; while the 18th. century witnessed a 
weakening of this sense, and a movement towards a more 
empirical definition: nature as personality in a human con­
text, or nature as the world of material t h i n g s . T h e  
dispute between the naturalistic ideal and the rational or 
religious ideal is as old as western philosophy itself, and 
sometimes it is difficult to draw a clear line between them; 
but as we have already mentioned, the notion which throughout 
the period of rationalism, carries with it the strongest 
naturalistic associations, is probably that of self-respect 
or probity, as far as ethics are concerned.
how when Saurin, whose rationalism taken to extremes 
has brought him face to face with naturalism, comes to deal
(1) See R. Mercier, La Rehabilitation de la Hature Humaine, 
Villemonble, I960; also P. Gohin, Les Transformations de 
la langue française au 18e. siècle, Paris, 1903.
(2) See above p.80.
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in his Traite de l ’Amour du Prochain with moral rather than 
metaphysical problems, it is the ideal of justice based on 
self-respect or amour-propre, which he advances. Love of 
reason involves love of nature, and love of nature includes 
self. Por if God loves the perfections contained in his 
rational essence, will not man also love those that are 
reflected in his own b e i n g ? I n  this case amour-propre 
is the logical outcome of a rational conception of the 
divine nature. Saurin has no hesitations on the score of 
original sin; on the contrary, amour-propre is the necessary 
natural basis of the justice which one renders to one's 
fellows; and if one perceives more perfection in oneself 
than in any one else, then it follows that ones self-respect 
will outweigh ones a l t r u i s m . H e r e  there is a certain 
similiarity with Spinoza’s idea that the more being embraced 
by a thing, the higher it is in the scale of reality, and 
the less dependent it becomes: this idea is in direct
opposition to the rationalist viewpoint that between things 
of the same kind there is a constant relationship of 
equality, which forms the basis of abstract justice, the 
position which Montesquieu later adopted. Indeed it is 
easy to suggest that by natural perfection, Saurin could
(1) Op.cit.. I, 1.
(2) Traite de l ’Amour du Prochain, Utrecht, 1704; I, 2; 13 
Traité de l ’Amour de Dieu, ÏV, 6.
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mean little else but being or reality, since be cannot 
intend to prove the validity of an independent rational 
criterion when he denies the existence of actual relation­
ships of equality between men, and stresses the importance 
of material circumstances in determining moral judgements.^^ 
The scale of values which he draws up to regulate moral 
conduct is exactly the reverse of that advanced by Malebranche 
for example, and later made famous by Montesquieu:
'Les voisins, les concitoyens, les compatriotes, les sujets 
d ’un même souverain, les membres d ’une même république se 
doivent quelques degrés particuliers d ’amour et d'affection, 
et certains offices qu’ils ne doivent pas à des étrangers, 
à des inconnus, à des ennemis. Ils vivent sous les mêmes 
lois^ ils ont en partie les mêmes intérêts; ils sont h 
portée de faire les uns pour les autres, mille choses qu'ils 
ne peuvent pas faire pour ceux avec qui ils n ’ont pas les 
mêmes liaisons.
It is conformity with nature, with the actual relationships 
between things, which forms the basis of Saurin’s ethical 
system; not conformity with a transcendent ideal. He adopts 
in fact the standpoint of immanent rationalism, rather than 
that of rational idealism; a position which is close to 
naturalism, and which is open to anyone who unreservedly 
associates reason with the nature of things.
(1) Traité de l ’Amour du Prochain, I, 9.
(2) Malebranche, Traité de Morale, ’Il faut être homme, 
chrétien, Français avant d’être grammqri^, poète, 
historien, étranger.’, part II, ch.10/ para.xiv.
cf. Montesquieu, Traité des Devoirs, Hagel III, p.160; 
Pensées 350 (Bkn.lO), 74-1 (Bkn.llJ; Histoire Véritable, 
Nagel^III, p.355.
(3) Traite de l ’Amour du Prochain, I, 9^ /O.
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Saurin's work, though uninspiring in itself, provides 
a very good example of the remarkably similar effects which 
casuistry and extreme rationalism could have on moral atti­
tudes. It also illustrates the use of Classical pagan 
ideals - probity and moderation, by Protestant writers, 
once their idea of the nature of things has undergone trans­
formation.
So far we have dealt with writers of the second or 
third rank, whose works reflect well established ideas or 
the beginnings of their modification at the end of the 
17th. century. With Saurin we have seen the weakening of 
the idealist approach to morals, in favour of the attitudes 
derived from a conception of immanent reason. The position 
from which he has moved is essentially one in which the 
pattern of things is seen to contribute to a design of 
ultimate perfection: beyond the created universe, there
is a transcendent ideal with which the fitness of things 
is connected, and to which, we, being part of creation yet 
endowed with freedom, must aspire, in order that our lives 
will also possess the quality of fitness. To this end a 
code of laws is evolved, not necessarily based on natural 
tendencies, but said to stem from the transcendent ideal, 
often the will of God in association with reason. Against
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this, the standpoint of naturalism is that organized matter 
exists we know not how, that we are part of it, and must 
therefore aim only to fulfil our natural tendencies in so 
far as these do not conflict with the demands of society.
In between lies the position of the immanentist doctrine: 
the natural structure of things expresses the rational 
order, and therefore, by conforming to nature, one realizes 
the ethical demands of reason.
This is a simplified outline, but it enables us to see 
three points more clearly. First, immanentist rationalism 
does not necessarily imply a rejection of rational ideals; 
it simply weakens their position, by emphasizing the 
necessity of fulfilling natural forms ; if nature is the 
expression of reason, v/hy look beyond it? Secondly, for 
the rational idealist, the idea of convenance signifies 
more than mere conformity; it is better translated as fit­
ness, since it calls up several secondary notions, such as 
harmony, unity, perfection. It necessarily implies the 
existence of a relationship of some kind, but that relation­
ship is invested with a quality of greater meaning than 
simple correspondence between terms. We may ourselves 
regard this quality as the simple projection of our own 
response to the perception of congruence in things, grafted 
on to a basic idea, and lacking any true counterpart in
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reality; but generally it is taken to signify participation 
of the material in an ideal order. Another way of seeing 
it is as a holist conception: when convenance is used to
describe an object it indicates a quality that is more than 
the sum of the object’s attributes. It could be described 
as a term which links theology and physics. The third point 
is that the idea of a structural correspondence between 
things is common to all three viewpoints: the idealist,
the immanentist and the naturalist. The 18th. century may 
have embraced materialism, but it did not abandon the idea 
that the pattern of nature was very reasonable, even on 
those occasions when it rejected the notion that this pattern 
indicated the existence of a supernatural intelligence.
As regards those thinkers who were instrumental in 
ensuring the dominance of the naturalistic tradition in 
morals, the two most outstanding, Pontenelle and Bayle, did 
not, despite their radical rationalism, make any great use 
of the notion of convenance, even as an extension of the idea 
of correspondence between terms fundamental to mathematics.
Pontenelle is justly regarded as the pioneer of what 
for want of a better English equivalent must be called the 
philosophic movement in French thought. Often described 
as the first example of the ’type philosophe*, rather than
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the ’type honnête homme', the perpetual secretary of the 
Académie des Sciences was probably known to Montesquieu at 
the time of the latter’s first visit to Paris between 1709 
and 1713.^2) himself was certainly acquainted with all
the outstanding men of science and letters of the day, and 
he made his own special contribution to the development of 
thought, as a propagandist of science, and a determined if 
cautious enemy of religion./gx But this is not to say that 
Fontenelle rejected outright the existence of God; he did 
not. On the contrary, he saw the universe as the expression 
of the divine intelligence; ’La physique suit et démêle les 
traces de l ’intelligence et de la sagesse infinie qui a tout 
p r o d u i t ' b u t  he denied the possibility of metaphysical 
knowledge: the ultimate wisdom of God, the purpose and
meaning of the world are for ever beyond our reach. Thus 
in the Éloge de Leibniz he questioned the validity of 
theories like that of pre-established harmony; and he even 
regarded Hewtonian attraction as some kind of occult force 
out of keeping with a mechanist interpretation of the 
universe. The structure of things was the proper sphere of 
hum-an inquiry, for everything was founded on order; even
(1) See Shackleton, Montesquieu, I, p.10.
(2) For a detailed study of Fontenelle, see J.R. Carre,
La Philosophie de Fontenelle, Paris, 1932, and
J.P. Counillon, Pontenelle, écrivain, savant, philosophe, 
Fecamp, 1959.
(3) Preface sur l ’Utilité des Mathématiques et de la Physiquet
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chance vanishes with the growth of knowledge: it is simply
’un ordre que l ’on ne connaît point,
What happens to the idea of conformity in all this?
One would expect Pontenelle to propound a system of ethics 
founded on the scientific function of reason; if reason is 
capable of penetrating the structure of the physical world, 
it can surely analyse the relationships binding the moral 
world together. But not so; like most thinkers who 
associated reason with nature, Pontenelle saw the application 
of rational methods in the moral sphere as a simple waste 
of time. Man is part of nature; and although the individual 
may use his natural faculties in the achievement of happi­
ness, his thought is insignificant in the cosmic pattern 
of things:
’II y a une raison qui nous met au-dessus de tout par les 
pensées, il doit y en avoir ensuite une autre qui^nous 
ramène à tout par les actions; mais à ce compte-la meme, ne 
vaut-il pas presque autant n ’avoir point pensé?’
Conformity with reason or rather with nature comes about 
without the operation of our rational faculties.
Pontenelle believed moreover that human nature was 
fixed, and dominated by self-interest:
’la politesse ou la grossièreté, la science ou l ’ignorance, 
le plus ou le moins d ’une certaine naïveté, le génie sérieux 
ou badin, ce ne sont là que les dehors de 1 ’komme, et tout
(1) Dialogues des Morts, Morts modernes II, Charles V et 
Érasme.
(2) Ibid., V, Parménique et Théocrite de Chio.
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cela change; mais le coeur ne change point, et tout l ’homme 
est dans le coeur. On est ignorant dans un siècle, mais la 
mode d ’être savant peut venir; on peut être intéressé, mais 
la mode d ’etre désintéressé ne viendra point,
Thus although in his essay De l ’Origine des Pables, he 
clearly considers that some progress has taken place during 
the course of history, and emphasizes the importance of 
overcoming prejudice and superstition, it is connected not 
so much with increased virtue, as with scientific knowledge.
The only truth is scientific, and progress in science comes 
about necessarily, hence all hope of moral improvement is 
tied to this;
’Avec une bonne logique et une bonne médecine, les hommes 
n ’auraient plus besoin de rien’,^2)
that is Fontenelle’s conclusion.
How did the other pioneer of scientific rationalism,
Pierre Bayle, approach moral questions? Like Pontenelle,
Bayle exercised a profound influence on succeeding generations, 
not least upon Montesquieu.^ Bayle’s outlook on life, in 
spite of a ruthlessly logical and ultimately destructive 
approach to revealed religion, was dominated by a thirst for 
truth, and for moral security in the face of seemingly
(1) Op.cit., Ill, Socrate et Montaigne.
(2) Eloge de Tschirnhaus.
(3) See Shackleton’s Article, ’Bayle and Montesquieu’, in 
Pierre Bayle, le philosophe de Rotterdam, ed. Dibon, P., 
Amsterdam, etc., 1959.
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overwhelming evil.^^ His thirst for truth was the thirst 
of the sceptic, of a man whose vision of the accumulated 
errors, abuses and delusions of centuries is so acute that 
he cannot rest until he has shaken his fellow men out of 
their stupor, and armed them against themselves. Reason, 
discursive reason, is the tool which, by painstaking research 
and comparison, can establish the concrete facts of past and 
present, and right the distorted visions of those who take 
refuge in fables or in metaphysical speculation:
'Je vous avoue encore qu'en examinant l'enchàtnure de 
plusieurs faits, en considérant le génie des auteurs, en 
pesant toutes les circonstances, en comparant ensemble ce 
qui a été dit par les uns et par les autres, on peut découvrir 
bien des impostures, réfuter bien des calomnies.'
But this is a mere declaration of intention; the whole of 
the Dictionnaire Critique, is devoted to the thankless task
(1) Bayle's attitude to truth is that of a positivist; although 
he was obviously always aware of the contradictions 
between facts, his scepticism was directed above all 
towards metaphysical speculation and the doctrines of 
revealed religion. The Article Maldonat in the Dictionary 
contains the assertion that even first principles of logic 
must be verifiable by experience to be valid; similarly, 
the attacks mounted on doctrine, Cartesian and religious, 
in the articles Pyrrhon and Manichéens, are too penetrat­
ing, and the conviction that human judgements are the only 
ones which can be applied to speculative beliefs, is too 
deep, for the assertion that Bayle was a rational fideist 
to hold water. This assertion has however been frequently 
made by recent criticism; see E.D, James, 'Scepticism and 
Eideism in Bayle's Dictionnaire', Erench Studies, 1962; 
and R.H. Popkin, 'Pierre Bayle's place in 17th. century 
Scepticism', in Pierre Bayle, Le Philosophe de Rotterdam.
(2) Critique générale de l'Histoire du Calvinisme, Oeuvres 
Diverses, 1727, vol.II, p.13.
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of clearing away confusion, and laying the foundations of 
positive fact upon which men might base their actions.
For although Bayle undoubtedly loved knowledge for its 
own sake, he saw in it a tool of progress also. Fontanelle 
put his faith in scientific progress, Bayle in moral educat­
ion; but Pontenelle really expresses a common approach to 
the kind of historical knowledge which preoccupied Bayle 
when he writes of the purpose of history:
' Coifime nous ne saisissons presque jamais les principes 
généraux si parfaitement que notre esprit n'ait besoin d'y
etre soutenu par des applications particulières   il
est bon que l'histoire accompagne et fortifie la connaissance 
que nous pouvons avoir de l'homnie. Elle nous fera voir, 
pour ainsi dire, l'homme en détail, après que la morale nous
l'aura fait en gros.....  Ce n'est point l'histoire des
révolutions des états, des guerres qu'il faut étudier,
mais, sous cette histoire, il faut développer celle des 
erreurs et des passions humaines.
* y
It is the knowledge of human abberation, which holds the key 
to reform. Bayle makes a moving declaration of his conviction 
in the article Macon, note D, wken writing of the wars of 
religion, he pleads, as some today remembering the horrors 
of concentration camps plead, that the atrocities of past 
ages should not be forgotten, but kept alive as a constant 
warning.
Bayle had as few illusions about human nature as 
Pontenelle; and he realised that conformity with the basic 
tendencies of this nature is the only real footing on which
(1) Pontenelle, Sur l'Histoire, Oeuvres, Paris, 1790; vol.V, 
pp.434-435.
1 1 5
life can be lived. Thus he accepted that instinct and vice 
could play a beneficial role in s o c i e t y , Y e t  there is 
also a place for conscience, if it is given a positive basis. 
In the Commentaire Philosophique, he declares that the 
natural understanding is capable of coming to clear conclus­
ions in ethical m a tt e r s ; h o w e v e r  the theory of conscience 
as a sincere act of will as regards belief, and as an inten­
tion to secure the greatest social good, where secular 
affairs are concerned, usually lumped together under the 
heading 'doctrine de la conscience errante', and developed 
in the famous digression of the Pensées Diverses sur la 
Comète, 'Si les athées sont capables de bonnes moeurs', 
fits in better with his approach to truth and his appreciation 
of human weakness. The good must be pursued when it is 
seen and understood; but the fallibility of human nature 
must be admitted, while at the same time its essential 
dignity, and individual freedom must be safeguarded, Bayle's 
theory of the right of the conscience to err was criticized 
on the grounds that it laid the way open to the kind of 
intolerance that it was supposed to prevent. In the Traité 
des Droits des deux Souverains, Jurieu for instance, pointed 
out that it justified the worst persecutions of the religious 
fanatic. But this kind of criticism was surely founded on 
a mistaken conception of what Bayle set out to do; his aim
(1) Dictionnaire, arts. Helene, Melanchthon.
(2) Op.cit., I, 1, i.
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was not to formulate an ideal, founded on a rational concept­
ion of truth, rather to elaborate a viable principle for 
action, that would take into account certain fundamental 
needs, and certain undeniable facts. His scorn for the 
rational idealist, for the deist, was as great as his despair 
for the orthodox b e l i e v e r . B a y l e ’s doctrine of conscience 
certainly reflects the same positive approach as character­
ized his attitude to truth.
So the erudite critic and the propagandist of science 
laid dov/n the foundations of the new materialism. At its 
heart was the recognition that nature is good, which gave 
rise to the conviction that behaviour should follow 
instinctive models, and renounce the pursuit of transcendent 
ideals. The idea of conscience was difficult to throw over­
board, without jeopardizing the health of society, but it 
could conveniently be linked with self-interest or put 
forward as a natural moral instinct* Innate ideas were dis­
missed, and so was the idea of fitness associated with 
teleological design in the universe. No longer could the 
reason, disembodied, abstract from the perfect order of 
things a guide for righteous living. Discursive reason, 
laboriously unravelling the relationships of the physical 
world, now had the upper hand. If one spoke of conformity.
(1) In the Réponse aux questions d'un provincial,ivol,III, 
172i, ch.128, he upbraids them for attempting to demon­
strate the existence of God by reason.
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it was of conformity with nature or of conformity between 
perception and the external object* In sensationalist 
epistemology, such conformity was the basis of sound judge­
ment* What is truth? - the disciple of Locke has his answer 
ready, 'une conformité de notre pensée avec son objet.
It is not long before the moralist declares, 'le crime est 
toujours un faux jugement*'^2)
But the revolution in philosophical attitudes was by 
no means a rapid or complete process. Well established 
theories, that of natural law, among them, continued to 
command the respect owing to their antiquity, and were duly 
incorporated into new systems. Indeed many of the leaders 
in philosophical progress preferred a modicum of respecta­
bility to the kind of notoriety which might have accompanied 
a franker expression of their views. Locke for example, may 
have enshrined the principle of property ownership in his 
political system, a principle which may be considered to 
run counter to the demands of natural justice, though it 
had a very respectable ancestry in the English Common Law; 
but he never abandoned the theory of natural law, and, had 
he lived long enough, would undoubtedly have been shocked
(1) Claude Buffier, Elements de Métaphysique, Paris, 1725,
IV, p.59. Buffier, like G.L. Le Sage, was an early 
disciple of Locke; in his works he attempts a synthesis 
of Cartesianism and of empiricism, and several of his 
theories were utilized by Montesquieu* See below,r; > ;
and also Heikki Kirkinen, La conception de l'homme machine, 
Helsinki, I960.
(2) C.P. Duclos, Considérations sur les moeurs de ce siècle, 
1750, ch.I*
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by Mandeville's outright rejection of virtue as a positive 
enemy of the state.
In France, much more than in England, circumspection 
was the order of the day. Pontenelle's elegant prose, and 
Bayle'3 erudition served to screen some of their more radical 
propositions from the censor. Similarly, more minor writers 
seem to have been able to insinuate most unorthodox ideas 
in apparently conventional treatises. The abbé Edmé Mariette 
is a good example. Largely uninfluenced by any particular 
system, he simply applied the tools of mathematics and 
observation to the solving of ethical problems, while none­
theless contriving to incorporate many of the theories and 
much of the conventional terminology of rational idealism 
into his essay. Thus his work may be read as a critique of 
the currently fashionable position.
Mariotte died in 1684, but enjoyed a reputation as one 
of the outstanding physicists of his day, and as a leading 
exponent of empirical methods in science. His observations 
on rainfall are mentioned in one of the early entries in 
the notebook which Montesquieu borrowed from Desmolets and 
copied out at the beginning of the Epicilege, )  and it is 
not unlikely that his theories on volume in gases were among 
the many scientific topics discussed by the Academy of
(1) See Two Treatises of Civil Government, ed. F. laslett, 
Cambridge, I960, introduction, IV, pp.82-84.
(2) Spicilege, 8. Montesquieu possessed the 1717 edition of 
Mariotte's Oeuvres, see Catalogue de la Brède, No.1499,
p.110. ______________________________
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Bordeaux. His ideas on ethics were probably less well known. 
In the Essai de logique he makes considerable use of the 
notion of conformity and appears at least at first sight, 
to take up an idealist position. He there suggests that in 
morals as in mathematics certain self-evident principles 
exist :
* II y a de ces propositions qui sont reçues sans qu’on en 
puisse douter, comme'il faut faire ce qui est le mieux'; on 
les appellera propositions morales premières, ou principes 
du devoir.’^^
Besides self-evidence, principles such as doing the best, 
giving to those in need, or respecting another’s property, 
possess the quality of convenance. Mariotte does not define 
convenance, but he implies that these first principles 
reveal an inherent orderliness or justice in the actions 
they describe. Action in accordance with them constitutes 
virtue. However, in spite of the fact that virtue is its 
own reward, it also brings respect and personal advantage,  ^
This element of personal satisfaction, which is quite distinct 
from the spiritual pleasure derived from virtue, holds the 
key to the other side of Mariotte’s theory. For although 
convenance is established as a moral criterion, it is for­
mally associated with aesthetic satisfaction rather than 
with reason;
(1) Op.cit., Oeuvres de Mariotte, Leyden, 1717, part I, 
art.lvii, p.625.
(2) Ibid., part I, arts. Ixxvi-lxxxii.
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’Il y a deux sortes principales de plaisirs de l ’esprit: 
ceux de l ’honneur, comme d ’être loues et aimés, d ’être plus 
parfaits et d ’avoir plus de pouvoir que les autres; et ceux 
de convenance, comme celui qu'on reçoit de la lecture d’une 
belle poésie, de la vue d ’une maison bien faite suivant les 
règles de 1 ’architecture,’
A virtuous action is bien faite rather than rational, in 
spite of the self-evidence of moral principles. Thus 
pleasure is taken to be the strongest motive in human con­
duct, and when the individual is faced with a choice between 
the duties arising from the principle of convenance, and 
those which Mariotte sees as the consequences of natural 
self-interest, the latter dominate, since they give greatest 
satisfaction.^2) fhis being the case, Mariotte concludes 
that practical ethics must be placed on a purely pragmatic 
basis. Experience and the practical wisdom of the proverbs 
are the surest guides for the individual; and for society, 
legislation must ensure that natural duty and moral duty 
coincide, by establishing harsh penalties against self- 
interest. j
Thus in effect, Mariotte’s systematic theory of morals 
based on the ideal criterion of fitness or proportion is 
superfluous. Once this notion is dissociated from reason, 
or from something that may be regarded as both transcendent
(1 ) Opj^ it., part I, art.lxxv.
(2) Ibid., part II, section 2, art.iii, pp.666-668.
(3) Ibid.
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principle and human faculty, it looses all meaning. Pleasure 
may provide a strong motive, but it is a law unto itself. 
Within the framework which Mariotte provides, convenance 
could have practical as well as theoretical relevance, only 
if he were to advance the ludicrous proposition that 
pleasure is associated exclusively with the contemplation 
of proportion in things and with nothing else. This of 
course, he had no intention of doing. His theories are given 
no real development in the Essai de logique; but we may 
interpret them as anticipating in some ways those that 
Locke advances in the Essay concerning human understanding; 
independent moral principles do exist, but man has no innate 
knowledge of them, and does not necessarily pursue them.^^) 
Alternatively, we may suggest that he presents a naturalistic 
psychological analysis, and positivist solutions, which are 
more closely related to Hobbes's theories, or to those of 
his countrymen who were prepared to affirm, at least in 
private, the relativity of moral values.
For clandestine pamphlets and tracts were most often 
the vehicle for the most outspoken criticisms of established 
ideas and institutions. Among them, Nicolas Freret's Lettre 
de Thrasibule à Leucippe has some interest for us. Fréret, 
a learned sinologist, whose advanced views earned him a 
short stay in the Bastille, was one of Montesquieu's earliest
(1) See op.cit.. I, iii, 6.
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acquaintances among the learned circles of Paris.
Montesquieu was probably introduced to him by their common
friend Father Desmolets, librarian of the Paris Oratory,
and Fréret's old schoolmaster.^2) Dike Boulainviller, his
close acquaintance, Fréret drew many of his ideas from
Spinoza, and although neither of them ever progressed beyond
an elementary exposition of his philosophy, they helped to
spread the influence of the critical methods employed in
10
the Tractatus theologjo-politicus throughout French thought.
The Lettre de Thrasibule à Leucippe was circulated anony­
mously, but there seems little doubt of its authorship.
(1) See Shackleton, Montesquieu, I, pp.10-12. Shackleton 
bases himself on a letter from Montesquieu to Desmolets, 
of April 4th, 1716.
(2) The case against the assignation of the Lettre to Fréret 
is presented in considerable detail as far as document­
ation is concerned, by Renée Simon in her work, Nicolas 
Fréret, published in Studies on Voltaire and the 18th. 
century, ed. Besterman^, XVII, 1961. She suggests in 
ch.XIII that the publication of this work and of the 
Examen critique des apologistes under Fréret*s name was 
arranged by the Holbach group, with Voltaire's connivance; 
and that its real author was Naigeon. However, she brings 
no conclusive evidence to disprove Fréret's authorship
of the Lettre, rather than of the Examén critique; and 
she does not comment at any length on the claim that 
Rousseau knew the Lettre before the composition of the 
Discours sur l'inégalité, 1754, the claim examined by 
J.P. Free in Rousseau's use of the 'Examen de la Religion' 
and of the 'Lettre de Thrasibule à Leucippe', Princeton, 
1935. Circulation of the manuscript before 1754 would 
cast doubt on the attribution to Naigeon.
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In it we find the basic Spinozistic conception of God as 
the totality of things set out, and Fréret follows this up 
with an explanation of what the universal law consists in.
If God is the universe, then this law must be based on the 
relationships between things:
'Cette loi nécessaire qu'est-elle elle-même? Est-elle 
distinguée de lui et des êtres, ou des perceptions qu'il en 
a? F'est-ce que la perception des rapports de convenance 
ou de disconvenance qui sont entre les choses, ou leurs 
idées? '
If evidence were available to show that Montesquieu actually 
examined the Lettre de Thrasibule à Leucippe, this definition 
of law would be of considerable importance for the study of 
his ideas. As it is, we are in a position to make only one 
definite statement, namely that Montesquieu knew Fréret by 
at least 1716; it is possible that if Fréret was in fact 
contemplating the composition of the Lettre, he may have 
discussed some of its theories with his friends. The dating 
of manuscript copies is uncertain, and no published version 
dating from before 1762 is extant, so that the likelihood of 
Montesquieu's coming across the Lettre, at least before the 
composition of the Lettres Persanes, is somewhat remote.
(1) Lettre de Thrasibule à Leucippe, Oeuvres completes, 
London, 1775, vol.IV, p.97.
(2) The dating of all 18th. century editions is given by
R. Simon, Nicolas Fréret, ch.13. One of the first London 
editions contains a prefatory note dating the composition 
of the Letter as 1722, but no confidence can be placed 
in this.
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Nevertheless the idea here presented, that law is associated 
with relationships of conformity, may he of some importance 
for the definition of law given in the Esprit des Lois.^^
This mention of law suggests another possibility; Maupertuis, 
as we have already seen, also used the phrase 'rapport de 
convenance' in his Essai de Cosmologie.^^) Now, although 
this is a much later work, it is significant that Montesquieu, 
Fréret, and Maupertuis knew each other, and during the 
1720's frequented much the same society in Paris. Maupertuis 
and Fréret were along with Duclos, Da Motte and Saurin, 
frequenters of the Café Procope. We may therefore assume 
that this and similar notions were often used in their dis­
cussions of scientific and philosophical topics.
Both Fréret and Maupertuis use the phrase in relation 
to natural phenomena, as part of their demonstration of 
cosmological theories which reject the idea of a transcendent 
order. It is true that in the Essai de Cosmologie,
Maupertuis himself embraces a teleological view of the 
universe; but when he actually mentions 'rapports de convenance', 
he is setting out the materialist theory which he wishes to 
refute,
(1) Lois I, 1. It was Montesquieu's definition of laws as 
'rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des 
choses', which most worried contemporary commentators, 
see Shackleton, Montesquieu, ch.XI. It is therefore 
interesting that Fréret also talks of necessary law and 
of the relationships between things in the same breath.
(2) See above,p.68.
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’ ?ne pourrait-on pas dire que dans la combinaison
fortuite des productions de la nature, comme il n ’y avait 
que celles où se trouvaient certains rapports de convenance, 
qui pussent subsister, il n ’est pas merveilleux que cette 
convenance se trouve dans toutes les espèces qui actuellement 
existent? ’
Me are back again with the conviction of 18th. century 
scientific rationalism, that, whatever its provenance, there 
is a necessary structural pattern in things, an order which 
will yield to human intelligence.^2) Stripped of its 
philosophical associations, it is the basic mathematical 
notion of correspondence between terms, upon which the whole 
of modern physics is built. It could then be the starting 
point for a definition of scientific law (though it hardly 
enters into the modern conception of scientific laws as 
descriptive summaries based on statistical evidence); and 
it is noticeable that Freret's idea of necessary law is 
quite unconnected with any theory of universal justice. 
Depending on one’s point of view, one may regard Spinozism 
proper, as the ultimate in rational idealism; but it admits 
no transcendent forces, no sanctions except those operating
(1) Essai de Cosmologie, I, Oeuvres complètes, Lyons, 1768, 
vol.I, p.10.
(2) The ’Discours préliminaire* of the Encyclopédie provides 
an authoritative statement of this conviction: *L’usage 
des connaissances mathématiques n ’est pas moins grand dans 
l ’examen des corps terrestres qui nous environnent.
Toutes les propriétés que nous observons dans ces corps 
ont entr’elles des rapports plus ou moins sensibles pour 
nous: la connaissance ou la découverte de ces rapports
est presque toujours le seul objet auquel il nous est 
permis d ’atteindre, et le seul par conséquent que nous 
devions nous proposer.’, vol.I, p.vi.
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through natural limitations. This was the kind of point 
that nascent materialism could utilize, without swallowing 
the corpus of metaphysical theory at the same time. And 
indeed Freret’s moral theory is founded on the law of natural 
inclinations, of observed tendencies. Moral attributes are 
only comprehensible in the light of human pleasure or pain; 
they have no absolute value. Thus we are again presented with 
the ideal of conformity with nature, in its sensible rather 
than its rational form.
'Quant au coeur, c'est-k-dire, au sentiment et à la volonté, 
il est vrai que j'y vois une loi gravée dès le premier 
instant de son existence, c'est-à-dire, l ’amour du plaisir 
et l ’aversion de la douleur; cette loi est généralement 
observée par tous les hommes...... Cette loi a attaché le
plaisir aux actions propres et même nécessaires à notre 
conservation; elle a attaché la douleur à celles qui y sont 
contraires; et par un instinct naturel, l ’amour du plaisir 
nous porte nécessairement à faire les unes, et l ’aversion 
de la douleur à éviter les autres.
Instinct is the principle of the moral law, not reason. 
The latter is limited to a comparative function; its role is 
to compare and choose between impressions. The reasonable 
man may be described as agreeing with the majority opinion 
of what constitutes pleasure and pain; the prudent man is 
he who shares common conceptions with his neighbour. 2^) 
Normality, not virtue, is the bond of society, and social 
utility is the measure of justice. It could only be founded
(1) Lettre de Thrasibule à leucippe. Oeuvres Completes, IV, 
pp.108-109 o
(2) Ibid.
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on equality if all men were reasonable; but, declares Fréret, 
this is not the case. So it is that laws are relative to 
the society that makes them, and conceptions of virtue and 
vice, purely a matter of habit.
But although reason as an independent criterion of 
belief and action has been banished from the scene, it is 
interesting to see that the old ideal of moderation, given 
a slightly different interpretation, is still to be found.
'Ceux-là passent pour raisonnables qui s'accordent avec les 
autres hommes dans ce qu'ils regardent comme le plus grand 
plaisir et la plus grande douleur, comme ceux-là passent 
pour sensés et pour prudents qui paraissent apercevoir les 
objets de la même manière dont les voient les autres hommes ;'
in essence, this is simply a materialist's version of the 
17th. century idea that for the sake of self-respect as 
well as common comfort, it was necessary to observe certain 
conventions. As we have already noted it is the natural­
istic elements of the 17th. century moral outlook which 
survive into the 18th. But the important change, important 
for our own organic conception of society and for the 
emergence of social psychology, as well as for the develop­
ment of primitive theories of environment already present 
in the work of Fénélon, Du Bos and others, and perfected 
by Montesquieu, is the linking of ideas of moderation and
(1) Op.cit., pp.115-116.
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of social convention, with the broad-based notion of group 
consciousness• The 17th. century thought of ethics in 
terms of an individual creed supported by universal con­
ceptions; the 18th, began to regard them as the product of 
society, determined by particular circumstances and 
characteristics. As regards our present study, this change 
of attitude involved explaining the notion of convenance, 
conformity or convention in terms of phenomena not of ideals.
The transformation of the idea of convenance is best 
illustrated in the work of another curious figure of the 
first half of the 18th. century. Like Fréret, Saint-Hyacinthe 
was a propagandist of philosophic ideas, a writer of pam­
phlets and short discourses, where theories derived from a 
variety of sources, but mainly from Spinoza were boiled down 
to make new and sometimes indigestible systems. In tempera­
ment however, Saint-Hyacinthe was the diametric opposite of 
the erudite historian and orientalist. He was a soldier of 
fortune who left his native France, embraced protestantism, 
and settled more or less permanently in England, where.
(1) For the history of the evolution of the theory of envi­
ronment, see K.S. Laurila, Les Premiers devanciers 
français de la théorie du milieu, Helsinki, 1928, 
published in the annals of the Finnish Academy of Science, 
series B., vol.XXII, He deals with Bodin, Chardin, 
Fontenelle, Fenélon and Du Bos. Similar theories, arising 
out of the study of religion in relation to political 
development, were put forward in England by harburton.
In the Alliance between Church and State, 1736, .he 
establishes the existence of a national personality 
distinct from the aggregated personalities of its members.
1 29
during his visit from 1729-31, Montesquieu made his acquain­
t a n c e . T h e  President was in due course presented with 
a copy of his Letters giving an account of several conver­
sations upon important and entertaining subjects, a kind of 
18th. century Canterbury tales, where in an account of a 
journey through Holland, serious philosophical discussion 
rubs shoulders with licentious a n e c d o t e s . I n  this and 
a later work, materialist tendencies come slowly to fruition, 
The strongest impression they give is of a mind crowded 
with conflicting theories, each cancelling the other out, 
which finally takes refuge in materialism, as the only view 
of the world answering the practical demands of living. 
Sensationalist epistemological theories seem to have acted 
as a catalyst in this process, for a typical feature of the 
second work, the Recherches philosophiques, is the fitting 
of notions drawn from Locke into existing Cartesian 
f o r m u l a e . T h e  following definitions are typical examples
(1) See Shackleton, Montesquieu, VI, p.134.
(2) London, 1731, 2 vols.; Catalogue de la Brède, No.2304, 
p.164.
(3) This procedure is characteristic of eclectics in the 
first half of the century; we have already mentioned 
Claude Buffier (see above,p477,n.l). The marquis 
d'Argens's La philosophie du bon sens, 1737, provides 
other typical examples: 'on peut aussi bien prouver 
l'existence, en disant "je sens, donc je suis", qu'en 
disant, "je pense, donc je suis".', edition of 1747, 
The Hague, p.211.
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of this procedure: evidence is defined as 'le sentiment
d'une chose si nécessaire que le contraire est impossible'; 
and knowledge of truth as 'la conformité du jugement avec 
la nature des choses,
The Letters giving an account of several conversations 
are still ostensibly the work of a deist; the second volume 
is almost entirely taken up by an exposition of the basic 
tenets of deism, and we find again such characteristics as 
the submission of religious dogma to the criterion of 
evidence, the rejection of miracles, the idea of the neces­
sity of a first cause, and the associated proof that nothing 
can produce nothing, that it possesses no properties.
But in spite of these features, there is a disturbing 
section in the second volume, allegedly designed to refute 
Baylien ideas on the virtues of atheism, v/hich in fact does 
just the reverse, and which sketches in the main lines of 
the materialist argument developed in the later work, 
Saint-Hyacinthe's declared intention in Letter X is to 
prove that without supernatural sanctions, there is no basis 
for morality or justice; and the argument centres around 
the notion of fitness, against which he measures the
(1) Recherches philosophiques sur la nécessité de s'assurer 
par soi-même de la vérité, sur la certitude de nos 
connaissances et sur la nature des etres, Rotterdam and 
the Hague, 1743; Book II, ch.3, para.79; Book II, ch.l, 
para.54.
(2) Op.cit., vol.II, letter XVI; vol.I, letter V; vol.II, 
letter XV.
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materialist claim that happiness is the sole concern of 
ethics :
'One thing, which has the most contributed to their error, 
who have maintained that independent of the positive will 
of God, and of future rewards and punishments, justice and 
injustice, our rights and duties, were founded upon the 
fitness of things, is the not observing that there is no 
obligation to act one way rather than another, so long as 
there is no inconvenience for him that is to act, to act 
one way more than another; that things require no conforming 
to them, farther than as they are fitting for him who is 
to act: and that he w^ ho is to act, in order to act accord­
ing to reason, ought to act no farther, than as he makes
himself the happier; because well-being is the only thing 
necessarily fitting and suitable to being.
In this passage, the three main conceptions of convenance, 
which we may roughly describe as the 17th. century teleo- 
logical, the 18th. century naturalist/materialist, and the 
intermediary immanentist, are brought together, and the 
essential weakness of the latter is effectively described.
This line of argument, characterized in the text as
relativist, is taken up much more vigorously in the
Recherches Philosophiques sur la nécessité de s'assurer 
par soi-même de la vérité, sur la certitude de nos 
connaissances et sur la nature des êtres. Here the pretence 
of proving the necessity of a transcendent will disappears, 
and the influence of Spinoza appears more pronounced.
(1) Op.cit., vol.II, Letter X,pp.291r 292 .
(2) In the Letters, Saint-Hyacinthe actually attempted a 
refutation of Spinoza, following lines similar to that 
made by Montesquieu in the unused fragment of the Traité 
des Devoirs, Pensée 1266 (Bkn.615): 'he are going to 
confound same with like, and shall presently say the 
Emperor of China is a chimney sweeper; a rock is a snail, 
etc.' Letter 14, p.451.
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Saint-Hyacinthe's moral theory is now reduced to the pro­
position that, because the nature of things is necessarily 
determined, and happiness consists in the fulfilment of 
the demands of one's relative nature, then to act in accord­
ance with reason and truth is to pursue satisfaction and 
the perfection of one's n a t u r e . T h e  attainment of 
happiness is the only true motive in human behaviour, and 
the only end of existence.
'J'entends par vertu^ le courage de pratiquer ce que la 
raison exige, c'est-a-dire, la conformité des sentiments et 
des actions selon ce qui est le plus convenable au bonheur'
there is no longer any question of the convenance of things 
being related to any transcendent principle; 'Convenance 
à la nature' is the only moral ideal which may be admitted, 
and one may only talk of convenance in things if they make 
a positive contribution to the attainment of natural ends;
'l'effet que font les choses selon ce degré auquel elles 
contribuent ou nuisent au bonheur, est ce qu'on appelle 
leurs convenances ou leurs disconvenances, et en ce sens on 
peut dire que les choses ont plus ou moins de convenances 
eu égard à l'état auquel elles conviennent.
Thus conformity is now related to immanent, not cosmic 
teleology, and it is a relative quality. However, since 
the pursuit of happiness is synonymous with virtue, it 
follows that law and justice will continue to be founded on 
the relationships of conformity between things;
Recherches Philosophiques, Bk.III, paras.158-160.
Ibid, para.154% V.244'
(3) Ibid., para.160^P»
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'C'est sur ces convenances ou ces disconvenances, et sur la 
nécessité que le bien être soit le but de l'être, que sont
fondés ce qu'on appelle le bien et le mal moral..... l'ordre
et le désordre, la vertu et le vice, le juste et l'injuste,
les droits et les devoirs d'un être.  C'est ce qui fait
que ces droits et ces devoirs ont été appelés naturels et 
que la raison sur laquelle ils sont fondés, c'est-à-dire 
cet amour du bonheur, cette tendance de l'être à sa 
perfection, a été nommé loi de nature, car on entend par 
nature, l'essence des choses, c'est-à-dire, les propriétés 
nécessaires à leur existence et ce qui en résulte nécessaire­
ment, et c'est de là qu'on a dit que les droits et les 
devoirs naturels étaient inaltérables et inviolables, parce 
qu'ils résultent des propriétés nécessaires à un être capable 
de bonheur et de perfection, d'une tendance nécessaire à se 
procurer tout le bonheur et la perfection dont il est capable 
et à s'y conserver s'il y était parvenu.
The influence of Spinoza is indisputable, as a brief com­
parison of this passage with the most distinctive section 
of the Tractatus shows :
'By the right and ordinance of nature I understand nothing 
but the conditions of the nature of each individual thing 
in accordance with which we conceive each individual thing 
to be determined by nature to live and act in a definite 
way, etc.'(2)
The Ethica was less well known in France, but although 
Spinoza's moral theory is there more highly developed, its 
basic message remains unchanged; there is no moral law as 
distinct from natural law, the good for each thing is that 
which helps it to exist, and the ability to secure this 
good is virtue.
(1) Recherches Philosophiques, Bk.III, \ v . ", para. 161^
(2) Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, XVI, 175.
(3) Ethica, IV, 20.
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The change of emphasis which has taken place in the 
Recherches Philosophiques, by comparison with the Letters 
giving an account of several conversations, is so great 
that one might even begin to suspect a change of author, 
were it not for certain identical phrases in the two works, 
and their characteristically repetitive style. There is 
also a brief mention in the Recherches, of the idea that 
justice is invariable if it is related to a transcendent 
force, but this is now plainly reduced to the level of a 
doubtful hypothesis. If this were so however, and celestial 
happiness was to be attained, then one might speak of 
'convenances invariables'; but the truth is more likely to 
be that legislators proclaim the existence of eternal 
punishments and rewards, in order to enforce their own laws. 
Natural law is necessary in origin; but its content is 
always relative to the individual condition, just as the 
particular laws and customs of a state are variable and 
relative to the nature of its people.
Thus the transformation is complete. Fitness in things 
is a relative quality; it does not witness to divine creation, 
nor to the ultimate goodness and perfection of the universe.
It is the basis of justice, but of a justice which is rela­
tive only to the individual nature, condition and needs.
(1) Recherches Philosophiques, Bk.III, para.161.
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The ideal of conformity with nature has been taken to its 
logical extremity, and there is no longer cause for reason, 
equity or charity to moderate the spontaneous striving of 
the individual towards fulfilment.
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CHAPTER POUR
ENGLISH THINKERS.
1 3 7
A study of the part played by the idea of convenance 
in the elaboration of moral theories in the opening years 
of the 18th, century, could hardly pretend to be complete 
without mention of the English. The political upheavals 
which mark the period; the war of the League of Augsburg 
running into the war of the Spanish Succession; religious 
persecution and economic depression in Prance; bitter mer­
cantile rivalry between England, Holland and Prance; the 
revolution of 1688 in England and the establishment of 
William of Orange on the English throne, followed by 
Louis XIV's espousal of the Stuart cause; all this, and the 
inevitable refugee movements that accompanied it, led to a 
weakening of cultural barriers and an exchange of ideas, in 
which English influence began to play an increasingly 
dominant role.^^) Tn matters of political philosophy, natu­
ral science, and economic theory, matters which closely 
affected the state of Prance, her men of science and letters 
began to look across the narrow seas to the country hitherto 
regarded by popular opinion as barbaric, but which now gave 
proof of the prosperity and political vigour so manifestly 
lacking at home. In the preceding chapters we have tried
(1) George Ascoli's La Grande Bretagne devant l'opinion 
française aux 16e. et 17e. siècles, Paris, 1927» 1930, 
is invaluable in assessing the extent of this influence 
up to this period. P. Hazard's La Prise de la Conscience 
européenne, Paris, 1935, deals with English influences in 
various fields; see especially part I, ch.3; part III, 
chs.1,4,5,6. C.A. Rochedieu's Bibliography of Prench 
translations of English works 1700-1800, Chicago, 1948, 
is a useful guide to later periods.
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to examine the contribution made to moral philosophy by 
a few outstanding figures in Prench literary circles, and 
to gauge the extent to which certain ideas became embedded 
in the national consciousness by reference to the works of 
several other relatively obscure writers. But from the last 
decade of the 17th. century onwards English ideas and 
theories are a factor to be considered in major as well as 
minor works. Of course, these theories spring from a common 
European tradition, and although they may be regarded as 
instrumental in establishing the dominance of empiricism in 
philosophy and science, it is often difficult, in view of 
the fact that some of them result from parallel developments 
in thought in which Prench influences have played their 
part, to estimate the extent to which they innovate as 
opposed to merely complementing or reinforcing notions 
already well established.
The notion of convenance undoubtedly possessed a long 
history in Prench thought, and the English moral treatises 
which drew on the idea of conformity or fitness were 
probably influenced by similar classical models if not also 
by French works. We have already mentioned the influence 
of Malebranche in England; and we should not forget the 
great esteem in which Prench aesthetic theories were held 
also.^j Perhaps it is also significant that several
(1) For the influence of Malebranche in England, see above p.51-
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English philosophers of the 17th* century had occasion to 
travel in Prance, either in the course of their duties as 
tutors to young noblemen or as a result of political changes 
which conflicted with their sympathies. Although he can 
scarcely be called an idealist, Hobbes made several visits 
to Prance for both of these reasons, became the close friend 
of Gassendi, and there acquired the main outlines of his 
general philosophy. This naturally included an enthusiasm 
for geometry, which is perhaps reflected in his conception 
of natural law. Even Hobbes is ready to associate reason 
with certain 'convenient articles of peace', although the 
great obstacle to their observance is the combination of 
natural passions and a lawless state;
'The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; 
desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; 
and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason 
suggest the convenient articles of peace, upon which men may 
be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which 
otherwise are called laws of nature: whereof I shall speak
more particularly.'
John Locke likewise spent his years of exile travelling in 
France and Holland, and there met at first hand the disciples 
of Gassendi and Descartes. But whatever the provenance of 
English ideas of fitness and conformity, and as regards the 
Cambridge neo-platonists, the main representatives of 
rational idealism in moral philosophy, we are ill equipped 
to suggest formative influences other than those implied by
(1) Leviathan, 1651, I, 15.
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their designation, it is important that the works of 
Cudworth, Locke, and Locke’s pupil Shaftesbury were among the 
first to make a widespread impression on Prench thought at 
the turn of the century.
The English works were put into Prench, analysed and 
reviewed by the Prench Protestant exiles in the Low Countries 
and in England. Pirst among these was Pierre Coste, the 
translator and friend of Shaftesbury and Locke, colleague 
of Newton in the Royal Society, and translator of the Optics. 
His translation of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understand­
ing, the version possessed by Montesquieu, was one of the 
most important works of the first half of the century; and 
he was also responsible for the translation of Locke’s 
Reasonableness of Christianity in 1696. Of Locke’s other 
works, the Two Treatises of Civil Government were reviewed 
by Jean Le Clerc in volume 19 of the Bibliothèque Universelle 
and the second was translated by a Huguenot pastor, David 
Maazel, also living in H o l l a n d . Jeun Le Clerc was a 
friend of Coste and of Shaftesbury, as well as a correspon­
dent of Pontenelle, Leibniz and Vico; the Bibliothèque 
Choisie, one of his other periodicals, also carried important 
reviews of Shaftesbury’s Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, which 
appeared in translation at the Hague in 1708.
(1) Amsterdam, 1691, pp.559-573.
2) Du Gouvernement Civil, Amsterdam, 1691.
3) Bibliothèque Choisie, vol.XIX, 1709.
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Shaftesbury's Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour was 
translated by both Coste and J. van Effen in 1710 and the 
complete edition of the Characteristics published in 1711, 
was reviewed by Leibniz in his Jugement sur les Oeuvres de 
Shaftesbury, which appeared in London in the same year, and 
again later in the Recueil de Diverses Pieces sur la
Philosophie, another major publication containing essays by
Newton and Collins, brought out by another eminent French­
man in London, Pierre D e s m a i z e a u x . The Recueil de 
Diverses Pieces also contained the correspondence between 
Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, disciple of Newton and rationalist 
theologian. His famous Boyle lectures of 1704 and 1705 
were translated by Ricotier in 1717.^2) The sermons of yet 
another noted English latitudinarian. Archbishop Tillotson, 
were translated by no less a person than the jurisconsult 
Jean Barbeyrac.^^) These are only a few of the English 
works that found their way into French libraries during the
first quarter of the 18th. century, as a result of the
labours of Coste, Desmaizeaux and others like them.
Some of them quite naturally found their way into 
Montesquieu's library at La Brède. He possessed for example
(1) Amsterdam, 1720; a detailed account of the reviews and 
translations of Shaftesbury is given by E. Casati in 
'Hérauts et Commentateurs de Shaftesbury en France',
Revue de Littérature comparée, XIV, 1934; p.615.
(2) De l'Existence et des Attributs de Dieu, Amsterdam, 1717.
(3) Amsterdam, 1713-1718.
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the Recueil de Diverses Pièces, a n d  the inventory of his 
Paris library lists Shaftesbury, More surprising, con­
sidering that Montesquieu seems unlikely to have read much 
English before his visit in 1729, are the number of works 
which he possesses in the original English version in 
editions published before that date. It is of course 
probable that he acquired earlier editions during his visit 
however. Shaftesbury’s Characteristics he had in the 
edition of 1714;^2) the Catalogue of La Brède also lists 
a copy of Clarke's Discourse on the Being and Attributes of 
God in the London edition of 1 7 2 8 . The influence of 
Steele and Addison's Spectator was strong in P r a n c e , a n d  
Montesquieu was obviously attracted by the ideal of good- 
humoured modesty which it presented, for the Catalogue lists 
at least two editions, and it appears again in the Paris 
i n v e n t o r y . S t e e l e ' s  Le Philosophe Nouvelliste also 
appears in the Catalogue.  ^ Apart from details given in 
the Catalogue however, Montesquieu's references are an 
invaluable source of i n f o r m a t i o n . T h u s  a reference to
(1) Catalogue de la Brède, éd.. Desgraves; art.1532, p.112.
(2) Ibid., No.696, p.52.
(3) Ibid., No.432, p.34.
(4) See G.Ascoli, La Grande-Bretagne devant 1|Opinion 
française au XVIIe. siècle, vol.II, Bk.iii, ch,5, 
section v,d.; and P. Hazard, La Crise de la Conscience 
européenne, part III, ch.7.
(5) Catalogue, p.52, Nos.701,2, Amsterdam ed. of 1717, and 
9th. London ed. 1729; Inventory of the Paris Library, 
Appendix I of the Catalogue, No.34.
(6) Catalogue No.652, p.49.
(7) Lists of authors cited in Montesquieu's main works are 
given by P. Barrière in Un Grand Provincial, Montesquieu, 
part I, ch.v, section 3, pp.199-201.
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Cudworth in the Dissertation sur la Politique des Romains 
dans la Religion, read at the Academy of Bordeaux in 1716, 
reveals a very early acquaintance with the English philo­
sopher's work.^^j In the Spicilège Montesquieu describes 
the works of Tillotson as being good examples of English 
style, ^ 2) -A.nd the use made in both the Discours sur la 
Transparence des Corps, and the Essai d 'Observations sur 
l'Histoire Naturelle, of Newton's theories of reflection and 
refraction of light, shows a sound knowledge of Coste's trans­
lation of the Optics. ^  He was by no means unprepared for 
his visit to England, two years after the death of Newton, 
and for his meetings, not only with the leading members of 
the learned world, but also with those same Frenchmen,
Pierre Coste, the secretary of Lady Masham, Ralph Cudworth's 
daughter, and Pierre Desmaizeaux, whose labours had helped 
in this preparation, and whose wide and influential contacts 
now contributed to the consolidation of his knowledge of 
English thought and customs.
Bearing in mind that Montesquieu probably possessed 
considerable knowledge of the major English works on moral 
philosophy produced at the end of the 17th. century, and in
1) Nagel III, p.44.
,2) Op,cit., 560.
(3; Discours sur la Transparence des Corps, 1720, Nagel III, 
p.96; Essai d 'Observations, 1719-1721; Nagel III, p.100. 
Montesquieu also possessed Coste's translation of Locke's 
Essay in the Amsterdam ed. of 1700, and the 1710 Rotterdam 
ed, of the Oeuvres Diverses, Catalogue, Nos.1489,1490,p.109
(4) Eor an account of Montesquieu's visit, and details of his 
encounters, see Shackleton, Montesquieu, ch.VI.
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the early years of the 18th., long before his visit to 
England, 2^ ) must now examine the place which the notion 
of fitness occupies in some of them,
Locke is often regarded as the father of sensationalism, 
and at least as far as French thought is concerned, the 
prophet and high priest of materialism. It commonly happens 
that the intellectual climate of one country will tolerate 
only those elements of an alien doctrine that appear to 
favour a current of thought which is already beginning to 
rise above conflicting streams, and needs only a little 
reinforcement to sweep home in flood. Perhaps too many in 
cultured circles preferfed Voltaire's introduction to 
M. Locke in the Lettres Philosophiques, to Pierre Coste's 
fine translation of 1700; and Voltaire himself, exercising 
his journalistic flair in decanting from a considerable 
treatise, only those elements which served his own opinions 
and were likely to satisfy the particular curiosities of 
his audience, provides us with a prime example of the way in 
which philosophical systems are naturally distorted in the
(1) In his critical edition of the Lettres Persanes, Paris, 
Gamier, I960, Paul Vernière gives complete lists of 
Montesquieu's sources, both certain and probable; it 
appears from these that Thomas Burnet was an influence 
in Letter 113, and Shaftesbury in possibly four letters, 
10,83,94,104; see op.cit.. Introduction p.xxiv. 
Shackleton sees the influence of Samuel Clarke in the 
vestiges of the lost Traité des Devoirs; see Montesquieu, 
ch.IV, p.71.
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process of absorption by a foreign culture. Voltaire chan­
nels his reader's attention to three aspects of Locke's doc­
trine; the rejection of innate ideas, the possibility that 
matter may be endowed with the faculty of thought, the effect 
this has on the hotly debated question of animal souls; and 
all this in the cause of pouring scorn on the theologians.^^ 
As Paul Hazard points out, Locke became a materialist in 
spite of himself. True, he rejected the doctrine of eternal 
torment; and he reduced the articles of faith to a minimum;
Wa-t.
but his real object in Reasonable Christianity,^to reconcile 
to revealed religion those alienated by the spectacle of 
warring sects and quibbling theologians. Whatever his tenta­
tive suggestions in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, 
Locke was not even a Deist properly speaking, let alone a 
materialist,
It is therefore not surprising to learn that Locke began 
his career as a philosopher of the idealist school. This was 
not known in his own day outside his immediate circle of 
acquaintances, although of course, passages on natural law, 
and on the finitude of the material universe in the Essay on 
Human Understanding, were proof enough of an unwillingness to
(1) Lettres Philosophiques, 1734, Letter 13. ^
(2) See Paul Hazard, La Crise de la Conscience européenne, 
part III, ch.l.
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undermine the validity of transcendent c r i t e r i a . L o c k e ' s  
early essays on natural law, the product of his idealist 
period, were not published until our own day,^2) although 
they date from the years 1654-1664. They are interesting 
from several points of view; for the ideas presented in 
them, and for the ways in which they anticipate the Essay 
of 1690. For instance, in the fifth essay of Van Leyden's 
edition which deals with the argument from general consent, 
there is a long account of the comparative customs and laws 
of various nations, barbaric and civilised, where Locke 
attempts to establish factual evidence for the standard rule 
of morality which he has posited. Besides breaking entirely 
new ground, the position adopted by Locke in this embryonic 
study of comparative law, anticipates in some ways that of 
Montesquieu in the Esprit des Lois; one recognizes the 
strange marriage of observational science and idealism; with 
regard to the Essay concerning Human Understanding however, 
it represents the start of a gradual transformation leading 
to a complete reversal of attitude. For in the Essay of 
1690, Locke argues that the great variety of customs among 
nations is positive proof that no universal, innate prin­
ciples exist.^2)
(1) Op.cit., Bk.I, ch.3; bk.IV, ch.10.
(2) The manuscripts of the Lovelace collection were edited by 
W. van Leyden, and published at Oxford, 1954.
(3) Op.cit., Bk.I, ch.3.
1 4 7
Yet although the early essays grew out of a discussion 
with his friend Gabriel Towerson on the question whether the 
law of nature,
’can be evinced from the force of conscience in those men 
who have no other divine law to square their actions
it is not really true to say that Locke ever embraced the 
nativist standpoint. He maintains consistently throughout 
his works, that man attains to the knowledge of God and of 
natural laws by the exercise of his natural faculties, that 
is, the senses and reason; the implications of this convict­
ion are not fully worked out in the early essays, whereas in 
the definitive work, he has come to realise the length and 
complexity of this exercise. On the basis of Locke’s chiefly 
consistent attitude to the processes of knowledge, and his 
agreement in this with his friend Archbishop Tillotson, who, 
while contending that the principles of natural religion 
could be ascertained by reason alone, interpreted reason not 
as innate perception but rather clear ratiocination, 2^) It 
might be possible to suggest that English idealism generally 
relied on a very different epistemological foundation from 
its French counterpart. But this is beyond the scope of our 
study. We must press on to consider the place of the idea 
of fitness in Locke’s treatment of natural law.
(1) Letter from Towerson to Locke c.1661-65, quoted in 
Van Leyden’s Introduction to the Essays.
(2) This interpretation of Tillotson's conception of reason 
is given by D. Brown in An edition of selected sermons 
of John Tillotson, a thesis presented for the degree of 
M.A. at London University, 1956.
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Locke’s reasoning with regard to the relationship 
between God and the universe rests on a teleological basis 
similar to that of Leibniz. While the design apparent in 
the universe is presented as a proof of the existence of 
God, the proposition that God is accordingly omnipotent, and 
omniscient, is put forward as evidence that the universe was 
built with a purpose, and that all its parts are endowed 
with a rule or pattern of life appropriate to their nature. 
Whatever the logical defects in this argument, it is clear 
that Locke wished to emphasize the conformity he saw between 
the nature of man and his divinely appointed role in the 
scheme of things. Of all creatures, man alone has the faculty 
of reason; it is therefore obvious that God requires him to 
live according to reason. Following the well trodden 
Aristotelian path, Locke goes on to affirm that the special 
function of the rational creature is to worship God and to 
live in society with other men. But, and in relation to the 
main stream of rational idealism, this is a very important 
but, the natural law which these special functions imply, is 
not so-called, and neither is it self-enforcing, because it 
derives from supernatural reason; on the contrary, it 
partakes of the nature of law, because it satisfies the 
requisite of any and every law established by reason and 
sense experience; that is to say, it emanates from the
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positive will of a superior power, to which man is subject. 
Locke calls it a natural law, because knowledge of it is 
acquired by the joint exercise of man’s natural faculties, 
it is a law promulgated by God in a natural way rather than 
by revelation; because it conforms to the natural constitut­
ion of the universe, and with the nature of man; and because 
its precepts are universally binding; that is to say, that 
like the laws governing natural phenomena, and unlike 
statutory laws, they do not vary from place to place.
Thus it is clear that the notion of conformity fulfils 
two important functions in Locke’s moral thought: the con­
formity which is posited between human nature and the content 
of the natural law is essential to the epistemological argu­
ment; by the combined operation of natural faculties man 
attains to knowledge of the existence of moral law and of 
its dictates. Secondly, this conformity plays a vital role 
in the exposition of the nature and extent of obligation, 
which Locke presents in the seventh of his early essays.
Here the idea of convenientia is put in its proper perspect­
ive. The primary or formal cause of obligation, that is of 
the binding force of natural law, is purely arbitrary; it 
consists in the Divine will. But at a secondary level, and 
here again the resemblance to Leibniz’s notion of a 
’nécessité de convenance’ is noticeable,obligation
(l) See above, p. 5*7»
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derives from the conformity which exists between God's will 
and its creation, between man's nature and his purpose as a 
rational being. Thus, taking a short view, one may derive 
obligation from a material cause: the nature of man. The
suitableness of moral values to the essential nature of man 
provides law with a natural foundation, and makes human 
reason a self-dependent source of obligation. But when it 
comes to isolating the ultimate source of moral determination, 
one must look beyond the teleological interpretation of 
human nature, beyond the notion of fitness, to the inexplic­
able will of God.
In his introduction to Locke's Essays on the Law of 
Nature, Van Leyden suggests that Locke took the term 
convenientia from Gulverwel's discussion of the notion of 
harmony between human nature and law, and of the origin of 
natural obligation, in the Discourse of the Light of Nature. 
Culverwel, he adds, took it from Scholasticism, and in par­
ticular from a treatise by Vasquez.^^) Thus Locke at least 
cannot be associated with any resurgent interest in Stoicism. 
The seventh essay does however contain a comparison between 
mathematical necessity and moral obligation. Locke here
(1) Op.cit., pp.49-52. Van Leyden gives the following 
reference to Culverwel: Discours of the light of Nature, 
ed. Brown, 1857; ch.VI, pp.71-77.
(2) G.Vasquez, Comment, in Sum. Theol. Thom. Aquin., 1,2, 
disp, 150, C.5.
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declares that it follows from the nature of man to observe 
the law of nature, just as it follows from the nature of a 
triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. 
This was a very common procedure in philosophical argument; 
Descartes used the same analogy in the fifth Meditation to 
demonstrate the existence of God; and not surprisingly, it 
had appeared in Aquinas's discussion of the universal 
validity of natural law;^^ so too much importance cannot be 
attached to its presence in Locke's essay. He is in fact 
rather more concerned with showing that by the proper use of 
their mental faculties men can arrive at certain knowledge 
of the order of absolute truth, than with demonstrating the 
generic unity of mathematical and moral principles.
Indeed, in the later Essay concerning Human Understand­
ing, Locke's main concern in Book I, is to emphasize the 
different means by which one comes to a knowledge of these 
principles :
'the doubt of their being native impressions on the mind is 
stronger against these moral principles than the others.
Not that it brings their truth at all in question. They are 
equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative 
maxims carry their o\m evidence with them; but moral prin­
ciples require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of 
the mind to discover the certainty of their truth.
(1) Summa Theologica, la, Ilae, quest., 94, art.4.
(2) Op.cit., Bk.I, ch.3; 5th. ed., London, 1706, reprinted 
London, 1961, pp.25-26.
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The core of the work is epistemological, and metaphysics 
and morals take second place; accordingly, the debate over 
the arbitrary or necessary nature of the rational order 
becomes a matter of relative insignificance. Firmly con­
vinced from the outset, of the part played by sense 
experience in the acquisition of knowledge, Locke had no 
time for the kind of distinctions which Gudworth and his 
fellow ethical rationalists were at pains to make. Never­
theless, in the course of his criticism of innate ideas, 
Locke does develop his moral theories. As compared with the 
earlier essays, his attitude to ethics becomes more scien­
tific than philosophical. Summarizing the significance of 
the Essay of 1690, Van Leyden describes it as an attempt, 
using the historical plain method, to define different kinds 
of moral evaluation, rather than to consider morality as 
the embodiment of absolute standards of truth. Locke's aim, 
concerning ethical matters, is to consider ideas of moral 
relations, that is, the range and varieties of moral rules 
to which men refer their a c t i o n s . W i t h o u t  abandoning 
the idea of an absolute ethical criterion, he concentrates 
his attention upon the notion, properly scientific, of 
adequate relationship between perception and its object, or 
in the moral sphere, between action and the rule to which
(1) Essays on the Law of Nature, Introduction, pp.76-77
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it is subject, so leaving the notion of convenientia in its 
special philosophical sense, that developed in the Essays 
on Natural law, on one side. Discussing in Book II, the 
various kinds of relationship, which a theory of knowledge 
must account for, he writes simply,
'There is another sort of relation which is the conformity 
or disagreement men's voluntary actions have to a rule to 
which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; 
which I think, may be called moral relation, as being that 
which denominates our moral actions.
There is a constant tension throughout the Essay between 
the idea of independent ethical standards and the scientific 
aim of description and definition of laws. Thus the rules 
of justice are characterized as 'rules of convenience', as 
the 'common ties of society', without which any community 
disintegrates; they are necessary practical principles, but 
neither the laws of the country, nor the code of behaviour 
within any particular group or corporation, always conform 
to them. Thieves and outlaws may behave justly to their 
own kind, notes locke, but their actions towards honest 
people are dictated by interest not e q u i t y . I d e a l i s m  in 
ethics is scrutinized for any evidence it may give of power 
to enforce its own dictates. In the early essays Locke 
had talked of the necessity of a law-giver with power to 
enforce his will, but he had also tied the law of nature 
to the rational nature of man, so that reason became a
(1) Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk.II, ch.28; p.295
(2) Ibid., Bk.I, ch.3; p.26“.
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self-dependent source of obligation. The Essay of 1690 
presents a different picture: practical or moral principles,
derived from nature, must produce conformity of action, 
otherwise they cease to be moral principles; but reason has 
ceased to operate as a motive force, and its place has been 
taken by the 'innate practical principles', desire for happi­
ness, and aversion to m i s e r y . T h e s e  are the real forces 
behind all action; and conscience is simply our personal 
judgement of the merit or demerit of our actions in accord­
ance with a rule, which may or may not embody the principles 
of justice, but which is, whether it be the law of God, of 
the state, or of fashion, in origin essentially arbitrary, 
and supported by sufficient sanctions:
'Good and evil, as hath been shown, are nothing but pleasure 
or pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or 
pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is only the conform­
ity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, 
whereby good or evil is drawn on us from the will and power 
of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, 
attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree 
of the law-maker, is that we call reward and punishment.
We might ask what has become of the absolutes of ri^t 
and wrong, related to the primitive ideas of fitness in the 
universe, and purpose in the rational essence of man.
There seems very little to salvage once moral values are
(1) Op.cit., Bk.I, ch.3; p.27.
(2) Op.cit., Bk.II, ch.28; pp.295-296.
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harnessed to subjective judgement on the one hand, and the 
arbitrary will of the legislator on the other. Yet Locke 
is at pains to defend his belief in natural law:
'And I think they equally forsake the truth who running into 
contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that 
there is a law knowable by the light of nature, i.e. without 
the help of positive revelation.'^^
Nowhere does Locke actually deny or set out to disprove the 
existence of a natural moral law. In the Recherches 
Philosophiques, Saint-Hyacinthe uses Locke's argument that 
innate moral principles would necessarily suppose the exist­
ence of innate conceptions of God, of obligation, of punish­
ment, and of life after death, to demolish the notion that 
convenance is an adequate basis for ethical theory. 2^)
Locke does not openly reject his own earlier theories how­
ever: in this case he simply applies his long-held convict­
ion that moral ideas are valueless unless they are expressed 
in the form of a command or prohibition which has the support 
of superior power, to the business of disproving the doctrines 
of nativism. One can only assume that he held to the con­
viction that those necessary practical principles, the rules 
of justice binding society together, were in conformity both 
with the natural inclinations of man, and with the will and 
purpose of God. It is a conviction which evades the problem
(1) Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk.I, ch.3; p.33
(2) See above pp. 129
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of possible conflict between natural inclination and the 
demands of justice, by assuming that the operation of rewards 
and punishments will automatically prevent such conflict. 
Perhaps too great a reliance is also placed on the proper 
operation of men’s natural faculties in the discovery of 
natural law: variable factors are obviously a weak basis for
an invariable law. But this criticism must be weighed against 
the fact that Locke's object in the Essay was to vindicate 
empirical philosophy rather than to provide a logical ana­
lysis of the concept of natural law. One thing is clear 
however; namely, that in spite of Locke's efforts to salvage 
the idea of a law 'knowable by the light of nature', it was 
no impossible task for anaspiring philosophe to piece 
together from the arguments of the Essay a doctrine of pure 
ethical naturalism, proclaiming the sole ideal of 'convenance 
à la nature'.
The evolution of Locke's ethical thought reflects the 
tensions of the philosophical 'climate' of the day.
Beginning with a theologically legislative ethic, basing 
right and wrong on God's commands and punishments, he soon 
adopted a hedonistic ethic as well, of a Hobbesian variety, 
with pain and pleasure as the springs of action. Meanwhile 
he passionately believed in the possibility of demonstrating
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ethics mathematically, but perpetually complicated every­
thing with an anthropological relativism, founded on the 
observation of the variety of ethical values among the world's 
peoples, which implied that vice and virtue were simply 
customary. Many of these tensions were still unresolved 
when Montesquieu came to write the Esprit des Lois. But 
although the moral testament of the Essay concerning Human 
Understanding is confused, we must bear in mind that it was not 
the sole vehicle for Locke's ideas. The second Treatise on 
Government was translated into French some ten years before 
the Essay, and here Locke's moral ideas are essentially the 
same as those advanced in the early Essays on the Law of 
Nature. The existence of a body of natural law is an essent­
ial presupposition of his political theory, and he continues 
to understand that law as being at one and the same time a 
command of God, a rule of reason, and a law in the very nature 
of things as they are. It may be that in spite of the dis­
appearance of the early works, the Locke known in the early 
years of the century was the idealist Locke, who combined 
belief in an immutable moral law based on the essential fit­
ness of things, with great confidence in the natural 
inclinations and natural faculties of man. This confidence 
survives and is intensified in the Essay of 1690, but rather 
at the expense of his metaphysical idealism.
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Locke never embraced the theories of the ethical 
rationalists of the Cambridge school, like Gudworth, who 
in such works as the True Intellectual System of the Universe, 
and the Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, 
attempted to found good and bad, justice and injustice on 
the necessary and immutable relationships between the eternal 
essences of things, and declared that this original and 
independent moral standard determined the will of God. For 
Locke, the source of moral values remained the arbitrary 
will of a superior being. But his pupil, Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, earl of Shaftesbury, combined his master’s confidence 
in the natural affections of man with the rational idealism 
of the Cambridge Platonists. The resulting combination, 
not without affinities to Spinozism, but unsupported by any 
developed philosophical structure, exercised considerable 
influence on European thought. It is almost certain, 
although Montesquieu does not mention him by name, that some 
of his ideas found their way into the Lettres Persanes, and 
into the Traite des Devoirs. G u d w o r t h ,  as we noted at 
the beginning of this chapter,^2) is cited by Montesquieu, 
but in connection with pagan religions, one of the President’s
(1) Parallels between Shaftesbury’s works and certain 
theories put forward in the Lettres Persanes are dis­
cussed in an article by A.S. Crisafulli, ’Parallels to 
ideas in the Lettres Persanes’, Modern Language Assoc. 
of America, Sep.1937, p.773 seq. See below p.^00 ) j.43’6.
(2) See above p. 14"^.
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earliest interests.Montesquieu clearly does not regard 
him in the same light as Shaftesbury however, and his 
theories were probably overshadowed by the already powerful 
influence of Malebranche. It is in the elevated company of 
the Oratorian father and Plato that Montesquieu places 
Shaftesbury;
'Les quatre grands poètes; Platon, le père Malebranche,
milord S h a f t e s b u r y )
All Shaftesbury's works are concerned in some way with 
morals or aesthetics; but the Inquiry concerning Virtue and 
Merit deals particularly with the idea of virtue as a natural 
characteristic of the social being, and as an essential 
condition of happiness. In the elaboration of this concept­
ion Shaftesbury makes much use of the idea of proportion 
and harmony in things, a notion with clear affinities to 
that of convenance or conformity.
Paul Hazard describes Shaftesbury as the prophet of 
humanity; and indeed, his confidence in the natural goodness 
of man, and of creation in general seems unshakable,
'Whatever the Order of the World produces is in the main 
both just and good';^^)
the influence of Locke seems present in his refusal to look
(1) Apart from the reference to Gudworth in the Dissertation 
sur la Politique des Romains dans la Religion, Montesquieu 
refers to him indirectly in another fragment on pagan 
religions. Pensée 1946, (Bkn.673).
(2) Pensée 1092, (Bkn.2095); Hagel II, p.296; Pléiade I, p.1546
(3) Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, 1699, Bk.I, part 111, 
section 3.
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beyond natural conditions for a staaidard by which moral 
judgements may be fixed;
'where can we fix our standard, or how regulate ourselves, 
but with regard to nature, beyond which there is no measure 
or rule of things? Now nature may be known from what we 
see of the natural state of creatures, and of man himself, 
when unprejudiced by vicious education,'
The case for ethical naturalism seems to be accepted without 
a murmur of opposition. But we find, Shaftesbury is really 
concerned with finding a ground for morality within the 
limits of natural constitution, like Spinoza he saw good­
ness as the spontaneous fulfilment of natural disposition, 
not as submission to coercion, human or divine;
'A good creature is such a one as by the natural temper or 
bent of his affections is carried primarily and immediately, 
and not secondarily and accidentally, to good and against 
ill.'(2)
The moral sphere may be said to embrace all things, since 
all things tend to fulfil their natural dispositions; but 
man alone is endowed with a natural disposition governed by 
reason, and therefore man alone possesses the special 
quality of virtue. Life in society is the necessary con­
comitant of the faculty of reason, and accordingly, recog­
nition of the public interest, and the ability to form 
ethical concepts, are the characteristics that distinguish
(1) Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, Bk.II, part ii, 
section 2.
(2) Ibid., Bk.I, part ii, section 2.
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the virtuous man from other creatures and from his fellows, 
if they are lacking in r e a s o n . T h u s  Shaftesbury rejects 
the conclusion implicit in the simple idea of conformity 
with nature, that all natural tendencies are good and vir­
tuous. As far as man as a rational being is concerned, the 
first principle of his constitution is his natural, i.e. 
rational sense of right and wrong; he is in fact careful 
to distinguish between natural and sensible affections:
'should the sensible affections stand ever so much amiss, 
yet if they prevail not, because of those other rational 
affections spoken of, 'tis evident, the temper still holds 
good in the man; and the person is with justice esteemed 
virtuous by all men.'^2)
Having established an identical self-dependent basis 
for both obligation and motivation: ethical behaviour is
spontaneous and its reward is the satisfaction of self- 
fulfilment; Shaftesbury goes on to examine the notion of 
virtue in itself. For the quality in man corresponds to a 
transcendent order of reason,
'the eternal measures and immutable independent nature of 
worth and virtue
which is unaffected by any arbitrary law or custom. The 
universe is the material expression of harmony and propor­
tion; and the fulfilment of natural dispositions is
(1) Op.cit., Bk.I, part ii, section 3.
(2) Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, Bk.I, part ii, 
section 3.
(3) Ibid.
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virtuous because it contributes to the order of the whole. 
Here Shaftesbury joins the ethical rationalists, in their 
persuasion that moral attributes depend on a divine order 
of necessary justice and truth. Not for him the relativism 
in ethics which could be drawn from Locke’s admission of 
the variability of human conceptions, or from the meta­
physical determinism of Spinoza. The atheist, as much as 
the wicked man, propagates evil by deliberately rejecting 
the harmony of the universe: his refusal to co-operate in
the work of building this harmony on earth brings unhappi­
ness to himself and to others. For the conformity existing 
between the supernatural order and the constitution of things 
means that happiness depends on harmony and proportion 
being reflected in the individual disposition, and that it 
is enhanced by an appreciation of cosmic unity. The vir­
tuous man takes
’A natural joy in the contemplation of those numbers, that 
harmony, proportion and concord, which supports the universal 
nature, and is essential in the constitution and form of 
every particular species or order of beings.
And this
'admiration and love of order is naturally improving to
the temper, advantageous to social affection, and highly 
assistant to virtue; which is itself no other than the love 
of order and beauty in society.
(1) Opcito, Bk.II, part ii, section 1.
(2) Ibid., Bk.I, part iii, section 3.
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Virtue and beauty in fact go hand in hand in 
Shaftesbury’s moral theory: he talks of a ’moral kind of
architecture’, and the ’inward fabric' of a personality. 
Indeed, he understands conscience above all as an aesthetic 
sense, the sense of difformity in an action which is odious 
because it impairs the social order - the social order 
because man is a social animal and the pursuit of self- 
interest is contrary to his true n a t u r e . T h e  situation 
created by the stifling of natural affections contrasts 
sharply with the state of harmony enjoyed by the animal 
world:
'it is hard to find in any region a human society which has 
human laws. No wonder if in such societies 'tis so hard to 
find a man who lives naturally and as a man.'^2)
Shaftesbury was deeply concerned with human happiness, but 
the contrast between his interpretation of the ideal of con­
formity with reason, and the conclusions of those budding 
materialists like Saint-Hyacinthe who saw in it no more than 
the pursuit of individual well-being, could hardly be more 
complete.
As Montesquieu's description of Malebranche and 
Shaftesbury in the Pensées as great poets implies, it is in 
the works of these two men that idealism in Prance and
(1) Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit, Bk.II, part ii, 
section 1.
(2) Ibid., Bk.II, part i, section 3.
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England achieves its most perfect expression. Yet this 
idealism rests on widely differing assumptions, and answered 
the needs of different generations. Shaftesbury had no 
time for orthodox doctrines of original sin, no sense of 
the tragedy of human existence, nor did he see in natural 
law the working of forces apparently divorced from the order 
of reason. Conversely, he laid less emphasis on the 
mathematical nature of truth and justice; virtue has more 
to do with natural disposition, with essential character, 
than with metaphysical speculation. If there is virtue and 
beauty in the world, then it is in ourselves and all around 
us, not hidden in transcendent obscurity which only the 
deepest meditation will penetrate. Shaftesbury is the 
idealist of the 18th. century, the century of humanity.
We pass now from Locke and Shaftesbury, two of the 
dominant figures on the English scene, to an obscurer thinker, 
and a theologian, William King. King belonged to the group 
of Anglican theologians centred on Trinity College Dublin, 
whose most outstanding representative was George Berkeley; 
but although King did not make an original contribution to 
philosophy in the way that Berkeley did, his main work, the 
De Origine Mali, was much discussed by his contemporaries.
This essay, an attempt to answer one of the most burning 
philosophical questions of the age, not unnaturally received
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considerable attention from both Bayle and Leibniz, champ­
ions of opposing factions in the d e b a t e . T h e  question 
of the origin of evil does not concern us directly, but 
the Essay is an interesting example of the kind of lati- 
tudinarian thinking, as optimistic in outlook as Shaftesbury's 
, that put man at the centre of the universe, and drew 
arguments from a wide variety of contemporary sources to 
justify this radical change in theological approach. King 
made considerable use of the idea of conformity, in the 
development of his thesis.
King bases his definition of truth and his conception 
of the structure of the universe on the idea of a system 
of relationships. Here we see the influence of Malebranche 
combining with that of Locke. King is no Cartesian; he is 
careful to distinguish the notion of matter from that of 
space or extension, and he affirms the validity of sense 
experience; but he takes from Malebranche the notion of a 
universal system in which things are related to each other 
and to God by the degree of perfection that they embody.
This is the basis for his explanation of evil: it arises
from necessary natural imperfection, an imperfection without 
which the infinite variety of things in the universe would 
have been unrealizable; and from the operation of natural
(1) Bayle attacks King in the Réponse aux questions d'un 
Provincial, ch. LXXIV; Leibniz discusses the Essay in 
the Theodicee, art.359.
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laws, necessary to hold the world together, and a source of 
benefits which far outweigh the occasional disaster. If 
we ourselves were not of necessity finite and contingent 
beings, then, says King, we would be able to comprehend the 
perfect harmony of the universe:
'if we could view the whole workmanship of God: if we
thoroughly understand the connections, subordinations, and 
mutual relations of things, the mutual assistance which 
they afford each other; and lastly, the whole series and 
order of them; it would appear that the world is as well as 
it possibly could be; and that no evil in it could be 
avoided which would not occasion a greater by its absence.
Following from his interpretation of the structure of the 
universe. King defines truth as the reason of things, the 
relationships binding them together. But it is here that 
he parts company with Malebranche and joins Locke; for he 
does not mean the essential relationships of things which 
constitute divine reason, rather the observed relationships 
between things, which, when there is an exact correspondence 
between human judgement and its object, go to form scientific 
truth. He implies the immanence of reason, but there his 
rationalism ends.
For neither does his moral theory depend on the notion 
of natural laws derived from a transcendent reason; on the 
contrary, it owes a great deal to the epistemology of the
(1) Essay on the Origin of Evil, translation by Law of the 
latin work of 1702, London, 1731, ch.IV, section 8; 
p.144.
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Essay concerning Human Understanding, and can only be 
described as naturalistic in tone, if not in intention.
King begins with the usual teleological interpretation of 
the universe: the end of creation was to exercise the
power and to communicate the goodness of the deity; there 
can be no doubt, since God is both infinite and perfect, 
that the world is the best possible world, and so on.^^^ 
Hence the 'convenience' and perfection of the universe 
depends ultimately upon the will of God. But the expression 
of divine goodness necessarily involved the existence of 
man, and it therefore follows that the human constitution, 
man's reason and his appetites are in conformity with the 
divine will. They thus provide a perfectly sound basis for 
ethicso This natural teleology, similar in some respects 
to that found in Locke's early Essays on the Law of Nature, 
leads to an unusual interpretation of the fitness of things. 
The idea that human nature is in conformity with God's will 
leads to the proposition that human happiness, that is, the 
preservation and satisfaction of natural inclinations, is 
equally the object of divine concern. Therefore, that which 
is good and as King terms it, 'convenient', is that which 
satisfies the 'appetites' of the creature:
(1) Essay on the Origin of Evil, ch.I, section 3
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'There are certain appetites implanted in us by nature, 
which are not to be esteemed useless, but contributing 
toward our p r e s e r v a t i o n ; . a n d  some things are naturally 
agreeable, some contrary to these appetites; ..... the for­
mer when present, please and impress a delightful sense of 
themselves; the latter displease and create uneasiness.
These therefore are called incommodious, troublesome and 
evil; and those, commodious, convenient, and good.'^^
This reasoning lies behind the two main propositions 
of King's Preliminary Dissertation; that the criterion of 
the will of God is the happiness of man; and that the happi­
ness of man is the criterion of virtue. Pleasure and pain 
determine this happiness, and accordingly, it is from a 
study of those things which cause desire or aversion, namely 
of the relations of fitness or unfitness between things, 
that all virtues and vices may be deduced. The function of 
reason is of course to carry out this study, and it constitutes 
a moral sense which is acquired by experience and observat­
ion. ^ 2)
So it is that in King the idea of relationships of 
fitness as the basis of virtue becomes associated with a 
teleological view of the universe, and with what amounts to 
the naturalistic moral ideal of conformity with nature.
Of course, in later chapters of the De Origine Mali, King is 
concerned to emphasize the moderating influence of reason.
(1) Essay on the Origin of Evil, ch.V, section 1, p.131.
(2) Ibid., Preliminary Dissertation, I, xix-xxii.
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and to establish the essential freedom of man to choose 
between various courses of action; it would therefore be 
inaccurate to describe his thought in terms of materialism 
proper. Like Locke, some of his roots went deep into 
Scholasticism; yet, again like his more eminent contemporary, 
he made a worthy contribution to the cause of re-establishing 
the integrity of human nature.
It may have been from King that both Leibniz and 
Samuel Clarke took their idea of the fitness of things.
We have given little attention to King's metaphysics, but 
it is fairly clear that for him fitness was the attribute 
denoting the compossibility of things in the universe, which 
in so doing pointed to the ultimate perfection of its 
design. Leibniz, as we have seen,^^ associated the prin­
ciple of convenance with the principle of sufficient reason, 
which he saw as determining the relationships of material 
things in the created universe. Now Samuel Clarke's con- 
ceptiajv of fitness or conformity is remarkably similar.
Clarke is particularly important for our study because of 
the likelihood that Montesquieu knew his Discourse on the 
Being and Attributes of God before the composition of the 
Traité des Devoirs and perhaps even before the Lettres 
Persanes^n) As we noted above, Montesquieu possessed the
(1) See above pp.5’7-59*
(2) Shackleton suggests the early influence of Clarke on 
Montesquieu in his Critical Biography, ch.IV, p.71.
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Discourse in the English edition of 1728, but it was trans­
lated into French by Ricotier in 1717, and there are enough 
similarities between the arguments used by the two writers, 
for Clarke's influence at least on the Devoirs to be 
reasonably certain. The precise details of these similiar- 
ities will be the subject of later discussion, but they 
range from the proof of the intelligence of the first cause 
given in the Traite des Devoirs and the first chapter of 
the Lois, to the arguments which on various occasions 
Montesquieu advanced against Hobbes. Montesquieu seems to 
have been attracted to Gudworth through his early interest 
in pagan religions, and this interest, continuing in the 
form of a deep admiration for the ethics of Stoicism, may 
also have drawn him to Clarke, who in the second part of 
the Discourse, makes considerable use of Cicero, and, in 
spite of his declared aim of proving the insufficiency of 
ancient philosophies for the reformation of humanity, cheer­
fully begins one chapter by declaring that paganism was 
blessed with excellent moralists.
In fact, the chief shortcoming of the work in the eyes 
of contemporaries, was that the excellent account it gave 
of the principles of natural religion served to justify
(1) Part II, ch.10.
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Deism, rather than to prove its inadequacy in comparison 
with Christianity, It enjoyed the same reputation as 
Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity in this, although 
Clarke set out to refute Spinoza and prove the necessity 
of revelation, working from Newtonian conceptions of the 
order of the universe. The attack against Spinoza is 
mounted on a large scale, and Clarke actually goes as far 
as quoting the Ethica in footnotes, a rare occurrence among 
such refutations. The argument centres around the idea of 
necessity; against the notion of a unique and necessary 
substance, Clarke advances the theory of necessary fitness, 
or as Ricotier's translation puts it, of 'une nécessité de 
convenance'• The universe is the creation of a free and 
intelligent agent, as its orderly design proves;
'Je prouve..... que l'être existant par lui-même, et 'k qui
toutes choses doivent leur origine, est un être intelligent, 
par la beauté, la variété, l'ordre et la symmétrie qui 
éclate dans l'univers, et surtout par la justesse merveilleuse 
avec laquelle chaque chose se rapporte à sa fin.
The only kind of necessity to which such a perfect and 
omniscient being can be subject is the necessity which pro­
ceeds from perfect will; the creation must be worthy of 
its creator; God must act in accordance with his perfect 
wisdom. In this sense his will and its creation are subject
(1) De l'existence et des Attributs de Dieu, Amsterdam, 1717; 
part I, ch.9, p.89.
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to the principle of fitness, and perfect liberty becomes 
perfect necessity;
‘Quelque grande que soit la liberté d’un être qui est tout 
ensemble infiniment intelligent, infiniment puissant et 
infiniment bon, il ne se déterminera jamais a agir d'une 
manière qui soit contraire à ses perfections. De sorte que 
le libre arbitre, dans un être revêtu de ces perfections, 
est un principe^d'action aussi certain et aussi immuable 
que la nécessité même des fatalistes. '
Subsequent to creation, the order brought into being by the 
will of God but accordin^^the principle of fitness, obliges 
even the Creator. It constitutes an order of reason and 
justice, which is eternal and immutable; here Clarke, in 
spite of his finalism, joins the ethical rationalists.
Unaware apparently of the inherent contradiction between 
a created order and an eternal, immutable order, he goes on 
to found his moral theory on the relationships of fitness 
in things, which correspond to this order and which contri­
bute to the perfection of the universe. Kan, being a 
rational creature, is capable of perceiving these relation­
ships, and therefore they form the basis of natural law, 
that is of a law independent of divine command or of positive 
revelation. It is worth quoting the passage where Clarke 
sets out this theory, for the echoes it contains of the 
opening chapter of Montesquieu's Dois ;
(1) Op.cit., part I, ch.13, pp.182-183.
173
’ il y a le certaines circonstances qui conviennent à
de certaines^personnes, et qui ne conviennent pas à d'autres, 
le tout fonde sur la nature des choses et sur les 
qualifications des personnes, antécédemment à aucune volonté, 
ou à aucun établissement arbitraire ou positif. C'est de 
quoi il faut convenir malgré qu'on en ait, à moins qu'on 
ne s'avise de soutenir, que dans la nature des choses et 
dans l^ordre de la raison, il est tout aussi convenable 
qu'un être innocent soit plongé dans une misère éternelle, 
qu'il est convenable, qu'il en soit affranchi. Il y a donc 
d ^ s  la nature des choses des règles de convenance, et ces
règles sont éternelles, nécessaires et immuables. ..... Or
c'est sur cette connaissance que les êtres intelligents ont 
des relations naturelles et nécessaires des choses, qu'ils 
règlent constamment leurs actions, a moins que quelque 
intérêt particulier ou quelque passion dominante ne vienne 
à^la traverse séduire la volonté, et l'entraîner dans le 
dérèglement: et c'est ici, pour le dire en passant que je
trouve le vrai fondement de toute morale.
Reason perceives the relationships of conformity between 
things, relationships both necessary and eternal, and this 
perception forms the basis of duties to which conscience
(1) De l'Existence et des Attributs de Dieu, part I, ch.13, 
pp.174-175 cf., the English of the Discourse concerning 
the Being and Attributes of God in the 1728 edition: 
'Further, that there is a fitness or suitableness of 
certain circumstances to certain persons, and an unsuit­
ableness of others, founded in the nature of things and 
the qualifications of persons, antecedent to will and to 
all arbitrary or positive appointments whatsoever; must 
unavoidably be acknowledged by every one, who will not 
affirm that 'tis equally fit and suitable, in the nature 
and reason of things, that an innocent being should be 
extremely and eternally miserable, as that it should be 
free from such misery. There is therefore such a thing 
as fitness and unfitness, eternally, necessarily and
unchangeably, in the nature and reason of things....
And by this understanding or knowledge of the natural and 
necessary relations of things, the actions likewise of 
all intelligent beings are constantly directed; (which 
by the by is the true ground and foundation of all moral­
ity) unless their will be corrupted by particular 
interestbr affection, or swayed by some unreasonable and 
prevailing lust.' Part I, Proposition XII, pp. 111-112..
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obliges, independently of positive law, or of the hope of 
reward or fear of punishment. No wonder Clarke's fellow 
clergymen feared that he had argued the case for natural 
religion far too cogently. Indeed, if the evidence and 
necessity of these moral relationships is, as Clarke declared 
it to be, identical with that of mathematical relationships, 
and God's perfect freedom is no more than perfect necessity, 
what becomes of the refutation of determinism? If God's 
nature determines his will, and consequently the form of the 
universe, it is possible to deduce that the material world 
is no more than a mode of the divine substance. Thus there 
were reasonable grounds for complaining that Clarke was 
setting up his argument oA the flimsy basis of nice verbal 
distinctions, and that, like many of those who set out to 
refute Spinoza, he had in reality succumbed to his insidious 
influence. Leibniz certainly took care when he embarked on 
the same enterprise, to make a clear distinction between the 
principles of fitness and mathematical necessity, and to 
subject the former to the arbitrary will of God, clearly and 
unequivocally.
Yet Clarke's very failure to grapple successfully with 
Spinoza is important for us, in as much as the main features 
of his thought anticipate some of the things that Montesquieu
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had to say on the score of metaphysics, and it is possible 
that they both stnn^(bled unwittingly into the trap of 
immanentism*
In view of the innumerable contexts in which the term 
convenance appeared, and the diversity of purposes which the 
idea of fitness fulfilled in aesthetic and philosophical 
thought, it would be difficult, not to say foolish, in the 
absence of certain textual evidence, to try to pinpoint the 
exact source of Montesquieu's definition of justice, even 
if one isolated works in which the key phrase rapport de 
convenance is used. But the reading of Clarke probably 
furnished him with some conceptions to support such a 
definition, supplementing the influence of Malebranche. 
Shaftesbury was another possible influence, this time on his 
moral thought; and Shaftesbury and Clarke were in turn 
indebted to thinkers like Locke and King. In addition, all 
of them contributed something to the vast pool of ideas, 
from which both Montesquieu and his contemporaries drew the 
raw material of their works.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AESTHETIC IDEAS
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¥e come finally to the examination of aesthetic theory 
during the second half of the 17th. century. In many ways 
aesthetics and morals occupy the same position in relation 
to metaphysics: their common principles may be deduced in
part from a body of systematic speculation; but on the other 
hand they may be considered as both the product and the 
reflection of a particular age and society. They share a 
common tension between the ideal and absolute and the 
empirical and relative. Indeed from the point of view of 
the sociologist or historian, they reflect to an equal degree 
the character and consciousness of the national or social 
group.
Their ideals lie parallel: the good beside the beautiful
Care for the cohesion and just equilibrium of the elements 
of society preoccupies the moralist; harmony of structure, 
balance of figures or movements concern the aesthetician.
The genius of both is normative rather than descriptive, for 
both make constant reference to absolute criteria. Judgement 
is of their essence. The moralist makes a direct analysis 
and evaluation of interpersonal relationships according to 
his conception of the meaning of things, and draws certain 
conclusions concerning the justice of motivation and purpose 
in behaviour; while the aesthetician deals in the same con­
text with the representation of interpersonal and person- 
object relationships, and with man's reaction to it.
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We are concerned with the mind of the 17th. century and 
with those notions proper to its idealism which were shared 
by ethics and aesthetics. Their common ground is the form 
of life, and an optimistic and systematic approach to this 
subject produces certain characteristic ideas. Thus, just 
as the moralist is concerned with the harmony and equilibrium 
of society, so the aesthetician looks for balance and 
proportion in the work of art. This reflects a common 
realisation of the necessary mechanical coherence of any 
structure, whatever its scale and kind, and from it are 
derived theories of compossibility on a cosmic level, or 
principles of structural unity, or scientific notions of 
causal determinism. It is as legitimate to talk of relation­
ships of conformity between the elements of an artistic 
composition, as it is to define moral values in such terms. 
Similarly, the ethical notion of conformity with reason or 
with nature seen as the expression of reason, variously 
interpreted as sincerity, or as conformity between the out­
ward appearance and the inward creature, or as conformity 
with an established order of things, is parallelled in 
aesthetics by the idea that the style and medium of a work 
should fit its subject, and that the whole should fulfil 
its purpose, either of persuasion or of decoration, or of 
edification. This brings us to epistemological similarities.
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Just judgement, or the clear perception of moral relation­
ships, or of regularities and irregularities of composition, 
is the essential prerequisite of both virtue and taste; and 
consequently the moral and aesthetic attributes of justice 
and justesse arise.
duch words as convenance, bienseance, ordre, rapport, 
and raison, are the very stuff of 17th. century aesthetic 
thought, as they are of moral theory in the same period.
Their attendant definitions and applications build a main­
stream conception of beauty which depends on rules and reason 
and a strong belief in the inherent order of things. But it 
was an ideal restricted to the privileged classes whose 
polished manners were deemed to entail sophisticated taste. 
Honnêteté was an aesthetic as well as a moral quality.
Towards the end of the century, with the growing strength of 
scientific rationalism, there was some weakening of the 
aristocratic associations of aesthetic theory, as a result 
of a tendency to emphasize the individual, subjective 
elements in the process of artistic appreciation. The 
influence of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding 
was dominant here as in other spheres, and the sensationalist 
theories adopted by Du Bos in his influential but rather 
uneven Reflexions Critiques, w e r e  later to receive
(1) Reflexions Critiques sur la Poesie et sur la Peinture, 
Paris, 1719.
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concise and systematic treatment in the work that Montesquieu 
prepared for the Encyclopédie, the Essai sur le Goût.,^\
But the rate of transformation in aesthetics, which until 
the mid 18th. century was hardly thought of as a separate 
branch of thought, was slower than that in the hotly debated 
field of ethics, if articles by Diderot and Marmontel in the 
Encyclopédie, and the Supplement à l ' E n c y c l o p é d i e where 
theories originating in the previous century still receive 
considerable attention, are given any authority.
The primary object of this study is however to demon­
strate the way in which the terms that we have already 
mentioned, in particular convenance, and the ideas that 
accompanied them, were used in a wide variety of works con­
tributing to the elaboration of aesthetic theory during the 
second half of the 17th. century, and the opening years of 
the 18th., although of course, certain changes will have 
to be taken into account.
In the earlier discussion of dictionary definitions,
certain general notions attached to the terms bienseance
and convenance were reviewed. Convenance, we decided,
(3)
emerged as the more general of the two terras, possessing
(1) Published posthumously. Encyclopédie, vol.VII, 1757. 
Montesquieu began thinking about this subject much earlier; 
he discussed Du Bos's work in a letter to his friend 
J.-J. Bel, dated 29 Sep. 1726 (Bagel III, p.862).
(2) Encyclopédie, vol.II, 1751; Supplement, vols.I,II, 1776: 
articles, 'Beau', 'Bienséances', etc,
(3) See above pp.20-2%*
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strong links with ideas of proportion and symmetry; whereas 
bienséance, once almost synonymous, and still dependent on 
the notion of proper relationship, developed specialized 
meanings within the sphere of manners and aesthetics. We 
have already mentioned the affinity between moral and 
aesthetic ideas, particularly during this period; the asso­
ciation arose from a common intellectual attitude, whose 
special manifestation was the cult of reason and order, that 
is of supernatural reason and superimposed order. Once the 
mind was convinced of the virtual if not actual existence 
of a correct order of things, and respect for proper manners 
and deportment in social relationships was firmly established, 
what was more logical than to insist that the same order 
should be introduced into the artistic pursuits of the cul­
tured. The critics who voiced this requirement, fully con­
scious of the connection between art and manners, saw no 
need to create new words where honnêteté and politesse would 
do. Accordingly, they were imported into aesthetics, along 
with useful multi-purpose words like bienseance and convenance, 
whose social significance was accompanied by the general idea 
of proportion and fitness, and the new socio-aesthetic 
theory emerged.
By 1610, the French critic Beimier, following paths laid 
out by Italian critics like Vida in the preceding century, 
was writing:
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'La raison est si étroitement nécessaire en la poésie que 
sans elle toutes les autres qualités... seraient toujours 
vides de bonté...... Toutefois il se trouvera quelques-uns
qui s'imagineront quelque raison à m'opposer, qu'il est 
permis au poète de dire tout......parce que le poète peut
se servir de toutes sortes d'opinions pour embellir son 
sujet. Mais je répondrai là-dessus......que en ce terme de
tout, on doit entendre toute chose honnête et raisonnable... 
C'est une maxime inviolable que toute^esure et raison est 
nécessaire aux écrits poétiques.K\ p^oute chose honnête et 
raisonnable';  ^ L-- -
good taste and good breeding go hand in hand, an obvious 
truth according to La Mesnardiere;
'tout ce qu'il y a de bien né, de raisonnable et de savant 
dans les états bien policés, est sépare d'avec le peuple, 
qui n'a pour toute connaissance que celle des arts mécaniques, 
qu'il exerce par usage plutôt que par théorie.
Such generalisations are far removed from the clear-sighted­
ness of La Bruyère where fashionable taste was concerned, 
and from Montesquieu's conviction that 'les gens du monde 
jugent ordinairement mal'; but they must have reflected only 
the established social conceptions of the age.
Similar assumptions underlie the theories of the Spanish 
apostle of good manners, Balthazar Gracian, writing in the 
middle of the c e n t u r y . G r a c i a n  did not achieve widespread 
popularity in France until much later, but the terminology 
used in the translations of his work, and the emphasis found 
there upon the idea that everything has a proper place in
(1) Académie de l'Art Poétique, pp.489-490
(2) Poétique, Paris, 1640, Discours, p. S,
(3) See above pp.92-9^.
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the scheme of things, and that elegance depends on the obser­
vation of the preordained pattern, is not without signifi­
cance ;
’^ u*est-ce que la politesse à l'égard de tout ouvrage en 
général que l'art produit et dirige? C'est une élégante 
disposition des choses qui doivent avoir du rapport les unes 
aux autres. La perfection d'un tout consiste dans la belle 
ordonnance des parties. Un homme serait un monstre de la 
nature, s'il avait la tête où doivent être ses pieds; et dans 
un ouvrage d'esprit, ou de mécanique, si le commencement se 
trouve à la fin, ce sera un monstre de l'art. Chaque chose 
dans l'ordre de l'art, aussi bien que dans celui de la nature,
a sa place marquée: ne l'y mettes pas, elle choque.....
Que les mêmes choses soient ramenées chacune à leur place, 
chacune comme à leur point de vue: la justesse et Inélégance
de cet arrangement, ajoutées à la beauté des choses, nous 
charmeronti * ^ ^
The establishment of a proper relationship between con­
stituent parts will ensure the perfection of nature, of 
society and of art.
It is necessary however to distinguish between the 
actual association of social class and artistic pursuits in 
the minds of contemporary writers, and the natural similar­
ity between moral and aesthetic theory, which arose from a 
common outlook on life. This outlook we have described as 
a firm belief in the existence of a metaphysical entity 
combining reason and order in its essence; rectitude in 
everything is the main aspiration of the believers, and their 
first duty to bring orderliness or perfection to all their
(1) L'Homme Universel, trans. J. de Courbeville, Rotterdam, 
1729, pp.171-172.
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works. René Bray saw the 'culte de la raison' as the main­
spring of classical do ct ri n e; H en r i  Peyre, in a later 
work on Classicism, insisted on the diversity of attitudes 
hidden behind such an all embracing title, some of them 
diametrically opposed to each other; and he suggested instead 
that the common characteristic of the age was a penetrating 
intellectualism, directed towards psychological analysis.,^) 
They are both really concerned to show that the rationalism 
of the 17tho century had more to do with the kind of beliefs 
implied by Cartesian metaphysics, than with the reasoned 
processes of Cartesian method. If cult there was, it was a 
cult of intuition, of certain knowledge which, but for its 
alleged universality, was not unlike inspiration; a cult 
which finally manifested itself in Quietism. Such rationa­
lism was not incompatible with art; it simply demanded a 
renunciation of individualism in favour of universal themes* 
Simplicity, unity, symmetry, the qualities bestowed by 
reason, became the watchwords of criticism; as la Bruyère 
explained in the Caractères, ahl that smacked of barbarian 
complication or Gothic obscurity was banished from art:
'On a dû faire du style ce qu'on a fait de l'architecture.
On a entièrement abandonné l'ordre gothique, que la barbarie 
avait introduit pour les palais et pour les temples; on a 
rappelé le dorique, l'ionique, et le corinthien: ce qu'on
ne voyait plus que dans les ruines de l'ancienne Rome et de 
la vieille’Grèce, devenu moderne, éclate dans nos portiques
(1) La formation de la doctrine classique, Paris, 1927; 
part II, ch.4.
(2) Le classicisme français, New York, 1942; ch.IV, b ..
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et dans nos péristyles. De même on ne saurait en écrivant 
rencontrer le parfait et, s’il se peut, surpasser les anciens 
que par leur imitation.
Combien de siècles se sont écoulés avant que les hommes, 
dans les sciences et dans les arts aient pu revenir au goût 
des anciens et reprendre, enfin le simple et le naturel.
Nature was in vogue, but the enthusiasm of the 17th. 
century was not for wild and solitary places. The natural 
resolved itself into the regular and well-proportioned, that 
which avoided excess; like the truth, especially the histo­
rical truth, it consisted in that part of experience, or 
those qualities, which persons or objects possessed in 
common. It was the essential being, the embellished product, 
the artificial. To arbiters of fashionable taste like 
Father Bouhours, this presented no contradiction:
’.....il y a bien de la différence entre la fiction et la 
fausseté: l ’une imite et perfectionne en quelque façon la
nature; l ’autre la gâte, et la détruit e n t i è r e m e n t )
In short, nature, that is perfection, furnished the ideal of 
all artistic enterprise, and the criterion of all aesthetic 
judgement; and conformity with nature, with the archetypal 
idea fixed in the preordained pattern of the universe, was 
the guarantee of authenticity.
Accordingly, the would-be poet, painter, architect, 
dramatist was exhorted to bear several things in mind: to
(1) ’Des ouvrages de l ’esprit’, 15.
(2) La Manière de bien penser dans les Ouvrages d’Esprit, 
1587, 1er. Dialogue; 2nd. edition, Amsterdam, 1692, p.9.
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avoid the deformed and irregular by the observance of certain 
necessary and permanent rules, corresponding to the essential 
character of the subject, and ensuring a result of perfect 
and permanent beauty; to create an authentic work by 
establishing within it a perfect correspondence between its 
subject, the means employed, its purpose, and its public. 
Success depended on giving tangible expression to certain 
links in an invisible pattern:
’Get art merveilleux des bienséances consiste principalement 
à ne rien souffrir qui ne soiit parfaitement conforme au 
caractère de celui qui parle, à ceux à qui il parle, et à 
la manière dont il parle, selon Quintilien. C’est cette 
harmonie secrète, et ce rapport parfait de toutes les parties, 
qui fait cette bienséance que nous cherchons, dont le détail 
serait infini;
such is the secret of eloquence according to Rapin. But 
although, as he goes on to explain, authenticity depends on 
the careful consideration of circumstances: time, place,
subject, person, etc., it is not to be considered a relative 
quality. For it expresses the eternal core of truth in 
things, that part of them that is subject to immutable 
general principles, and therefore it too is absolute.
’II y a dans I ’art un point de perfection, comme de 
bonté ou de maturité dans la nature. Celui qui le sent et 
qui l ’aime a le goût parfait; celui qui ne le sent pas, et 
qui aime en deçà ou au delà, a le goût défectueux, Il ^ a 
donc un bon et un mauvais goût, et l ’on dispute des goûts
avec fondement.’ 2^)
(1) Traité des Bienséances, Baris, 1686, art.xxii; pp.119-120
(2) Les Caractères! ’Les Ouvrages de l ’Esprit’, 10.
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La Bruyère, we find is in general agreement. After this, 
it is no surprise to read his definition of taste:
'Entre le^bon sens et le bon goût il y a la différence de 
la cause à son effet,
faste is directly related to that quality in man by which 
reason manifests itself.
The same point is made by Bouhours in his Manière de 
bien penser dans les Ouvrages d'Esprit:
'La sublimité, la grandeur dans une pensée est justement 
ce qui emporte, et ce qui ravit, pourvu que la pensée 
convienne au sujet: car c'est une règle générale, qu'il
faut penser selon la matière qu'on traite; et rien n'est 
moins raisonnable que d'avoir des pensées sublimes dans un 
petit sujet qui n'en demande que de médiocres.'/g)
The recognition of relationships of just proportion is the 
main factor in appreciation as well as composition, and it 
is intimately connected with reason. It comes as no surprise 
to find Henri de Lelevel, the faithful disciple of Malebranche, 
describing the sublime and the natural in his treatise on 
eloquence, as the
'juste rapport que toutes les pensées ont les unes aux 
autres, toutes se soutenant mutuellement, et l'une servant 
toujours de preuve à l'autre.
Indeed, as far as the principles governing taste and compo­
sition were concerned, there was little to distinguish the
(1) Les Caractères, 'Des Jugements', 56; (éd.4).
(2) Op.cit., 2e. Dialogue, p.79.,
(3) De la Vraie et de la Fausse Eloquence, Toulouse, 1698; 
ch.V, p.245.
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majority of theorists from each other during the second half 
of the century. Conformity was the central criterion to 
which all factors involved in the creation and judgement of 
a work of art were ultimately subjected.
But this central notion possessed, as we shall see, two 
distinct applications, one absolute, and the other relative, 
which sometimes determined the choice of the term used to 
express it. The difference between the absolute and the 
relative significance lay between the idea of conformity as 
the right relationship of the subject and its expression, 
and the idea of conformity as the right relationship of the 
finished work and its audience. Bray groups the whole 
theory of conformity under the heading Bienséance, and 
characterizes these two related notions as bienséances 
internes and bienséances externes,
'harmonie à l'intérieur de l'oeuvre d'art et harmonie entre 
l'oeuvre d'art et le public
The first of these is related to the idea of vraisemblance, 
and the principles of authenticity and universality; and the 
second depends on the accepted moral and social standards of 
the contemporary public. However, Bray's choice of termino­
logy does not altogether reflect that of the theorists in 
question. Rapin, as we saw a b o v e , d o e s  write of the
(1) See La Formation de la Doctrine classique en France, 
part III, ch.2; p.215 ff.
(2) Above p.
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'art des bienséances', and includes under this heading all 
the particular conformities that the aspiring orator must 
observe. Similarly, Fenelon declares in his 'Projet de 
Rhétorique' in the Lettre à M. Dacier sur les Occupations 
de l'Académie,
'Il y a une bienséance à garder pour les paroles comme pour 
les habits',
and goes on to expound a theory based on the principle 
enshrined in the Logique de Port-Royal,
'La vraie raison place toutes choses dans le ran,g qui leur 
convient
Indeed the great Jansenist writers provide much of the 
theory attached to the term convenance, rather than 
bienseance, and it is perhaps significant in this respect 
that their account of aesthetic theory is more scientific 
in character, and that less regard is paid to the variable 
factor, the demands of public taste, which do in fact seem 
worthier of the title bienséances. The importance of this 
group lies in the stress they place upon the idea of con­
formity between the artistic work and the nature of man, 
rather than the conventions of a particular age. Nicole 
dismisses the beauty which results from the application of
(1) Lettre à M. Dacier sur les Occupations de l'Académie, 
Paris, 1714, IV. Logique de Port-Royal, I662,
1er. Discours.
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the latter principle as transient and superficial.^^ 
Clearly, their conception of the nature of man will not be 
that of the post-lockian era; but their theories anticipate 
in some measure the introduction of the principle of sensi­
bility, and the criterion of subjective judgement, into 
aesthetics. Pascal, for example, combines predictable 
comments with an outright rejection of judgement by rule and 
reason.
’Ge n'est pas assez qu'une chose soit belle; il faut qu'elle 
soit propre au sujet, qu'il n'y ait rien de trop ni rien de 
manque S  (2)
is an opinion which could have come from the pen of any of 
the writers that we have so far examined. But he follows 
this with the idea that aesthetic appreciation depends to 
a certain extent on individual dispositions;
'II y a un certain modèle d'agrément et de beauté, qui 
consiste en un certain rapport entre notre nature, faible 
ou forte, telle qu'elle est, et la chose qui nous plaît.
Conformity is considered a necessary attribute, but its 
imposition by rule under the sanction of reason is excluded 
not only by the introduction of subjective elements into 
the definition of beauty, but also by a definite negation 
of the efficacity of reason:
(1) In the Traité de la Vraie et de la Fausse Beauté, intro- 
duction to the Epigrammatum delectus, Paris, lé59> 
trans. Richelet, 1698; ch.V.
(2) Pensées, (Brunschvicg) 15 appendice.
(3) Ibid., 32
1 9 1
‘Ceux qui jugent d'un ouvrage par règle sont à l'égard des 
autres comme ceux qui ont une montre à l'égard de ceux qui 
n'en ont point. L'un dit: 'Il y a deux heures que nous
sommes ici.'; l'autre dit: 'Il n'y a que trois quarts
d'heure.' Je^regarde ma montre; je dis a l'un: 'Vous vous
ennuyez'; et à l'autre: 'Le temps ne vous dure guère'
and more briefly:
'Tout notre raisonnement se réduit à céder au sentiment.'^^ )
No doubt Pascal was the exception in a generation par­
ticularly susceptible to the attractions of rational idealism; 
and it is always possible to weigh his anticipation of the 
18th. century revolution in aesthetic thinking against his 
debt to the scepticism and mysticism of earlier centuries.
The ideas of Pierre Nicole are perhaps more moderate and 
more characteristic of the age, while possessing clear 
similiarities with those of Pascal. Just as Pascal's rheto­
ric was based on a deep psychological penetration, so 
Nicole's aesthetic theories stemmed from his pedagogic 
activities and his equal concern with the processes of 
persuasion. This common psychological interest was perhaps 
one of the reasons for the new emphasis in their work on 
human nature, and the need to consider it when theorizing 
about art. Nicole's Traité de la Vraie et de la Fausse 
Beauté.was in fact conceived as the introduction to a school 
anthology, the Epigrammaturn delectus. It sets out very
(1) Pensées, 5.
(2) Ibid., 274.
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concisely a theory built around the idea of conformity 
between human nature, seen undoubtedly as something univer­
sal and invariable, and the work of art, where beauty takes 
on the universal and eternal characteristics of that reason 
which brings it into being.
'Un des principaux avantages de la vraie beauté, c'est 
qu'elle n'est ni variable ni passagère; mais qu'elle est 
constante, certaine et au goût de tous les temps.
True beauty, as opposed to the transient elegance that 
results from the observation of fashionable tastes, is not 
to be created nor appreciated, by applying the principle 
of pleasure and following the faulty judgement of sentiment:
'Si l'on veut donc éviter cet embarras de décisions équivoques, 
il faut avoir recours à la lumière de la raison. Elle est 
simple et certaine, et c'est par son moyen qu'on peut trouver
la. vraie beauté naturelle...... Elle nous conduira d'abord
à la nature; elle nous apprendra pour règle générale qu'une 
chose est belle, lorsqu'elle a de la convenance avec sa 
propre nature et avec la nôtre.'^2)
Reason is understood as the clear perception of an objective 
body of truth revealed in nature; it depends on the confor­
mity of thought and ob j ect:
'Nous allons présentement traiter des pensées qui, cormne nous 
avons déjà dit, doivent convenir aux choses et aux personnes. 
Elles conviennent aux choses lorsqu'elles sont vraies, 
propres et tirées du fond du sujet; et aux personnes ^
lorsqu'elles s'accommodent aux mouvements que nous a donne 
la nature,
(1) Op.cit.. Recueil des plus belles épigrammes, trad. Richelet, 
Paris, 1698; vol.I, ch.l; p.5. ^
(2) Traité de la Vraie et de la Fausse Beaute, ch.l, p.5.
(5) Ibid., ch.8, p.28.
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Nicole develops his theory of convenance by examining 
the constitution of the human mind, and deducing the parti­
cular rules that the writer must follow from his conclusions. 
Since we are for example, incapable of prolonged effort on 
a high level, variety is an essential ingredient in all 
works. 2^) These beginnings of an empirical approach seem to 
have influenced the method adopted by Montesquieu in the 
Essai sur le Goût. Although Montesquieu works on the prin­
ciple that pleasure determines aesthetic judgements, and the 
metaphysical trappings of Nicole’s theory are entirely absent 
from his essay, the whole work consists of a development of 
the insight that art should satisfy the needs and nature of 
the human mind; he examines in turn the pleasures of order, 
the pleasures of variety, the pleasures of synmietry, and 
so on. An entry in the Pensées makes Nicole's influence 
even more possible:
'Pour bien écrire, il faut sauter les idées intermédiaires, 
assez pour n'être pas ennuyeux; pas trop, de peur de n'être 
pas entendu. Ge sont ces suppressions heureuses qui ont 
fait dire à M. Nicole que tous les bons livres étaient 
doubles•’(2)
Nicole's theory of convenance, however, and his conception 
of reason as a metaphysical entity reflected in nature, seem 
more relevant to Montesquieu's theory of justice than to 
his aesthetic theories.
(1) Traité de la Vraie et de la Fausse Beauté, ch.6.
(2) Op.cit., 1970 (Bkn.802); Nagel II, p.604; Pleiade I, p.1220
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One of the first apart from Pascal to suggest that 
feeling and pleasure were more important in aesthetic 
appreciation, than reason and rules, was the ever contro­
versial Malebranche. And Malebranche even went as far as to 
incorporate his ideas into one of the major themes of his 
philosophical work, the theory of occasional causes, thus 
giving it the support of a whole body of metaphysics. In the 
Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-même, Bossuet wrote at length 
of the beauty and economy of the universe, of the harmony of 
every part within the pattern of the whole, and of its perfect 
correspondence to the end of creation. Similar terms were 
also used to describe and explain the nature and function of 
the human c o n s t i t u t i o n . B u t  reason is presented as the 
only faculty capable of appreciating a beauty which consists 
in order and proportion;
'Connaître les proportions et l'ordre, est l'ouvrage de la 
raison, qui compare une chose avec une autre, et en découvre 
les rapports...... La beauté ne consiste que dans l'ordre,
c'est-à-dire, par l'arrangement et la proportion.
As we have seen in most of the theorists of style and taste,
although considerable emphasis is placed on the duty to
please, it is always assumed that the artist must satisfy
the intellectual appetites of his public. Now Malebranche,
much more of a metaphysician than Bossuet, conceived of a
(1) Op.cit., ch.IV, ; 'L'homme est un ouvrage d'un gr^d
dessein, et d'une sagesse profonde...... C'est ce qui se
remarque dans toute la nature. Nous voyons tant de 
justesse dans ses mouvements, et tant de convenance entre 
ses parties, que nous ne pouvons nier qu'il n'y ait de 
l'art, etc.'
(2) Op.cit., ch.l, section 8.
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universal economy that would include and utilize every 
aspect of human nature; feeling and pleasure, 'amour naturel*, 
as opposed to 'amour de choix', received the theoretical 
justification that their obvious dominance in judgement and 
motivation would appear to demand. Taking care to safeguard 
the definition of beauty as order and proportion, Malebranche 
achieved a careful reconciliation of reason and sentiment, 
by transforming the latter into the natural cause bringing 
man to a knowledge and love of this order. Pleasure is not 
seen as a barrier to aesthetic appreciation, but as the 
actual and only cause of human happiness:
'La lumière et le sentiment sont en général les deux 
principes des déterminations de la volonté. Afin que tu 
aimes l'ordre, il faut que tu en voies la beauté, et que tu 
la goûtes. Tu ne peux ni voir ni^goûter cette beauté, si 
Dieu ne t'éclaire de quelque lumière, et ne te modifie ou 
ne te touche de quelque plaisir: et, afin que Dieu agisse
en toi, et donne la connaissance et le goût de la beauté de^  
l'ordre, il faut que tu détermines l'efficace de la volonté' 
par la cause occasionnelle qu'il a établie pour te sanctifier, 
et pour former son ouvrage d'une manière sage,'^^^
that is by
'la Grâce de sentiment, ou cette délectation intérieure qui 
fait aimer aux hommes, comme par instinct, une beauté qu'ils 
ne devraient aimer que par raison,'^2)
Remove the theology, and couch the whole passage in the plain 
language of sensationalism, and one is left with Montesquieu's 
definition of taste:
(1) Meditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques, XIII, para.10.
(2) Ibid., XIV, para.14.
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'La definition la plus générale du goût, sans considérer 
s'il est^bon ou mauvais, juste ou non, est ce qui nous 
attache à une chose par le sentiment; ce qui n'empêche pas 
qu'il ne puisse s'appliquer aux choses intellectuelles, dont
la connaissance fait tant de plaisir à l'âme.......L'âme
connaît par ses idées et par ses sentiments; elle reçoit des 
plaisirs par ces idées et par ces sentiments: car, quoique
nous opposions l'idée au sentiment, cependant, lorsqu'elle 
voit une chose, elle la sent; et il n'y a point de choses si 
intellectuelles, qu'elle ne voie ou qu'elle ne croie voir, 
et par conséquent qu'elle ne sente.
Strangely enough however, the aesthetic theories which 
drew their inspiration from Malebranchian philosophy in 
general, like Père Roche's Traité de la Nature de I'lme, and 
Père Andre's Discours sur le Beau, remained strongly 
idealist, advancing the theory that truth is beauty, and 
beauty truth against the oncoming tide of sensationalism. 
Shaftesbury's works likewise injected a strong dose of 
Platonic idealism into the aesthetic thought of the early 
18th. century. Not unnaturally, the prophet of virtue pro­
claimed beauty to be identical with truth and goodness, 
external beauty being nothing more than internal beauty in 
a material form.^2) fact, much of the aesthetic thought
of the 17th. century survived intact, for the main reaction 
of sensationalism in favour of sensibility as the ultimate 
criterion of taste, was directed not so much against it, as 
against the scientific rationalism which prompted such com­
ments as that made by Terrasson in the Preface to the
(1) Essai sur le Goût, 'Des Plaisirs de notre Âme'.
(2) Por a full account see W. Folkierski, Entre le 
Classicisme et le Romantisme, Crakow, 1925, part I, 
ch.2.
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Dissertation critique sur l'Iliade d'Homère;
'Tout homme qui ne pense pas sur toute matière littéraire 
comme Descartes prescrit de penser sur les matières
physiques, n'est pas digne du siècle présent Rien ne
prépare mieux que les mathématiques à bien juger des 
ouvrages d'esprit.
The first concerted attack was made by the Abbe Du Bos 
in his Reflexions critiques sur la Poésie et sur la Peinture. 
Du Dos was a friend and disciple of Locke, and his aesthetic 
theory was founded on observation rather than speculation, 
and on the doctrine that the senses determined man's vision 
of the world. Accordingly the artist's main concern became 
the provision of pleasurable experience; the academic 
shortcomings of a work mattered little unless they greatly 
hindered this purpose. On this basis Du Bos classified 
works according to their 'intérêt de rapport' and their 
'intérêt général'; the first heading indicated a limited 
appeal, relative only to certain groups at certain times, 
and the second, an appeal to basic human sensibility. Both 
qualities were essential to the successful work. 2^) this 
way, Du Bos modified the idea of bienséances internes' and 
'bienséances externes', to fit his terms of reference. 
Similarly he retained the notion of authenticity or 
vraisembla.nce, and many of the rules associated with it.
(1) Op.cit., Paris, 1715; p.65.
(2) Réflexions sur la Poesie et sur la Peinture, Paris, 1719; 
part I, ch.xii.
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Imitation remained a factor of primary importance in com­
position; the painter for example must observe the natural 
order of things, and also ensure that the emotions he por- 
trays are fitting to his subject. Some apparent or hidden 
order in the structure of the composition is necessary for 
ease of c o m p r e h e n s i o n . Y e t  excessive regard for pro­
portion and fitness leads only to disaster by creating 
monotony and consequently boredom. Du Bos introduces a new 
term into the discussion; le merveilleux, a quality far 
more important than convenance.
'Les sentiments où il n ’y a rien de merveilleux, soit par 
la noblesse ou par la convenance du sentiment, soit par la 
précision de la pensée, soit par la justesse de l'expression, 
paraissent plats.'^2)
This quality characterizes the work of genius, which satis­
fies the demands of vraisemblance, avoids the absurd, and 
yet at the same time continually surprises and delights.
But Du Bos's new term is essentially descriptive; it 
is characteristic of a work full of energy and ideas, which 
nonetheless restricts itself to describing methods and 
examples, and suggesting reasons for appreciation of beauty 
in terms of psychology, environment, climate and so on.
Though it utilizes many notions proper to the previous 
century, simply dressing them up in different clothes, it
(1) Reflexions sur la Poésie et sur la Peinture, part I, 
ch.xxxi.
(2) Ibid., part I, ch.xviii; p.227.
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proffers no metaphysical definition of beauty, fully inte­
grated into a systematic, rational view of the universe; and 
this empirical approach to the subject of aesthetics, made 
in the cause of human sensibility, is the true measure of 
its originality.
The terms convenance and bienseance continued to hold 
their own however in aesthetic theory, if the evidence of 
the Encyclopédie is anything to go by. In his article Beau, 
Diderot examines at length the theories of Nicole and 
Le Père André, and sets out his own system founded on the 
idea of harmonious relationships existing between the 
members of the object, between the object and other objects 
and so on:
'J'appelle donc beau hors de moi, tout ce qui contient en 
soi de quoi réveiller dans mon entendement l'idée de rapports; 
et beau par rapport à moi, tout ce qui réveille cette idee.'^j
Yet Diderot makes it clear that he is dealing only with the 
idea of the beautiful, or rather with the perception of 
certain elements in an object which may be said to constitute 
an impression of beauty; he does not associate them with an 
objective body of reason, but with human intelligence. He 
remarks in passing for instance:
'Ces notions sont expérimentales comme toutes les autres.*^2)
(1) Op.cit., vol.II, I75I; p.176.
(2) Ibid., p.175.
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ThuG, while conserving the idea of relationships of fitness 
or proportion as a kind of independent objective standard by 
which the beauty of things could be judged, Diderot took 
care not to confuse attribute with essence, by assuming that 
the quality of harmony pointed to the existence of a meta­
physical entity called b e a u t y . I n  later works he went on 
to examine the place of feeling and the idea of utility in 
aesthetics.^
The articles in the Supplement à 1 * Encyclopédie devoted 
to Convenances and Bienseances were written by Marmontel, 
and provide us with a perfect summary of the aesthetic 
thought of the preceding century. Everything is to be found 
in them: the association of fitness with the idea of eternal
(1) The avoidance of this error preoccupies Montesquieu in 
the early entries of the Pensees: 'Substance, accident,
individu, genre, espèce, ne sont qu'une manière de 
concevoir les choses, selon le diffèrent rapport qu'elles 
ont entre elles.....' (156, Bkn.2061); and, 'Les termes 
de beau, de bon, de noble, de grand, de parfait, sont 
des attributs des objets, lesquels sont relatifs aux 
"êtres qui les considèrent..... Il faut bien se mettre ce 
principe dans la tête: il est 1'éponge de la plupart des
préjuges. C'est le fléau de toute la philosophie ancienne, 
de la physique d'Aristote, de la métaphysique de Platon...' 
(410, Bkn.2062). On the whole his own aesthetic theory
as presented in the Essai sur le G-oût observes the prin­
ciple; but the idealism of the moral theory of the 
Lettres Persanes and the Traité des Devoirs would seem to 
run directly counter to it.
(2) See W. Polkierski, Entre le Classicisme et le Romantisme, 
Part II, ch.5.
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beauty and of natural law; the precise distinction of 
convenance and bienséance according to the universal or 
relative significance of the conformity in question; their 
relationship to historical authenticity and so on. In poetry 
and drama the 18th, century tended to be backward looking 
and this perhaps helps to explain Marmontel's remarkable 
fidelity to the theories of the 17th., although surprisingly 
in his article Beau he took issue with Diderot, pointing out 
that such ideas as order and regularity were only relative 
to intelligence, which was neither the first nor the only 
cause of the admiration inspired by beauty.
His other contributions amount nevertheless to a 
definitive statement of idealism in aesthetics, and furnish 
a useful conclusion to this part of our study. In the article 
Convenances, the sphere of conformity is carefully separated 
from that of propriety:
’II y a dans les objets de la poésie et de l ’éloquence des 
beautés locales et des beautés universelles: les beautés
locales tiennent aux opinions, aux moeurs, aux usages des 
différents peuples; les beautés universelles répondent aux 
lois, au dessein, aux procédés de la nature, et sont 
indépendantes de toute institution.’^2)
The entry on Bienséances elaborates the difference between 
these two criteria, and demonstrates their relationship to 
truth:
(1) Op.cit., vol.I, 1776.
(2) Ibid., vol.II, 1776; p.586.
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’DarivS l ’imitation poétique, les convenances et les bienséances 
ne sont pas précisément la même chose: les convenances sont
relatives^aux personnages; les bienséances sont plus 
particulièrement relatives aux spectateurs: les unes
regardent les usages, les moeurs du temps et du lieu d ’action; 
les autres regardent l ’opinion et les moeurs du pays et du 
siècle ou l ’action est représentée, lorsqu’on a fait parler 
et agir un personnage comme il aurait agi et parlé dans son 
temps, on a observé les convenances: mais si les moeurs de
ce temps-lè étaient choquantes pour le notre, en les peignant
sans les adoucir, on aura manqué aux bienséances.  Ainsi
pour mieux observer la décence et les bienséances actuelles, 
on est souvent obligé de s ’éloigner des convenances en altérant 
la vérité. Celle-ci est toujours la même, et les convenances 
sont invariables comme elle: mais les bienséances varient
selon les lieux et les temps.
So it is that convenance, conformity with the original and 
universal essence of things, emerged as a central notion in 
aesthetic as well as moral thought; and as a notion that in 
this sphere at least, survived into the mid 18th. century.
In earlier chapters, we have tried to show how moral 
values, particularly justice, were connected with the idea 
of relationships of conformity in things. Now in aesthetics, 
one of the main values, and one which has a close formal 
connection with justice, is that of justesse ; and it is 
interesting to find out whether it too was commonly associated 
with the idea of convenance. Clearly, if justice depends on 
the correct assessment of moral relationships, then justesse, 
which is defined in the Dictionnaire Universel as ’précision, 
exactitude, régularité', its near relation. Considered
(1) Op.cit., vol.I, p.888.
(2) Dictionnaire Universel français et latin, Trévoux, 1704; 
vol.II.
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as a human attribute, just judgement is its primary ingredient; 
applied to objects, it denotes exact proportion, structural 
perfection, and is almost synonymous with conformity.
Voltaire certainly saw justice and justesse as intellectual 
and moral counterparts when he wrote of the Duchesse de 
Ohoiseul, 'Je sais qu'elle a outre les grâces, justesse dans 
l'esprit, et justice dans le coeur.
But their relative significance was not always so clearly 
defined. Combining so closely the ideas of right proportion 
and just judgement, justesse possessed a certain moral sig­
nificance in addition to its intellectual and aesthetic 
meaning. Bor in the century of La Bruyère if not in that of 
Voltaire, proportion and judgement were generally associated, 
as we have already mentioned more than once, with an all 
embracing metaphysical reason. La Bruyère's conception of 
justesse clearly implies a connection between intellectual 
attribute and value judgement:
'La même justesse d'esprit qui nous fait écrire de bonnes 
choses nous fait appréhender qu'elles ne le soient pas assez 
pour mériter d'être lues. Un esprit médiocre croit écrire 
divinement; un bon esprit croit écrire raisonnablement^2)
And Bossuet, in an eloquent appeal to reason, is quite happy 
to use justesse where one might have expected justice :
(1) Lettre à Mme. du Deffand, 13 July, 1768.
(2; Les Caractères, 'Des Ouvrages de l'Esprit'; 18.
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justesse dans la viel û égalité dans les moeurs! 6 mesure 
dans les passions, riches et véritables ornements de la 
nature raisonnable, quand est-ce que nous apprendrons à vous 
estimer?'/^\
The 17th. century endowed all judgements whatever their 
object with a certain moral significance; thus justesse 
tended to imply 'ce qui doit être', or the ability, acquired 
or innate, to perceive what is necessary, a s  might be 
expected, the Chevalier de Mere had a word to say on this 
subject. Addressing his Essay De la Justesse to a certain 
noble lady he writes:
' vous parlez et jugez de tout également bien, et
j'admire principalement cette extrême justesse que vous avez 
à penser et à dire ce qu'il faut sur tout ce qui se présente.'
But this extreme nicety of judgement with regard to 
changing circumstance, though it might be presented as 
reasonable and invested with the authority of right and 
truth, relied far more on the quality of sensibility than on 
the faculty of rational thought. In this respect as far as 
aesthetic appreciation is concerned, it seems more closely 
connected with the indefinable but essential ingredient 
'le je ne sais quoi'; and as regards moral judgements with 
the kind of natural charity founded on 'amour-propre', which 
J.-J. Rousseau later isolated as the foundation of justice.
(1) Sermon sur l'Honneur, Oeuvres Oratoires, vol.V, p.52
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Both Mere and Pascal were at pains to distinguish 
'1'esprit juste' from '1'esprit géométrique'. Mere groups 
both these qualities under the heading justesse, but when 
describing the second type, he plainly has in mind a much 
more rigid and scientific outlook:
'II % a deux sortes de justesse; l'une paraît dans le bon 
tempérament qui se trouve entre l'excès et le défaut. Elle 
dépend moins de l'esprit et de l'intelligence que du goût 
et du sentiment; et quand l'esprit y contribue on peut dire... 
que c'est un esprit de goût et de sentiment: je n'ai point
d'autres termes pour expliquer plus clairement, ce je ne 
sais quoi de sage et d'habile qui connaît partout la 
bienséance, qui ne souffre pas que l'on fasse trop grand, 
ou trop petit, ce qui veut être grand ou petit: et qui fait
sentir en chaque chose les mesures qu'il y faut garder.....
Il est impossible d'en donner des règles bien assurées, car 
outre qu'elle s'occupe sur des sujets qui changent de moment 
en moment, elle dépend encore de certaines circonstances qui 
ne sont quasi jamais les mêmes. Il me semble que pour 
l'acquérir il faut être d'abord extrêmement .âo elle, et consulter 
le plus qu'on peut ceux qui en jugent bien. Ensuite on 
s'achève par l'expérience du monde et dans le commerce des 
personnes qui la savent pratiquer.'
Adaptability, sensibility and experience are the prerequisites 
for this type of justesse : they alone will cope effectively
with the demands of bienséance and moderation, always subject 
to the changing scene. The other kind, one suspects, will 
be associated with the perception of the eternal verities, 
with the unchanging nature of things, with v/hat critics and 
moralists usually called les convenances :
(1) De la Justesse, Oeuvres de H. le Chevalier de Méré, 
Amsterdam, lé92. I, p.153.
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'L'autre justesse consiste dans le vrai rapport que doit 
avoir une chose avec une autre, soit qu'on les assemble ou 
qu'on les oppose; et celle-ci vient du bon sens et de la 
droite raison; pour peu qu'on y manque ceux qui ont le sens 
net y prennent garde, ou du moins ils en sont persuadés 
sitôt qu'on les en avertit. C'est que cette sorte de 
justesse s'exerce sur la vérité simple et nue, et qui n'est 
point sujette au plus ni au moins, et qui demeure toujours 
ce qu'elle est. Je crois que pour y faire du progrès et 
pour en trouver la perfection, il faut essayer premièrement 
de connaître les choses, ensuite mettre à part celles qui ne 
veulent pas être ensemble, et surtout prendre bien garde de 
ne pas tirer de mauvaises conséquences
'Le vrai rapport que doit avoir une chose avec une autre', 
is indeed nothing more than 'la convenance des choses'; and 
Mere could have called the quality he is describing simply 
'la raison', or as Pascal preferred '1'esprit de géométrie'. 
It was for this kind of mental constitution that works like 
Terrasson's Dissertation Critique sur l'Iliade d 'Homère, 
later claimed, in the cause of progress and philosophy, 
supremacy in the field of aesthetic appreciation as well as 
physics and mathematics. Calling for nothing more than 
'conformité avec la droite raison et la belle n a t u r e it 
proscribed sentiment and admiration in art. Pascal in his 
day was a clear sighted opponent of all that was arid in art 
as well as religion; and he draws in the Pensees a definite 
line between justesse and géométrie, the first charcteristic 
of the sensitive, intuitive nature, and the second describing 
the method of the rigorous thinker;
(1) De la Justesse, pp.153-154.
(2) Terrasson, Op.cit., 1715; Preface, p.4.
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'Il y a donc deux sortes d'esprit, l'un de pénétrer vivement 
et profondément les conséquences des principes, et c'est la 
l ’esprit de justesse; l'autre de comprendre un grand nombre 
de principes sans les confondre, et c'est là l'esprit de 
géométrie.'^^
A century later, in spite of the recognition of sensi­
bility as a major force in aesthetics, the geometric concep­
tion of justesse dominates. Vauvenargues defines taste as
'une aptitude à bien juger des objets du sentiment Le
bon gout consiste dans un sentiment de la belle nature; ceux 
qui n'ont pas un esprit naturel ne peuvent avoir le goût 
juste';^2)
but he presents justesse as the essential characteristic of 
the erudite mind;
'Savoir bien rapprocher les choses, voilà l'esprit juste.
Le don de rapprocher beaucoup de choses, et de grandes choses, 
fait des esprits vastes. Ainsi la justesse paraît être le 
premier degré, et une condition très nécessaire de la vraie 
étendue d'esprit.
Its moral significance seems to have disappeared almost com­
pletely;
'Ceux qui veulent tout définir, ne confondent pas le jugement 
et l'esprit juste; ils rapportent à ce dernier l ’exactitude 
dans le raisonnement, dans la composition, dans toutes les 
choses de pure spéculation; la justesse dans la conduite de 
la vie, ils l'attachent au jugement.
(1) ed. Brunschvicg, 2.
(2) Introduction à la Connaissance de l'Esprit humain, Paris, 
17,46; Book I, p.23. ^
(3) Reflexions et Maximes, 215; in Oeuvres complètes de 
Vauvenargues, 3rd éd., Paris, 1797, vol.II, p.59.
(4) Introduction à la Connaissance de l'Esprit humain,
Paris, 1746, Book I; p.11.
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The kind of insight acquired by experience, which Méré had
associated with the criterion of bienséance and the ideal of 
moderation, Vauvenargues preferred to call bon sens and not 
justesse ; and although it still consisted *
'a n'apercevoir les objets que dans la proportion exacte 
qu'ils ont avec notre nature ou avec notre condition',
such conformity was associated not with a quasi-aesthetic 
approach to manners, but with concern for present utility 
and a d v a n t a g e . W e  are reminded again that moral concep­
tions had changed; that reason was often now considered as 
a scientific tool not a metaphysical absolute; that idealism 
in morals and aesthetics had given way to something more 
nearly approaching empiricism which tended to treat good and 
bad, beautiful and ugly as relative values./g)
Yet, while bearing in mind the change in conceptions of 
reason and the growth of sensationalist psychology, it is 
clear that the conception of justesse that undergoes least 
modification is that associated with the fixed relationships 
of things; with the irreducible elements of intelligence, 
and with the necessary conformity of structural relationships 
in the universe, whatever their cause. It is this conception.
(1) Op.cit., pp.13-14.
(2) Significantly, Vauvenargues tied moral values to the good 
of the community, and recognized only one natural law, 
that of violence and coercion of the weak by the strong; 
'les abus inevitables sont des lois de la nature'.
Maximes 26; cf. nos.164,184,187.
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combining the ideas of just judgement and of conformity in 
things, that is most closely connected with a definition of 
justice as 'un rapport de convenance'.
2 1 0
COWCLUSIOW
2 1 1
We have attempted to review the fortunes of the notion 
of conformity, more particularly of the notion of rapport de 
convenance, in the fields of philosophical and moral thought 
during the second half of the 17th. century and the early 
years of the 18th. It might be objected that studies of this 
kind are in many respects unsatisfactory, since they must aim 
for a compromise between the comprehensiveness of the 
encyclopedia, and the narrow limits of the dictionary 
definition; and in dealing with so general a term, the danger 
of over-dilution is the greater. But some broad categories 
have been isolated in which the idea of relationships of 
fitness or conformity plays a major role, and some main trends 
in the development of the notion described. Bor the purpose 
of the study is not a critical biography of Montesquieu, but 
an account of the particular area of his cultural heritage 
which would appear to have most relevance to the terms and 
ideas incorporated in his moral theory. Thus, although some 
possible sources have been indicated, attention has not been 
restricted exclusively to them; and indeed, in the case of 
the major figures like Malebranche, Bossuet and Bayle, there 
is little need to demonstrate the possibility of influence 
since they determined to a large extent the shape of 
philosophical discussion during the period, and it is above 
all a question of ascertaining the directions in which this 
influence exerted itself.
2 1 2
One of the most important developments of the 17th. 
century as a whole was the consolidation of the Copernican 
view of the universe as an harmonious system supported by 
mathematicso This revival of Pythagorean and Platonic 
theory not only accounted adequately for the factual knowledge 
in the possession of contemporary scientist-philosophers, 
but also established a scientific method dominated by 
mathematics, that permitted further investigation and 
systematization. The notion of harmony, the method associated 
with it, and the theories belonging to the ancient tradition 
from which it stemmed, spread quite naturally to fields other 
than astronomy, physics and metaphysics, embracing among 
other things, ethics and jurisprudence. Now harmony is 
above all an aesthetic notion: it expresses the apparent
coherence of organized substance; we feel that there is 
pattern and purpose in nature, that the perfection of the 
whole depends on the proportion of its parts. These parts 
must in fact stand in a relationship of fitness to each 
other. This primary organizational necessity was recognized 
by Plato in the Timaeus :
'God, in the beginning of his fashioning, made the body of 
the universe out of fire and earth. Now two terms cannot 
be brought together without a third: there must be a bond
between them to bring them together. There is no better bond 
than that which makes of itself and the terms it joins a 
single and complete whole. Now such is the nature of pro­
portion.
(1) Op.cit., 31B-32A.
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and it was still recognized in the 17th. century. Whitehead 
has expressed the opinion that the safest general character­
ization of the European philosophical tradition is that it 
consists in a series of footnotes to Plato; this is certainly 
true of works like Bossuet's Be la Connaissance de Dieu et 
de Soi-même, which is built around the idea of conformity 
as the essential characteristic of structure in every part 
of the universe. Indeed, even when chance was substituted 
for God or reason as the cause of organization, the apparent 
existence of conformity could not be disputed, since the 
factual knowledge to destroy the notion was not available. 
Even when Kaupertuis posed the question in his Essai de 
Cosmologie in the middle of the following century :
’o....ne pourrait-on pas dire que dans la combinaison 
fortuite des productions de la nature, comme il n'y avait 
que celles où se trouvaient certains rapports de convenance, 
qui pussent subsister, il n'est pas merveilleux que cette 
convenance se trouve dans toutes les espèces qui actuellement 
existent?'^  ^
the fact of conformity is not disputed, as it would be now 
that the mechanisms of organization and evolution are better 
understood. Moreover, the mathematical process involved in 
the analysis and comprehension of the structure of things, 
by which matter was reduced to a system of spatial and 
causal relationships, naturally lent support to the idea of 
universal harmony.
(1) See above p. .
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Thus the idea of relationships of fitness in things, 
associated with mathematical reason, was central to the 17th. 
century world-vision; it permeated their thinking on physics, 
metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics, and was for them the 
foundation of truth and right and beauty. This was the 
tradition in which Montesquieu's mind was formed and from 
which he drew his theoretical material; and he himself recog­
nized that originality lay in the reappraisal and reapplica­
tion of old ideas:
'Nos pensees roulent toutes sur des idées qui nous sont 
communes; cependant, par leurs circonstances, leur tour et 
leur application particulière, elles peuvent avoir quelque 
chose d'original à l'infini comme les visages.
(1) Spicilège, 265; MS, 210; Nagel II, p.758; Pléiade II,
pp.1281-1282.
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PART TWO
MONTESQUIEU'S IDEA OP JUSTICE;
ITS BACKGROUND, MEANING AND SIGNIEICANCE.
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CHAPTER ONE
BIOGRAPHICAL ORIGINS.
'Ciceron est, de tous les 
anciens, celui qui a eu le plus 
de mérité personnel, et à qui 
j'aimerais mieux ressembler; il 
n'y en a aucun qui ait soutenu 
de plus beaux et de plus grands 
caractères, qui ait plus aimé 
la gloire, qui s'en soit fait 
une plus solide, et qui y ait 
été par des routes moins battues.'
Discours sur Cicéron.
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'Le droit politique est encore à naître Le seul
moderne en état de creer cette science êut été l'illustre 
Montesquieu, Mais il n'eut garde de traiterdes principes du 
droit politique; it se contenta de traiter du droit positif 
des Gouvernements établis. Et rien au monde n'est plus 
différent que ces deux études. Celui pourtant qui veut 
juger^sainement des Gouvernements tels qu'ils existent est 
oblige de les réunir toutes deux: il faut savoir ce qui
doit etre pour bien juger de ce qui est.'(1)
Rousseau's judgement of Montesquieu in Emile, which, once 
due consideration is given to his debt to the author of the 
Lois, may be seen to disguise not a little of the same self­
esteem as prompted the President to add the epigraph 'Prolem 
sine matre creatam' to the title of his own masterpiece, 
continues nevertheless to lend authority to those criticisms 
which deny the Lois any serious moral c o n t e n t . Y e t  many 
among those who acclaim Montesquieu as the founder of the 
science of comparative law and the precursor of modern
(1) J.-J. Rousseau, Emile, Bk.V; édition Gamier, Paris, 1961, 
p.584.
(2) The object of Georges Davy's contribution to the bi-cen­
tenary of the Esprit des Lois, 'Montesquieu et la Science 
Politique' (in lie. Centenaire de l'Esprit des Lois de 
Montesquieu, Conférences organisées par la ville de 
Bordeaux, Delmas, Bordeaux, 1949) is for example to dis­
prove the existence of any a priori elements in the Lois. 
Similarly, P. Martino claims in his article 'De quelques 
résidus métaphysiques dans l'Esprit des Lois' (Revue
d'Histoire de la Philosophie, Base,45, July-Sept,1946, 
pp.255-245) that the first book was intended only to 
'endormir des defiances irritables'; and L. Althusser's 
recent study restates this opinion most firmly: 'Refus 
de soumettre la matière des faits politiques a des
principes religieux et moraux..... voilà qui introduit
aux grandes révolutions théoriques de Montesquieu', 
Montesquieu, La Politique et l'Histoire, P.U.E., Paris,
1959, p.22.
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sociology are ready to acknowledge the existence in his 
works of certain vital elements, moral in inspiration, that 
owe more to his intellectual heritage and his cast of mind 
than to the calm reflections of an impartial observer.
In his thesis on Montesquieu's contribution to sociology,
Émile Durkheim conceded that the conclusions of the Lois 
were sometimes determined by criteria other than scientific:
'ce ne sont pas seulement les lois, mais les règles de la 
vie humaine qui sont étudiées dans son livre; ce n'est pas 
seulement lascience, mais aussi l'art,
Meinecke describes the President as a 'Januskopf in the 
evolution of political and historical thought. In his work 
on the origins of Historicism Montesquieu's importance is 
seen to lie in his success in combining the naturalistic and 
rationalistic attitudes as far as was historically possible:
'Montesquieus Tat war es, dass er, von jenen Bruchstellen 
der beiden Denkweisen, die wir ihm beobachten, abgesehen, 
sie mit weit ausgreifenden Armen miteinander zu vereinigen 
und zu durchdringen strebte - den empirischen Sinn fur die 
Mannigfaltigkeit der menschlichen Binge und ihrer unendlich 
vielen besonderen Verursachungen, und den Sinn fur die 
vernunftgemasse Einheit, die diese Mannigfaltigkeit beherrscht 
und letzten Endes erklart, fur oberste Gesetze, aus denen 
man alle Mannigfaltigkeit wie aus einer Quelle fliessen sehen 
mochte. So dass zuletzt, wie es im Eingang des Esprit heisst, 
jede Verschiedenheit Uniformitat, jede Veranderung Konstanz 
wird. Die kuhnste philosophische Absicht, die immer nur 
sein kann, dem Sein und dem Werden gleichzeitig gerecht zu 
warden, regt sich dahinter, aber freilich noch gebannt in 
das mechanistische Denken der Seit.'^g)
(1) La Contribution de Montesquieu à la Constitution de la 
Science Sociale, published in Montesquieu et Rousseau, 
précurseurs dë~la Sociologie, Libraire Marcel Rivière, 
Paris, 1955, p.45»
(2) P. Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, R. Oldenbourg, 
München u. Berlin, 1956; vol.I, ch.5, p.155.
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These are judgements of Montesquieu as a thinker and of the 
purpose of his work, hut they inevitably prompt a closer 
look at certain cultural influences which may have helped 
form this enigmatic mind that leapt the gap between the 
universalism of the Renaissance and the universalism of 
modern scientific determinism.
Shackleton's critical biography is of course mainly 
devoted to the identification and evaluation of such influ­
ences throughout Montesquieu's lifetime, while Barrière's 
biography pays special attention to the people and 
institutions of Bordeaux and their importance in the life 
and thought of the President. Levin's The Political 
Doctrine of Montesquieu's 'Lois'; its Classical Background, 
is an exhaustive study of Montesquieu's debt to Antiquity.
In their respective fields these works are authoritative, 
and the effort involved in reworking the ground which they 
cover would be for the most part wasted. In the first part 
of this study however, some attempt has been made to illu­
strate through the semantic fortunes of the word convenance 
the fluctuating relationship of naturalism and rationalism 
in European thought at the end of the 17th. century, and
(1) R. Shackleton, Montesquieu, A Critical Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 1961; and P. Barrière, Un grand 
Provincial; Qharles-Louis de Secondât, baron de la 
Brède et de Montesquieu, Delmas, Bordeaux, 1946.
(2) L.M. Levin, Op.cit., Columbia University Press,
New York, 1956.
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the gradual emergence of the former as a dominant intellect­
ual current as the 18th. century progresses. The object 
of the exercise was to place Montesquieu's definition of 
justice in the Lettres Persanes in its general philosophical 
context and to throw its ambivalence into relief against 
the background of intellectual upheaval into which their 
author was born and which reached its climax during his 
formative years. This inevitably leads to the question of 
what particular pressures Montesquieu was subject to during 
his education, and of the measure in which they reflected 
the general movement of ideas.
Both Barrière and Shackleton devote sections of their 
works to Montesquieu's formal education at the Oratorian 
college at Juilly from 1700 to 1705. Their main concern is 
to outline the curriculum and describe the discipline at 
this model establishment, the testing ground for some of the 
most advanced educational theories of the age. They both 
emphasize the erudition and the forward-looking liberalism 
of its teachers, and note the solid factual basis of the 
Oratorian education in contrast to the attention paid by the 
Jesuits to formal rhetoric and stylistic elegance. The 
hallmark of the Oratorian tradition was concern for the 
development of the' individual personality rather than the
22 1
grooming of brilliant Classicists.^^ These general details 
may perhaps throw light on the President’s subsequent efforts 
to collect and classify materials for the Lois, on his 
liking for abstract ideas, and on his tolerance in questions 
of religion and manners; but in an article discussing 
Montesquieu's concept of progress, René Hubert also makes 
the point that his education made no radical departure from 
the traditional humanism of the Renaissance; it presented 
him with a view of an unchanging nature, of man as a 
universal type at the centre of the u n i v e r s e . a n y  
discussion of the progressive features of the President's 
education this factor must be kept in mind, for the latent 
conflict between this Classical concept of man, and the 
relativism encouraged by the more liberal studies of history 
and geography which were included in the Oratorian curriculum, 
could account in part for the later tension in Montesquieu's 
thought between rational idealism and scientific relativism.
The discernible influence of Montesquieu's stay at 
Juilly on his subsequent literary activity is limited.
Apart from early indications of an interest in Roman history 
provided by a school notebook entitled Historia Romana which 
is preserved in the library of La B r è d e , we can be certain
(1) See Barrière, op^it., part I, ch.l, iii; and Shackleton, 
op.cit., ch.l, ii.
(2) See 'Le Devenir historique chez Montesquieu', Revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale, année 46, 1939, pp.588-610.
(3) See Pléiade II, pp.1443-5.
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only of an enthusiasm for tragedy revealed by fragments of 
a youthful dramatization of La Galpranede's novel Qleopatre, 
renamed Britomare, which Montesquieu reproduced in the 
Pensees. Barrière sees in these fragments of verse a 
taste for the roman galant which expressed itself later in 
such works as Le Temple de Gnide and Arsace et Isménie; and 
he adds the more ambitious suggestion that La Galpranede's 
reputation as an historian over and above his actual achieve­
ments as a novelist may have inspired in the young Montesquieu 
a curiosity for the origins of the French nation. Besides 
these tangible vestiges of Montesquieu's schooldays, his 
early participation in the activities of the Academy of 
Bordeaux may have been encouraged by the existence at Juilly 
of a literary Academy in which the students were expected 
to play full part.
Nevertheless, a closer investigation of the methods and 
spirit of Oratorian education, and of the contribution made 
by some of its members to scholarship and the theory of 
education, reveals factors which could be of considerable 
significance for the development of Montesquieu's thought and 
for his later works. The period of intense intellectual 
agitation, of reassessment and rejection of traditional ideas 
and attitudes, during which Montesquieu spent his schooldays,
(1) Pensée 359 (Bkn.477); Nagel II, pp.142-146; Pléiade I, 
pp.1027-1031.
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could not be entirely unconnected with a new approach to 
the subject of education, even though this approach was 
made by a body normally associated with the unwavering 
conservatism of the Church. Indeed the general phenomenon 
of renewed intellectual activity over a broad European front, 
and the particular actions of this religious body, resulted 
from similar, sometimes identical forces, slowly transforming 
the vision of the Classical age. The prophets of revolution 
were often as not, whether by choice or accident, themselves 
clerics of one denomination or another; one thinlis imme­
diately of such outstanding figures as Malebranche in the 
Oratory itself, or of Bayle in the Protestant camp. Thus 
although the Oratory as an association attempted to remain 
aloof, in a way that contrasted completely with the involve­
ment of the Jesuits, from political and doctrinal disputes, 
the activities of its member priests as philosophers, 
scholars and teachers made of it an instrument of change. 
Indeed, among ecclesiastical establishments, the Oratory, 
by virtue of its voluntary and non-monastic institution and 
its dependence not on Rome but on the French episcopate, was 
open as few others were to absorb and to propagate new ideas.
(1) Barrière notes (Un grand Provincial, p.13) be Tellier's 
reproach to the Congregation for their republicanism, 
and their spirit of independence and liberty; also their 
enthusiasm and support a century later for the Revolution.
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It is true that its members were with a few brilliant 
exceptions such as Richard Simon and Malebranche, men of 
the second rank as far as their importance for the history 
of ideas is concerned; but although they failed to provide 
the brilliant hypotheses which form the raw material of 
intellectual progress, they contributed to the work of con­
solidation without which such hypotheses remain in the realm 
of fantasy. The combination of genius and erudition found 
in a Leibniz is a rare occurrence; even the depth of 
intellect found in Bayle expressed itself in criticism rather 
than creation; and for one brilliantly dexterous manipulator 
of ideas like Fontenelle there were dozens of obscure but 
patient scholars. Thus when Monod reviewed the progress of 
historical studies in France for the first number of the 
Revue Historique, the work of the religious orders, in 
particular of the Benedictines, in the publication and cri­
ticism of documents concerning the origins of feudalism and 
of the French monarchy received particular attention.
Similarly, the Oratorian historians, Lecointe, Belong and 
Thomassin gained an honourable mention beside the greater 
names of Saint-Êvremond, Voltaire, Bubos and Boulainviller,
The necessity of a cultural process in which imaginative 
thought and solid research complement each other is exactly 
illustrated by Monod*s judgement of Montesquieu as a historian:
(1) 'Du Progrès des Études historiques en France', R.H., 
vol.l, 1876; pp.5-38,
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•Montesquieu fut au XVIIIe. siècle le représentant le plus 
éminent de cet esprit nouveau à la fois philosophique et 
politique appliqué à l ’étude de l ’histoire et des lois.
Il y apporte une élévation de pensée et une pénétration 
supérieures, mais ses oeuvres sont propres plutôt à stimuler 
et à féconder l ’esprit qu’à 1 ’éclairer et à le guider avec 
certitude•* ^ )
What was true of historical studies also held good for the 
law. As Ilhert pointed out in his lecture on Montesquieu, 
the President was in the vanguard as far as the philosophy 
of law was concerned, hut he had no part in the scholarly 
work of the french jurists under the leadership of 
D ’Aguesseau and Pothier, of codifying and modernising the 
existing elements of French law,^^)
Prom the time of its foundation by Pierre de Bérulle 
in 1611 for the purpose of instructing the priesthood, the 
Congregation maintained a tradition of liberal piety.
The Bulle d ’institution de la Congrégation de l ’Oratoire>(^) 
emphasizes the dignity of knowledge, and associates this 
with the idea, which runs like a continuous thread through 
the works of the Oratorian teachers, the philosophy of 
Malebranchf, and the moral writings of Montesquieu, that God 
is supreme intelligence, and the Law of Reason. Cardinal 
Bérulle was a friend of Descartes and favoured the adoption
(1) Op,cit. p.25.
(2) Sir Courtenay Ilbert, Montesquieu, the Romanes Lecture, 
1904, Oxford,
(3) Reproduced in Appendix to A. Perraud’s L ’Oratoire en 
Prance au XVIIe. et au XlXe. àiêcle, Paris, 1865,
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of the new philosophy by the priests of the Oratory; but 
even in this, no rigidity was allowed to hamper their think­
ing, and Saint Augustine and Plato exercised an equal 
influence. Indeed, the spirit of Oratorian philosophy is 
in many ways reminiscent of the Platonic humanism of 
Erasmus: a spirit of tolerant eclecticism, convinced that
the true philosophy is never opposed to genuine Christianity, 
more concerned with the discovery and interpretation of its 
sources than with dogma, but, while critical of the anti­
quated forms of Scholasticism, hostile towards scepticism. 
Similarly, Oratorian discipline seems to have been inspired 
by the notion that the sense of Scripture must be understood 
from the central point of the moral and personal life of the 
individual. Knowledge of God, Bernard L<amy declares in the 
Entretiens sur les Sciences, i s  not dependent on erudition;
’La science (de Lieu) est facile; le ciel et la terre 
nous instruisent mieux que les livres et sans une profonde 
connaissance de la théologie, on peut aimer Dieu plus que 
ne font les plus savants.’^2)
Although the Oratory had been set up for the purpose of 
instructing the priesthood, in 1630 it took over the Collège 
de Troyes, and that was the beginning of its pedagogic 
interests. The compilation of a Ratio Studiorum was begun
(1) Bruxelles, Pricx. 1684. This small Oratorian manual 
exercised a considerable influence in the 18th. century, 
and has a special significance for both Montesquieu and 
Rousseau studies.
(2) Entretienssur les Sciences, I.
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in 1634 by a team of priests under the supervision of 
Le père de Oondren./^^ They set out with the firm convic­
tion that the basis of education should remain the study of 
the Humanities, but that all method should be taught in 
French, starting from a groundwork provided by the gramma­
tical study of the French L a n g u a g e . T h i s  departure from 
the traditional methods employed by the Jesuits and in the 
colleges of the University was their first innovation and 
the basis of all those that f o l l o w e d . T h e i r  testing 
ground was the college de Juilly.
(1) The first part was inserted in the acts of the General 
Assembly in 1634, but dealt only with discipline; the 
second part, completed in 1643, and embodying the prin­
ciples practised at Juilly was published in 1645 under 
the title; Ratio Studiorum a magistris et professoribus 
Qongregationis Oratorii Domini Jesu observanda (Paris, 
Vitré), but apparently no text remains extant, A résumé 
by le père Adry is however to be found in the Mémoire 
sur le règlement des études dans les lettres humaines par 
M. Arnauld, publ. by Ingold in the Annales de l ’Oratoire, 
April and May 1885, and also in the Revue Internationale 
de 1 ’Enseignement, July and August, 1886.
(2) Le père de Condren himself compiled a Méthode en langue 
française, à l ’usage de l ’Académie de Juilly, pour 
apprendre avec facilite les principes de la langue latine, 
ou sont expliqués les genres, la syntaxe et la quantité 
dans un ordre clair et concis tout ensemble. See
Oh. Hamel, L ’Histoire de l ’Abbaye et du Collège de Juilly, 
Paris, 1868, part IV, ch.l; p.211,
(3) There is some disagreement as to whether the Oratorians 
were influenced by the methods of the Jansenists in the 
Petites Ecoles de Port-Royal, or vice-versa. Jansenist 
influence was first suggested by SainlJ-Beuve in his 
Histoire de Port-Royal, and A. Théry reproduces the notion 
in his Histoire de l ’Education en France, Paris, 1858, 
part II, Bk.5. But G. Compayré in Histoire Critique des 
Doctrines de l ’Éducation en France depuis le 16e. siècle, 
Paris, 1879, Bk.II, ch,2, inclines to believe that both 
institutions carried out similar reforms at the same time 
but independent of each other, while Hamel in his Histoire 
de l ’Abbaye et du Collège de Juilly, Bk.IV, ch.l, on the 
evidence of the Ratio Studiorum, puts forward the case for
 the influence of Juilly on the Petites-Ecoles._____________
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The study of history followed naturally upon that of 
French. It was introduced by order of the first assembly 
of the Congregation of the Oratory and came to occupy a 
special place in the curriculum. In the senior classes par­
ticular emphasis was laid upon French history and a library 
was provided for pupils to pursue their ovai research. In 
his Notice sur le Collège de Juilly, l e  père Adry recounted:
'Lorsque notre langue se fut perfectionnée, il 
(le professeur d'Histoire) donnait lui-même ses leçons en 
français, et de vive voix, dans la Chambre des Grands, et 
l'histoire de France en était toujours l'objet. Dans les 
cinq autres chambres, il remettait des cahiers d'histoire 
aux préfets de pension. On voyait l'Histoire Sainte dans 
les deux dernières chambres où étaient les plus jeunes 
écoliers; et dans les trois chambres suivantes, on faisait 
apprendre l'Histoire grecque et l'Histoire romaine.
In all Oratorian colleges use was made of le père Lecointe's 
notebooks; the regent at the college de Vendôme was also the 
author of the Annales Ecclesiastici Francorum (1665-1683), 
a work which Montesquieu later used.^^^ Le père Bertault's 
Florus Francicus, an abridgement of French history, which 
went through 78 editions between 1632 and 1660, was their 
other main textbook.
History in the Oratory was complemented by geographical 
studies, which had been originally encouraged by le père
(1) Notice sur le Collège de Juilly par un Ancien Elève de 
cette Académie, Paris, à l'Institut des Sourds-Muets, 
1807.
(2) Ibid., p.13.
(3) See Pensées 189 (Bkn. 1581)
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Eustache Gault, a friend and contemporary of Berulle.^^^
The syllabus appears to have been unusually full, comprising 
not only the study and drawing of maps, but also research 
into social and political factors, such as government, 
manners and customs, language and natural ressources.
The course is outlined in the programme of the college at 
Le Mans, dating from the beginning of the 18th. century;
'Nous n'avons point borné la géographie à une nomen­
clature sèche et aride. Nous avons mile à la connaissance 
du globe un précis des religions, du commerce, du gouverne­
ment, des moeurs des peuples qui l'habitent, des révolutions, 
des curiosités historiques, des productions en tout genre. 
Jaloux d'avoir une connaissance exacte de notre patrie, nous 
nous sommes étendus sur la France. Comment se gouverne la 
France? Qu'est- ce que le grand conseil, le conseil 
souverain, le parlement, un président, un baillage, une 
généralité, la chambre des comptes? On donne aussi un 
aperçu sur les provinces, avec un résumé des révolutions 
qu'elles ont éprouvées
There is no reason to suppose, since Juilly was the model 
establishment among Oratorian colleges, that its geography 
syllabus differed greatly from that of Le Mans. The breadth 
of the course, ranging from cultural background to economics.
(1) Cloyseault wrote of le père Gault: 'II aimait 
passionément la géographie, à laquelle il s'était 
toujours attaché avec tant de soin et de curiosité'. 
Recueil des Vies de quelques prêtres de l'Oratoire, 
Bibliothèque Oratorienne, ed. Ingold, vol.I, Pari s,
1880; p.339.
(2) Lallemand bases this outline partly on the Exercices 
publiques d'Effiat, (1785) and partly on the syllabus of 
the college of Le Mans (c.l700). See Histoire de 
l'iÊducation dans l'Ancien Oratoire de France, Paris, 
1888; p.254.
(3) Programme à la Bibliothèque municipale du Mans, 408c, 
quoted by Lallemand, op.cit., p.254, note 1.
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is obviously not without significance for Montesquieu’s 
practical observations during his European travels, not to 
mention the sociological preoccupations of the Lois. The 
surprisingly modern spirit in which these new studies were 
conceived, contrasting strongly with Classical attitudes, 
is revealed in Lamy's Entretiens sur les Sciences; of
history and geography he wrote that they go to form a man
'de tous les siècles et de tous les pays, ce que la nature 
n'a pu faire ’ •
The physical sciences were also given a place at 
Juilly. In his Entretiens, Lamy enthuses over the current 
fashion for laboratory experiments, which may indicate that 
the idea of utilizing knowledge derived from observation 
was also introduced to the college's pupils, alongside 
standard Cartesian p h y s i c s . T h u s  the President's willing­
ness to study the effects of climate on physical disposition 
by experiments with a sheep's tongue may have stemmed from
a much earlier acquaintance with the natural sciences than
the early activities of the Academy of Bordeaux.
Experiment within the discipline of Cartesian 
philosophy must have long been part of the Oratorian tradition,
(1) Op.cit.. I, p.21,
(2) Ibid., VI.
(3) Montesquieu describes his experiments in the Lois, 
BkoXIV, ch.2.
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Malebranche himself devoted considerable time to physics 
and wrote a Traité des lois de la Communication du 
Mouvement (1669); while entomology, botany, chemistry and 
astronomy also claimed his attention. Montesquieu was to 
make several explicit attacks in the Pensées on the episte- 
mological foundations of Malebranchian m e t a p h y s i c s , y e t  
there remains, as we shall see, plentiful evidence to 
suggest that the President's moral thought was at least 
partly inspired by the spirit of the great philosopher, and 
beyond this, that he also approved of the Cartesian method
in science.^2)
Yet the influence of Malebranche's thought should be 
seen in the context of the philosophical tradition of the 
Oratory. Its founder, Pierre de Bérulle, was as we have 
already mentioned, a close friend of Descartes, and favoured 
the dissemination of Cartesianism throughout the Congregation. 
Generally speaking it combined with a strong Platonic tradi­
tion which was basically hostile to dogmatism. Thus although 
Bernard lamy was driven from the chair of philosophy at the 
college at Angers for his Cartesian sympathies, his works
(1) Pensées, 156 (Bkn.2061), 410 (Bkn.2062), 157 (Bkn.2066).
(2) See Essai d'observations sur l'histoire naturelle,
Nagel III, p.112; and Pléiade I, p.39.
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in fact reveal a tolerant e c l e c t i c i s m . T h e  college at 
Juilly used a manual specially composed by le père Fournenc 
to direct philosophical studies along the paths of ilato 
and the early Fathers, and, at least according to Hamel, 
to divert the attention of the official defenders of 
Scholasticism from the Cartesian elements which had found 
their way into the syllabus; for Adry describes the manual 
as a work,
'dans lequel ce 1ère, en substituant l'autorité de la raison 
à celle d'Aristote, préparait la voie aux ouvrages plus 
parfaits qui ont été donnés depuis.
Thus the teachers at Juilly escaped the censure which 
stifled Cartesianism in the other Oratorian colleges, and 
continued unmolested to instruct their pupils in the beliefs 
of a liberal idealism, based on a grounding in Cartesian 
method drawn mainly from Descartes's Principes de la 
Philosophie and modified by certain rudimentary forms of a 
comparative method.
(1) In the Entretiens sur les Sciences one finds on the one 
hand an unmistakably Cartesian emphasis on the importance 
of mathematics in the training of the mind, and an 
adherence to certain Cartesian doctrines such as that of 
innate ideas, and on the other a remarkable exposition of 
the critical techniques of an historical method. In an 
article, 'De la Composition de l'Esprit des Lois; 
Montesquieu et les Oratoriens de l'Académie de Juilly', 
(Revue d'Histoire littéraire de la France, 1952, pp.440-450) 
H. Roddier has pointed out the significance of Oratorian 
eclecticism, in particular that of Lamy, for the political 
and historical thought of Montesquieu, and for his method
of research and composition in the Lois.
(2) Histoire de l'Abbaye et du Collège de Juilly, part IV, 
ch.l, p.223, note 3.
(3) Notice sur le Collège de Juilly, p.15.
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In this way, the teaching of philosophy in the Oratory 
complemented on the one hand the growing relativism of its 
historical and geographical studies, and on the other the 
humanism of its Classical studies. These centred on the 
teaching of Latin authors, among whom, for stylistic reasons 
quite naturally, and for Montesquieu's moral ideas mest 
significantly, Cicero held pride of place. Cloyseault notes 
in his biographies of outstanding Oratorians, that le pere 
du Condren, superior of the Congregation at the time of the 
composition of the Ratio Studiorum, had a special liking
for C i c e r o , a n d  this predilection seems to have been 
widespread throughout the colleges. Lamy reproduces it in 
his outline of Classical studies in the Entretiens sur les 
Sciences :
*11 faut joindre à la lecture des poètes celle des 
^ orateurs, et de tous les ouvrages de Cicéron, car je n'en 
 ^ ei^pte aucun. 11 n'y a point d'Auteur dans l'Antiquité 
Payenne dont l'étude soit plus utile pour la solidité des 
pensées, pour les maximes admirables, pour la Latinité et 
la belle manière de mettre une vérité en son jour, et de 
la faire connaître ayec tant de variété et de fécondité, 
que les esprits les plus distraits soient contraints de 
1'aperc evoir•(2)
(1) Le père C.E, Cloyseault, Recueil des Vies de quelques 
Prêtres de l'Oratoire, Bibliothèque Oratorienne, ed. 
Ingold, vol.l, Paris, 188O; Book V.
(2) Op. cit., IV, p.122.
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Similarly, Cicero's De Officiis, and the De Datura Deorum 
figure prominently in the programme of the college at Le 
Mans at the end of the 17th. c e n t u r y . S e n e c a  was also 
included in the syllabus, and it therefore seems possible 
that Stoicism claimed considerable attention in the teaching 
of moral philosophy, and that Montesquieu's enthusiasm for 
its ideals of justice and moderation was contracted during 
his years at Juilly. It is true that the influence of 
Cicero is usually associated with the Traité des Devoirs 
composed in 1725, some twenty years after Montesquieu left 
Juilly; indeed, in a letter to Fitz-James refering to a 
passage on Stoicism in the Lois, ) h.e names tie De Officiis 
and Marcus Aurelius's Réflexions Morales as his main 
inspirations for the Traité. \ Nevertheless, even a rapid 
glance at the President's earliest literary enterprises, the 
Discours sur Cicéron, dating from about 1709, and the 
Dissertation sur la Politique des Romains dans la Religion, 
a more mature and serious work read to the Academy of 
Bordeaux in June 1716, reveals the esteem in which he already 
held the Roman moralist.
(1) See P. Lallemand's outline of the curriculum in Oratorian 
colleges based on the Le Mans programme, in Histoire de 
l'Éducation daas l'Ancien Oratoire de France, pp.362-571.
(2) Book XXIV, ch.“lÔ.
(5) Montesquieu to Mgr. de Fitz-James, Paris, Oct.8, 1750, 
(Nagel III, p.1527).
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The first of these short essays, the Discours sur 
Cicéron, is nothing more than a straightforward eulogy, in 
which enthusiasm obscures critical appreciation. The 
opening paragraph sets the tone ;
'Cicéron est, de tous les anciens, celui qui a eu le 
plus de mérite personnel, et à qui j'aimerais mieux 
ressembler; il n'y en a aucun qui ait soutenu de plus beaux 
et de plus grands caractères, qui ait plus aimé la gloire, 
qui s'en soit fait une plus solide, et qui y ait été par 
des routes moins battues,
and Montesquieu later added a footnote which reveals not 
only an awareness of this deficiency, but also a growing 
interest in the fortunes of the Roman republic itself, not 
just its great protagonist;
'J'ai fait ce discours dans ma jeunesse. Il pourra 
devenir bon, si je lui ôte l'air de panégyrique. Il faut 
outre cela, donner un plus long détail des ouvrages de 
Cicéron, voir les lettres surtout, et entrer plus avant 
dans les causes de la ruine de la République et dans les 
caractères de César, de Pompée, d'Antoine.'^2)
Yet Montesquieu already emphasizes in the Discours the 
greater importance of Cicero's moral philosophy compared to 
his rhetoric, and outlines the content of the De Officiis. 
Besides this, he pays considerable attention to the other 
work which appeared in the programme of Le Mans, the De 
Datura Deorum, and to a related treatise, the De Divinatione.
(1) Op.cit., Nagel III, p.15; Pléiade, I, p.93
(2) Ibid,
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Significantly, the only other moral philosopher mentioned 
in the essay is Seneca, and not Marcus Aurelius, perhaps 
because Greek was comparatively neglected in the Oratorian 
schools; but for Montesquieu at least, Seneca’s brand of 
Stoicism pales before the stouter virtues of his hero.^^
Thus in this early work two of the President’s main 
preoccupations, and two which at once reflect both the 
curious mixture of Classical humanism and historical 
relativism in Oratorian teaching, and the tension in his 
own thought between rational idealism and scientific 
determinism, are already beginning to emerge. The first of 
these is concern for the dictates of reason, the ideal of 
justice, and the duties of society. Cicero is
’le premier, chez les Romains, qui ait tiré la philosophie 
des mains des savants, et l ’ait dégagée des embarras d ’une 
langue étrangère. Il la rendit commune a tous les hommes, 
conme la raison, et, dans les applaudissements qu’il en 
reçut, les gens de lettres se trouvèrent d ’accord avec le 
peuple...... Il nous apprend ce que c ’est que l ’honnête et
ce que c'est que l'utile; ce que nous devons a la société, 
ce que nous devons à nous mêmes; ce que nous devons faire en 
qualité de pères de familles ou en qualité de c i t o y e n s )
The second preoccupation, and possibly the one which was 
uppermost in his mind during this early period, is not
(1) 'Qu'on lise ses ouvrages, et on sera dégoûté pour toujours 
de Sénèque et de ses semblables, gens plus malades que 
ceux qu'ils veulent guérir, plus désespérés que ceux 
qu'ils consolent, plu9 tyrannisés.des passions que ceux 
qu'ils veulent affranchira.' Ibid., Nagel III, pp.17-18; 
Pléiade, I, p.95.
(2) Discours sur Cicéron, Nagel III, pp.16-17; Pléiade I, 
pp.94-95.
237
totally unrelated to his admiration for Cicero’s rational 
ethics however; for the interest in paganism which underlies 
his brief discussion of the Traité de la Nature des Dieux 
and the Traité de la Divination goes hand in hand with an 
obvious desire to use critical reason in the service of 
tolerance as well as of science:
’Quel plaisir de voir, dans son livre De la Nature des 
Dieux, faire passer en revue toutes les sectes, confondre 
tous les philosophes, et marquer chaque préjugé de quelque 
flétrissure! Tantôt il combat contre ces monstres; tantôt 
il se joue de la philosophie. Les champions qu’il introduit 
se détruisent eux-mêmes; celui-là est confondu par celui-ci, 
qui se trouve battu à son tour. Tous ces systèmes 
s’évanouissent les uns devant les autres, et il ne reste, 
dans l ’esprit du lecteur, que du mépris pour les philosophes 
et de l ’admiration pour le critique.
Avec quelle satisfaction ne le voit-on pas, dans son 
livre De la Divination, affranchir l'esprit des Romains du 
joug ridicule des aruspices et des règles de cet art, qui 
était l'opprobre de la théologie payenne, qui fut établi 
dans le commencement par la politique des magistrats, chez 
les peuples grossiers, et affaibli, par la même politique, 
lorsqu'ils devinrent plus éclairés.
The use of discursive reason in the criticism of pagan super­
stition, which Montesquieu here admires in Cicero, was pre­
cisely the weapon used by some of his contemporaries, 
scientific rationalists like Pontenelle in their attempt to 
undermine the blind enthusiasm of the Classicists and to 
destroy the intolerant dogmatism of established religion, 
by introducing the notion that the value of beliefs, prac­
tises and superstitions lies not in their literal meaning -
(1) Discours sur Cicéron, Nagel III, p.17; Pléiade I, p.94.
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often absurd - but in their relation to the origin and 
development of social organisation. Thus his admiration 
has its roots in contemporary intellectual movements, which, 
while pursuing the immediate ends of overcoming religious 
intolerance and of freeing science from the yoke of the 
Church, and whilst retaining some connection with a rational 
idealism whose supreme values were justice and law, even­
tually gave birth to the new science of sociology; and it 
is accompanied by an indication of his own later contribution 
to the founding of that science: the notion, one of the
unifying themes of all his works, that religions are natural 
products, and religion an essentially social phenomenon,
Montesquieu's interest in paganism spanned much of his 
lifetime and can be examined from various aspects. But it 
was not a purely pedantic interest, since paganism was a 
central topic in contemporary literary and philosophical 
discussion. It produced in Montesquieu one startling and 
original idea, that religion is a social phenomenon and as 
such should foster the State's ends, which after a brief 
indication in the Discours sur Cicéron, is further developed 
in the Dissertation sur la Politique des Romains dans la 
Religion. Here again extensive use is made of quotations 
drawn from Cicero, from the De Divinatione in particular, 
although the central theme :
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•Ce ne fut ni la crainte ni la piété qui établit la religion 
chez les Romains, mais la nécessité où sont toutes les
sociétés d ’en avoir une..... Je trouve cette différence
entre les législateurs romains et ceux des autres peuples, 
que les premiers firent la religion pour l ’État, et les 
autres l ’État pour la religion’,
where a germ of the new scientific determinism lies next to 
a grain of old Machiavellianism, is now more closely related 
to St, Augustinés account in the De Givitate Dei of the 
political wisdom of Scevola in matters of religion.
St, Augustinds writings were also highly favoured by 
the Oratorian teachers, but it has also been suggested that 
Montesquieu drew on Bayle’s Continuation des Pensées diverses 
sur la Comète for much of the material used in quotations 
in the Dissertation. T h e y  have in common references to 
the De Civitate Dei, to Cicero’s De Datura Deorum, and to 
the English Platonist Cudworth. This may be true; it is 
sufficient to comment that Montesquieu uses his quotations 
as illustrations, almost as proofs; like his Oratorian 
masters he consistently regarded a well established text as 
valid empirical evidence; Bayle on the contrary used them 
as the critical weapons of scepticism. It is also certain 
that Montesquieu’s attitude to religion in the Dissertation
(1) See Nagel III, p.44; Pléiade I, p.86.
(2) In Shackleton’s ’Bayle and Montesquieu’, in Pierre Bayle 
le Philosophe de Rotterdam, ed. Dibon, Paris, 1959;
ch.VII, p.142.
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was already quite different from Bayle *s,^^ as the remarks 
made there about Cudworth show. In the Continuation des 
Pensées Diverses (1705), Bayle put forward the objection 
to Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe, 
that it was in reality a concealed defence of atheism, not 
a plea for the establishment of religious tolerance on the 
basis of a liberal attitude to d o g m a . M o n t e s q u i e u  on 
the other hand takes up Cudworth’s point that in spite of 
the plurality of gods in pagan religion, the most enlight­
ened of pagan thinkers were in fact deists; he responds to 
the rational idealism of the Cambridge Platonist, and him­
self adds a sympathetic outline of Stoic pantheism;
’M. Cudworth a fort bien prouvé que ceux qui étaient 
éclairés parmi les païens adoraient une divinité suprême, 
dont les divinités du peuple n ’étaient qu’une participation. 
Les paiens, très peu scrupuleux dans le culte, croyaient 
qu’il était indifférent d ’adorer la divinité même, ou les 
manifestations de la divinité; d ’adorer, par exemple, dans 
Venus, la puissance passive de la nature, ou la divinité 
suprême en tant qu’elle est susceptible de toute génération; 
de rendre un culte au soleil, ou à l ’être suprême en tant 
qu’il anime les plantes et rend la terre féconde^par sa 
chaleur. Ainsi, le stoïcien Balbus dit dans Cicéron, que 
Dieu participe, par sa nature,, à toutes les choses d ’ici-bas; 
qu’il est Cérès sur la terre,'Neptune sur les mers......
Comme le dogme de l ’âme du monde était presque universellement 
reçu, et que l ’on regardait chaque gartie de 1 ^univers comme 
un membre vivant dans lequel cette ame était répandue, il
(1) At some date Montesquieu was particularly concerned to 
refute Bayle, as the fragments. Quelques réflexions qui 
peuvent servir contre le Paradoxe de M. Bayle, qu’il 
vaut mieux être athée qu’idolâtre, (Pensée 1946, Bkn.673) 
show; Shackleton dates this refutation after 1731, and 
Montesquieu’s return from England however.
(2) See L.P. Courtines, Bayle’s Relations with England and 
the English, New York, 1938, p.47 ff.
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semblait qu’il était permis d ’adorer indifféremment toutes 
ces parties, et que le culte devait être arbitraire comme 
était le dogme.
Voilà d ’où était né cet esprit de tolérance et de
douceur qui régnait dans le monde païen; on n ’avait garde
de se persécuter et de se déchirer les uns les autres; 
toutes les religions, toutes les théologies, y étaient 
également bonnes; les hérésies, les guerres et les disputes 
de religion y étaient inconnues; pourvu qu’on allât adorer 
au temple, chaque citoyen était grand pontife dans sa 
famille. ’
Thus Montesquieu’s approach to the question of religious 
tolerance is based on the notion that all cults may be 
tolerated, because they all possess a certain validity, 
namely the way in which they express the idea of a universal 
reason, or a world soul; it is not based as Bayle’s was, on 
the idea that religion is profoundly indifferent for the 
fortunes of the State, since from a social point of view at 
least, atheism is to be prefered to paganism. For 
Montesquieu man is both a social and a religious creature.
In relation to this passage it is also worth noting
that the Stoic idea of a world soul is not far removed from
the notion of immanent reason; a predisposition in 
Montesquieu towards this concept would help to reconcile the 
determinism implicit in the idea that the establishment of 
religion follows from social necessity with his rational 
idealism; for if it is assumed that all religious phenomena
(1) Dissertation sur la Politique des Romains, Nagel III, 
pp.44-45; Pleiade, I, pp.87-88.
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are valid in that they express in some way the cult of 
immanent reason, it follows logically enough that any given 
religion may be regarded as necessary,^^
Montesquieu’s interest in paganism is directly related 
in the Dissertation sur la Politique des Romains dans la 
Religion to the concept of religion as a social phenomenon 
and to the political implications of this idea; the question 
of religious tolerance is only a secondary theme in the 
essay. But there is little doubt that Montesquieu desired 
to use his notion that all religions express something of 
the religious nature of man, in the contemporary debate on 
inter-sectarian tolerance which was stimulated by historic 
events such as the persecution of the Huguenots in Prance, 
the emergence of the eirenic movement, and by the dissemin­
ation of rationalism and the accompanying growth of natural 
religion. One of the most hotly debated topics was the 
question of eternal punishment; it was becoming more and 
more difficult to reconcile the orthodox dogma concerning 
heretics and pagans with the notion of a God of reason and 
justice; and not surprisingly therefore, another of 
Montesquieu’s early works seems to have had as its aim to 
prove
(1) For Montesquieu and the idea of immanent reason, see 
below, . 311-14"i 4 6 6 - ^
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’(jue 1 ’idolâtrie de la plupart des payers ne paraissait pas 
mériter une damnation eternelle.'
Other works mentioned in the Pensées, hut long since dis­
appeared: Les Prêtres dans le Paganisme,/n) and a Discours
sur l ’idolâtrie en général, were also probably the out­
come of a combination of sociological interest and 
rationalist conscience.
The interesting point here in relation to the influence 
of the Oratorians is indeed the fact that Montesquieu's 
scientific interest in paganism is inseparable from his 
rational idealism. For it seems certain on the one hand 
that both originated in the study of Cicero; and on the 
other, the concern which he shows to salvage man's spiritual 
nature while at the same time answering in full the demands 
of scientific relativism, has more in common with the spirit 
of religious liberalism found in the works of a Classicist 
like Thomassin, than with the rational scepticism of 
Fontenelle, whose influence Montesquieu nevertheless also 
experienced.
(1) This is refered to by D ’Alembert in his Eloge de 
Montesquieu; see Nagel I, p.iii, note (a.
(2) Mentioned in Pensée 2004 (Bkn.591); Nagel II, p.617; 
Pleiade, I, p.1082.
(3) Pensée 1946 (Bkn.673); Nagel II, p.584; Pléiade I, p.1172 
Other entries in the Pensées, nos.112(446), 420(2119), 
421(2184), were also possibly connected with this or a 
similar work.
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Montesquieu probably met Fontenelle during his first 
stay in Paris from 1 7 0 9 - 1 7 1 3 , and he certainly came to 
know him well in later life. There is evidence in the Pensées 
that he was in the habit of discussing matters concerning 
the origin of certain beliefs and customs with Fontenelle, 
and the account of one of these discussions provides the key 
to the difference in their attitudes to religion, and also 
throws light on his lengthy refutation of Bayle’s opinions
on atheism.^2)
Fontenelle remained faithful to Cartesian physics but not 
to Cartesian metaphysics; he preserved the positivist 
mechanist elements of the new philosophy, emphasizing the 
importance of a method dependent on doubt and evidence, and 
his application of it to questions of belief led quite 
naturally to scepticism. In spite of his rather uncritical 
adulation of Descartes in early scientific essays like the 
Observations sur l ’Histoire Naturelle, Montesquieu was 
apparently aware quite early of Fontenelle’s attitude; his 
early criticisms of Malebranchian metaphysics in the Pensées 
were most likely inspired by Fontenelle; and at least one 
judgement of Descartes which he records there recalls his 
friend's attitude:
(1) See Shackleton, Montesquieu, ch.l, iii, p.10.
(2) The account is given in Pensée 1677 (Bkn,2147); Nagel II, 
p.499; Pleiade I, p.1556, and probably dates from the 
period 1746-1750, though this is not a sure indication of 
the date of the conversation itself. The refutation of 
Bayle is of course Pensée 1946 (Bkn.673).
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'Descartes a enseigné à ceux qui sont venus après lui, 
à découvrir ses erreurs mêmes.
Je le compare à ïimoléon qui disait: 'Je suis ravi que,
par mon moyen, vous avez obtenu la liberté de vous opposer 
a mes désirs•’*(p)
Many years before, in the Digression sur les Anciens et les 
Modernes, (1688) Fontenelle had written:
^'C'est lui (Descartes) qui a amené cette nouvelle 
manière de raisonner, beaucoup plus estimable que sa philo­
sophie même, dont une bonne partie se trouve fausse ou 
incertaine, selon les propres règles qu'il nous a apprises.'
Nevertheless, Montesquieu perseveres in acclaiming Descartes's 
contribution to religious thought; in the record of his con­
versation with Fontenelle he mentions that Descartes was 
the first to establish a real distinction between the soul 
and the body, and the same point reoccurs in the refutation 
of Bayle:
'II est même certain qu'avant M. Descartes la philosophie 
n'avait point de preuves de l'immatérialité de l'âme: car
l'âme ne se peut connaître que de deux manières, par l'idée
ou par s e n t i me n t^2)
Montesquieu never rejected Descartes's rational spiritualism, 
though he was prepared to consider the possibility that 
thought was an attribute of matter.
Fontenelle however was consistent in his outlook. As 
a partisan of the Modernes, he set out to demolish the
(1) Pensée 775 (Bkn.2105); Nagel II, p.231; Pleiade I, p.1548,
(2) Pensée 1946 (Bkn.673); Nagel II, p.585; Pléiade I, p.1173.
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arguments of those who supported the cause of Classical 
learning against that of the modern age, by subjecting the 
fables of antiquity to a comparative interpretation. It 
little mattered that the critical method used here was 
equally well suited to reducing all speculative belief to 
natural, non-religious origins. The work of demolition 
began with the Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes, 
and was continued in the Histoire des Oracles (1686), a 
translation and re-arrangement of Van Dale's De Oraculis 
Ethnicorum Dissertationes duae, and in the De l'Origine des 
Fables ( 1 7 2 4 ) . In their enthusiasm for Antiquity, the 
Anciens made spectacular claims for the historical importance 
of its literature. Rapin's estimation of Homer's significance 
is typical :
'Les législateurs y ont pris le premier plan des lois, 
qu'ils ont données aux hommes: les fondateurs des monarchies
et des républiques ont dressé leurs états sur le modèle 
qu'il s'en était formé; les philosophes y ont trouvé les 
premiers principes de la morale qu'ils ont enseignée aux 
peuple s.....'^2^
Claims such as these, however absurdly exaggerated, did 
however skirt, without ever grasping it, an important truth: 
namely that the legends of antiquity reflected certain basic 
characteristics of primitive social organisation. Fontenelle
(1) In his critical edition of the work (Paris, 1932),
J.R. Carré suggests that it was probably written before 
1680, and drawn from a larger projected work on history.
(2) Reflexions sur la Poétique d'Aristote, Paris, Muguet, 
1674; iv, p.7.
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seized on the relationship between fables and religious 
cults, and developed the thesis that all primitive belief 
is essentially anthropomorphic:
'Cette philosophie des premiers siècles roulait sur un 
principe si naturel, qu'encore aujourd'hui notre philosophie 
n'en a point d'autre; c'est-à-dire que nous expliquons les 
choses inconnues de la Nature par celles que nous avons 
devant les yeux, et que nous transportons à la physique les 
idées que l'expérience nous fournit. Nous avons découvert 
par l'usage, et non pas deviné, ce que peuvent les poids, 
les ressorts, les leviers; nous ne faisons agir la,nature que 
par des leviers, des poids et des ressorts. Ces pauvres 
sauvages qui ont les premiers habité le monde, ou*ne 
connaissaient point ces choses-là, ou n'y avaient fait aucune 
attention. Ils n'expliquaient donc les effets de la Nature 
que par des choses plus grossières et plus palpables qu'ils 
connaissaient. Qu'avons-nous fait les uns et les autres?
Nous nous sommes toujours représenté l'inconnu sous la 
figure de ce qui nous était connu; mais heureusement il y a 
tous les sujets du monde de croire que l'inconnu ne peut pas 
ne point ressembler à ce qui nous est connu présentement
Fontenelle just failed to reach the idea that religious 
beliefs and practices may be conditioned by national charac­
ter and environment, the notion that is visible in 
Montesquieu's Dissertation sur la Politique des Romains dans 
la Religion; but nevertheless the establishment of a definite 
relationship between speculative belief and psychological 
factors was an important first step towards a sociological 
interpretation of religion. It was a belief in the immut­
ability of human nature which prevented him taking his 
analysis further; this led him to suggest that all history
(1) De l'Origine des Fables, Oeuvres de Fontenelle, Paris, 
1767, vol.Ill, pp.274-275.
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could be deduced from basic human characteristics,and in 
spite of a belief in the possiblility of material progress, 
his view of the moral state of mankind was fundamentally 
pessimistic ;
'Sur ce nombre prodigieux d'hommes, assez déraisonnables, 
qui naissent en cent ans, la nature en a peut-être fait deux 
ou trois douzaines de raisonnables, qu'il faut qu'elle 
répande par toute la Terre, et vous jugez bien qu'ils ne se 
trouvent jamais nulle part en assez grande quantité pour y 
faire un monde de vertu et de d r o i t u r e )
Considering the nature of man to be brutish and fixed, it 
was hardly surprising that he saw no religious spirit in 
him; thus his scientific explanation of religious phenomena 
depended on their reduction to natural, non-religious 
causes; to the primitive instincts of an irrational 
creature :
'dans toutes les divinités que les payens ont imaginées, 
ils y ont fait dominer l'idée du pouvoir, et n'ont eu 
presque aucun égard ni à la sagesse ni à la justice, ni à 
tous les autres attributs qui suivent la nature divine. Rien 
ne prouve mieux que ces divinités sont fort anciennes, et ne 
marque mieux le chemin que l'imagination a tenu en les 
formant, les premiers hommes ne connaissaient point de plus 
belle qualité que la force du corps; la sagesse et la 
justice n'avaient pas seulement de nom dans les langues 
anciennes;  d'ailleurs la première idée que les hommes
(1) Sur l'Histoire; 'Quelqu'un qui aurait bien de l'esprit, 
en considérant simplement la nature humaine, devinerait
toute l'histoire.....  Il dirait: la nature^humaine est
composée d'ignorance, de crédulité, de vanité, d'^ambition, 
de méchanceté, d'un peu de bon sens et de probité par­
dessus tout cela  Donc ces gens-là feront une infinité
d'établissements ridicules.' Oeuvres, Paris, Bastien,
1790, vol. V, pp.432-434.
(2) Dialogues des Morts, Socrate-Montaigne.
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prirent de quelque être supérieur, ils la prirent sur des 
effets extraordinaires, et nullement sur l ’ordre réglé de 
l ’univers qu'ils n'étaient point capables de reconnaître ni 
d'admirer. Ainsi ils imaginèrent les dieux dans un temps 
où ils n'avaient rien de plus beau à leur donner que du 
pouvoir, et ils les imaginèrent sur ce qui portait des 
marques de pouvoir, et non sur ce qui en portait de sagesse.
Thus in spite of his retention of the traditional idea 
of an unchanging human nature, Fontenelle did not subscribe 
to the rational-idealist notion that it was basically 
reasonable; in his attitude to pagan religions he shared 
nothing with the supporters of natural religion, who were 
prepared to grant them at least a respect for tbe universal 
ideas of truth and justice. It is here that his real 
differences with Montesquieu lie, and that the full signi­
ficance of the influence of Cicero and of the Oratory on 
the President's thought becomes apparent.
For if we turn now to the account of Montesquieu's 
discussion with Fontenelle on the origin of ideas of purçty 
and impurity in religious thought, we certainly find a 
readiness to look for a natural cause within the sphere of 
basic human reactions: 'L'origine de la pureté et de l'im­
pureté des choses vient de ce qu'il est naturel d'avoir eu 
de l'aversion pour les choses désagréables à nos sens.'^2)
This explanation easily fits into the context of a sensation­
alist theory of the origin of ideas; but Montesquieu
(1) De l'Origine des Fables, Oeuvres, 1767, vol.Ill, pp.276-277.
(2) Pensée 1677 (Bkn.2147); Nagel II, p.499; Pleiade I, p.1556.
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obviously sees in sense perception the natural mechanism 
through which the primitive religious imagination worked,
For him sensationalism in no way undermines the validity of 
human religious inspiration; the operation of the religious 
imagination through the medium of the senses is clearly 
understood as a cause which is historically and generically 
adequate to the material nature of the facts it is held to 
e x p l a i n , T h e  principle at stake in Montesquieu's mind is 
thus that a religious solution must account for religious 
facts, that their scientific explanation should not lead to 
the disintegration of their religious sense./g) This is 
born out by the suggestion made in the text that intellectual 
progress has brought a change or a modification of ideas of 
purity and impurity:
'Or, dans des temps ou l'on n'avait guère d'idee de la 
nature de l'âme et de sa distinction réelle avec le corps, 
distinction qui n'a ete guère bien établie que depuis 
Descartes, on pouvait naturellement croire que ce qui 
souillait le corps souillait aussi l'âme et mettait l'âtre 
qui était touche'’, à une espèce d'état de péché et le rendait 
désagréable à Dieu, comme la souillure nous rendait 
désagréables les uns aux autres. Mais, quand l'âme a été
(1) It is useful to remember that Malebranche, while main­
taining the fallibility of the senses, accepted their 
validity and their necessity in so far as man was a cor­
poral being: 'L'esprit de l'homme..... est uni à un corps,
qui non seulement le remplit de fausses idées, mais qui 
excite encore dans son coeur mille mouvements déréglés.
Et comme il veut invinciblement être heureux, ce qui ne 
peut être actuellement que par quelque plaisir actuel, 
il n'est pas possible que ce corps ne le trouble et ne le 
dérègle, s'il ne trouve dans la recherche de la vérité et 
dans l'exercice de la vertu quelque douceur actuelle, qui 
fasse qu'il contemple et qu'il agisse avec plaisir'. 
Méditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques, Plaignard, Lyon, 
1707, XIV, section xiv, p.310.
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Note to page 2 ^ 0 .
(2) This interpretation of Montesquieu's attitude to religion 
is also put forward by G.J. Beyer in 'Montesquieu et 
I'Bsprit Cartésien', Actes du Congrès Montesquieu, 
Bordeaux, 1956,
252
bien distinguée du corps, on a bien vu qu’il n ’y avait que 
le corps qui était souillé,
There is still the same equivalence between the cause given: 
a deeper insight into the nature of the soul, and its effect: 
the di^association of bodily uncleanliness from the idea of 
sin. In this way Montesquieu reconciled scientific 
relativism with his religious and moral convictions.
Further proof of Montesquieu’s attitude is provided by 
his rejection of Fontenelle’s explanation as ingenious but 
basically unsound, how Fontenelle argues that ideas of 
impurity originated in the association of blood-stains with 
murder, and that in this way crime and uncleanliness came to 
be linked together. As there is undoubtedly an attempt here 
to provide a natural explanation, Montesquieu’s objection 
must stem from the fact that the suggested cause is unrelated 
to the nature and mechanisms of religious imagination, and 
therefore inadequate to the phenomenon it pretends to explain.
Montesquieu develops his thesis in the refutation of 
Bayle’s claims for the superiority of atheism to paganism. 
Starting from the same general principle that the senses 
determined man’s first ideas of God, he argues that pagan 
notions of a plurality of gods in human form, and endowed 
with both rational faculties and physical appetites, were the 
natural, anthropomorphic products of the imagination,
(1) Pensée 1677 (Bkn.2147); Nagel II, p.499; Pléiade I, p.1557
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’les véritables fruits de l'enfance’. Their beliefs were 
the logical if erroneous consequences of the original idea 
that God like man must possess physical being. On the other 
hand, if paganism was misguided, atheism is inexcusable; for 
it was natural and inevitable for man to come to a knowledge 
of God’s existence, and to refuse to acknowledge it is to 
deny reason and the evidence of the senses:
’Quant aux athées de M. Bayle, la moindre reflexion 
suffit à l ’homme pour se guérir de l ’athéisme. Il n ’a qu’à 
considérer les Gieux, et il y trouvera une preuve invincible 
de l ’existence de Dieu. Il n ’est point excusable lorsqu’il 
ne voit point la Divinité peinte dans tout ce qui l ’entoure: 
car, dès qu’il voit des effets, il faut bien qu’il admette 
une cause. Il n ’en est pas de même de l ’idolâtre: car
l ’homme peut bien voir et considérer l ’ordre des Gieux et 
rester opiniâtrement dans l ’idolâtrie. Gette disposition ne 
répugne point à la multiplicité des Dieux, ou, si elle y est 
contraire, ce ne peut être que par une suite de raisonnements 
métaphysiques, souvent trop faibles sans le recours de la foi, 
qu’ils le peuvent découvrir. Je dis plus: peut-être que la
seule chose que la raison nous apprenne de Dieu, c’est qu’il 
y a un être intelligent qui produit cet ordre que nous 
voyons dans le monde. Mais, si l ’on demande quelle est la 
nature de cet être, on demande une chose qui passe la raison 
humaine. Tout ce qu’on sait de certain, c’est que l ’hypothèse 
d ’Êpicure est insoutenable, parce qu’elle attaque l ’existence 
d ’un être dont le nom est écrit partout.
Here Montesquieu sets himself apart from both Bayle and 
Fontenelle, for one only has to recall the passage from the 
De l ’Origine des Fables;
’la première idée que les hommes prirent de quelque être 
supérieur, ils la prirent sur des effets extraordinaires, et 
nullement sur l ’ordre réglé de l ’univers’,
(1) Pensée 1946 (Bkn.673), Nagel II, p.588; Pléiade I, p.1176.
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to realise the contrast in their attitudes towards paganism 
and religion in general. In his adherence to a sensational­
ist theory of the origin of ideas, Montesquieu may he 
regarded as a, rationalist of the positivist school, but at 
the same time he salvaged something of the metaphysical 
outlook of orthodox Oartesianism, and this combined with a 
deep sympathy and admiration for Stoicism, formed the basis 
of his religious philosophy and of his moral thought.
Both these sources of inspiration were first opened to 
him by his teachers at Juilly, just as they also introduced 
him to the endlessly fascinating enigma of history. Indeed, 
the spectacle of the history of the nations, and the cause 
of Natural Religion were not entirely unrelated in Oratorian 
thought. Be Père Thomassin’s vast, almost encyclopedic 
manual, La Méthode d*étudier et d ’enseigner chrétiennement 
et solidement les lettres Humaines par rapport aux Lettres 
Divines et aux Écritures, which was commissioned by the 
Congregation for teaching in the colleges, was designed to 
reinforce the truth of Christian revelation by relating 
Classical Literature, general history, and the history of 
philosophy to Scripture. Thomassin aimed to demonstrate the 
continuous revelation of God in time, by selecting on the 
basis of a rational eclecticism, scattered fragments of
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•truth’ from the whole field of human knowledge, and 
reassembling them into one monumental and irrefutable proof. 
All diversities of belief and practice were to be drawn into 
the fold of natural religion. Significantly the inspiration 
of Thomassin's rationalism, and the basis for the 
rapprochement between men of reason which the work was 
designed to effect, was Cicero’s moral philosophy, understood 
as a manifestation of that pia philosophia, belief in which 
formed the central core of the Platonic tradition of the 
Oratory, and which was strengthened by the idealism of 
Cartesian metaphysics. In the P r e f a c e , C i c e r o  is presented 
as an exponent of natural religion, and the treatise De la 
Mature des Dieux is singled out for special praise as a 
weapon against superstition and idolatry. Later in the fourth 
part of the work, devoted to philosophy, the exposition of 
Cicero’s moral thought, supported by ample quotations from 
the De Legibus and the De Officiis, occupies a prominent 
position. Thomassin declares that the object of the 
exposition is to prove that:
(l) La Méthode d ’étudier et d ’enseigner......les Lettres
Humaines etc., part I, vol.l, Paris, Muguet, 1681; -pref&cA, 
section xix, ’Les oeuvres philosophiques de Cicéron, et 
principalement les trois livres de la nature des Dieux 
font voir les efforts de plusieurs grands génies, qui 
combattaient la superstition et l ’idolâtrie, par les 
lumières de la raison, par les restes de l ’image de la 
loi divine, que le péché n ’a pu entièrement effacer de 
nos coeurs, et par les secours généraux de la céleste 
lumière, qui se fait voir à tous les hommes qui viennent 
au monde.’
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•l’homme est un animal naturellement religieux, lié de 
commerce et en société avec Dieu, comme avec la Loi éternelle 
de justice; et cela est aussi évident et aussi nécessaire, 
qu’il est évident et nécessaire que la raison agisse 
raisonnablement selon^la loi de la vérité et de la justice.
Les autres lois sont émanées de notre raison, mais notre 
raison, pour faire de sages lois, et pour ne pas se laisser 
aller aux égarements dont elle est capable doit être réglée 
elle-même par une loi supérieure, éternelle et immuable de 
sagesse et de justice, qui domine sur toutes les intelligences 
créées, parce qu’elles sont aussi toutes naturellement 
sujettes au changement, aussi bien que celle de 1 ’h o m m e ^ ^
The halebranchian undertones of this passage, and their 
resemblance to the doctrines put forward by Montesquieu in 
Letter 83 of the Lettres Persanes, and in the First Book of 
the Lois are unmistakable. The notion of an eternal and 
immutable law of justice accessible to all intelligent 
creatures must have dominated the teaching of moral philosophy 
in the Oratory, linking it with a wider movement in favour 
of rational idealism and natural religion throughout Europe.
But besides its idealism, Thomassin’s work is notable for 
its erudition, for the vast span of fact, legend, and 
opinion it c o m p r i s e s . I t s  initial condemnation of an 
education designed only to teach
’L ’élégance des expressions, ou les beaux tours d ’esprit, 
ou les antiquités du P a g a n i s m e ^
(1) La Méthode d ’étudier et d ’enseigner....la philosophie par 
rapport à la religion chrétienne. Muguet, Paris, lé83; 
part III, ch.7, xviii,p.^39.
(2) Thomassin, himself educated by the Oratorians of Marseilles, 
was something of a polymath; he was professor of mathematics 
at Juilly, but also taught heraldry, geography, history, 
Italian and Spanish. See Perraud, L ’Oratoire de France au 
XVIIe. et au XlXe. siècle, part II, ch.5.
(3) Méthode d ' étudi~er "et d ’ enseigner... .les Lettres Humaines,
Préface, vol.l, section xviii. " ~
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is reinforced by a massive demonstration of painstaking 
research, and thorough scholarship. Thus in spite of its 
avowed object, it becomes in a way, an early monument to 
comparative science; and Thomassin may be said to have 
achieved the odd combination of a treatise devoted to natural 
religion, but relying for the demonstration of its a priori 
propositions on largely comparative methods. In works such 
as Thomassin’s Méthode, the tension between scientific 
relativism and moral idealism, which was to some extent 
characteristic of European thought in general at the beginning 
of the 18th. century, and which became acute in Montesquieu's 
work, although perhaps unconscious, was already present.
The case for maintaining that Montesquieu's attitude to 
religion, one of his earliest interests, and one in which 
this tension began to emerge, was particularly influenced 
by his Oratorian education, rests largely upon the features 
it shared with approaches like Thomassin's: a common con­
viction that man is naturally religious, coupled with a 
critical interest in diversities of belief and practice, 
both of which were associated with a predilection for 
Cicero. But there are other general details of Oratorian 
interests and activities which further strengthen the case.
258
The Congregation’s open-mindedness with regard to con­
temporary scientific and philosophical questions is for 
example demonstrated by their association with some of the 
pioneers of the Enlightenment. Richard Simon, author of the 
Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament (1678), where for the 
first time in France the techniques of philology divorced 
from any philosophical or religious bias, were applied to 
biblical exegesis, was a priest of the Oratory, and taught 
philosophy and rhetoric at Juilly from 1664-1673. Nicolas 
Frèret, the authority on ancient chronology and oriental 
religions, was connected with the Paris Oratory; and le père 
Desmolets, librarian of the Congregation’s house in the Rue 
Saint-Honoré, who probably introduced him to Montesquieu, 
was himself a literary figure of some importance. Desmolets 
was responsible for the publication of tv/o unedited works of 
Pascal, De l ’esprit géométrique, and the Entretien avec 
M. de Sacy, and also edited the Continuation des Mémoires de 
Littérature, a journal which brought to light rare and 
important documents. One of Freret’s close associates, and 
a pupil of Juilly, was the brilliantly individualistic 
Boulainviller, the author of a life of Mahomet, of a 
’refutation’ of Spinoza, which was rather an exposition of 
his doctrines in thin disguise, and of a history of the feudal 
origins of the French monarchy.
(1) See R. Simon, Henry de Boulainviller, Paris, 1940
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Besides these eminent associates, the Oratory counted 
among its members humbler scholars, whose contribution to the 
history of ideas was nevertheless of some significance.
Besides the historians Belong and Lecointe,^^ there was 
le Père Le Brun, who contributed to the comparative study 
of religion, by following up Fontenelle’s Histoire des 
Oracles, with a critical study of alchemy, the Histoire 
critique des pratiques superstitieuses. Henri Lelevel’s 
Conférences sur l'ordre naturel et sur l ’histoire universelle, 
also throw light on ideas current in the Oratory at the 
turn of the c e n t u r y . L e l e v e l  was basically sympathetic 
to the cause of the ’Modernes’, but while criticizing the 
confusion of Classical philosophies, an attitude which set 
him apart from Platonists like Thomassin, he produced the 
interesting theory that Paganism was inspired by the 
imagination, and in inventiveness far surpassed the religion 
of later ages.
’G’est par cette raison, qu’autant que les Modernes 
surpassent les Anciens dans tout ce qu’on appelle philosophie, 
autant leur sont-ils inférieurs dans tout ce qu’on appelle 
brillant de l ’imagination. Il ne se pouvait que des hommes 
nourris uniquement d ’idées profanes, et qui ne connaissent 
que le sensible, n ’excellassent dans tout ce qui peut remuer 
les passions et présenter à l ’esprit des phantômes agréables.
La spiritualité de la. religion dans laquelle nous sommes 
élevés, change tout.’^^ ^
(1) See above p.224r*
(2) Paris, 1702.
(3) Paris, Musier, 1698. His treatise on education. Entretiens 
sur ce qui forme l ’honnête homme et le vrai savant, Pari s, 
Oouterot, 169O, also reflects much of the practice of 
Oratorian schools.
(4) Ibid., Conférence VI, p.298.
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As we have seen, the notion that the senses determined pagan
beliefs and customs is central to Montesquieu’s refutation
of Bayle; and although there is no evidence to show that
Montesquieu was in any way directly acquainted with Lelevel’s
work, the fact that the idea of an association between
primitive religion and fertile imagination was also used by
the President in his discussion of the poetic poverty of
contemporary t h e o l o g y , i s  at least a further demonstration
of the community of ideas which existed between his early
works and those of Oratorian writers.
\
Passing from religion to law, it is equally interesting 
to find in another of Lelevel*s works. La Philosophie Moderne 
par Demandes et par Réponses, a combination of idealism 
and relativism, which again suggests the later development 
of Montesquieu’s thought. Lelevel proclaimed on the one 
hand the unity of the human race, and the universality of the 
law of reason and justice; but turning to civil law, he 
insisted that its primary aim was to procure men the benefits 
of life in society, and tha.t it should therefore be designed 
to suit the character of the community it governed:
(1) See above, p. 2^2.
(2) In an early entry in the Pensées, 112 (Bkn.446); Nagel II, 
p.37; Pléiade I, p.1018.
(3) Toulouse, 1698.
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’Comme le bon effet des lois dépend de la proportion 
qu’elles ont avec le génie de ceux à qui on les impose, il 
faut consulter ce génie dans toutes celles qu’on fait; et 
même en certains cas, il faut, comme si l ’on n ’avait point 
de raison à consulter, n ’avoir égard qu’à la faiblesse des 
hommes.
Nothing here approaches the complexity of Montesquieu’s theory 
of the ’esprit général d ’une nation’, yet the inspiration 
of the passage is clearly in harmony with the sociological 
insight which produced Book XIX of the Lois.
It would no doubt be possible to find in a great variety 
of works totally unconnected with the Oratorians, examples 
of ideas that Montesquieu later made use of. The crux of 
our argument is simply that the intellectual life of the 
Oratory reflected to a greater extent than that of many other 
religious bodies, the climate of ideas in Europe at the end 
of the 17th. century; and the relevance of this lies in the 
fact that it was to their care that the young Montesquieu 
was trusted. The ideas of his Oratorian masters provided 
his first intellectual stimulus: significantly, it was from
Desmolets that he borrowed the notebook which constitutes 
the first half of the Spicilège. Therefore it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that their preoccupations, and the 
conflicts latent in their attitude to contemporary debates 
can help us to situate Montesquieu’s early thought in the 
climate of the day.
(1) Op.cit., vol.Ill, ch.14, p.176.
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There is another respect in which Oratorian influence 
was important for Montesquieu’s later development, and this 
is in the field of method. For several of its teachers, 
the reconciliation of scientific inquiry with idealism in 
moral philosophy, no longer depended on a deliberate sub­
ordination, in the manner of orthodox Oartesianism, of 
experimental and critical methods to the procedure of logical 
deduction from a priori propositions. The introduction of 
new, non-mathematical subjects into the curriculum, such as 
history and geography, demanded a new approach to method.
The results of their reflections in this field are best 
recorded in Lamy’s Entretiens sur les Sciences, and the 
possibility of this work’s influence on the methods used by 
Montesquieu in the composition of the Lois has already been 
investigated by H. Roddier in his article. Le la composition 
de ’l ’Esprit des Lois’; Montesquieu et les Oratoriens de 
l ’Académie de Juilly. There were of course other works 
on education which embodied Oratorian theories: Lelevel’s
Entretiens sur ce qui forme l ’honnête homme et le vrai savant 
(1690), and the Abbé Fleury’s Traité du Choix et de la
(l) Revue d ’histoire littéraire de la France, 1952, pp.440-450.
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Méthode des jjtudes (1686),^^^ for example; hut they are more 
concerned with the aims and methods of education itself, 
than with the actual techniques at the disposal of the scholar 
engaged in academic work. Thus the importance of Claude 
Pleury's Treatise, a valuable and original contribution to 
the literature of education, lay in its advocacy of a uni­
versal right to education independent of social considerations, 
and in its emphasis on the necessity of vocational training 
for those occupying responsible p o s i t i o n s . H i s  attitude 
to Plato does perhaps reveal a realisation that each subject 
demands its own particular techniques, for he dismisses the 
philosopher’s scientific method on the grounds that
’étant accoutumé à raisonner moralement en morale, il a 
raisonné de même en physique et a voulu expliquer toute la 
nature par des convenances
(1) Fleury was himself a Benedictine, and was educated by the 
Jesuits at Clermont; his treatise is however an indirect 
attack on the educational practices of that order, and 
clearly draws some of its inspiration from the methods 
and programmes of the Oratory and Port-Royal. See
G. Lartigues, Le Traité des ^^udes de l ’abbé Claude Pleury, 
Paris and Auch, 1921, pp.68-69; and F. Gaguère, La Vie et 
les Oeuvres de l ’abbé Claude Fleury, Paris, 1925, p.188.
(2) Fleury’s outline of the kind of education suitable for a 
magistrate curiously anticipates some of the tasks which 
Montesquieu set himself: ’II est bon qu’ils sachent
aussi l ’histoire, par rapport à la jurisprudence. C ’est- 
à-dire, qu’ils observent les lois et les maximes diverses 
qui ont régné dans leur pays, en divers temps. Ils doivent 
encore aller plus loin..... Il leur sied bien de remonter 
aux sources des loix; et d ’en examiner les raisons, par 
les principes de la véritable morale, et de la véritable
politique. En un mot, quoi qu’ils ne soient chargés que 
de 1 ’exécution des lois, il est bon qu’ils soient capables 
d ’être législateurs.’ Op.cit., Paris, 1686, ch.XXXIX, 
pp.288-289.
(3) Op.cit.,‘Liscours sur Platon*, p.316.
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in the sixth Entretien, in order that an effective approach 
may be made to such subjects.
The first requirement of such a procedure is that the 
best editions of the best printed books should be consulted, 
together with sound summaries and abridgements. As a guide 
to these lamy indicates the catalogues of the Oratorian 
library, the Journal des Savants, the Nouvelles de la 
République des Lettres and the Bibliothèque Universelle of 
Jean Leclerc. Dictionaries, glossaries, commentaries and 
criticisms are also indispensible tools, and in historical 
research, the independent evidence afforded by medals and 
inscriptions. Indeed, Lamy insists on the necessity of 
comparing and contrasting source materials:
’Ce n ’est point dans un seul auteur qu’il en faut chercher 
le bout, il faut fouiller dans toutes les pièces, et en les 
confrontant démêler le noeud de la difficulté.
After mastering the resources of the library, the student is 
advised to follow a certain pattern and to apply certain 
techniques in his reading; he should fix a goal and work 
towards it in stages, arranging material obtained according 
to books, chapters and articles, and leaving spaces below 
his headings to be filled in when new evidence comes to 
light:
(1) Op.cit., Bruxelles, 1684, VI, p.207.
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’Il faut digérer soi-méme la matière sur laquelle on 
veut travailler, la disposer par livres, par chapitres, par 
articles, ou se servir de la disposition de la même matière 
faite par quelque habile homme. On laisse entre chaque 
titre beaucoup de vide qu’on remplit à mesure qu’on étudie,
ou que l ’on médite..... Cette manière de disposer ces
recueils est la meilleure, et contribue davantage à faire un 
homme savant. On peut avoir un livre particulier pour les 
mélanges, c’est-à-dire pour les diverses choses et les 
différentes pensées qui se présentent à l ’esprit, et pour 
lesquelles on ne trouve point de lieu propre.
0 " f
With large works, Lamy recommends the composition,paraphrases
in the form, of marginal notes, which can then be transferred 
into notebooks at will;
’Après quand je veux travailler sur quelque sujet en 
consultant mes marges, je tire en un moment tout ce qui est 
dans mes écrits sur ce sujet, et le transporte dans mes 
grands recueils, qui sont proprement des plans et des 
desseins d ’Ouvrages, où après de longues méditations, et 
avoir trouvé l ’ordre naturel, j’ai rangé sous des titres 
les principales parties de l'Ouvrage, dont j’ai tiré les 
premiers traits.’^g^
Thus, Lamy claims, it is possible for a determined and able 
man to amass over a period of twenty years or so, enough 
material to compose a very rich work.
This as Roddier points out in his article on Montesquieu’s 
methods in the Lois, is precisely what the President did 
over a similar period of time, and employing methods very 
close to those advocated by Lamy. Learned journals and the 
catalogues of the Oratorian library were in fact some of 
the sources of Montesquieu’s erudition; while the list of
(1) Entretiens sur les Sciences, VI, pp.193-194.
(2) Ibid., p.195.
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Montesquieu’s notebooks in the Catalogue des Manuscrits 
envoyés à mon cousin en Angleterre, the surviving 
collections of annotated extracts such as the Geographica, 
not to mention the Spicilège and the Pensées, are sufficient 
evidence of the way in which he set about his documentation, 
collecting extracts and paraphrases in separate books under 
specific headings, leaving spaces for later additions, and 
jotting down his personal reflections in yet another volume. 
lamy’s methods were designed according to Roddier to effect 
a renewal of philosophical and historical criticism which 
would produce works with an organic unity, rather than a 
formal deductive order. Now what pattern Montesquieu 
intended to follow when he began writing the Lois is still 
something of an open question, and, at least according to 
the Preface, it was for a time a cause of some bewilderment 
to the author himself:
’J ’ai bien des fois commence, et bien des fois abandonné 
cet ouvrage; j’ai mille fois envoyé aux vents les feuilles 
que j’avais écrites; je sentais tous les jours les mains 
paternelles tomber; je suivais mon objet sans former de 
dessein; je ne connaissais ni les règles ni les exceptions; 
je ne trouvais la vérité que pour la perdre. Mais quand 
j’ai découvert mes principes, tout ce que je cherchais est 
venu à moi; et dans le cours de vingt années, j’ai vu mon 
ouvrage commencer, croître, s’avancer et finir.
(1) Nagel III, Appendice V, pp.1575-1582 «
(2) Nagel II, p.925; other fragments of annotated extracts 
published in vol.Ill, pp.703-719.
(3) Nagel I, p.lxii; Pléiade II, p.231.
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His concern to find the principles governing his subject 
make it at least possible that he had some intention of 
proceeding in a logical fashion; on the other hand his con­
fusion could have been that of the pioneer of any new science 
struggling to extract some meaning from a formless mass of 
data. But if we take Montesquieu’s advice to the reader in 
the Preface at its face value ;
’Si l ’on veut chercher le dessein de l ’auteur, on ne le peut 
bien découvrir que dans le dessein de l ’ouvrage’,
then we are forced to admit that the only kind of pattern 
that the theoretical, the scientific, and the historical 
parts of the work fall into, is indeed organic.
Moreover, it can hardly be denied that although his 
approach to his source materials, both in the Lois, the 
Considérations sur les Romains, and elsewhere, was never as 
rigorous as Lamy might have desired, he did indeed succeed 
in renewing historical and political thought, to the extent 
of founding a. new science in which both combine to discover 
those conditions of life in society which determine the 
happiness of men. But it was to be a social and not a 
natural science; a discipline in which material and moral 
factors were equally involved. And the methods employed in 
its creation were determined by the ambition which Montesquieu 
inherited from his Oratorian masters, and which can be found
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at the root of most of his works: a desire to reconcile the
moral values of an idealist tradition Inspired by Plato and 
Cicero, and renewed by Descartes and Malebranche, with a 
growing mass of empirical data relative to the human con­
dition and with the deeper understanding of causation which 
the scientific apparatus of Oartesianism had produced.
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CHAPTER TWO
TOWARDS A METAPHYSICAL FRAMEWORK.
’Admirable idée des Chinois, 
qui comparent la justice de Dieu 
à un filet si grand que les 
joissons qui se promènent croient 
etre en liberté; mais réellement 
ils sont pris. Les pécheurs 
croient de même, qu’ils ne seront 
pas punis de Dieu; mais ils sont 
dans le filet.’
Pensée 434 (Bkn.2124).
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I.
It is of the greatest significance for the appreciation 
of Montesquieu’s moral idealism that the earliest indication 
of the notion of ’esprit général’, that combination of moral, 
social and physical factors determining the life and destiny of 
nations, should occur in the Traité des Devoirs. This idea, 
of seminal importance for sociology, seems to have been the 
direct outcome of Montesquieu’s meditations on justice and of 
his consequent desire to rebut the principles and practices 
of that ’|?ealpolitik’ whose evil results were manifest in the 
economic and moral decay of contemporary France, and to which 
the political thought of Machiavelli, of Hobbes and even of 
the righteous Bossuet, had lent powerful but illconceived 
s u p p o r t . I n  the Lettres Persanes, using, as
(1) Although hostility to the policies of Louis XIV is
necessarily implied in the Lettres Persanes, it is more 
overt in the Réflexions sur la Monarchie universelle 
(1734) where Montesquieu dealt specifically with the 
politics of aggrandizement, probably as a preliminary or 
companion study to the Considerations sur les Romains 
published at the same time. An unusual if brief con- 
firmation of his attitude is to be found in his anno­
tations to a Recueil des harangues prononcées par 
Messieurs de l ’Académie française (Paris, 1698j, published 
by L. Desgraves in the Revue historique de Bordeaux et 
du Département de la Gironde, April-June 1952, pp.149-151. 
The passage is from a Panégyrique du roi par l ’abbé 
Tallement le jeune; ’^O’est ici, messieurs, que j’aurais 
un beau champ pour m ’étendre sur la valeur de ce grand 
monarque^ si j’osais m ’y abandonner; mais j’aurais peur 
d ’être désavoué de tous ses sujets.’ Montesquieu simply 
comments, ’Il a raison’.
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Roger Caillois has d e m o n s t r a t e d , ^  relativistic sociolo­
gical method of profoundly disturbing implications,
Montesquieu had already achieved a caustic though not 
wholly negative satirical protrait of contemporary society; 
not wholly negative, since the notions of absolute justice, 
of republican virtue and of moderate government were 
weighed against the description of corruption and folly.
The Traité des Devoirs inspired by Cicero and Marcus 
Aurelius, was conceived as a more systematic and comprehensive 
exposition of the theoretical grounds of this optimistic 
idealism;^2) however, when he reached the point of demon­
strating in antithesis the injustice of ’la politique*, 
Montesquieu went beyond a priori argument, attempting to 
base his refutation on historical evidence.
’II est inutile d ’attaquer directement la politique en 
faisant voir combien elle répugné à la morale, a la raison, 
à la justice. Ces sortes de discours persuadent tout le 
monde et ne touchent personne. La politique subsistera 
toujours pendant qu’il y aura des passions indépendantes 
du joug des lois.
(1) See ’Montesquieu et la Révolution sociologique’. Cahiers 
de la Pléiade, Automne 1949.
(2) Shackleton suggests that the subject of the work was 
actually put to Montesquieu by Madame de Lambert whose 
works include a Traité de l ’Amitié, and a Traité de la 
Vieillesse, imitated from Cicero. See op.cit., p.70.
But the problems of happiness and virtue also appear to 
have preoccupied the Académie de Bordeaux to whom 
Montesquieu first read parts of his Traité, during the 
same period; see P. Barrière, ’Eléments personnels et 
éléments bordelais dans les Lettres Persanes’, Revue 
d ’histoire littéraire de la France. Jan.l9^1, p.32.
273
Je crois qu’il vaut mieux prendre une voie détournée 
et chercher à en dégoûter un peu les grands par la consi­
dération du peu d ’utilité qu’ils en retirent. Je la 
discréditerai encore en faisant voir que ceux qui ont acquis 
le plus de réputation par elle, ont abusé de l ’esprit du 
peuple d ’une manière grossière.’
Intimately associated with this historical demonstration 
was the hypothesis of the ’esprit général’ and a related 
non-providentialist view of historical causation. The 
destinies of nations are controlled neither by God, nor by 
the intrigues of a handful of wily statesmen; historical 
events are rather the outcome of a constantly changing com­
bination of causes operating over long periods of time, and 
having their origins in the moral and political character 
of a people;
Dans toutes les sociétés, qui ne sont qu’une union 
d ’esprit, il se forme un caractère commun. Cette âme 
universelle prend une manière de penser qui est l'effet d ’une 
chaîne de causes infinies, qui se multiplient et se combinent 
de siècle en siècle. Dès que le ton est donné et requ, c’est 
lui seul qui gouverne, et tout ce que les souverains, les 
magistrats, les peuples peuvent faire ou imaginer, soit 
qu’ils paraissent choquer ce ton, ou le suivre, s’y rapporte 
toujours et il domine jusques à la totale destruction....
.... Si un ton donné se perd et se détruit, c’est toujours 
par des voies singulières et qu’on ne peut pas prévoir.
Elles dépendent de causes si éloignées que toute autre 
semblerait devoir être aussi capable d ’agir qu’elles, ou bien 
c’est un petit effet, caché sous une grande cause, qui 
produit d ’autres grands effets, qui frappent tout le monde, 
pendant qu’elle garde celui-ci pour le faire fermenter 
quelques trois siècles après.
(1) De la Politique, opuscule originally constituting Chapters
XIII and XIV of the Traité des Devoirs; Nagel III, p.165;
Pléiade I, p.112.
(2) Ibid., Nagel III, pp.168-169; Pleiade I, pp.114-5.
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The compte rendu of Montesquieu’s readings from the 
Traité des Devoirs to the Academy of Bordeaux clearly shows 
how these scientific and deterministic notions were intro­
duced into the discussion on justice;
’Comme rien ne choque plus la Justice que ce que l ’on 
appelle ordinairement la Politique, cette science de ruse 
et d ’artifice, l ’auteur, dans le chapitre XIII, la décrit 
d ’une façon plus utile que s’il en prouvait l'injustice; il 
en montre l ’inutilité par la raison. La plupart des effets, 
selon lui, arrivent par des voies si singulières, et dépendent 
de causes si imperceptibles ou si éloignées qu’on ne peut 
les prévoir. La politique, par conséquent, n ’a pas lieu à 
l ’égard de cette espèce d ’événements. Elle est inutile encore 
sur les événements prévus, parce que toute révolution prévue 
n ’arrive presque jamais.
Sadly, the Traité remained unfinished, and perhaps for this 
reason Montesquieu never directly confronted the problem of 
reconciling his theory of historical causation where indivi­
dual action is shown to have only marginal significance, with 
the notion of justice as a transcendent ideal, a notion that 
implies the autonomy of the human mind and will. ^2) the 
effort to control events is futile, then the desire to realise 
in them the ordered pattern of justice is equally so. How 
curious then that so impersonal and mechanistic a view of 
history should be introduced to add weight to the cause of 
common humanity and of civic virtue. Although, as the
(1) Compte rendu published in the Bibliothèque française, 
Amsterdam, mars 1726, pp.238-243; see Nagel III, p.161; 
Pléiade I, p.110. ^
(2) Montesquieu gave his reasons for abandoning the Traite 
in a letter to Mgr, de Eitz-James of October 8th., 1750.
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extraction from the treatise of those sections devoted to 
politics and the theory of history under the separate title 
of De la Politique shows, as does also of course the writing 
of the Considerations sur les Romains. Montesquieu’s 
attention became concentrated upon the notion of the ’esprit 
général’, eventually to such à degree that from about 1734 
he undertook the Herculean labour of gathering together all 
the materials necessary for a comprehensive analysis of each 
separate factor influencing the corporate character of a 
nation expressed in and through its laws, the account of the 
Traité itself does not suggest that he was simply using it 
as a vehicle for revolutionary notions on history and society. 
It was acclaimed as a work on morals, and at the time of its 
composition it was undoubtedly there that Montesquieu’s 
interest lay:
’il y a environ trente ans que je formai le projet de faire 
un ouvrage sur les devoirs. Le Traité des Offices de 
Cicéron m ’avait enchanté et je le prenais pour mon modèle.
(1) Some of the key passages in the Considérations are plainly 
an elaboration of the notions found in De la Politique, 
eg.: ’Ce n ’est pas la fortune qui domine le monde - on 
peut le demander aux Romains qui eurent une suite 
continuelle de prospérités quand ils se gouvernèrent sur 
un certain plan, et une suite non interrompue de revers 
lorsqu’ils se conduisirent sur un autre. Il y a des 
causes générales, soit morales, soit physiques, qui 
agissent dans chaque monarchie, 1 ’élèvent, la maintiennent, 
ou la précipitent; tous les accidents sont soumis à ces 
causes; et, si le hazard d ’une,bataille, c’est-à-dire une 
cause particulière a ruiné un Etat, il y avait une cause 
générale qui faisait que cet itat devait périr par une 
seule bataille: en un mot, l ’allure principale entraîne
avec elle tous les accidents particuliers.’ Ch.XVIII;
Nagel I, p.482; Pléiade II, p.173.
(2) Letter to Pitz-James, Nagel III, p.1327.
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Thus while the subsidiary notion of the *âme universelle*, 
otherwise * esprit general*, subsequently proved to be the 
most fertile of Montesquieu *s career as a thinker, it is 
nonetheless clear that the initial inspiration for his 
investigation of law and society stemmed from his belief in 
the paramount importance of the pursuit of justice. Review­
ing the whole of his work, it seems almost as if the dis­
covery of the idea of the * esprit general* provided him with 
the essential key to the description and analysis of those 
varying social and physical conditions within which the 
lawgiver or statesman must operate if his policies are to 
give effective expression to the joint ideals of universal 
justice and the good of the people. In the Lois, Montesquieu 
aimed to provide him with a surer, sounder, more honest 
science than Machiavelli*s Prince;
*Si je pouvais faire en sorte que tout le monde eût de 
nouvelles raisons pour aimer ses devoirs, son prince, sa 
patrie, ses lois; qu*on pût mieux sentir son bonheur dans 
chaque pays, dans chaque gouvernement, dans chaque poste où 
l*on se trouve, je me croirais le plus heureux des mortels.
Si je pouvais faire en sorte que ceux qui commandent 
augmentassent leurs connaissances sur ce qu*ils doivent 
prescrire, et que ceux qui obéissent trouvassent un nouveau 
plaisir à obéir, je me croirais le plus heureux des mortels.
Je me croirais le plus heureux des mortels, si je 
pouvais faire que les hommes pussent se guérir de leurs 
préjugés. J ’appelle ici préjugés, non pas ce qui fait qu’­
ignore de certaines choses, mais ce qui fait qu’on s ’ignore 
soi-meme, *
on
(1) De l ’Esprit des Lois, Préface; Bagel I, p.lxi; 
Pléiade, II, p.250,
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The relativism that characterizes Montesquieu’s treat­
ment of political institutions in the Lois necessarily 
implies that environment largely determines social responses, 
yet he never conceded that the influence of milieu, instru­
mental though it was in producing the astonishing range of 
laws and customs that he recorded, was entirely responsible 
for shaping human character. He retained the classical 
notion of an unchanging human nature; thus in the Considera­
tions . side by side with the idea of the ’esprit général* 
varying according to a multitude of factors from nation to 
nation, one finds the following statement:
’oomme les hommes ont eu dans tous les temps les mêmes 
passions, les occasions qui produisent les grands changements 
sont différentes, mais les causes sont toujours les mêmes.
Human nature, and presumably human reason are universal and 
immutable ; and for this reason Montesquieu found it possible 
to repeat in the first chapter of the Lois his conviction 
that justice is absolute and unchanging:
’Les êtres particuliers intelligents peuvent avoir des lois 
qu’ils ont faites; mais ils en ont aussi qu’ils n ’ont pas 
faites...... Dire qu’il n ’y a rien de juste ni d ’injuste que
ce qu’ordonnent ou défendent les lois positives, c’est dire 
qu’avant qu’on eût tracé de cercle, tous les rayons n ’étaient
pas égaux.’^2)
As long as society existed in a recognizable form, placing 
the individual in circumstances where he could not but
(1) Op.cit.. Ch.I; Hagel I, p.354; Plei 
(2; Nagel I, pp.2-3; Pleiade II, p.233.
é ade II, p.71.
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acknowledge the idea of reciprocity fundamental to any 
definition of justice, then Montesquieu could rightly insist 
on his notion of justice as either the ’rapport général’ of 
the Traité des Devoirs, or the ’rapport de convenance’ of 
the Lettres Persanes. The precise significance of the 
qualification ’de convenance’ raises many questions it is 
true; Letter LXXXIII gives little indication of what is meant 
by a proper relationship actually existing between two things, 
a relationship said to be immutable and visible to all orders 
of intelligent beings. Are we to infer that such relation­
ships are immanent in the natural order, or that they belong 
to an ideal transcendent order; do they exist between beings 
of different orders, or only between beings of the same order? 
In the absence of any specific textual information, the 
answers to such questions remain largely conjectural. Yet 
whatever conclusion one reaches as to the metaphysical nature 
of the relationship, or to the criterion that governs its 
’convenance’, the most elementary moral interpretation of 
Montesquieu’s definition remains unaffected, given the con­
ception of man associated with it. As an intelligent being, 
once a member of society, he will determine his conduct 
according to a consideration of his relationships with other 
members. Interpersonal relationships are likewise the main 
concern of the lawgiver or magistrate. Thus, although many 
other variable factors conditioning this relationship will
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have to be taken into account, and here obviously environ­
mental forces are involved, recognition of the social bond 
is the essential basis of just conduct or of just government.
Neither the ideal nor necessarily Montesquieu’s defini­
tion of justice is incompatible with the sociological insights 
embodied in his work. Indeed, as the short essay De la 
Politique and the account of the parent work, the Traité des 
Devoirs, demonstrate, the elaboration of the most important 
of these insights, the theory of the ’esprit général’, 
appears to have been conditional upon a powerful conviction 
of the primacy of justice. Although with the beginning of 
the preparation of the Considerations sur les Romains in 
1731, a marked change of emphasis from moral theorizing to 
historical reconstruction and scientific observation is 
evident in Montesquieu’s researches, the change is not alto­
gether unprepared as the remarkable and very early 
Dissertation sur la politique des Romains dans la religion 
s h o w s ; a n d  on the other hand it is inconclusive evidence 
that the moral idealism central to the early essays and 
fragments was completely abandoned in favour of scientific 
materialism as some scholars have m a i n t a i n e d . A n a l y s i s  
of the Dissertation sur la politique des Romains and related 
texts reveals an attempt on Montesquieu’s part to provide a
(1) See above. Part II, ch.l.
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Note to page 2/9.
(2) The opinions of Davy, Martino and Althusser on this issue 
have already been mentioned, see above p.217 > note (2).
As many scholars have been at pains however to demonstrate 
that moral idealism remained an imaginative force in 
Montesquieu’s thought, and to reconcile the metaphysical 
theories supporting his definition of justice with the 
determinism implicit in many parts of the Lois. See for 
instance, P. Janet, Histoire de la Science Politique,
Paris, 1872; part IV, ch.5. G. Lanson, *Le Déterminisme 
historique et l ’idéalisme social dans l ’Esprit des Lois’, 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, année 23, janvier 
1916, pp.177-20%; for Lanson, the Lois is ’le véritable 
Antimachiavel du XVIIIe. siècle;’^Montesquieu distin­
guishes himself from other theorists in that he ’fonde la 
correction du present sur la connaissance exacte du passé’, 
E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, tr,
P.C.A. Koelln and J.#. Pettegrove, Princeton, 1931, ch.6. 
C.J. Beyer, ’Le problème du déterminisme social dans 
l ’Esprit des Lois,’ Romanic Review, vol.XXXIX, 1948, 
pp.102-106.^ S. Cottâl ’Il problema dell’ordine umano e 
la nécessita nel pensiero di Montesquieu’, Rivista di 
Filosofia, vol.XXXIX, 3e série. Cet.-Dec. 1948, pp.368-380. 
J. Wrdblewski, ’La Théorie du Droit de Montesquieu’, 
Monteskuisz i jego dzi^e. Département des sciences 
sociales de l ’Académie polonaise des Sciences, 1956.
W. Stark, Montesquieu, pioneer of the sociology of 
knowledge, London, I960; Stark defines the position of 
Montesquieu’s idealism very succinctly, ’the eternal 
principle of justice belongs to the noumenal world of 
lasting reality rather than the phenomenal world of 
shifting appearances.’ Ch.V, p.182.
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scientific explanation of religion considered as a social 
phenomenon without undermining the validity of religious 
belief in itself as the expression of the religious 
imagination of h u m a n i t y . S i m i l a r l y  it is possible to 
see the Lois as a scientific and comparative study of human 
societies considered as phenomena, but a study which, far 
from invalidating the ideal of justice as the expression and 
aspiration of the rational moral conscience of a social 
creature, serves rather as has already been suggested, to 
provide an understanding of the laws governing the life and 
growth of societies, without which such an ideal is indeed 
no more than idle speculation. A short sentence from one 
of Montesquieu’s less well known oriental stories Arsace et 
Ismënie seems a sincere if naive reflection of his own 
attitude to moral idealism; among the principles that 
govern Arsace’s conduct as king is the conviction:
’Que le désir général de rendre les hommes heureux était 
naturel aux princes; mais que ce désir n ’aboutissait à rien, 
s’ils ne se procuraient continuellement des connaissances 
particulières pour y parvenir.
Two related points emerge then from those sections of 
De la Politique which we have considered; namely, the central
(1) See above pp. 243-25'^.
(2) Nagel III, p.513; Pleiade I, p.495. Shackleton dates the 
novel at 1742, op.cit., p.226; Caillois is of the opinion 
that it could be the continuation of the Histoire Veritab 
dating from about 1731, Pléiade I, p.1611.
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importance of the ideal of justice in the genesis of 
Montesquieu's work as a whole and as its unifying principle; 
and secondly the lack of any clear demarcation in the pre­
sentation of his ideas between the postulates of idealism 
and the hypotheses of inductive reasoning. But although 
these points immediately suggest something about Montesquieu's 
philosophical standpoint, for instance that he may have had 
some conception of an immanent reason, it is necessary to 
return to the Lettres Persanes in order to place his idea 
of justice in its full moral and metaphysical context.
Montesquieu gives his famous definition of justice in 
Letter LXXXIII:
'La Justice est un rapport de convenance, qui se trouve 
réellement entre deux choses*.
Although this is one of the best known phrases in the work, 
and the letter containing it certainly one of the most out­
standing, it is surprising how few of the others are in fact 
devoted to the straightforward exposition of moral or 
philosophical ideas. Or perhaps it is equally surprising 
that such an essay should find a place in a work remarkable 
for having accomplished what Roger Caillois calls 'la 
revolution sociologique' throu^ the use of the device of 
the foreign observer, a device which seriously handled
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implies a relativistic outlook with regard to moral and 
social v a l u e s . Y e t  the definition itself has both 
scientific and normative associations; the first element, 
rapport, recalls the ordered structure of things which will 
yield to rational analysis, the idea of a necessary corres­
pondence between terms fundamental to all theories of causal 
determinism; the second, convenance, implies the existence 
of a transcendent criterion governing that structure, invokes 
a metaphysical order, a teleological design. In fact, the 
definition exemplifies the basic tension we have discerned 
in Montesquieu's thought between the real and the ideal. 
Moreover, if we go on to examine its presentation in 
Letter LXXXIII, we find surprisingly little of the stock-in- 
trade of rational idealism and in its place unusual argumen­
tation incorporating elements of empirical psychology and 
sensationalist epistemology.
Montesquieu opens the letter with what could pass as 
a variation of Descartes's ontological proof; if God exists, 
then he is of necessity just, for were he not so then he 
would be the most imperfect of all beings. This is followed 
by the most important passage, the definition of justice and 
the statement of its immutability. In terms reminiscent of 
Malebranche's conception of truth as aninvariable relation­
ship, Montesquieu defines justice as an actual and unchanging
(1) See Pleiade I, pp.v-vi.
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relationship between things, a relationship visible to all 
beings. Such a notion raises an obvious question: why
injustice? In contrast to God, who is necessarily just, 
man's limited nature is such that he is sometimes blind to 
justice, and indeed sometimes deliberately ignores it. The 
voice of justice is strong, but not strong enough to over­
come the influence of the passions or of self-interest. Men 
are capable of injustice because it serves their own interests, 
and because they prefer their own satisfaction to that of 
others. Interest is a determining factor in human nature, 
and for this reason it is impossible to maintain that evil 
is gratuitous. God on the other hand is self-sufficient, 
and needing nothing, were he to act unjustly, he would be 
the wickedest of all beings. From this, Montesquieu draws 
the conclusion that we should continue to love justice even 
if God does not exist; we should direct all our efforts to 
modelling our own behaviour on the fine idea we have of a 
divinity of necessary and absolute justice. Free of the yoke 
of religion, we should not cast aside that of justice. These 
are the reasons which he considers will justify his contention 
that justice is eternal and independent of human conventions; 
if the contrary were true, then man would have to hide such 
knowledge from himself.
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Montesquieu then approaches his subject from a slightly 
different angle. Metaphysical speculation apart, the actual 
situation in which most men find themselves is that of weak­
ness. They are surrounded by others capable of harming them 
in a thousand different ways, most of the time with impunity. 
Were it not for the existence of a 'principe intérieur', a 
principle of justice in the hearts of men capable of moving 
them to disregard their own interests, then, he declares, we 
would live our lives in continual terror, fearing men as we 
fear wild beasts, never for an instant assured of our life, 
our property or our honour. For such reasons also, Montesquieu 
finds it impossible to agree with those who, for fear of 
offending God's majesty, present him as a being of tyrannical 
power acting in a manner repugnant to our own ideals of 
behaviour; who thereby endow him with those very imperfections 
that he punishes in us, and, in their confusion create con­
flicting images, sometimes of an evil being, sometimes of a 
being who hates and punishes wickedness. The letter concludes 
with an evocation of the profound if sober sense of satisfac­
tion enjoyed by the just man:
*Ce plaisir, tout sévère qu'il est, doit le ravir: il voit
son etre autant au-dessus de ceux qui ne l'ont pas, qu'il se 
voit au-dessus des tigres et des ours*.
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From this summary it can he seen that the argument of 
the letter is sketched very rapidly and consists basically 
of a comparison between the human nature and predicament and 
the Divine nature. A series of concise statements is made 
in the antithetical style characteristic of Montesquieu, and 
although the effect is of dialectic, in fact very little 
logical proof is supplied to support the bald propositions.
The striking definition of justice stands alone without 
further explanation - a fact which may lend support to the 
much repeated judgement that Montesquieu was no metaphysician, 
although it must be born in mind that the Lettres are a 
work of satire and fiction and not a lengthy treatise. But 
Montesquieu does not even have recourse to a direct parallel 
with mathematical truth in order to demonstrate the immuta­
bility of justice, a method for which he would have found 
ample precedent in his reading of Malebranche, and which he 
himself later employed to considerable effect in the first 
chapter of the Lois. Instead of elaborating his abstract 
definition, he devotes more space to examining the differing 
responses of God and man to the eternal 'rapport de 
convenance'. He stresses the imperfect and indeterminate 
nature of human behaviour in contrast to Divine perfection 
and fixity, accepting self-interest as a natural character­
istic, an inevitable concomitant of the human condition.
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Furthermore it emerges from the discussion that he regards 
the description of the Divine nature as a hypothesis: in
fact, the actual definition of justice apart, both the meta­
physical and the moral doctrine of the letter are presented 
not as the gift of revelation, nor as the discoveries of 
intuitive reason, but as ideas that would recommend them­
selves to a civilized intelligence adopting the scientific 
standpoint that all concepts are anthropomorphic.
What Montesquieu has to say about the nature of God 
hinges on the human notion of the perfection of a supreme 
being. If we conceive of a God, then that being must be 
perfect and we must include justice among his attributes; 
similarly, if God is perfect, then he is self-sufficient and 
can have no interest in unjust action. In making his point
Montesquieu always uses the conditional mode:
's'il y a un Dieu, il faut nécessairement qu'il soit juste', 
's'il existait, il serait nécessairement juste'
etc.; while this does not necessarily reveal an equivocal 
attitude on his part to the existence of God, it does indi­
cate how he regards the source and nature of the moral
imperative. God is of necessity perfect, self-sufficient 
and therefore just; but he is not presented as the author of 
justice, which subsists as an independent metaphysical 
entity, God contemplating it from eternity as man may do in
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his temporality. Hence we are not enjoined to exercise 
justice because God is its author or because we are pre­
sumed to love God.^j The crux of the argument is to be 
found in the paragraph;
'Ainsi, quand il n'y aurait pas de Dieu, nous devrions 
toujours aimer la Justice.*
While the transcendence and immutability of justice seems 
implicitly guaranteed by its quasi mathematical nature, the 
incentive to pursue it derives from the moral and indeed 
aesthetic satisfaction of emulating a concept of perfection:
'nous devrions.....faire nos efforts pour ressembler à cet 
être dont nous avons une si belle idée, et qui, s'il existait, 
serait nécessairement juste.'
It is sanctioned not by the will or power of God, but by a 
human ideal. Indeed, God is here even reduced to a position 
of secondary importance, for we can strip our 'belle idée' 
of the concept of a supreme being:
'quand il n'y aurait pas de Dieu, nous devrions toujours aimer 
la Justice...... Libres que nous serions du joug de la
religion, nous ne devrions pas l'être de celui de l'équité.*
That Montesquieu is primarily concerned to establish the 
idea of justice as a morauL imperative, and that to do so he
(1) of. Pensée 1080 (Bkn.2071), 'ceux qui disputent sur
l'amour de Dieu n'entendent pas ce qu'ils disent, s'ils 
distinguent cet amour du sentiment de soumission et de 
celui de reconnaissance pour un être tout-puissant et 
bienfaiteur. Mais, pour de l'amour, je ne puis pas plus 
aimer un être spirituel que je puis aimer cette 
proposition: deux et trois font cinq.' Nagel II,
p.294; Pléiade I, p.1541.
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adopts a position which appears to be a compromise between 
idealism and materialism is further born out by the paragraph 
closing the first half of Letter LXXXIII:
'Voilà, Rhedi, ce qui m'a fait penser que la Justice est 
éternelle et ne^dépend point des conventions humaines; et, 
quand elle en dépendrait, ce serait une vérité terrible, 
qu’il faudrait se dérober à soi-même.'
The implication of his argument is of course in part that 
justice must be transcendent and invariable because human 
reason is capable of perceiving it, but its real burden is 
that because man is capable of conceiving of justice, there­
fore he is also capable of acting justly. The idea of 
justice like the idea of God may be the artefact of the 
human mind, yet neither its universal relevance nor its 
moral utility are thereby undermined.
Confirmation of the scientific epistemological foundation 
of the moral doctrine of the letter is provided by a later 
passage where Montesquieu sets up in opposition against 
those thinkers who have tried to make justice dependent upon 
the arbitrary will of the Creator. Here he clearly has 
orthodox theologians in mind. Montesquieu continues:
'Toutes ces pensées m'animent contre ces docteurs qui 
représentent Dieu comme un être qui fait un exercice 
tyrannique de sa puissance; qui le font agir d'une manière 
dont nous ne voudrions pas agir nous-mêmes, de peur de 
l'offenser; qui le chargent de toutes les imperfections qu'il 
punit en nous, et. dans leurs opinions contradictoires, le 
représentent tantôt comme un être mauvais, tantôt comme un 
être qui hait le mal et le punit.'
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The arguments of those who declare the irrational, arbitrary 
nature of the Divine will are proscribed because they 
diminish the original and superior concept of an all-perfect 
being, the concept which is alone commensurable to the 
rational and social nature of the mind conceiving it, thus -
'ils le font agir d'une manière dont nous ne voudrions pas
agir nous-mêmes, ....ils le chargent de toutes les
imperfections qu'il punit en nous'.
Montesquieu is evidently deriving metaphysical and moral 
conclusions from the scientific notion that there must be a 
constant relationship of equivalence between the machine and 
its products; more specifically from the theory that all 
ideas are anthropomorphic, that they reflect as sensationa­
list psychology supposed, the nature, character and experi­
ence of the individual. However equally clearly Montesquieu 
is far from accepting the thoroughgoing relativism that such 
a theory implies; he firmly believes that human nature is 
basically rational and moral.
In the previous chapter we saw how he used his insight 
into the anthropomorphic nature of religious perception and 
its development in order to explain certain pagan beliefs.
The discussion with Fontenelle reported in the Pensees^^) on 
the origin of ideas of purity and impurity in pagan religions 
shows that his explanation, the influence of the senses on
(1) See above pp.
(2) Pensée 1677 (Bkn.2147).
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the primitive imagination, while remaining generically 
adequate to the phenomena which it purported to explain, did 
not destroy their religious significance. Now in 
Letter LXXXIII Montesquieu is not seeking a natural explana­
tion of historical beliefs, but his argument depends simi­
larly on the supposition of an equivalence between the stage 
of development attained by moral perception - its capacity 
to formulate the concept of an all-perfect being or of an 
immutable order of justice for example - and the concepts 
which it produces. The mind must be adequate to its ideas, 
and by extension, the concepts must be worthy of their 
creator. Thus Montesquieu is here using this scientific 
notion of equivalence in the business of working out a moral 
code, and it can be seen that certain of his analytical 
techniques are common to both his scientific and his ethical 
thought.
Clearly, the letter is little more than a fragment and 
several crucial links in the argument are missing. For 
example it is not enough to demonstrate that man is capable 
of formulating this 'belle idée' which is justice, without 
explaining at the same time the grounds for supposing that 
men will in fact act upon their ideal. It is true that 
Montesquieu indicates certain motives: moral and aesthetic
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satisfaction, psychological comfort and s e c u r i t y ; s u c h  
basically materialist and utilitarian principles are not 
necessarily incompatible with the scientific hypothesis fun­
damental to his argument, but the most important factor, in 
that it links the conceptual argument to the definition of 
justice and the related metaphysical apparatus, the principle 
of human rationality, is not explicitly mentioned. We must 
simply assume that it is at the back of his mind, for on the 
other hand we are given a very clear indication of the reasons 
for unjust behaviour, of the selfish passions that hinder man 
in his pursuit of justice. Furthermore, reason and sociabi­
lity are qualities that must be taken as given, if the 
possession by human creatures of an invariable notion of 
justice is to be accepted as a fact.
(1) The description of justice as a 'belle idée' and the 
mention of the 'plaisir sévère* experienced by the just 
man, recalls Diderot's moral argument in the Neveu de 
Rameau. Moi attempts to prove to Rameau that virtueand 
happiness belong together^ 'Quelquefois avec mes amis 
une partie de débauché, même un peu tumultueuse, ne me 
déplaît pas; mais, je ne vous le dissimulerai pas, il 
m'est infiniment plus doux encore d'avoir secouru le 
malheureux, d'avoir terminé une affaire épineuse, donné 
un conseil salutaire, fait une lecture agréable, une 
promenade avec un homme ou une femme chère à mon coeur, 
passé quelques heures instructives avec mes enfants, 
écrit une bonne page, rempli les devoirs de mon état...'
He simply demonstrates however that pleasure is his main 
motive, and that his moral principles are as materialistic 
as those of the dissolute Rameau. It seems likely that 
the aesthetic element in the thought of both Diderot and 
Montesquieu was derived from Shaftesbury's neoplatonism; 
his Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit was a common 
source.
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Once this point is understood however, then the moral 
doctrine of the letter places itself in the context of the 
Ciceronian humanism which was so marked an influence on 
Montesquieu's earliest essays^j and at the same time antici­
pates its reappearance in the Traité des Devoirs, where 
according to a surviving fragment Montesquieu declared quite 
unambiguously:
'Les actions humaines sont le sujet des devoirs. C'est la 
raison qui en est le principe, et qui nous rend propres à 
nous en acquitter.
Indeed the premisses of the argument in Letter LXXXIII tend 
to confirm rather than to contradict the view of reason that 
emerges from the De Officiis, in spite of the Malebranchian 
undertones of the definition of justice itself. The scienti­
fic hypothesis underlying the moral doctrine suggests a 
reason which is discursive rather than intuitive, which com­
bines speculative and moral functions, which constitutes 
intelligence and will, personal and social discipline. More­
over, in this respect it is surely significant that 
Montesquieu shows considerable awareness of the importance of 
such auxiliary factors as sentiment and habit in determining 
the moral disposition. In Letter XI we find:
'il y a certaines vérités qu'il ne suffit pas de persuader, 
mais qu'il faut encore faire sentir. Telles sont les vérités 
de morale.'
(1) See above pp. 254"'J7/
(2) Pensée 220 (Bkn. 597); Nagel II, p.93; Pléiade I, p.1126.
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In the fragment of the Devoirs where he declares reason the 
principle of duty, Montesquieu nevertheless continues with 
a passage on the importance of habit:
'Le moyen d'acquérir la justice parfaite, c'est de s'en faire 
une telle habitude qu'on l'observe dans les plus petites 
choses, et qu'on y plie jusqu'à sa manière de penser.'
Similarly justice is characterized in Letter LXXXIII as a 
principle of the heart not as an innate idea:
'Quel repos pour nous de savoir qu'il y a dans le coeur de 
tous ces hommes un principe intérieur qui combat en notre 
faveur et nous met a couvert de leurs entreprises.'
Were justice conceived as an innate idea intimately associ­
ated with intuitive reason, then feeling and habit might be 
considered more as obstacles to its pursuit.
Montesquieu's attitude to human nature as well as to 
morals seems well summarized in an early passage of the 
Pensées addressed to his son:
'(O'est un grand ouvrier que celui qui a fait notre être et 
qui a donné à nos âmes de certaines tendances et de certains 
penchants.)
Comme le monde physique ne subsiste que parce que 
chaque partie de la matière tend à s'éloigner du centre, 
aussi le monde politique se soutient-il par^ ce désir intérieur 
et inquiet que chacun a de sortir du lieu où il est placé. 
C'est en vain qu'une morale austère veut effacer les traits 
que le plus grand de tous les ouvriers a imprimés dans nos 
âmes. C'est à la morale, qui veut travailler sur le coeur de 
l'homme, à régler ses sentiments, et non pas à les détruire.'
(1)
(1) Pensée 5 (Bkn.69); Nagel II, p.2; Pléiade I, p.993.
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The nature of things and the general laws governing them 
cannot be transformed; and indeed, as numerous chapters in 
the Lois dealing with obscure or bizarre customs and beliefs 
were to demonstrate, it is far from being the case that 
apparently irrational tendencies or amoral characteristics 
are without political or social utility. On the other hand, 
human reason and the moral science at its disposal is a 
powerful means of controlling and directing nature, of 
schooling the passions according to the tenets of idealism. 
Throughout his writings Montesquieu's lesson is that we 
should work within existing circumstances using the material 
and all the means at our disposal towards the realisation of 
our moral aims. As the nature of things is determined by a 
complex of external causes, so scientific knowledge cannot 
be ignored, if the pursuit of moral ideals is to be effective. 
In the fragment on reason and duty which has already been 
quoted it is significant that Montesquieu suggests a way in 
which mechanistic psychological theory can be utilized in 
the study of morals;
'Nous avons tous des machines qui nous soumettent éternelle­
ment^ aux lois de l'habitude. Notre machine accoutume notre 
âme à penser d'une certaine façon. Elle l'accoutume à penser 
d'une autre. G'est ici que la physique pourrait trouver 
place dans la morale, en nous faisant voir combien les 
dispositions pour les vices et les vertus humaines dépendent 
du mécanisme.'^2^
(1) Pensée 220 (Bkn.597); Nagel II, pp.93-94; Pléiade I, 
pp.1126-1127.
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Thus as in Letter LXXXIII, the principles of an empirical 
approach to psychology and epistemology, even the very basic 
assumptions of a belief in causal determinism, are given 
moral significance, and utilized in the cause of justice. 
Together, the method and content of Montesquieu's moral 
argument represent a viable if incomplete reconciliation of 
the postulates of scientific rationalism and Classical 
idealism. It is at least arguable in fact, that his approach 
to morals, while being a great deal more subtle, is as 
scientific as the naturalism of the materialists.
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II.
In spite of the great play made in Letter LXXXIII with 
the idea of the perfection of God, there is little in the way 
of coherent metaphysical theory linking the moral and the 
theological elements of the argument together, and placing the 
definition of justice with its geometric structural under­
tones in the context of a unified cosmological theory. We 
are left in doubt as to whether the 'rapport de convenance, 
qui se trouve réellement entre deux choses', is a real 
relationship in the sense that it is immanent in the material 
world and therefore accessible to both scientific and specu­
lative reason and also indicative that the general physical 
laws of the universe constitute its moral laws at the same 
time; or whether Montesquieu conceived of it as a real 
relationship in the sense of a transcendent truth akin to 
mathematical truths, subsisting in the Divine intelligence, 
and constituting part of that 'sagesse éternelle*, that 
eternal and immutable order of essences, which Malebranche 
had seen as the universal law, but which he had maintained 
was quite distinct from the substance of the universe and was 
only linked to it by the operation of the Divine Will acting 
through separate natural laws.^^ We must acknowledge 
Montesquieu's debt to Malebranche, but nevertheless, the
(1) See above, part I, ch.2, pp.54'4-0
2 9 8
precise ontological significance of his definition of justice 
remains unclear. The immutability of the relationship and 
its accessibility to all intelligences are alone stressed.
Similarly, as the analysis of the moral argument of the 
letter de mon str at e d, t he  discussion of the logical perfec­
tion and justice of the Divine nature finally bears only a 
tenuous relation to the human moral predicament, and its 
introduction is hardly indispensable on the grounds of 
guaranteeing either the necessity or even the transcendence 
of justice. It does however serve another purpose by 
pointing a contrast with human nature and the human condition, 
a contrast which is clearly emphasized by the structure of 
the letter and its division into brief paragraphs dealing 
alternately with God and with man.
The perfection of God's nature demanding that absolute 
justice be included among his attributes, and capriciousness 
excluded, (the very harmony which Montesquieu requires among 
these attributes might itself be said to reveal again the 
search for a 'rapport de convenance'), it follows that all 
his actions are of necessity just. Human nature is in con­
trast imperfect, for passion and self-interest together 
obscure man's vision of the relationships of justice. Thus 
though both God and man contemplate the same relationships.
(1) See above, pp
2 9 9
God is self-determining and of necessity just, while man may 
be determined by attributes and motives which conflict with 
justice. Here Montesquieu seems to be contrasting two 
determinisms; the internal, logical determinism of Divine 
perfection, and the natural determinism governing the Human 
condition, which paradoxically accounts for the indeterminate 
nature of human behaviour.
However, Montesquieu's analysis of the causes of human 
injustice does not stop short at the indictment of those 
natural passions that may be seen to constitute imperfection 
in metaphysical terms, and which stand in the way of the 
rational pursuit of justice. For the distinguishing feature 
of the human condition is indeed its insufficiency. Man is 
born into a complex of limiting relationships, whereas God 
is unique, self-causing and self-sufficient;
'Mais il n'est pas possible que Dieu fasse jamais rien 
d'injuste; dès qu'on suppose qu'il voit la Justice, il faut 
nécessairement qu'il la suive, car, comme il n'a besoin de 
rien, et qu'il se suffit à lui-même, il serait le plus
(1) The natural grounds which Montesquieu puts forward for 
injustice recall his natural explanation of the origin 
of society; 'Si les hommes n'en formaient point, s'ils 
se quittaient et se fuyaient les uns les autres, il 
faudrait en demander la raison et chercher pourquoi ils 
se tiennent séparés. Mais ils naissent tous liés les 
uns aux autres; un fils est né auprès de son père, et 
il s'y tient: voila la société et la cause de la
société.' Lettres Persanes, XCIV.
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méchant de tous les êtres, puisqu'il le serait sans intérêt.
The fact of human interdependence is the explanation for human 
self-interest :
'C'est toujours par un retour sur eux-mâaes qu'ils agissent; 
nul n'est mauvais gratuitement.'
Thus the whole problem of justice is seen to stem from the 
fact of relationship; the bonds which link us to others are 
balanced and sometimes cancelled by that which binds us to 
ourselves :
'Les hommes peuvent faire des injustices, parce qu'ils 
préfèrent leur propre satisfaction à celle des autres.'
Significantly, Montesquieu's definition of justice itself 
reflects his analysis of the human condition. Once removed 
from the metaphysical plane where it may be understood as a 
structure of immutable archetypal relationships, justice 
becomes in real terms the regulation of dealings between men 
according to a given and constant ideal. It always implies 
reciprocity. Thus it is as if the perfection of the Divinity 
can only be paralleled in creation at a corporate level, by 
the realisation in society of the ideals of justice. The 
limitations imposed by human relationships do not become a 
source of evil, unless individuals deny their natural
(1) In his article 'Parallels to ideas in the Lettres 
Persanes', A.S. Crisafulli points out the probable 
origin of this unusual argument in Shaftesbury's Letter 
on Enthusiasm (Works ed. Robertson, 1900, vol.I, p.28): 
'There can be no malice but where interests are opposed, 
A universal being can have no interest opposite, and 
therefore can have no malice'; P.M.L.A., sept. 1937, 
p.777.
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sociability by acting selfishly. Again paradoxically, the 
nature of things, human interdependence, is either the source 
of equity or the cause of wickedness.
The arguments of Letter LXXXIII indicate a deep awareness 
in Montesquieu of the complexity of the natural causes 
influencing human behaviour, but at the same time suggest 
that he was far from accepting a philosophical standpoint 
that could be described as deterministic either in the pro- 
videntialist or the materialist sense. While he seems 
unwilling to burden man with that absolute freedom which 
carries with it the absolute responsibility for evil, and 
accordingly stresses the determining force of self-interest -
*nul n'est mauvais gratuitement. Il faut qu'il y ait une 
raison qui détermine, et cette raison est toujours une 
raison d'intérêt* -
he nevertheless implies that natural conditions themselves 
endow man with a sort of liberty, a liberty which translated 
into metaphysical terms is really imperfection or insuffi­
ciency contrasting with the necessary perfection of God.
From this it is possible to infer that Montesquieu could 
hardly have considered the 'rapports de convenance' repre­
senting justice and associated with the perfection of the 
Divinity, to be immanent in the natural order. For man they 
constitute only a potential order, in so far as he is a
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rational creature, and his rational insights may be given 
expression through the will. Taking Montesquieu's premisses 
in the Lettres Persanes alone into account, it would only be 
possible to affirm that his philosophy amounted to a doc­
trine of immanent reason, if he had clearly equated the 
'proper relationships actually existing between things' with 
the Divinity itself, or had maintained unequivocally that 
God was not simply of necessity just, but also that the 
relationships of justice were really consubstantial with him*
However, Montesquieu does emphasize in Letter LXXXIII 
the necessity to which God himself is subject: he explicitly
rejects the idea that the Divine Will is arbitrary. In this 
his attitude may be compared with that of Samuel Clarke in 
his Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God; 
the English theologian, while discerning a certain necessity 
in the universe deriving from the principle of fitness,
(1) Montesquieu possessed the Discourse in the English 
edition of 1728, (see above, part I, ch.4, p . 142); 
Ricotier's French translation of 1717 brings out termino­
logical similarities more forcibly however. The passage 
in question is as follows: *J*y trouve, à la vérité', une
nécessité de convenance, c'est-a-dire, que je reconnais, 
qu'afin que l'univers fut bien, il fallait que ses parties 
fussent dans l'ordre, où nous les voyons aujourd'hui.
Mais je ne vois pas la moindre apparence a cette nécessité 
de nature et d'essence, pour laquelle les athées 
combattent'. De l'Existence et des Attributs de Dieu, 
Amsterdam, 1717, ch.IV, 3e proposition, pp.33-34.
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but distinct from absolute necessity, nevertheless asserted 
that God was subject to the determinism of his own perfection:
'Quelque grande que soit la liberté d'un être, qui est tout 
ensemble infiniment intelligent, infiniment puissant et 
infiniment bon, il ne se déterminera jamais à agir d'une 
manière, qui soit contraire à ses perfections. De sorte 
que le libre arbitre, dans un être revêtu de ces perfections, 
est principe d'action aussi certain et aussi immuable que 
la nécessité même des fatalistes.'
Whatever reservations are made, such a standpoint inevitably 
raises the question of Divine omnipotence, and ultimately 
brings one full circle to the problem of whether the natural 
order is governed by the same transcendent necessity as 
determines God's will, raising in due course the related 
subject of human freedom, since, if the created order is no 
more than the emanation of transcendent perfection and justice, 
then in fulfilling their own natures, as they are so deter­
mined, all creatures may be deemed to be acting justly.
Montesquieu never claimed the authority of a philosopher 
or a theologian; in the Lois for example, he is at pains on 
several occasions to explain that his ideas should not be
(%)
'Z
taken in their traditional moral or philosophical context.
Op.cit., ch.XIII, 12e prop. p.182.
See for example the Avertissement de l'Auteur at the 
beginning of De l'Esprit des Lois, where Montesquieu 
carefully if somewhat ingenuously explains that for him 
la vertu is a political and not a moral or religious 
attribute. He uses a similar stratagem in the introduct­
ory chapter of the first of the books devoted to religion 
in the state, 'Comme dans cet ouvrage je ne suis point 
théologien, mais écrivain politique, il pourrait y avoir 
des choses qui ne seraient entièrement vraies que dans 
une façon de penser humaine, n'ayant point été considérées 
dans le rapport avec des vérités plus sublimes.'
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But, his interests lying as much in the field of morals as 
of politics or law, he was bound to trespass on these tra­
ditional disciplines; and indeed, here and there, more par­
ticularly in his early works and in his personal notebooks, 
he attempted to grapple with the same philosophical problems 
as excited his contemporaries.
Before attempting to construct a coherent philosophical 
outlook from various scattered passages however, or to decide 
what light they throw on his definition of justice, it is 
perhaps advisable to outline the context in which Montesquieu 
himself habitually presented his philosophical and theolo­
gical theorizing.
Certain characteristics of this presentation have 
already come to light. In discussing the moral doctrine of 
Letter LXXXIII, we noticed how the notion of Divine perfect­
ion was presented as an hypothesis, as the artefact of the 
human intellect. This was moreover far from being an isolated 
instance, and represented rather a consistant historico- 
sociological approach to the phenomenon of speculative 
belief, which could be traced from the earliest Discours sur 
la Politique des Romains dans la Religion to the books on 
religion in the Lois, This attitude is best expressed in one
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of the Pensées which Montesquieu entitled significantly: 
Quelques Réflexions qui peuvent servir contre le Paradoxe de 
M. Bayle, qu'il vaut mieux être athée qu'idolâtre, avec 
quelques autres fragments de quelques écrits faits dans ma 
jeunesse, que .j'ai déchirés. Here Montesquieu worked out 
his theory of the development of religious perception, a 
theory on which he based his contention that religious belief 
is always morally valuable, the position he maintained in 
books 24 and 25 of the Lois, T h e  sensationalist basis of 
the theory is also to be found in his discussion with 
Pontenelle reported in the Pensées, on the origin of ideas 
of purity and impurity in pagan religions.
Montesquieu begins his refutation of Bayle by explain­
ing how, by the medium of the senses alone, primitive man 
came to possess the idea of God, of a Creator and First 
Cause, but of a God who was a material and not a spiritual
(1) Pensée 1946 (Bkn,673), Nagel II, p.584; Pléiade I, p,1173ff. 
This entry can be dated using the system invented by 
Shackleton in his article Les Secrétaires de Montesquieu 
(reproduced in the Introduction to Nagel II) at some time 
after 1748; although, as the title indicates, it is
simply a recopying of fragments from certain early works,
(2) E,g, 'la religion, même fausse, est le meilleur garant 
que les hommes puissent avoir de la probité des hommes*, 
(Lois XXIV, 8), It is surprising in view of an anti­
clericalism even more virulent than Montesquieu's to find 
a similar opinion in Voltaire: 'II est nécessaire que
chacun soit juste, et la plus sûre manière d'inspirer la 
justice à tous les hommes, c'est de leur inspirer la 
religion sans superstition,' Dictionnaire Philosophique, 
article Fraude,
(3) See above p.2 #  , and pp, 249-2^2.
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being, and whom he imagined in the image o f himself. Thus 
he emphasizes the anthropomorphic nature of pagan beliefs, 
demonstrating how the primitive imagination inevitably con­
ceived of a plurality of gods, and pointing to the fact that 
even advanced religions cannot rid themselves of a human 
picture of God, His conclusion is that the pagans were in 
error only because of their mistaken supposition that God 
was a material being; the evidence of their senses as to the 
existence of a first cause was just, and the same evidence 
remains to disconcert Bayle's atheists:
'Quant aux athées de M. Bayle, la moindre réflexion 
suffit à l'Homme pour se guérir de l'athéisme. Il n'a qu'à 
considérer les Cieux, et il y trouvera une preuve invincible 
de l'existence de Dieu, Il n'est point excusable lorsqu'il 
ne voit point la Divinité peinte dans tout ce qui l'entoure: 
car, dès qu'il voit des effets, il faut bien qu'il admette 
une cause. Il n'en est pas de même de 1'idolâtrie: car
l'Homme peut bien voir et considérer l'ordre des Cieux et 
rester opiniâtrement dans l'idolâtrie. Cette disposition ne 
répugne point à la multiplicité des Dieux, ou, si elle y est 
contraire, ce ne peut être que par une suite de raisonnements 
métaphysiques, souvent trop faibles sans le secours de la 
foi, qu'ils le peuvent décourvrir.'
But, he goes on to imply, very little more can be learnt 
about God than that he is the first cause:
'Je dis plus: peut-être que la seule chose que la raison nous
apprenne de Dieu, c'est qu'il y a un être intelligent qui 
produit cet ordre que nous voyons dans le Monde, Mais, si 
l'on demande quelle est la nature de cet être, on demande une 
chose qui passe la raison humaine. Tout ce qu'on sait de 
certain, c'est que l'hypothèse d 'Epicure est insoutenable, 
garce qu'elle attaque l'existence d'un être dont le nom est 
écrit partout,'
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Modern speculation on the nature of the infinite as exempli­
fied in Malebranche*s 'palais magnifique, qui se dérobe aux 
yeux, et qui se perd dans les nues', adds nothing to our 
knowledge, since in reality, it is impossible to imagine the 
infinite, and we can therefore have no true idea of eternity 
or of boundlessness.
God for Montesquieu is then the 'Deus Absconditus' of 
Scripture; and faith and submission are more important in 
religion than knowledge. Thus paradoxically, although for 
different reasons, Montesquieu reaches the same fideistic posi­
tion as Bayle adopted in the face of doctrinal illogicality.
They differ however, in that Montesquieu does not acquiesce 
in absurdity in spite of rational evidence; on the contrary, 
his reasoning confirms his belief in God's omnipotence and
(1) Illustrated by such passages as the following from the 
Article Pauliciens in the Dictionnaire Historique et
Critiquai *11 vaut mieux croire et se taire Il
faut captiver son entendement sous l'obéissance de la 
foi et ne disputer jamais sur certaines choses.....
Il faut humblement reconnaître que toute la philosophie 
est ici à bout.' Whether Bayle's fideism was as profound 
and sincerely held as some critics have maintained, 
(notably R.H. Popkin in 'Pierre Bayle's place in 17th. 
century Scepticism', published in Pierre Bayle. le 
Philosophe de Rotterdam, ed. Dibon7'TirTs7i9597^nd 
E.D. James in 'Scepticism and Fideism in Bayle's 
Dictionnaire', in French Studies XVI, 1962) is however 
open to question. The articles Pyrrhon and Manichéens, 
to name but two of his best known demolitions of Christian 
dogma, provide striking evidence that he was far from 
bridling his reason and submitting humbly to the 
authority of revelation.
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spirituality, his conviction that human reason is limited, 
and surprisingly his recognition of the necessity of rewards 
and punishments;
'On ne manquera pas de me dire qu'il s'ensuit de mon 
raisonnement que Dieu est trompeur, et qu'il jette les hommes 
dans l'erreur, sans toujours voir la vérité. Je réponds 
qu'il n'est point nécessaire que Dieu nous donne assez de 
lumières pour conserver notre être./.\ Cela doit nous suffire. 
Il nous a faits aussi parfaits et aussi imparfaits qu'il a 
voulu; il a pu nous rendre plus ou moins intelligents. Quand 
il nous découvre quelque chose, il nous fait une grâce; mais 
il pouvait nous la cacher sans injustice. Dieu nous trompe- 
t-il parce que les sens, ces infidèles témoins, nous 
déçoivent à chaque instant? Non, sans doute! Peut-être que 
Dieu n'a pas voulu que nous eussions plus de certitude des 
choses, afin que nous connaissions mieux notre faiblesse,'
and;
'Dieu, qui est un pur esprit, ne pouvait se faire 
connaître aux hommes par idée ou par image représentative de 
lui-même. Il ne pouvait non plus se faire connaître que par 
sentiment, que de la même manière qu'il se fait sentir aux 
Anges et aux Bienheureux dans le Ciel. Mais^ comme un si 
grand bonheur, qui est la félicité suprême, était une grâce 
que l'Homme devait mériter avant que de l'obtenir, et qu'il 
ne pouvait même acquérir que par la voie des peines et des 
souffrances. Dieu choisit un troisième moyen gour se faire 
connaître, qui est celui de la foi; et, par la, s'il ne lui 
donna pas des connaissances claires, il l'empêcha, du moins, 
de tomber dans l'erreur.'
Clearly then, Montesquieu's attitudes towards religion 
in general, towards theology, and towards revealed dogma 
were of considerable complexity. First of all there is the
(1) Here as Roger Caillois suggests in the Pléiade edition 
of the Pensées, vol.I, p.1644, n.l06, the context of the 
argument would imply an alternative reading: 'Je réponds
qu'il est seulement nécessaire......'
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initial reservation, suggestive of a sustained scepticism 
based on a scientific approach to religious psychology, that 
beliefs are relative to the degree of enlightenment attained 
by human reason. Such a stance fits in quite naturally with 
his relativistic sociological attitude towards religion as 
a social institution, as later exemplified in the Lois. It 
also helps to explain the coexistence in the Pensées of the 
refutation of Bayle's atheists with a passage like the follow­
ing, where Montesquieu conceeds that even the most elementary 
postulates of religious belief may be completely alien to 
peoples of a different culture:
'Les théologiens soutiennent qu'il n'y a point d'athées 
de sentiment. Mais peut-on juger de ce qui se passe dans le 
coeur de tous les hommes? L'existence de Dieu n'est pas une 
vérité plus claire que celles-ci: l'homme est composé de
deux substances; l'âme est spirituelle. Cependant^ il y a 
des nations entières qui doutent de ces deux vérités. C'est 
que notre sentiment intérieur n'est pas le leur, et que^ 
l'éducation l'a détruit. Il est vrai que ce sont des vérités 
claires; mais il y a des aveugles. Ce sont des sentiments 
naturels; mais il y a des gens qui ne sentent point.
Related to this apparent scepticism are likewise a marked 
antipathy towards the excesses of metaphysical speculation, 
visible in his reflections on Bayle as in several other frag­
ments, ^ 2) Sind a complementary belief that the proper function 
of human reason is the practical business of living, its 
application to the real and pressing issues of morals and 
politics :
(1) Pensée 64 (Bkn.2077); Nagel II, p.22; Pléiade I, p.1542.
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(2) One rather humorously disparaging estimation of the
attraction of metaphysics has typically a serious twist at 
the end, revealing Montesquieu's awareness of the deep 
human need for speculative beliefs of some kind;
'La métaphysique a deux choses bien séduisantes.
Elle s'accorde avec la paresse: on 1'étudie partout,
dans son lit, à la promenade, etc.
D'ailleurs^ la métaphysique ne traite que de grandes 
choses: on y négocie toujours pour de grands intérêts.
Le physicien, le logicien, l'orateur, ne s'occupent que 
de petits objets; mais le métaphysicien s'empare de toute 
la nature, la gouverne à son gré, fait et défait les 
Dieux, donne et ôte l'intelligence, met l'Homme dans la 
condition des bêtes ou l'en ôte. Toutes les notions 
qu'elle donne sont intéressantes, parce qu'il s'agit de 
la tranquillité présente et future.' Pensée 202 
(Bkn.^2060); Nagel II, p.74; Pléiade I, p.1536. Other 
Pensées criticize in particular the essentialism of the 
Platonists and Malebranche, e.g.: 156 (Bkn.2061),
410 (Bkn.2062), 799 (Bkn.2093).
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'Je vois ici des gens qui disputent sans fin sur la 
religion; mais il me semble qu'ils combattent en même temps 
à qui l'observera le moins.
'Non seulement ils ne sont pas meilleurs chrétiens, mais 
même meilleurs citoyens, et c'est ce qui me touche; car,
dans quelque religion qu'on vive, l'observation des lois,
l'amour pour les hommes, la piété envers les parents, sont
toujours les premiers actes de religion.
To compound these reservations into a thoroughgoing relativ­
istic materialism complete with atheistic undertones, one 
needs only to quote other passages on the organization of 
the universe, and the relative insignificance in this con­
text of the entire human species. Here we have Montesquieu 
implying that all forms of life comprising the physical order, 
and all the associated processes of development and repro­
duction, including the acquisition of the sophisticated 
faculties of thought and feeling, are simply the product of 
the general movement of matter;
'On peut dire que tout est animé, tout organise. Le 
moindre brin d'herbe fait voir des millions de cerveaux.
Tout meurt et renaît sans cesse. Tant d 'animaux qui n'ont 
été reconnus que par hasard doivent bien en faire soupçonner 
d'autres. La matière qui a eu un mouvement général, par 
lequel s'est formé l'ordre des cieux, doit avoir des
mouvements particuliers qui la portent à l'organisation....
(Laissant la pensée à l'homme, il est difficile de refuser le 
sentiment à tout ce qui existe.)*^2)
(1) Lettres Persanes, XLVI; Nagel I, p.88; Pléiade I, p.194.
(2) Pensée 76 (Bkn~.6'90); Nagel II, p.23; Pléiade I. p.1187; 
cf. Pensées 1187 (Bkn.2064) and 1341 (Bkn.2065) where 
Montesquieu expounds a sensationalist theory of knowledge. 
The first of these begins conventionally: ^Les bouts des 
fibres de notre cerveau reçoivent un petit ébranlement, 
qui produit un chatouillement ou sentiment en nous. Cela
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(2) suffit pour expliquer tout. Par exemple, nous voyons pour 
la premiere fois un carré. Il suffit que nous sentions 
que nous le voyons, pour en avoir une idée: car, sans
cela, l'on ne verrait point le carré.. Etc.', but again 
ends with a question suggesting that sensationalism is 
far from solving all the problems, 'Mais, si ce que je 
viens de dire est bien vrai, pourquoi les bûtes ne 
raisonnent-elles pas comme les hommes?' Nagel II, p.316; 
Pléiade I, p.1537.
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Side by side with this scientific materialism very much in 
the Pontenellian mould, is a characteristic understanding of 
the vastness and complexity of the universe, into which 
humankind and its destiny disappear almost without trace.
When discussing the legal prohibition of suicide, Usbek in 
the Lettres Persanes argues its absurd injustice on the grounds 
that the taking of ones own life does nothing to upset the 
order of the universe: the general laws governing the orga­
nization of matter continue unimpeded by any human inter­
ference with nature;
'Lorsque mon âme sera séparée de mon corps, y aura-t-il 
moins d'ordre et moins d'arrangement dans l'Univers? Croyez 
vous que cette nouvelle combinaison soit moins parfaite et 
moins dépendante des lois générales?..... Pensez-vous que 
mon corps, devenu un épi de blé, un ver, un gazon, soit 
changé en un ouvrage de la Nature moins digne d'elle? et que 
mon âme, dégagée de tout ce qu'elle avait de terrestre, soit 
devenue moins sublime?
Toutes ces idées, mon cher Ibben, n'ont d'autre source 
que notre orgueil: nous ne sentons point notre petitesse,
et, malgré qu'on en ait, nous voulons être comptés dans 
l'Univers, y figurer et y être un objet important. Nous nous 
imaginons que l'anéantissement d'un etre aussi parfait que 
nous dégraderait toute la nature, et nous ne convenons pas 
qu'un homme de plus ou de moins dans le monde - que dis-je? - 
tous les hommes ensemble, cent millions de têtes comme la 
nôtre, ne sont qu'un atome subtil et délié, que Dieu n'aperçoit 
qu'à cause de l'immensité de ses connaissances.
This conviction that the human creature is no more than a 
drop in the cosmic ocean, seems indeed to draw Montesquieu 
very close to the same hylozoism as, later in the
(1) Lettres Persanes LXXVI; Nagel I- pp.157-158; Pléiade I, 
p.247; of. Pensées 22 (Bkn.2191), 54 (Bkn.2193).
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Traité des Devoirs, he attributed to Spinoza and condemned.
It appears again in the Lettres Persanes in a passage arguing 
the relativity of judgements and beliefs;
'II me semble, Usbek, que nous ne jugeons jamais des choses 
que par un retour secret que nous faisons sur nous-mêmes.
Je ne suis pas surpris que les Nègres peignent le diable 
d'une blancheur éblouissante et leurs dieux noirs comme du 
charbon;..... On a dit fort bien que, si les triangles 
faisaient un dieu, ils lui donneraient trois cotés.
Mon cher Usbek, quand je vois des hommes qui rampent 
sur un atome, c'est-à-dire la Terre, qui n'est qu'un point de 
l'Univers, se proposer directement pour modèles de la 
Providence, je ne sais comment accorder tant d'extravagance 
avec tant de petitesse.
a combination of ideas which would indeed tend to confirm a 
strong leaning in Montesquieu at this stage towards a rela­
tivistic materialism.
Paradoxically however, his very conviction of the weak­
ness of human reason, either as a speculative or as a moral
(1) See Pensée 1266 (Bkn.615); Nagel II, pp.342-343; Pléiade I, 
p.1138; *^ependant, un grand génie m'a promis que je 
mourrai comme un insecte. Il cherche à me flatter de 
l'idée que je ne suis qu'une modification de la matière.
Il emploie un ordre géométrique et des raisonnements qu'on 
dit être très forts, et que j'ai trouvés très obscurs, 
pour élever mon âme à la dignité de mon corps, et, au 
lieu de cet espace immense que mon esprit embrasse, il 
me donne à ma propre matière et à une espace de quatre ou 
cinq pieds dans l'univers.'
(2) Letter LIX; Nagel I, p.119; Pléiade I, pp.217-218. In 
his note to this passage, (Gamier éd., Paris, I960,
p.124), Paul Vernière attributes its attack on anthropo­
morphic beliefs to a source in the Tractatus theologico- 
politicus. so accentuating the ambivalence of Montesquieu's 
attitude towards Spinoza. He also mentions the equally 
probable influence of Pontenelle.
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faculty, and this same understanding of the insignificance 
and powerlessness of man seen against the immensity of the 
universe, and the awful simplicity and regularity of its 
laws, appear in fact to have drawn him in just the opposite 
direction. Just as his deterministic theory of historical 
causation formed the scientific basis of his justification 
of moral idealism in the Traité des Devoirs, so here also 
his critical attitude towards speculative belief coupled 
with the scientific rationalism of his physics, however 
suggestive of scepticism they seem, constitute the essen­
tial groundwork for a rehabilitation of religious faith, and 
even for a renewed confidence in revelation. If Montesquieu 
had simply asserted that some kind of religious feeling was 
natural and necessary in man, and if, affirming that the 
ordered pattern of the universe was evidence of the existence 
of an intelligent and all-powerful first cause, and only 
that, he had inclined to a view of God remote and indifferent 
to his creation, it would have sufficed to describe him as 
an advocate of natural religion, a Deist. But he goes much 
further than that, for in Pensée 1946 revelation and heavenly 
rewards are presented as marks of Divine grace, solace for 
the ignorance and limitations of man#(q)
(l) See above p.509.
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Moreover, it is difficult to dimiss this orthodoxy as 
a defensive stratagem, an easy fideism cynically displayed 
to pull the wool over the eyes of censorious schoolmen.
First of all, Montesquieu had no real motive to disguise his 
thoughts as he recorded them in the Pensées and the Spicilege, 
since for most of his life he considered these as private 
notebooks. And although it is true that certain entries 
there demonstrate a laudable tolerance:
'Dieu est comme ce monarque qui a plusieurs nations sous son 
empire: elles viennent toutes lui porter le tribut, et 
chacune lui parle sa langue.
while others reveal a thoroughly rationalist caution towards 
revelation:
'Quand je crois ce que je pense, je cours risque de me 
tromper. Mais, quand je crois ce qu'on me dit, j'ai deux 
craintes: l'une, que celui qui me parle se trompe; l'autre,
qu'il ne veuille me tromper.
nevertheless others are clearly intended to give it support 
with a pessimism that is almost Pascalian:
'Ce qui me prouve la nécessité d'une révélation, c'est 
l'insuffisance de la Religion naturelle, vu la crainte et la 
superstition des hommes: car, si vous aviez mis aujourd'hui
les hommes dans le pur état de la Religion naturelle, demain 
ils tomberaient dans quelque superstition grossière.
Although his outlook on life is hardly as joyless as Pascal's,
(1) Pensée 1454 (Bkn.2117); Nagel II, pp.420-421; Pléiade I,
, p.1551,
(2) Spicilège 632. M.S. (598-599); Nagel II, p.868; Pleiade II, 
 ^ PP.13WW-1389.
(3) Pensée 825 (Bkn.2110); Nagel II, p.243; Pleiade I, p.1550.
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the appeal to sentiment on which he founds his defence of 
religious belief in one of the fragments from the Devoirs 
is strongly reminiscent of the spirit of the Pensées. How, 
Montesquieu asks, once we have freed ourselves of the burden 
of error and prejudice represented by belief in God, can we 
face with equanimity the miseries of illness, old age, and 
worse, the terror of death? Perhaps there is nothing but 
annihilation to follow, but what if the soul survives, 
isolated and helpless, deprived of the pleasures of physical 
existence, and yet irritated by an impossible desire for 
happiness; mean, empty and frustrated by its own inadequacy?
'Accablante immortalité! S'il n'est pas bien sûr qu'il n'y 
ait point de Dieu, si notre philosophie a pu nous laisser 
là-dessus quelque doute, il faut bien espérer qu'il y en a
(1)
un. '
Moreover, he argues, our very existence is strong proof of 
the benevolence of God, for he has given us life which we 
value above all else, and consciousness of our individual 
being. In return for his beneficence, we should love God; 
that is to say, we should show our gratitude through contented 
service.^2) It is impossible to imagine so perfect a being 
simply creating the universe, and then abandoning it to its 
own fate; and indeed, if the organization of the universe as 
we see it, must have required infinite power, one cannot
(l) Pensee 1266 (Bkn.615); Nagel II, p.342; Pleiade I, p.1137.
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Note to p. 517*
(2) Montesquieu accepts a personal bond with God, but hesi­
tates to see this as love, cf. Pensee 1080 (Bkn.2071), 
'...mais je dis bien que ceux qui disputent sur l'amour 
de Dieu n'entendent pas ce qu'ils disent, s'ils 
distinguent cet amour du sentiment de soumission et de 
celui de reconnaissance pour un être tout-puissant et 
bienfaiteur. Mais, pour de l'amour, je ne puis pas plus 
aimer un être spirituel que je puis aimer cette proposition: 
deux et trois font cinq.' Nagel II, p.294; Pléiade I, 
p.1541.
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conceive of God either losing this power, or suspending his 
providence as far as the human part of creation is concerned. 
And again, if we have known happiness during life, why 
should we fear that God would suddenly deprive us of it?
His power is proof of his will; and since our happiness costs 
him nothing, he would be more imperfect than men, were he to 
deprive us for no reason.
Although the substance of Montesquieu's defence could 
doubtless be compiled from the innumerable volumes of ratio­
nalist apologetic that followed in the wake of the critical 
exegesis of Spinoza and Richard Simon, not to mention the 
remorseless logic of B a y l e , i t s  tone and presentation are 
far from being rationalistic in the Cartesian sense. Perhaps 
Montesquieu would have agreed with the 'rationaux' that faith 
and reason are complementary and not contradictory, but he 
does not invoke geometric proofs or the stock-in-trade of 
idealist metaphysics. Hardly a mystic, his appeal is never­
theless directed to 'sentiment intérieur' rather than to 
reason; indeed, as we have seen, he is far from conceding 
that all the principles of natural religion, let alone those 
of Christian theology, are accompanied by that 'évidence' 
that so recommended itself to enlightened believers; on the 
contrary, rational perception is a limited faculty, and the 
way to religious knowledge, if indeed there is a way, is 
through faith.
(1) See A. Monod, De Pascal à Chateaubriand, 1916, chs.IV-VI.
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Nevertheless, Montesquieu's acceptance of revealed 
religion, hedged about as it was by scientific theory and 
utilitarian considerations^^) which one imagines were largely 
unacceptable to his orthodox contemporaries, did not deter 
him from indulging on his own account in a little theological 
speculation.
* Tu ne te serais jamais imagine que je fusse devenu plus 
métaphysicien que je ne l'étais: cela est pourtant, et tu
en seras convaincu quand tu auras essuyé ce débordement de 
ma philosophie',
declares Usbek at the beginning of a letter on Divine pre­
science, ^ 2) where Montesquieu does indeed show himself ready 
to use those concepts which were in his estimation acceptable 
to reason, that is to say those based on empirical evidence 
such as the organization of the universe, as premisses in a 
purely deductive argument whereby further attributes of the 
Divinity are defined. We have in fact already seen this 
characteristic procedure employed in Letter LXXXIII, where in 
spite of his assertion in Pensée 1946 that human reason is 
incapable of fathoming God's nature, Montesquieu founds his 
argument on its hypothetical perfection and also rejects the 
assumption that the Divine will is purely arbitrary. In 
Letter LXIX, using the same method, he goes on to tackle the
(1) Such considerations are subsequently well illustrated in 
Books 24 and 25 of the Lois: religion is a safeguard of
morality; certain dogmas such as the existence of heavenly 
rewards and punishments may supplement or replace civil 
sanctions; a single, established religion is preferable for 
the tranquillity of the state, etc..*.. ^
(2) Lettres Persanes, LXIX; Nagel I, p.145; Pleiade I, p.238.
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related problems of cosmic determinism, Divine omniscience, 
and human freedom.
Here he begins by examining once again the notion of 
Divine perfection; as in Letter LXXXIII, his contention is 
that most philosophers have encumbered the Divinity with all 
kinds of attributes, which, though men may regard them as 
the sum of perfection, are in fact contradictory. Apparently 
oblivious of the fact that the logic of perfectionnas he 
envisages it, is open to an identical criticism, Montesquieu 
continues by reiterating his persuasion that God is bound by 
his own nature to act in a particular way;
'Ainsi, quoique Dieu soit tout-puissant, il ne peut pas violer 
ses promesses, ni tromper les hommes. Souvent même 
l'impuissance n'est pas dans lui, mais dans les choses 
relatives; et c'est la raison pourquoi il ne peut pas changer 
l'essence des choses,'
Montesquieu thus makes two points: the first is that in spite
of his omnipotence, the justice essential to God's perfection 
prevents him from subjecting his creatures to conditions 
which he knows they cannot fulfil, just as in Letter LXXXIII 
he had argued that it prevented arbitrary action. The example 
of Adam, which Montesquieu cites at the end of the letter 
reveals that he has the problem of sin in mind:
'Dieu met Adam dans le Paradis terrestre^ à condition qu'il 
ne mangera point d'un certain fruit: précepte absurde dans
un être qui connaîtrait les déterminations futures des âmes;
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car enfin un tel être peut-il mettre des conditions à ses 
grâces sans les rendre dérisoires? C'est comme si un homme 
qui aurait su la prise de Bagdat disait à un autre: 'Je
vous donne cent tomans si Bagdat n'est pas pris.' Ne ferait- 
il pas là une bien mauvaise plaisanterie?'
Thus, while presumably accepting the omniscience which is the 
logical accompaniment of Divine omnipotence, Montesquieu 
infers that man must be assumed to enjoy freedom. The second 
related point refers to the theory of the natural laws 
governing creation as Montesquieu might have found it in 
Malebranche or in Leibniz, a theory designed to resolve the 
problem of evil.
Malebranche had maintained that the natural laws govern­
ing the universe were immutable; that it was wholly in accord­
ance with God's wisdom and perfection that they should be so; 
and that the physical and moral evils incidental to their 
operation were countered in the overall scheme of things by 
the establishment of occasional causes, such as Divine 
G r a c e . S i m i l a r l y ,  and perhaps more significantly as far 
as Montesquieu's metaphysical ideas are concerned, Leibniz, 
while freeing the Divine will from the determinism of meta­
physical reason by the invention of a second principle,
'la raison suffisante' or the moral principle of 'convenance', 
according to which he supposed, God was pleased to order
(1) See above Part I, ch.2, p.40,
323
creation, 2^) averred that the natural order was the best of 
all possible orders, and that evil was a purely human notion, 
for the phenomenon itself disappeared in the universal scheme 
of things:
’l'existence de certains inconvénients particuliers qui nous 
frappent, est une marque certaine que le meilleur plan ne 
permettait pas qu'on les évitât, et qu'ils servent à 
l'accomplissement du bien total.'^2)
Now when Montesquieu writes of God in Letter LXIX,
'Souvent même l'impuissance n'est pas dans lui, mais dans les
choses relatives; et c'est la raison pourquoi il ne peut pas 
changer l'essence des choses',
although his terminology is misleading, he seems in fact to 
be subscribing to a similar t h e o r y . G o d ' s  will is inevi­
tably determined by considerations of perfection, therefore, 
if creation exhibits certain shortcomings, it must be con­
cluded that these are an inevitable result of the grand 
scheme, and that God would be belying his own perfection and 
constancy in altering it.
But Montesquieu does not pursue this point directly; he
moves instead to the very reasonable objections made by
(1) See above Part I, ch.2, pp. ÿS'f).
(2; Théodicée, art.359.
(3) In his edition of the Lettres Persanes (Belles Lettres, 
1929), Élie Carcassone indicates the influence of 
Leibniz on Letter LXIX. Montesquieu possessed the 1714 
edition of the Theodicee, cf. L. Desgraves, op.cit. p.32, 
No.405). This influence is most important in view of the 
probable source in the Theodicee of Montesquieu's 
definition of justice.
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quelques-uns de nos d o c t e u r s ' to the theory of Divine omniscience. 
How, they had asked, could omniscience and justice together be 
predicated of a being who has created a world where evil and sin 
appear the inevitable consequences of its organization ? Either 
God must be assumed to have set certain general forces in action, 
and left them free to combine at random, in which case human will is 
as free as it could wish to be, and divine foreknowledge is reduced 
to mere conjecture; or, God's prescience is real in that all pheno­
mena and events are the necessary effects of certain predetermined 
causes; in which case, human actions are no freer than the movements 
of one billiard ball in collision with another.
Montesquieu, evidently reluctant in the early stages of the 
letter to sacrifice either omnipotence or justice in God, never­
theless argues the case of the opposition with considerable force.
The tone of personal conviction colours his affirmation of the 
freedom of the will :
'L'âme est l'ouvrière de sa détermination; mais il y a des 
occasions où elle est tellement indéterminée qu'elle ne sait pas 
même de quel côté se déterminer. Souvent même elle ne le fait 
que pour faire usage de sa liberté; de manière que Dieu ne peut 
voir cette détermination par avance, ni dams l'action de l'âme, 
ni dans l'action que les objets font sur elle.'
(l) As Vernière suggests (ed. cit., p.150, n.5), 'nos docteurs', 
may well signify the Socinian theologians attacked by Leibniz 
in the Théodicée.
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Indeed his solution to the problem, rather unsatisfactory in 
rigorous philosophical terms, turns out to be a compromise 
designed to salvage the advantages of metaphysical determinism 
and the Socinian doctrine of freedom. Montesquieu happily 
suggests that although God is all-powerful and all-seeing -
'il fait agir les creatures à sa fantaisie, il connaît tout 
ce qu'il veut connaître* -
he is usually simply content to allow his creatures the free­
dom to earn rewards or p u n i s h m e n t s . W h e n  he wishes to 
know the future pattern of events, he has only to will that 
they should happen:
'Mais, quand il veut savoir quelque chose, il le sait toujours, 
parce qu'il n'a qu'à vouloir qu'elle arrive comme il la voit, 
et déterminer les créatures conformément à sa volonté. C'est 
ainsi qu'il tire ce qui doit arriver du nombre des choses 
purement possibles, en fixant par ses décrets les détermina­
tions futures des esprits, et les privant de la puissance 
qu'il leur a donnée, d'agir ou de ne pas agir.'
This tactic, so facile as to seem almost an evasion of 
the whole issue of cosmic determinism and free will, whether 
envisaged from a theological or a scientific angle, neverthe­
less throws some light on the apparently contradictory philo­
sophical notions scattered throughout Montesquieu's early 
work. The doctrine of what might aptly be termed the bene­
volent indifference of the Divinity, renders for instance the
(1) A similar doctrine also emerges from one of the Pensées
dealing with the notion of predestination (1945 (Bkn.674)); 
see below p.532.
32 6
reiterated notion that men, to plagiarize Voltaire, are no 
more than
•des insectes se dévorant les uns les autres sur un petit 
atome de boue*^^^
much more compatible with the idea of God as a being of 
infinite justice, and of man as a creature of moral dignity.
In Montesquieu's view the moral and physical world is 
determined by an intricate pattern of causation controlled 
in turn by transcendent laws which God as Creator, in the 
necessity of perfect wisdom, has chosen to follow. Whether 
these laws were conceived on the Malebranchian pattern as 
the eternal and immutable laws of reason hardly distinct from 
the Godhead itself; or whether Montesquieu followed Leibniz 
in relating them to a principle of sufficient reason subject 
to the Divine will and distinct from immutable, mathematical 
reason, is not immediately clear. One must weigh the implic­
ations of the idea found in Letter LXXXIII that the relation­
ships of justice (or of reason) are immutable, eternal, 
visible to, but distinct from God, against the incorporation 
in the definition of justice itself of the notion of convenance, 
bearing in mind that the principle of Convenance* or of 
sufficient reason was presented by Leibniz as the source of 
moral and physical necessity.
(1) Zadig (1747), 'La Demme Battue',
(2) See Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison II; 
and above p.
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Within this structure of causation, Montesquieu assumes 
that man enjoys free will on two grounds. The first of 
these depends as we have seen, on the theological argument 
that a just God will leave his creatures free to earn their 
salvation. The second, implicit in the reasoning of 
Letter L X X X I I I , a n d  confirmed by certain passages in the 
Pensées is the argument of human imperfection, of the limit­
ations of human reason, and the obstacles imposed by the 
human c o n d i t i o n . T h i s  second argument is, we shall see, 
closely connected with Montesquieu's definition of justice as 
a 'rapport de convenance'.
Other evidence exists to show that he considered that 
the laws of the moral and indeed the physical universe 
determined in only the most general way. In the earlier 
letter on suicide he expressed the view that the order of 
Providence was not greatly disturbed by human interference 
with the natural laws of creation;
(1j See above p.^01
(2) This theory of causation and human freedom is reproduced 
exactly in the first chapter of the Lois; 'Ainsi la 
creation, qui paraît être un acte arbitraire, suppose des 
règles aussi invariables que la fatalité des athées. Il 
serait absurde de dire que le Créateur, sans ces règles, 
pourrait gouverner le monde, puisque le monde ne subsiterait
pas sans elles.
Mais il s'en faut bien que le monde intelligent soit 
aussi bien gouverné que le monde physique. Car, quoique 
celui-là ait aussi des lois qui, par leur nature, sont 
invariables, il ne les suit pas constamment comme le monde 
physique suit les siennes. La raison en est que les êtres 
particuliers intelligents sont bornés par leur nature, et 
par conséquent sujets à l'erreur; et, d'un autre côte, il 
est de leur nature qu'ils agissent par eux-memes,'
Nagel I, pp.2-3; Pleiade II, p.233.
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'Troublé-je l'ordre de la Providence, lorsque je change les 
modifications de la matière et que je rends carrée une boule 
que les premières lois du mouvement, c'est-à-dire les lois de 
la création, et de la conservation, avaient faite ronde?
Non, sans doute; je ne fais qu'user du droit qui m'a été 
donné, et, en ce sens, je puis troubler à ma fantaisie toute 
la nature, sans que l'on puisse dire que je m'oppose à la 
Providence. '
Within the general physical structure of the world man is free 
to act as he wishes, Montesquieu follows a similar line of 
argument with regard to the moral world. In an early entry 
in the Pensées where the lawfulness of incestuous marriage 
and the prohibition of this institution since primitive patri­
archal societies is under discussion, he puts forward the 
view that it is not in fact contrary to Natural Law; its 
prohibition is simply a custom derived from filial respect, 
a custom which God has incorporated into Divine Law, since it 
happened to fit in with his general moral purpose;
'Ceci étant une fois gravé dans l'esprit des hommes. Dieu a 
voulu s'y conformer; et il en a fait un point fondamental de 
sa loi; car, lorsque Dieu a donné des lois aux hommes il 
n'a eu qu'une vue générale, qui était d'avoir un peuple 
fidèle, source naturelle de tous les préceptes.
Thus again, within the limits of certain transcendent moral 
purposes, God is assumed to have left men and societies to 
their own devices.
(l) Lettres Persanes LXXVI, Nagel I, p.157; Pléiade I, 
pp.246-247.
Pensée 205 (Bkn.1928); Nagel II, p.76; Pleiade I, p.1464. 
It is noticeable here how easily Montesquieu's theological 
outlook could be reconciled with a relativistic, sociolo­
gical understanding of institutions and customs.
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Enlarging for a moment on this theological attitude, 
and without wishing to suggest that Montesquieu subscribed 
to a doctrine of economy of means in creation of the type later 
advanced by Maupertuis, it often seems however that behind 
much of his theorizing there lies a certain notion of a uni­
versal economy. This may be in reality simply an impression 
fostered by his scientific approach to social phenomena, his 
readiness to seek out and in some cases invent a rational 
explanation for beliefs and customs. On the other hand, the 
passage quoted above seems to denote a conviction, perhaps 
not consciously formulated, that the nature of things, besides 
being explicable in scientific terms, actually contributes to 
the realization of certain divinely appointed moral ends, the 
ultimate significance of which transcends human understanding. 
One recalls for instance the passage in Pensée 1946, where 
Montesquieu touches on the very limitations of human reason;
*11 nous a faits aussi parfaits et aussi imparfaits qu'il a 
voulu; il a pu nous rendre plus ou moins intelligents.....
Dieu nous trompe-t-il parce que les sens, ces infidèles 
témoins, nous déçoivent à chaque instant? Non, sans doute! 
Peut-être que Dieu n'a pas voulu que nous eussions plus de 
certitude des choses, afin que nous connaissions mieux notre 
faiblesse, *
Human limitations possess a transcendent significance; 
similarly, as we have seen in Letter LXIX, human liberty
(1) See above Part I, ch.2, pp.69-9. In the Spicilège 511,
(M,.S. 470-471), Montesquieu does actually refer to the 
refutation of atheism from the argument of the perfection 
and economy of the universe, although a subsequent allusion 
makes it clear that he has Leibniz in mind once again.
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serves the purpose of sorting the sheep from the goats in 
preparation for heavenly rewards. Again in Letter LXXVII, 
the reply to Usbek's defence of suicide,Montesquieu 
seems to be arguing that in spite of the insignificance of 
individual death seen in the context of cosmic harmony, the 
prohibition of suicide may well serve some moral purpose:
'Si un être est compose de deux êtres, et que la nécessité 
de conserver l'union marque plus la soumission aux ordres du 
Créateur,^ on en a pu faire une loi religieuse. Si cette 
nécessité de conserver l'union est un meilleur garant des 
actions des hommes, on en a pu faire une loi civile.'
Returning to the limitations of human nature, these according 
to one of the Pensées are the explanation for and justifi­
cation of Revelation, for men unaided are incapable of per­
severing in Natural R e l i g i o n . F i n a l l y ,  if Montesquieu 
did indeed hold to some notion of a universal economy, then 
the fideistic tone adopted at the end of Letter LXIX for 
example:
'Mon Cher Rhédi, pourquoi tant de philosophie? Dieu est si 
haut que nous n'apercevons pas même ses nuages. Nous ne le 
connaissons bien que dans ses préceptes. Il est immense, 
spirituel, infini. Que sa grandeur nous ramène à notre 
faiblesse. S'humilier toujours, c'est l'adorer toujours.'
would certainly indicate a faith inspired more by a Leibnizian
(1) This letter first appeared in the supplement to the 1754 
edition of the Lettres Persanes; Vernière suggests (ed. 
cit. p.162 n.l) that it was intended to counter criticisms 
of irréligion, but this would not necessarily undermine 
the sincerity of the opinions expressed in it.
(2) Op.cit., 825 (Bkn.2110); Nagel II, p.245; Pléiade I, 
p.1550.
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teleological optimism, than by a Baylian scepticism.
Elsewhere after all, Montesquieu did proclaim his confidence 
in some metaphysical ideas:
'Quand l'immortalité de l'âme serait une erreur, je serais 
très fâché de ne pas la croire. Je ne sais comment pensent 
les athées. (J'avoue que je ne suis point si humble que les 
athées.) Mais, pour moi, je ne veux point troquer (et je n'irai 
point troquer) l'idée de mon immortalité contre celle de la 
béatitude d'un jour. Je suis charmé de me croire immortel 
comme Dieu même. Indépendamment des vérités révélées, des 
idées métaphysiques me donnent une très forte espérance de 
mon bonheur éternel, à laquelle je ne voudrais pas renoncer.'^2)
A general rather than particular determinism is also 
indicated in a late and rather different passage in the 
Pensées where Montesquieu returns to the question of Divine 
prescience, this time in connection with the doctrine of 
predestination. After pointing out that this must be a rare 
occurrence, 'car il n'arrive que rarement que Dieu nous ôte 
la liberté,' he maintains that when God does predestine, 
then it can only be to salvation; for how could a just God 
punish by damnation a creature whom he has deliberately 
deprived of this special grace. Those that are not prede­
stined must surely have the chance to earn their own salva­
tion; the words of the apostle can only signify that God 
knew in a general way, because of the laws governing his 
creation, that some would succumb to temptation:
(1) Verniere suggests a source in Bayle's Dictionnaire, 
article 'Pauliciens', for this passage; see ed. cit., 
p.152, n.5.
(2) Pensee 57 (Bkn.2083); Nagel II, pp.20-21; Pleiade I, p.1543.
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'Quand saint Paul dit que Dieu a prédestiné l'un pour être le 
fils de la colère, l'autre pour être le fils de la miséricorde, 
il veut dire que Dieu a vu généralement qu'il y aurait des 
damnés et des sauvés, sans sacrifier tel ou tel; car il 
voyait bien, par l'arrangement des causé secondes, qu'il y en 
avait qui seraient bien plus susceptibles des objets que les 
autres. '
Thus as creatures we enjoy the freedom to err, but we 
are still trapped in the net of universal justice, for ultimate 
retribution is inescapable;
'Admirable idée des Chinois, qui comparent la justice de 
Dieu à un filet si grand que les poissons qui s'y promèment 
croient être en liberté; mais réellement ils sont pris. Les 
pécheurs croient de même, qu'ils ne seront pas punis de Dieu; 
mais ils sont dans le filet.'^2)
Our liberty, even the freedom to ignore the laws of justice, 
is only a human condition, the temporary result of our imper­
fection and our ignorance, as much as the dispensation of a 
just God. And to God, it goes without saying, all the laws 
of justice are visible;
'La liberté est en nous une imperfection: nous sommes libres
et incertains, parce que nous ne savons pas certainement ce 
qui nous est le plus convenable. Il n'en est pas de même de 
Dieu: comme il est souverainement parfait, il ne peut jamais
agir que de la manière la plus parfaite.
That Montesquieu equates perfect knowledge with perfect 
justice becomes clear at this point; in contrast to God, the 
human moral dilemma stems from imperfect reason, as was
(1) Pensee 1945 (Bkn,674); Nagel II, p.584; Pléiade I, p.1180.
(2) Pensée 434 (Bkn.2124); Nagel II, p.164; Pléiade I, p.1552.
(3) Spicilège 391 (336); Nagel II, p.787; Pleiade II, p.1310.
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implied in Letter LXXXIII, In a sense then, injustice is 
latent in the order of things, although in so far as doubt 
is only cast upon the speculative powers of reason, and not 
upon its discursive function, the door is left open to a 
moral optimism as much foreshadowing positivist doctrines as 
reminiscent of the Cartesian idea of scientific progress, 
and based essentially upon confidence in the relevance of 
scientific knowledge to the solution of moral problems. It 
seems as if rational perception of various orders of truth, 
be they the invariable relationships of justice, the pre­
cepts of revelation, or positive fact, and even though this 
insight may be limited, does constitute in Montesquieu’s 
estimation a sufficient motive for moral a c t i o n , w i t h o u t  
however cancelling the uncertainty inseparable from the 
human condition:
(1) Although reason is considered an effective motive force, 
it is by no means the only factor involved in virtuous 
action. As the Troglodytes cycle in the Lettres Persanes 
demonstrates, habit and education are equally important 
in predisposing towards just behaviour; and as this would 
suggest, emotional forces are also involved. Montesquieu 
does not draw these into a systematic moral theory, but 
such passages as the following clearly indicate an aware­
ness of them: ’C ’est 1 ’envie de plaire qui donne de la
liaison à la Société, et tel a été le bonheur du Genre 
humain que cet amour-propre, qui devait dissoudre la 
Société, la fortifie, au contraire, et la rend 
inébranlable.* (Pensée 464 (Bkn.1042)), Nagel II, p.168; 
Pléiade I, p.1274. In this he is at least a forerunner 
of the 'Philosophes* and the theorists of 'sensibilité', 
and much less of a disciple of the 'nationaux' of the 
early part of the century. His idea of the function of 
'amour-propre* can be compared to the attitude to self- 
interest revealed for instance by Voltaire in his
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îote to p. continued:
[l) Remarques premières sur les Pensées de Pascal (1732-3): 'Il
est aussi impossible qu'une société puisse se former et 
subsister sans amour-propre, qu'il serait impossible de faire 
des enfants sans concupiscence, de songer à se nourrir sans 
appétit. C'est l'amour de nous-mêmes qui assiste l'amour des 
autres; c'est par nos besoins mutuels que nous sommes utiles 
au genre humain; c'est le fondement de tout commerce; c'est 
l'éternel lien des hommes.' (Lettres Philosophiques, Garnier, 
Paris, 1956, p.152); and to Rousseau's specific isolation of 
'amour de soi' as the real source of justice: 'Le précepte
même d'agir avec autrui comme nous voulons qu'on agisse avec 
nous n'a de vrai fondement que la conscience et le sentiment; 
car où est la raison précise d'agir, étant moi, comme si 
j'étais un autre, surtout quand je suis moralement sûr de ne 
jamais me trouver dans le même cas? et qui me répondra qu'en 
suivant bien fidèlement cette maxime, j'obtiendrai qu'on la 
suive de même avec moi? Le méchant tire avantage de la 
probité du juste et de sa propre injustice; il est bien aise 
que tout le monde soit juste, exepté lui. Cet accord-là, 
quoi qu'on en dise, n'est pas fort avantageux aux gens de bien, 
Mais quand la force d'une ame expansive m'identifie avec mon 
semblable, et que je me sens pour ainsi dire en lui, c'est 
pour ne pas souffrir que je ne veux pas qu'il souffre; je 
m'intéresse à lui pour l'amour de moi, et la raison du 
précepte est dans la nature elle-même qui m'inspire le désir 
de mon bien-être en quelque lieu que je me sente exister.
D'où je conclus qu'il n'est pas vrai que les préceptes de la 
loi naturelle soient fondés sur la raison seule, ils ont une 
base plus solide et plus sûre. L'amour des hommes dérivé de 
l'amour de soi est le principe de la justice humaine,'
Emile, Bk.IV. (Garnier, Paris, 1961, pp.278-279.)
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'Dans les actions ordinaires de ma vie, lorsque j'agis, j’agis 
toujours par un motif qui est efficace, parce que j'agis; qui 
ne m'ôte point la liberté, parce que je pouvais ne pas agir.
Il en est de même des oeuvres qui ont besoin de.la grâce.
J'agis de la même manière, j'agis librement, j'agis efficace­
ment, mais par une grâce, c'est-a-dire par un motif qui me 
vient de l'autre monde: car, si je n'avais eu aucune
connaissance des vérités révélées, je ne me serais point 
déterminé à faire le bien.'^j
Knowledge of the ultimate and transcendent harmony of 
the cosmos is what surpasses human understanding, and what, 
as Pensee 1946 indicates, is moreover superfluous to human 
existence. Just as the influence of Leibniz is visible in 
Letter LXIX on Divine prescience, so also it is possible to 
discern traces in Montesquieu's thought of such passages as 
the following:
'Une vérité est au-dessus de la raison quand notre esprit ne 
la saurait comprendre: et telle est, à mon avis, la Sainte
Trinité; tels sont les miracles réservés â Dieu seul, comme 
par exemple la création; tel est le choix de l'ordre de 
l'Univers, qui dépend de l'harmonie universelle, et de la 
connaissance distincte d'une infinité de choses à la fois,'^2)
one recalls Usbek's last words in Letter LXXVII:
'tous les hommes ensemble, cent millions de têtes comme la 
notre, ne sont qu'un atome subtil et délié, que Dieu n'aperçoit 
qu'à cause de l'immensité de ses connaissances,'
The vastness of the universe which dwarfs man physically could 
only be accessible to a boundless intelligence.
Indeed Montesquieu's theory of the necessary perfection 
and justice of the Divinity, exhibited in the complete
(1) Pensee 435 (Bkn.2081); Nagel II, p.164; Pléiade I, p.1542.
(2) Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, XXIII.
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intelligence of universal harmony, that is to say, of those 
'rapports de convenance* which inform its structure, together 
with the associated theory of human liberty coupled to human 
imperfection, shows striking affinity to some of the major 
doctrines of the Theodicee.^^ For instance, the burden of 
the short passage from the Spicilège quoted a b o v e , i s  that 
human imperfection results from ignorance of the principle of 
'convenance' which should govern man's actions as it governs 
those of God, the sum of moral perfection. Now we have seen 
in the analysis of Letter LXXXIII that Montesquieu defines 
justice as an immutable 'rapport de convenance', and how in 
Pensee 434 he considers supernatural justice to be inescapable 
in its totality. Thus it seems that for Montesquieu as for 
Leibniz, the moral order of the universe was determined by 
the principle of fitness. God's will is not arbitrary in so 
far as his absolute wisdom and perfection, his absolute justice, 
lead him to establish that order of reality which is most 
'convenable', which in its perfection most fully represents 
his nature.
Bearing in mind this common notion of 'convenance' as the 
principle of cosmic harmony, or equally the notion of a moral 
order consisting of 'rapports de convenance', an examination
(1) Significantly, most of the material drawn from the Pensées 
and the Spicilège dates from the period before 1738, and a 
large proportion of this from before 1731, that is from the 
time when the theory of justice was still a major pre­
occupation for Montesquieu.
(2) P.5^2.
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of the actual passage from the Theodicee which was the 
probable source of Montesquieu's definition of justice 
tends to confirm the philosophical similarities between the 
two thinkers. Significantly, Leibniz is here arguing against 
Hobbes, in defence of the necessity of justice, a task to 
which Montesquieu also applied himself in the Lettres Persanes 
and the Traité des Devoirs, and which may have originally 
drawn his attention to the passage:
'II y a pourtant une espèce de justice et une certaine 
sorte de récompenses et de punitions, qui ne paraît pas si 
applicable à ceux qui agiraient par une nécessité absolue, 
s'il y en avait. C'est cette espèce de justice qui n'a point 
pour but l'amendement, ni l'exemple, ni même la réparation du 
mal. Cette justice n'est fondée que dans la convenance, qui 
demande une certaine satisfaction pour l'expiation d'une 
mauvaise action. Les Sociniens, Hobbes et quelques autres, 
n'admettent point cette justice primitive, qui est proprement 
vindicative, et que Dieu s'est réservée en bien des rencontres: 
mais qu'il ne laisse pas de communiquer à ceux qui ont droit 
de gouverner les autres, et qu'il exerce par leur moyen, 
pourvu qu'ils agissent par raison, et non par passion. Les 
Sociniens la croient être sans fondement; mais elle est 
toujours fondée dans un rapport de convenance, qui contente 
non seulement l'offensé, mais encore les sages qui la voient, 
comme une belle musique ou bien une bonne architecture contente 
les esprits bien faits. Et le sage législateur ayant menacé, 
et ayant, pour ainsi dire, promis un châtiment, il est de sa 
constance de ne pas laisser l'action entièrement impunie, 
quand même la peine ne servirait plus à corriger personne.
Mais quand il n'aurait rien promis, c'est assez qu'il y a une 
convenance qui l'aurait pu porter à faire cette promesse; 
puisqu'aussi bien le sage ne promet que ce qui est convenable. 
Et on peut même dire qu'il y a ici un certain dédommagement de 
l'esprit, que le désordre offenserait, si le châtiment ne 
contribuait à rétablir l'ordre.*^2)
(1) Indicated by A.S. Crisafulli in 'Parallels to ideas in the 
Lettres Persanes', P.M.L.A., vol.Ill, 1937, p.773 sq.
(2) Op.cit.. I, sec.73; Oeuvres, ed. Janet, 1866, vol.II, 
pp.147-148.
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Leibniz clearly had in mind the kind of cosmic justice evoked 
by Montesquieu in his metaphor of the fishing net; it is this 
transcendent justice that is satisfied by the administration 
of rewards and punishments; such recompense serves to restore 
cosmic harmony, producing aesthetic as well as moral satis­
faction in those that contemplate it. And the principle on 
which it depends is plainly that 'convenance* or sufficient 
reason, which Leibniz had seen as the source of moral and 
natural order, a principle that is eternal and immutable in 
that it proceeds from the perfection of the Divinity;
'Mais quand il n'aurait rien promis, c'est assez qu'il y a 
une convenance qui l'aurait pu porter à faire cette promesse; 
puisqu'aussi bien le sage ne promet que ce qui est conve­
nable. '
It is interesting that Leibniz goes on in the following 
section to link the existence of heavenly rewards and 
punishments with the operation of the principle of 'convenance';
'C'est ainsi que les peines des damnés continuent, lors même 
qu'elles ne servent plus à détourner du mal; et que de même 
les récompenses des bienheureux continuent, lors même 
qu'elles ne servent plus à confirmer dans le bien,'
Now we have already seen how in Letter LXIX and Pensee 434 
Montesquieu found a place for rewards and punishments in his 
theory of human freedom and Divine justice, and in this his 
thought again seems to follow that of Leibniz closely. But 
although he appears to accept the doctrine in a philosophical
(1) For a more detailed discussion of Leibniz's idea of justice, 
see above pp. 61-65“.
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f r a m e w o r k , o t h e r  passages reveal a certain doubt as regards 
its acceptability in the context of revealed religion.
Rewards and punishments are admissible where they express the 
demands of metaphysical justice, but can we credit them when 
they cease to redress evil, and are distributed according to 
belief or unbelief;
'Ceux qui disent qu’il n ’y a point de peines ni 
récompenses dans l ’autre vie ne le disent pas en faveur des 
bons; car ils les privent des récompenses. Ils établissent 
donc leur système en faveur des méchants qu’ils soulagent de 
la peine. - Cet argument, que le cardinal de Polignac a mis 
dans son Lucrèce, serait plus fort dans la Loi de Nature ou 
une religion qui n ’admettrait que l ’équité, que dans une loi, 
qui,^admettant une révélation, damne ceux qui ne croient pas, 
et où l ’Enfer*Jet le Paradis est distribué entre les croyants
et les non-croyants^2)
One is again confronted by the incredible breadth of vision, 
and corresponding lack of dogmatism, which enabled Montesquieu 
to examine an idea from all its angles with a disturbing and 
sometimes misleading objectivity. Thus, yet another passage, 
an incidental remark in Letter CXXIX dealing with the wisdom 
of legislators who seek to strengthen paternal authority, 
seems to indicate a sound appreciation of the doctrine in 
religious psychology;
’les pères sont l ’image du Créateur de l ’Univers, qui, 
quoiqu’il puisse conduire les hommes par son amour, ne laisse 
pas de se les attacher encore par les motifs de l'espérance
(1) In the Lois (XXIV,14) he also brings out its important 
effect on the morals of particular societies.
(2) Pensee 422 (Bkn.2087); Nagel II, p.161; Pléiade I, p.1544.
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et de la crainte*
while elsewhere Montesquieu even seems to align himself 
unreservedly with the universalist cause, questioning the 
reasonableness of the doctrine of hell on grounds character­
istic of the enlightened magistrate, who regards punishment 
primarily as a reformative deterrent;
*11 est difficile de comprendre par la raison seule l'éternité 
des peines des damnés; car les peines et les récompenses ne 
peuvent être établies que par rapport à l'avenir. On punit 
aujourd'hui un homme, afin qu'il ne faille pas demain; afin 
que les autres ne faillent pas aussi* Mais, lorsque les 
bienheureux ne seront pas libres de pécher, ni les damnés de 
bien faire, à quoi bon des peines et des récompenses?'^2)
Thus it is at least conceivable that Montesquieu would 
have hesitated to concur with Leibniz on the question of 
eternal damnation; although the general pattern of his meta­
physical thought is remarkably similar. A comprehensive 
summary suggests then that Montesquieu understood his 
definition of justice as 'un rapport de convenance' in the 
context of a theory of the universe where fitness constituted, 
as it did for Leibniz, the transcendent and immutable prin­
ciple governing its moral and physical structure through the 
agency of the natural law.^^) Whether this principle equalled 
in his mind that of sufficient as opposed to necessary reason; 
that is to say, whether, again like Leibniz, he considered
(1) Nagel I, p.258; Pléiade I, p.325; of. Lois XXV,2, 'Les 
hommes sont extrêmement portés à espérer et à craindre; 
et une religion qui n'aurait ni enfer ni paradis, ne 
saurait guère leur plaire.' Nagel I, p.108; Pléiade II, 
p.737.
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Notes to p.540 continued.
(2) Pensée 82 (Bkn.2088); Kagel II, p.27; Pléiade I, p.1544. 
cf. lettres Persanes CXXV, on the difficulty of conceiving
the nature of heavenly rewards.
(3) The complete definition, as it stands in Letter LXXXIII,
'La justice est un rapport de convenance, qui se trouve 
réellement entre deux choses', does it is true retain a 
strong geometrical element. The 'qui se trouve réellement 
entre deux choses' may have been added to drive home the 
absolute universality and necessity of the principle of 
'convenance'; or it may be a reflection of the notion of 
reciprocity characteristic of orthodox juristic definitions 
of justice; cf. the juristic significance of his definition 
of law, below pp.427*1; or of his essentially mathematical 
conception of knowledge; see below pp.4^0 -452,
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it dependent upon the Divine will, 'le choix du Sage', and 
distinct from necessary or mathematical reason, is not fully 
certain. In view of the asserted perfection of the Divinity 
it must in a sense he considered as a necessary principle;
God is bound by his perfection to choose that order of things 
which is most 'convenable'. Yet as we have seen in the 
theological letters and fragments, Montesquieu supports the 
idea of an omnipotent and omniscient God, and repeatedly 
affirms that men are incapable of penetrating his ultimate 
designs. Such a persuasion would seem to set him apart from 
Malebranche, who, although he put forward the idea, akin to 
Montesquieu's, that justice like truth consisted in real and 
immutable relationships^nevertheless affirmed that such 
relationships belonged to an eternal, necessary and all 
embracing metaphysical order, consubstantial with the Divine 
Intelligence, and predetermining the Divine Will, Malebranche 
saw no real distinction between necessary reason and suffi­
cient reason, between metaphysical truth, scientific truth 
and moral truth;
'Ainsi Dieu a deux sortes de lois qui le règlent dans sa 
conduite. L'une est éternelle et nécessaire, et c'est l'ordre; 
les autres sont arbitraires, et ce sont les lois générales de 
la Nature et de la Grâce. Mais Dieu n'a établi ces dernières 
que parce que l'ordre demande qu'il agisse ainsi. De sorte
que c'est l'ordre éternel, immuable, nécessaire,......qui est
la loi que mon père consulte toujours, qu'il aime
(1) Malebranche did use the phrase 'rapport de convenance' in 
the Recherche de la Vérité, Book III, Conclusion (1678 ed. 
p.228); but in a context with no significance for the 
topic of justice.
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invinciblement, qu'il suit inviolablement, et par laquelle 
il a fait et conserve toutes choses.
In fact his ontological theories were such that he found it 
difficult to persuade his contemporaries of any convincing 
distinction in his system between the Divine substance, meta­
physical reason, and the extended universe; that the eternal, 
immutable and necessary order of archetypal relationships was 
not an immanent rather than a transcendent order.^2)
Montesquieu however, at least during the period repre­
sented by the material we have c o v e r e d , i s  far from 
positing an immanent conception of order. The 'rapports de 
convenance' which constitute justice belong to a transcendent 
order of perfection, to which man as a rational but imperfect 
creature may aspire, and in part fulfil in the context of his 
social existence. As far as the totality of cosmic harmony 
is concerned, man is unable to fathom its reason, and partakes 
in it by virtue of his immortality, through the operation of 
eternal rewards and p u n i s h m e n t s . I n  his early works, 
^convenance* is for Montesquieu a teleological principle in 
both a metaphysical and a moral sense. For we infer from his 
discussion of Divine foreknowledge and the arrangement of
(1) Meditations Chrétiennes, VII, para 18.
(2) See above Part I, ch.2, pp.36-59*
(3) This would extend from the date of the Lettres Persanes, 
1721, to approximately 1738, basing the second limit on 
the system of dating developed by Shackleton in Les 
Secretaires de Montesquieu (Nagel II, Introduction II), 
and applied to the Pensées by L. Desgraves (Nagel II, 
Introduction III).
(4) Thus Spinoza's idea that man may attain moral perfection 
through the fulfilment of his rational nature and in the 
context of a finite existence is equally far from
 Montesquieu's mind.-----------------------   —
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secondary causes, that fitness governs the ultimate design 
of the created order, although within this structure man is 
endowed with an apparent freedom. Thus with the notion of 
'convenance' as the final cause, Montesquieu can be placed, 
at least until the writing of De l'Esprit des Lois adds a 
new and disturbing dimension to his thought, in the august 
company not only of Malebranche, but perhaps even more import­
ant of Leibniz and indeed of C l a r k e , a s  an upholder of 
rational idealism, against those other thinkers of more 
materialist outlook like Ereret and Saint-Hyacinthe, 2^) who 
considered that relationships of conformity belonged not to 
a transcendent order of justice, but were no more than 
symptomatic of the spontaneous organization of matter; who 
used them to elaborate a relativistic and hedonistic ethic, 
rather than a constant ideal of virtue proclaiming the 
ultimate goodness and perfection of the universe.
(1) See above, Part I, ch.4, pp. 169-174.
(2) See above. Part I, ch.3, pp. 121-154.
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CHAPTER THREE
JUSTICE AND LAW;
THE SIGNIFICANCE^OP 'DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIS', Bk.I.
'Les bêtes, qui ont toutes des intérêts 
séparés, s'entrenuisent toujours. Les 
hommes seuls, faits pour vivre en 
société, ne perdent rien de ce qu'ils 
partagent.
J'ai mille avantages à vivre, non 
pas dans un grand état, mais dans une 
grande société.'
Pensée 1747 (Bkn.366).
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In spite of its shortness in relation to the rest of the 
work and its somewhat eclectic philosophy, the first book of 
De l'Esprit des Lois has remained from the time of its 
publication in 1748 to the present day the centre of dispro­
portionately heated debate. It achieves that rare distinc­
tion, usually reserved for the sacred books of great reli­
gions, of being all things to all men. Indeed after reviewing 
its fortunes and taking stock of innumerable commentaries, 
interpretations, denunciations and dismissals, one hardly 
needs more convincing evidence of the truth of Montesquieu's 
own remark in the Essai sur les causes qui peuvent affecter 
les Esprits that opinions are formed in the heart and not in 
the mindo
The bewildered reactions of some of the author's con­
temporaries to this first book, and especially to the unusual 
definition of law at the very beginning, are partly accounted 
for by Shackleton in his critical biography of Montesquieu.^^ 
They were expecting the theories and definitions of a jurist : 
to see law set down in the style of Grotius as
'a rule of moral actions, obliging as to that which is just
and reasonable',^2)
(1) Op.cit. above (p.JO n.2 ), ch.XI, section II.
(2) De Jure belli ac pacis, I,i,9.
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or alternatively of Pufendorf, as
'the will of a superior by which he obliges those dependent 
upon him to act in the particular way he prescribes^^
or they looked at the very least for an echo of the genera­
lities of lexicographers, exemplified by the definition of 
loi in the dictionary of the French Academy, as 'constitution 
écrite qui ordonne ce qu'il faut faire et qui défend ce qu'il 
ne faut pas faire.
Small wonder then that the invective of the Nouvelles
ecclésiastiques whose virulence nrovoked Montesquieu's 
— ----■ ^ (3)
Defense, was directed first of all against this new definition 
of law;
'Les lois, dans la signification la plus étendue, sont 
les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des choses,'
evidence in the eyes of the Jansenist reviewer of his 
adherence to the pernicious doctrines of Spinozism;
'Les lois, des rapports! Cela se conçoit-il?
Cependant l'auteur n'a pas changé la définition ordinaire des 
lois sans dessein. Quel est donc son but? le voici *(4)
Even David Hume, an enlightened and enthusiastic admirer of 
the Lois as a political work, took exception to the theories 
of the first book;
(1) De Jure naturae et gentium, I,vi,4o
(2) Grand dictionnaire de l'Académie française, 2nd. éd., 
Amsterdam, 1696.
(3) Of the 9th. and 16th. October 1749.
(4) Defense de l'esprit des Lois, première objection; Nagel I , 
p.435î Pleiade II, p.1122.
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'This illustrious writer sets out with a different theory, 
and supposes all right to be founded on certain rapports or 
relations; which is a system that, in my view, will never 
reconcile with true philosophy.'^^
Similarly the equally enthusiastic Charles Bonnet, who wrote 
flatteringly though rather more perceptively:
'Newton a découvert les lois du monde matériel: vous avez 
découvert. Monsieur, les lois du monde intellectuel,'^2)
later insisted in his Essai analytique sur les facultés de 
1'âme, that the definition of law as a relationship as it 
stood in the Lois needed further elaboration.^
It seems indeed in spite of the title of the work and 
Montesquieu's references in the Preface to its purpose;
'J'ai d'abord examiné les homines, et j'ai cru que, dans 
cette infinie diversité de lois et de moeurs, ils n'étaient 
pas uniquement conduits par leurs fantaisies,
J'ai posé les principes, et j'ai vu les cas particuliers 
s'y plier comme d'eux-mêmes; les histoires de toutes les 
nations n'en être que les suites; et chaque loi particulière 
liée avec une autre loi, ou dépendre d'une autre plus générale.'
that hardly any of the savants of the day, not to mention the 
jurists and theologians, grasped the compound significance of 
the term loi as it appeared in the first book. While object­
ing in the Essai analytique that laws were not properly 
defined as rapports,but rather as the effects of relationships
(1) An Enquiry concerning the principles of morals, London, 
, 1751, p.54.
(2) Letter to Montesquieu, 14th. November 1755.
(3) Op.cit. (Copenhagen, 1760), 2nd. ed., Copenhagen and 
Geneva 1769, ch.XXVII, para.856, p.310.
(4) Nagel I, p.lix; Pleiade II, p.229.
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between the qualities of objects as determined by primitive 
r e a s o n , B o n n e t  on the one hand perceived, it is true, 
that Montesquieu's most fundamental objective in the Lois 
was scientific: the isolation and description of the causal
relationships or laws which govern the infinitely varied 
institutions of human society; as he expressed it in his 
letter to Montesquieu, the discovery of the 'lois du monde 
intellectuel'. On the other hand, Hume's comment reveals an 
acuter awareness of the possible juristic and philosophical 
significance of Montesquieu's use of loi in book I, Thus as 
he sees it, Montesquieu has wrongly attempted to found all right 
on certain rapports.
Similarly, although criticism in the wake of Comte's 
analysis of the Lois as a straightforward explanation of 
positive laws in terms of the influence of environment, )  
has in general acknowledged the scientific conception of law 
to be found there, individual commentators have still tended 
to favour dogmatic interpretations in which the scientific is 
emphasized at the expense of the moral and juristic or vice- 
versa. Thus the kind of description of Montesquieu's purpose 
to be found for example in Cassirer's Philosophy of the 
Enlightenment ?^) is unexceptionable and fairly commonplace:
(1) Op.cit. , para.856, pp.310-511.
(2) Cours de Philosophie positive, 47e. leçon.
(3) Die Philosophie der Aufklarung (Tübingen, 1932), trans­
lated by P.O.A. Koelln and J.P. Pettegrove, Princeton, 1951.
3 50
'As a jurist he asks the same question that Newton the 
physicist had raised. He is not content with the empirically 
known laws of the political world. He attempts to trace the 
variety of these laws back to a few definite principles. The 
existence of such an order, of such a systematic interdepen­
dence among the various normative legal forms constitutes the 
'spirit of the laws'. He is thus enabled to begin his work 
with an explanation of the concept of law which formulates 
this concept in its most comprehensive and universal sense, 
not limiting it to any special field of factual data.'^)
But representative of the more dogmatic extremes of interpre­
tation are Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire, who in an article com­
paring Plato, Aristotle and Montesquieu, fiercely rebuked the 
latter for his definition of law, on the grounds that the 
exclusive concern of a political writer should be positive 
law understood as the expression of free will, firmly rooted 
as to its contents in human nature:
'Ainsi Montesquieu débute par un défaut de méthode, et tout 
son premier livre, qui traite des lois en général, est'd'une 
métaphysique faible et obscure* comme le lui reprochent 
Voltaire et Helvétius.*^2)
and, in contrast, the modem writer 1. Althusser, who, in his 
enthusiasm for the work as a cornerstone of sociology, 
declares of the opening definition of law;
'cette loi ne sera plus un ordre idéal, mais un rapport 
immanent aux phénomènes',
excluding any possibility of reference to moral principles on 
Montesquieu's part; and who sees actual mentions of justice
(1) Op,cit.. Beacon Press, Boston, 1961; pp.242-243.
(2) 'Mémoire sur la science politique, et particulièrement sur 
la politique de Platon, d'Aristote et de Montesquieu.', 
Séances et Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences morales et 
politiques, 2e. série, vol.4, 1848; p.151.
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in the text as nothing more than convenient exploitation of 
•une tradition la plus fade*, included for the sole purpose 
of attacking Hobbes*
The business of interpretation would certainly have 
been less bewildering had Montesquieu departed from his normal 
stylistic practice of aiming for the most economical express­
ion of his thoughts, and instead allowed some of the passages 
intended for the Preface to remain in place, rather than 
relegating them to the Pensées. His readers might then have 
understood where he stood in relation to orthodox political 
theory, and also why. They would have known for instance 
that he had no intention of emulating recent eminent prac­
titioners in this field;
’Je rends graces à M.M, Grotius et Pufendorf d ’avoir 
execute ce qu’une grande partie de cet ouvrage demandait de 
moi, avec cette hauteur de génie à laquelle je n ’aurais pu
atteindre.*^2)
Equally they would have gained some inkling of the inter­
dependence of scientific attitudes and moral awareness in the 
conception of the work:
’On a, dans notre siècle, donné un tel degré d ’estime 
aux connaissances physiques que l ’on (n)*a conservé que de 
l ’indifférence pour les morales. Depuis les Grecs et les 
Romains, le bien et le mal moral sont devenus un sentiment 
plutôt qu’un objet de connaissances,’
(1) Montesquieu, la Politique et l ’Histoire, P.U.P., Paris, 
1959, ch,II,
(2) Pensée 1863 (Bkn,19l), Hagel II, p,556; Pleiade II, p,1038
(3) Pensée 1871 (Bkn,199;; Nagel II, p.557; Pléiade II, p,1040
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These and several similar rejets testify to an attempt by 
Montesquieu to explain the nature and purpose of his work more 
clearly than he does in the existing Preface. Perhaps his 
confidence was such that he subsequently decided that this 
was unnecessary:
•Si tout le monde ne sent pas ce que je dis, j'ai tort.'^^
or perhaps he was already practising the principle which he 
expounds at the end of book XI: the reader must be stimu­
lated, not sated;
'II ne s'agit pas de faire lire, mais de faire penser.
Whatever the case, concision to the point of elision wqs its 
outcome in the Preface as in book I, where he regrettably 
never distinguishes between the various senses in which he 
employs the term loi, senses of which three can be isolated 
immediately: law with the scientific meaning of causal
relationship; law with the juristic force of commandment; and 
law in the moral and philosophical sense of a principle of 
reason. Misunderstanding and confusion of these senses is 
all too easy, when both the scientist and the moralist, though 
working within philosophical frameworks which are poles apart, 
may start out from the supposition that the mind inhabits a
(1) Pensée 1863 (Bkn.191); Nagel II, p,556; Pleiade II, p.1038.
(2) cf. Montesquieu's formula for good style: 'Pour bien
écrire il faut sauter les idées intermédiares, assez pour 
n'être pas ennuyeux; pas trop, de peur de n'être pas 
entendu. Ce sont ces suppressions heureuses qui ont fait 
dire à M. Nicole que tous les bons livres étaient doubles.* 
Pensée 1970 (Bkn.802); Nagel II, pp.604-603; Pléiade I,
p.1220.
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rational world, with the result that the dividing line between 
logical and causal relationships begins to blur.
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II
The first chapter of hook I of the Lois, entitled some­
what ambiguously Of laws in general, deals with laws in their 
relationship to various beings, giving the immediate, though 
as it proves, unfounded impression that Montesquieu is flying 
in the face of the Aristotelian dictum that man alone is a 
social animal. His argument develops from the opening defi­
nition of law in its broadest sense as the necessary rela­
tionships which derive from the nature of things; in this 
sense Montesquieu claims, all beings may be considered to 
possess their own laws: God, the material world, creatures
of superior intelligence to man, brute creation, and man.
Its next stage is the association of the nature of things 
with the existence of a primitive reason, which he proves by 
citing the existence of intelligent creatures in the world.
To claim as some have done, meaning of course the so-called 
Spinozists, that blind fatality is the principle governing 
the organization of matter, is according to Montesquieu 
patently absurd. Thus laws originate in reason, and comprise 
both the relationships between this primitive reason and 
various orders of beings, and the relationships between beings 
themselves. They correspond to the twofold relationship, as 
both creator and conserver, of God with the universe; the laws 
of creation and of conservation are identical, and God created
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and sustains his creation in accordance with them because 
ultimately they derive from his wisdom and power;
'11 agit selon ces règles parce qu'il les connaît; il les 
connaît parce qu'il les a faites; il les a faites, parce 
qu'elles ont du rapport avec sa sagesse et sa puissance
Montesquieu then goes on to describe the precise nature 
of these laws. Their most important characteristic is the 
invariability which belies the apparently arbitrary nature 
of the act of creation. It is demonstrated by the inanimate 
universe, which, although the simple product of the movement 
of matter, and obviously devoid of intelligence, nevertheless 
continues to exist. This would be impossible if its motion 
was not governed by invariable laws; indeed these are so much 
the condition of all organization and all existence that 
without them God would be powerless to govern the universe.
In the terms of Montesquieu's original definition, they are 
'constantly established relationships', and are exemplified 
by the uniform and constant law of movement, consisting 
invariably in the relationships of speed and mass of the 
objects concerned.
But the sphere of these general laws of primitive reason 
is not confined to the organization of matter. It extends 
to include the world of intelligent creatures also, for the 
potential order of relationships linking such beings together 
would remain the same whether they actually existed or not;
(1) Nagel I, p.2; Pléiade II, p.232
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'Avant qu'il y eût des êtres intelligents, ils étaient 
possibles; ils avaient donc des rapports possibles, et par 
conséquent des lois possibles.
Hence Montesquieu argues, intelligent beings are not governed 
solely by positive laws of their own making, but are subject 
to the rule of primitive justice:
'Dire qu'il n'y a rien de juste ni d'injuste que ce 
qu'ordonnent ou défendent les lois positives, c'est dire 
qu'avant qu'on eût tracé de cercle, tous les rayons n'étaient
pas égaux.'^2)
Just as a circle is not a circle unless its radii are equal, 
so intelligent beings stand in a relationship of justice 
towards each other, prior to or in the absence of positive 
laws giving expression to it, Montesquieu then gives several 
instances of this relationship of justice: the social bond,
which sanctions obedience to the laws of any community; the 
relationship of indebtedness which compels gratitude, and 
so on.
However Montesquieu has an important restriction to 
make concerning the operation of these laws of justice to 
which intelligent creation is subject. Having already 
observed that the purely inanimate world by its very nature 
can only subsist through the operation of invariable laws, 
he points in contrast to the two distinctive characteristics 
of intelligent beings, which, while they do not invalidate
(1) Nagel I, pp.2-3; Pleiade II, P.233.
(2) Ibid.
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the invariable laws of justice, nevertheless radically affect 
the relationship of the individual to them. The intelligent 
creature is distinguished on the one hand by his limitations 
and on the other by his freedom; and as a result, he does not 
conform invariably to his own laws.
Other orders of being form a chain linking the incon­
sistency of the intelligent world to the invariability of the 
physical. Animals for example, while possessing no closer 
links with God than the rest of material creation, neverthe­
less enjoy inter-personal relationships as human beings do, 
with the essential difference that theirs is a community of 
feeling rather than intelligence. These purely affective 
relationships constitute the natural laws to which they are 
peculiarly subject, positive laws being precluded by their 
lack of intelligence. Thus the way in which their various 
appetites relate to themselves and to their fellows governs 
the conservation of both the individual and the species*
But they are in general less successful than the plant world 
in observing their own laws, for the latter, devoid of both 
feeling and understanding, is much nearer to inanimate 
invariability.
Man, while belonging to intelligent creation, is equally 
subject by virtue of his emotions to the government of natural 
laws, though here again, as a result of the complexity of his
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nature, is inclined to observe them irregularly; for example, 
his hopes make him a prey to fear, and his passions the victim 
of intemperance.
Finally, as a preparation for his true subject, the laws 
peculiar to mankind, Montesquieu recapitulates the various 
attributes of human nature which he has isolated in the course 
of his discussion, and correlates them with the particular 
order of law which they sustain, indicating the degree to 
which they may be said to determine man's conduct. Thus it 
is only as a purely physical body, that he is subject to 
invariable laws in the same way as the rest of the material 
universe. As a sentient being subject to natural law, his 
conduct is swayed by a thousand passions; while as an intel­
ligent but imperfect creature, and consequently a free agent, 
he violates not only the laws of his own making, but also the 
law of reason.
Yet even if imperfection and instability are inseparable 
from the human condition, Montesquieu implies that the very 
laws men neglect still provide them with the means of approach­
ing the invariable perfection of absolute wisdom:
’Un tel être pouvait, à tous les instants, oublier son 
créateur; Dieu l'a rappelé à lui par les lois de la religion. 
Un tel être pouvait, a tous les instants, s'oublier lui-même; 
les philosophes l'ont averti par les lois de la morale. Fait 
pour vivre dans la société, il y pouvait oublier les autres; 
les législateurs l'ont rendu à ses devoirs par les lois 
politiques et civiles.
(1) Nagel I, p.4; Pleiade II, p.234,
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In chapter II, Of the laws o f nature, Montesquieu passes 
from the essence of laws considered in relation to the 
structure of the universe and the nature of created beings, 
to an examination of the evolution of laws in time. The 
context of the discussion changes in effect from the meta­
physical to the historical, at least in so far as the frame­
work he adopts is the same hypothesis of a state of nature 
preceding the inception of organized society as was commonly 
used by the philosophers of the School of Natural Law.^^
But at the same time chapter II remains a clearly consistent 
development of certain integral assumptions of chapter I.
(1) This is not to say that Montesquieu had the same concept­
ion of the state of nature as Grotius, Pufendorf and 
their disciples. They were not in fact concerned with 
historical explanations of social evolution, but used the 
idea as a brilliant fiction with which to oust theolo­
gical explanations of the origin of political power. If 
the theory of divine right was to be replaced by that of 
the origin of sovereignty in human conventions, then it 
was necessary to posit the existence of a state of nature 
prior to the inception of the political state, in which 
men were free, equal, and subject only to the law of 
reason. (For natural law theory of the priority of the 
individual to the community, see 0. Gierke, Natural Law 
and the Theory of Society, (E. Barker's translation of 
part of the fourth volume of Las deutsche Genossenschafts- 
recht), C.U.P., 1934, ch.II: section I, part l6, ii.)
It is clear from the beginning of the Lois, that for 
Montesquieu the battle against theology was already won, 
and in Lettres Persanes XCIV, he attacks the individua­
lism in natural law theories; but he was far from dis­
pensing entirely with the idea of a state of nature; see 
below pp.59?-421.
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He opens his argument however with a statement which 
appears largely contradictory to the central notion of this 
chapter, namely that the structure of the universe and its 
laws are grounded in primitive reason:
'Avant toutes ces lois, sont celles de la nature, ainsi 
nommées, parce qu'elles dérivent uniquement de la constitution 
de notre être. Pour les connaître bien, il faut considérer 
un homme avant l'établissement des sociétés. Les lois de la 
nature seront celles qu'il recevrait dans un état pareil,
Unless one is to assume that Montesquieu has carelessly 
lumped together two alternative accounts of the origin of 
laws in order to dispatch the tiresome chore of introducing 
his work with the minimum of intellectual effort, one must 
of course read this as a further comment upon those 'lois de 
la religion', 'lois de la morale', and 'lois politiques et 
civiles', which he introduced at the end of chapter I. It 
serves first of all to confirm that these three categories 
are intended to represent varieties of positive law or 
written precepts, as opposed to the invariable laws governing 
the structure of the universe upon which he concentrated most 
of his attention. The laws of nature which he now intends to 
examine precede the establishment of such varieties of 
positive law, and are to be discovered by considering the 
nature of pre-social man. Not that Montesquieu thereby con­
cedes the actual existence of such a creature, although he
(1) Nagel I, p.5; Pleiade 11, p.235.
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does go on to cite the behaviour of certain ’hommes sauvages' 
found in the forests of Hanover as empirical evidence of his 
portrait. He simply implies in this first paragraph that 
primitive man and his laws would of necessity more vividly 
reflect particular aspects of the essential human nature 
described in chapter I, since the conditions of his existence 
would be such that the * constitution de notre être' alone 
would govern his relationships.
Thus the idea that emerges is of a stage of human 
development, pre-social but not necessarily anarchic, where 
individual behaviour would be determined by the less sophi­
sticated elements of human nature, by feelings rather than 
reason. At this stage in fact, men would more closely 
resemble the beasts described in chapter I, in that emotional 
relationships would define their laws to the exclusion of 
the more complex elements present in the social intercourse 
of fully rational creatures; hence the emphasis of Montesquieu's 
opening words,
'ainsi nommées, parce qu'elles dérivent uniquement de la 
constitution de notre etre.'.
Accordingly when he constructs the psychology of this 
pre-social being in order to indicate the laws which would 
arise from it, he admits only those faculties and emotions 
which would be proper to such a primitive creature existing
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before the establishment of organized institutions. He 
rejects the theological notion that the first law of nature 
is that which establishes and governs man's relationship to 
God, on the grounds that while it may be the most important, 
it cannot be the first in the chronological order of these 
laws, since it originates in a concept entirely beyond the 
reach of the primitive mind:
'L'homme, dans l'état de nature, aurait plutôt la faculté de 
connaître, qu'il n'aurait des connaissances. Il est clair 
que ses premières idées ne seraient point des idées spécula­
tives: il songerait à la conservation de son être, avant de
chercher l'origine de son être,'^^
In a State of nature the individual's first relation­
ships would be determined by subjective emotions; overwhelmed 
by his own weakness, his behaviour would reveal only timidity; 
his ideas and consequently his intentions would extend no 
further than self-preservation, and he would exist in a con­
dition of comparative isolation. Inter-personal relationships 
would be governed by mutual feelings of inferiority. Con­
sequently the first law of nature would be peace:
'Dans cet état, chacun se sent inférieur; à peine chacun 
se sent-il égal. On ne chercherait donc point à s'attaquer, 
et la paix serait la première loi naturelle.'^2)
In addition however, each would feel certain basic needs, and 
so a second law of nature would be the impulse to nourish 
oneself.
1) Nagel I, p.5; Pléiade II, p,235.
2) Ibid.
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Yet conditions in the state of nature would be far from 
static, for in time these simple emotions would give rise to 
more complex relationships and further laws. Thus conscious­
ness of mutual fear would bring about the transformation of 
conditions of isolation, and in combination with the pleasures 
of communal living and the power of sexual attraction, would 
produce a third law, that of sexual union. More complex 
relationships would also lead to the perfecting of the mental 
faculties and gradually men would acquire ideas as well as 
feelings. In this way they would enter the world of rational 
intercourse, and a new and generically different order of 
relationships would arise marking the transition to true 
social existence, and constituting the basis of positive laws. 
This transition would be governed by the fourth and final 
natural law: the desire to live in society.
For Montesquieu then, the laws of nature form a distinct 
category of laws originating in and proper to a particular 
stage in the development of human faculties, and therefore 
characteristic of a particular type and level of communal 
existence. The laws themselves consist in those simple 
relationships of feeling of which a potentially intelligent 
yet unsophisticated creature would be capable. Furthermore, 
although, providing the state of nature is accepted as a 
historical possibility rather than a mere hypothesis, they 
may be said to govern the later evolution of society and its
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laws, and although presumably they remain valid in so far as 
man continues to be a feeling as well as a thinking creature, 
there is no evidence in chapter II that Montesquieu conceives 
of their possessing anything more than a limited descriptive 
and causal significance. Given a state of nature and a par­
ticular kind of creature, he is arguing, these are the laws 
of behaviour which would obtain; but nowhere does he suggest 
that such primitive patterns will exclusively sanction the 
far more complex relationships of the intelligent being.
The historical method which Montesquieu adopts in 
chapter II leads to an important digression concerning Hobbes's 
conception of the state of nature. The English philosopher's 
proverbial view of the natural condition of mankind as
'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short......a war of
every man against every man,'^^
was already notorious; Montesquieu, like him, links the idea 
of a state of nature to a particular analysis of human nature, 
but counters his description of the former by disputing his 
version of the latter. Hobbes's psychology, he objects, is 
anachronistic; he blunders by attributing to an unsophisticated 
creature, feelings and desires which are properly speaking 
attributes of the fully fledged social being. Where 
Montesquieu sees fear, timidity and diffidence, Hobbes sees 
aggression, and the more complex motives of conquest and 
dominion, but;
(l) Leviathan, Part I, ch.13*
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'l'idée de l'empire et de la domination est si composée, et 
dépend de tant d'autres idées, que ce ne serait pas celle 
qu'il aurait d'abord.
The proof of Hobbes's error lies in the evidence be cites to 
support his portrait of human nature:
'Hobbes demande 'pourquoi, si les hommes ne sont pas 
naturellement en état de guerre, ils vont toujours armés? 
et pourquoi ils ont des clefs pour fermer leurs maisons?'
Mais on ne sent pas que l'on attribue aux hommes, avant 
l'établissement des sociétés, ce qui ne peut leur arriver 
qu'après cet établissement, cÿ ii leur fait trouver des motifs 
pour s'attaquer et pour se defendre.'^g)
The conditions which arise following the establishment 
of organized society and the developments which they induce 
in the emotional and intellectual constitution of the human 
being, are indeed the historical causes which Montesquieu 
himself then puts forward in chapter III, to account for the 
creation of positive laws. Once men are in society, they 
exchange their comparative independence and weakness for a 
sense of security; fear becomes aggression, equality gives 
way before acquisitiveness, and the state of war begins. 
Exactly the same process is witnessed among the society of 
nations, where as each begins to feel its strength, expan­
sionism and war ensue. As a result of such conflict, the 
various kinds of positive laws come into being*
Montesquieu goes on to apply the same method as he used 
in the foregoing chapter to identify and describe the classes
(1) Nagel I, pp.5-6; Pléiade II, p.235
(2) Ibid.
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of this law; he proceeds by examining the nature of the 
individuals concerned, whether citizens or societies, and then 
deduces from his analysis the nature and purpose of the 
relationships which arise from it. Particular laws are not 
however identified as each law of nature was, since obviously 
the number and complexity of the relationships to be consi­
dered is infinitely greater, and their analysis will in any 
case form the body of the work. At this stage Montesquieu is 
content to isolate the general principles which will govern 
the nature and purpose of each class of law.
Three main classes are isolated: the law of nations,
political law, and civil law. The first of these comprises 
the relationships between peoples, whose necessity Montesquieu 
establishes rather naively by refering to the vast size of 
the globe. The purpose he ascribes to international law is 
logically identical with that attributed to the laws of 
nature in chapter II, and in the first chapter, to all general 
laws governing the structure of the universe, namely conser­
vation, It is his view that all beings and entities, con­
sidered in relation to themselves, will, assuming reality to 
be grounded in reason, have this as their natural end. Thus 
international law will so regulate the conditions of peace 
and war that each nation enjoys the maximum opportunity of 
conserving itself:
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*Le droit des gens est naturellement fondé sur ce prin­
cipe: que les diverses nations doivent Se faire, dans la 
paix, le plus de bien, et, dans la guerre, le moins de mal 
qu'il est possible, sans nuire à leurs véritables intérêts.
From it a second principle arises, namely that the proper 
object of war is the conservation of the conquered people.
The second class of positive law, political law, con­
sists of the relationships arising from the distribution of 
power between the members of any given society, which in 
turn derives from the society's nature as a political entity, 
formed by 'la réunion de toutes les forces particulières', 
and needing government to maintain its existence. Montesquieu 
distinguishes two possible ways in which collective power may 
be distributed within the state: it may be entrusted to one
person, or to several. Such consequences of the natural 
structure of the state constitute the general principles 
governing the political law of any society; but Montesquieu 
declines to elaborate any further details, since, if the 
object of conservation is to be fulfilled, each particular 
state will require the government best suited to its own 
character and conditions.
For this reason he disputes the arguments of the patri­
archal theorists, ^ 2) drawing a false analogy between the 
structure of the state and the nature of the family, maintained
(1) Nagel I, p.7; Pléiade II, pp.236-237.
(2) Best represented by Bossuet's Politique tirée des propres 
paroles de l'Ecriture Sainte, Paris, 1709; and Filmer*s 
Patriarcha, London, 1680.
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that monarchic government, on the pattern of paternal autho­
rity, best answered the needs of every society. The vice of 
their method is proved, Montesquieu claims, by the fact that 
it can be used to justify not only monarchic government, but 
also the very democratic forms it is designed to exclude, for 
on the death of the father, paternal authority gives way to 
the power of brothers and uncles, and so on. Indeed there 
can be no analogy between the structure of the family and 
the state, since the latter is by definition, a union of 
several families.
The third class of positive law, civil law, comprises 
all other relationships between the members of a society, 
and derives from its nature as a civil entity constituted by 
'la reunion de toutes les volontés'. Once again its object 
is conservation, and in all respects it is closely linked to 
political law.
As regards the innumerable individual laws which fall 
into each class, and which are to occupy the centre of his 
study, Montesquieu simply confirms the conclusion of chapter II, 
that social existence is the proper state of rational creatures, 
for he sees them all as particular applications of human 
reason. But although grounded in reason, they do not simply 
express those invariable and universally applicable precepts 
which Cartesian idealism would have attributed to rational
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intuition. On the contrary they are here conceived to be 
the product of rational insight into, and reflexion upon the 
manifold factors governing the life of each society. 
Montesquieu insists that they should be:
'tellement propres au peuple pour lequel elles sont faites, 
que c'est^un très grand hasard si celles d'une nation peuvent 
convenir à une autre.
Ideally they will be related to both the nature and the prin­
ciple of the established or proposed form of government.
They will take into account the physical conditions of each 
society's existence, for example, climate, geographical 
situation, territorial extent, and nature of the terrain; 
also such related factors as pastoral or agricultural econ­
omies. They will have equal regard to moral factors: to the
degree of liberty consistent with the established constitu­
tion, to religion, to customs and national characteristics, 
to commercial and demographic circumstances. Finally, they 
will be relative to each other, to their origin, to the 
intentions of the legislator, and to their particular field 
of jurisdiction.
The study of all these related aspects of law, forms, 
Montesquieu declares, the task which he has set himself. He 
intends to examine not just positive laws in themselves, but
(1) Nagel I, pp.8-9; Pleiade II, p.237.
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their relationship to the nature of things; in other words, 
he intends to discover the laws governing positive law;
'J’examinerai tous ces rapports; ils forment tous ensemble 
ce que l'on appelle l^SPRIT DES LOISo'^j
(1) Nagel I, p.9; Pléiade II, p.238.
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III
The feature of this opening book which must first be 
underlined is its closely knit argument. Whatever strictures 
may be made on the logic of its parts - for instance, the 
deduction of the existence of an intelligent first cause from 
the existence of intelligent creatures - Montesquieu's deter­
mination to forge strong links between his analysis of 
positive laws and his first, essentially a priori principles 
becomes obvious as soon as the oddly dislocated effect pro­
duced by his elliptical style is removed by elaboration of 
each point and stage in the argument. We may deplore or 
applaud his efforts, but it is no longer easy to acquiesce in 
the superficial jibes at scholastic pastiche paraded by the 
abbé Bonnaire:
'J'entre dans le premier livre et je suis étonné d'y voir 
prendre les allures du sottisier des scolastiques. C'est une 
discussion hors-d'oeuvre des divers sens du mot loi.'^^
or with more wit, by Voltaire:
'Ne discutons point la foule de ces propositions qu'on 
peut attaquer et défendre longtemps sans convenir de rien.
Ce sont des sources intarissables de dispute. Les deux 
contondants tournent sans avancer, comme s'ils dansaient un 
menuet; ils se rétrouvent à la fin tous deux au même endroit 
dont ils étaient partis. Je ne chercherai point si Dieu a 
ses lois : ou si sa pensée, sa volonté sont sa seule loi; si 
les bêtes ont leur loi, comme dit l'auteur; ni s'il y avait 
des rapports de justice avant qu'il y eût des hommes, ce qui
(1) L'Esprit des lois quintessencié par une suite de lettres 
analytiques, 1751, vol.I, p.26.
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est l'ancienne querelle des réaux et des nominaux...... Ne
nous jouons pas dans les subtilités de cette métaphysique, 
gardons-nous d'entrer dans ce labyrinthe 1'^^
Although it is certainly not possible to judge on a 
simple reading of book I, the actual methods which Montesquieu 
employed in arriving at each proposition, for in at least 
one case, the evidence of collateral texts points to the 
probable application of inductive m e t h o d s , w h i l e  this is 
belied by the deductive presentation of the argument, never­
theless they are all ably brought together to suggest the 
outline of a coherent, if derivative philosophy, designed to 
illuminate the origin and significance, as well as the struc­
ture of human societies and their laws. He assigns to man 
and society their place in the order of nature, thereby link­
ing their positive laws to a universal principle, which not 
only accounts for them in metaphysical terms, and furnishes 
criteria by which they may be judged, but at the same time, 
serves to guarantee the validity of his owm scientific 
analysis.
Indeed, once the stylistic obstacles to comprehension 
have been removed, it is the very confrontation with an ana­
lysis that in several respects fully merits the qualification 
scientific, even in the restricted modern sense of the word, 
rather than the dubious parentage of Montesquieu's metaphysics,
(1) Commentaire sur quelques maximes de l'Esprit des lois, I.
(2) See below pp,409-412.
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which gives rise to the question of the pertinency of book I. 
And this is the question which has lain at the heart of so 
much subsequent debate as to the real significance of 
Montesquieu's various references to law and laws.
The structure of the work does indeed suggest as lanson 
ruefully remarked when retracting his original theory that 
both the form and the content of the Lois were typical 
expressions of a rigidly systematic Oartesianism,/^\ that the 
sole method of research employed by Montesquieu was deduction 
from a priori principles; but Lanson's amended conclusion, 
namely that the reason at work there may have recognized 
transcendent ideals, yet still proceeded from the facts, seems 
in the light of other consideration, much more acceptable.
Some such considerations, largely based on related texts, 
particularly the legacy of Montesquieu's Oratorian masters of 
a highly eclectic methodology combining logic, experiment and 
historical comparison, have been set out by H. Roddier in an 
article which endorses Lanson's c o n c l u s i o n . B u t  without 
engaging here and now in a thoroughgoing investigation of 
such obvious test cases as the empirically based theory of 
climate in book XIV, which is in striking contrast to the
(1) See 'L'influence de la philosophie cartésienne sur la 
littérature'. Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 1896.
(2) See 'Le rôle de l'expérience dans la formation de la 
philosophie du 18e. siècle en France', Revue du mois,
Jan.-June, 1910; part I.
(3) Op.cit., above part II, ch.l, p.2^2, n.l.
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ruthlessly logical idealism of the demolition of the 'droit 
d'esclavage* in the following book, it is possible on the 
sole basis of book I to argue the probable implementation of 
empirical methods by Montesquieu. The notion that positive 
law is relative to many external forces, both physical and 
moral, is fundamental to his description of its nature in 
chapter III; consequently it is automatically implied by his 
declared intention of discovering the constant pattern of 
these influences, that they - the physical and moral pheno­
mena - will be his starting point.
The comment which Montesquieu himself makes at the end 
of chapter III on the way he has approached his task would 
also be difficult to reconcile with a work exclusively domi­
nated by methods of definition and deduction;
'.....comme je ne traite point des lois, mais de l'esprit 
des lois, et que cet esprit consiste dans les divers rapports 
que les lois peuvent avoir avec diverses choses, j'ai du 
moins suivre l'ordre naturel des lois, que celui de ces 
rapports et de ces choses.
Even the apparent confession of Cartesian orthodoxy which 
occurs in the Preface;
'J'ai posé les principes, et j'ai vu les cas particuliers 
s'y plier comme d'eux-mêmes; les histoires de toutes les 
nations n'en être que les suites; et chaque loi particulière 
liée avec une autre loi, ou dépendre d'une autre plus 
générale.'^2)
(1) Nagel I, p.9; Pléiade II, p.238.
(2) Nagel I, p.lix; Pléiade II, p.229
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has been taken by at least one eminent historian of sociology 
as a declaration of Montesquieu's intention to proceed by the 
isolation of types, which, in constituting an intermediate 
stage between meaningless diversity and absolute ideals, will 
serve to render this diversity intelligible, and thereby 
complement the function of causal a na l ys i s. Si mil ar ly,  
it is the application of a strikingly original sociological 
method, the method of 'ideal types', that Cassirer discerns 
in books II and III, where Montesquieu, in contradiction to 
his declared intentions, appears to revert in his analysis 
of governments to a method of definition and logical deduc­
tion. /gX
One may find it difficult in the light of certain cogent 
and well documented articles demonstrating the persistence in 
Montesquieu's early essays and in the Lettres Persanes of 
typically Cartesian solutions to the problems of physics and 
psychology, and even in later works, to those of metaphysics, 
to differentiate in any significant way between the simple 
extension of a method recognizably related to Cartesian pro­
cedures to the field of politics and social organization.
(1) Raymond Aron, Les étapes de la pensée sociologique, (N.R.F. 
Bibliothèque des Sciences Humaines), 19&7, part I, p.29.
(2) Op.cit., above (p.280, n.2), ch.7, pp.210-212. It is not 
difficult to put a Cartesian construction on such 
passages as the following: 'II y a trois espèces de
gouvernements: le REPUBLICAIN, le MONARCHIQUE et le
DESPOTIQUE. Pour en découvrir la nature, il suffit de 
l'idée qu'en ont les hommes les moins instruits. Je 
suppose trois définitions, ou plutôt trois faits......Il
faut voir quelles sont les lois qui suivent directement de 
cette nature, et qui par consequent sont les premières lois 
fondamentales.' (11,1;, Nagel I, p.10; Pléiade II, p.239.
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and the introduction of an original and distinctively 
sociological m e t h o d . Y e t  for all that, the relativism 
and determinism inseparable from his conception of positive 
law, in theory undoubtedly demand the implementation of 
inductive methods in the ensuing analysis. The fact that 
when he subsequently confronts the phenomenon of government, 
Montesquieu ostensibly reverts to the old procedure of 
deduction from general assumptions, working towards particular 
instances and not from them, can be accounted for not only 
in terms of recourse to the new method of ’ideal types’, but 
also in very simple terms of an overall empirical approach 
which nevertheless finds room for other methods as and when 
necessary. Thus Montesquieu is prepared to take a Cartesian 
short cut to isolate the respective natures of the republic, 
the monarchy and the despotism:
’Pour en découvrir la nature il suffit de l ’idée qu’en ont 
les hommes les moins instruits*;
but when their principles are in question, he invokes the 
empirical evidence of history as well as ’la nature des 
choses’, whether by the latter he is alluding to the inner 
logic of type, or alternatively to the necessity of a 
rationally ordered universe:
’Ce que je dis est confirmé par le corps entier de l ’histoire, 
et est très conforme a la nature des choses.’
(1) See for instance, E. Buss, ’Montesquieu und Cartesius’, 
Philosophische Monatshefte, 1869-70, Band IV, pp.1-37; 
and C.J. Beyer. ’Montesquieu et l ’esprit cartésien’. 
Actes du Congres Montesquieu, Bordeaux, 1956.
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The semblance of a grand Cartesian design in the expo­
sition of the complete analysis of positive laws, which is 
created by Montesquieu’s initial concentration on the 
political forms of social structure, as if its every detail 
were implicitly contained in their laws, arises of course 
from his evaluation of the relative importance of the factors 
which make up the spirit of the laws. From the very 
beginning in chapter III, he underlines the particular signi­
ficance of political forces;
’J ’examinerai d ’abord les rapports que les lois ont 
avec la nature et avec le principe de chaque gouvernement; 
et, comme ce principe a sur les lois une suprême influence, 
je^m’attacherai à le bien connaître; et si je puis une fois 
l ’établir, on en verra couler les lois comme de leur source.
Je passerai ensuite aux autres rapports, qui semblent être 
plus particuliers,*
and the dominance which he accords them is obvious throughout 
the work. It is well illustrated by a remark from the book 
dealing with the central unifying notion of the whole thesis, 
that of the ’esprit général*:
’C ’est au législateur à suivre l ’esprit de la nation, 
lorsqu’il n ’est pas contraire aux principes du gouvernement^2)
If we accept then that the logical implication as well as 
the actual result of Montesquieu’s remarks concerning positive 
law in book I, is the adoption in the body of the work of a 
method which is at least in part empirical, and likewise, 
bearing in mind the didactic purpose expressed in the Preface;
(1) Nagel I, p.9; Pléiade II, p.238
(2) Nagel I, p.413; Pléiade II, p.559. (BookXIX, ch.5)
378
’Si je pouvais faire en sorte que ceux qui commandent 
augmentassent leurs connaissances sur ce qu’ils doivent 
prescrire.... je me croirais le plus heureux des mortels,
that he is consequently urging legislators themselves to 
base their craft upon scientific foundations, what are we 
to make of the postulates of chapter I, for all that they 
are so skilfully dovetailed into the main scientific thesis?
The writing of be 1 ’Esprit des Lois may reasonably be 
judged and applauded, as has already been suggested,^^) aa 
the completion of a task which Montesquieu set himself years 
before in the inconspicuous fragment of the Traité des 
Devoirs, subsequently entitled be la Politique, where he 
contrived to vindicate his own ideal of justice by drawing 
on historical evidence which demonstrated the futility of 
statecraft. The art of politics legitimized injustice in 
the mistaken belief that events could be manipulated to 
foster selfish ends, but against it Montesquieu argued that 
their real causes lay outside human control. Now the Lois 
forestalled the counsel of indifference which too superficial 
a reading of his theory of historical causation might have 
prompted. Human reason might be relatively powerless to 
manipulate history, but it was by no means incapable of ana­
lysing its pattern. Consequently there were sound grounds 
for the muted optimism voiced in Montesquieu’s Preface:
Î) Nagel I, p.lxi; Pléiade II, p.230. 
,2) See above Part II, ch.2, p. 2/5.
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knowledge will be the key to statesmanship and the safeguard 
of human happiness. Yet what relation does the original ideal 
of justice retain to all this, the ideal which, in harness 
with the notion of virtuous citizenship, presupposed the 
active pursuit of moral ends? For if the statesman can aspire 
only to imitate a necessary pattern of events, then it follows 
logically if disturbingly, that the pursuit of justice exactly 
equals the practice of injustice in its futility. As G. Davy 
clearly reveals in an article on Montesquieu’s method, 
once all arbitrary elements are excluded from an analysis of 
causation in the moral and political spheres, as they must be 
if its laws are assumed to be necessary and constant on the 
model of physical laws, then the legislator who applies the 
principles of this science may reorganize, but can never 
transcend a given determinism.
But although the practical expression of Montesquieu’s 
sociological thesis seems inevitably restricted to an empirical 
conservatism, and this approach certainly colours his attitude 
not only to the active role of the legislator, but also to 
the related theoretical problem of historical evolution, 
being discernible as much in the caution of the Preface ;
*Je n ’écris point pour censurer ce qui est établi dans 
quelque pays que ce soit. Chaque nation trouvera ici les 
raisons de ses maximes; et, on en tirera naturellement cette
(1) ’Sur la méthode de Montesquieu’, Revue de métaphysique et 
de morale, année 46, 1939.
(2) See R. Hubert's article ’Le devenir historique chez 
Montesquieu’, op.cit., above n.l.
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conséquence, qu'il n'appartient de proposer des changements 
qu'à ceux qui sont assez heureusement nés pour pénétrer d'un 
coup de génie toute la constitution d'un État.*^^
as in the sudden disquieting pessimism which shatters the 
vision of a liberal constitution in Book XI, chapter 6:
'Gomme toutes les choses humaines ont une fin, l'État 
dont nous parlons perdra sa liberté, il périra. Rome, 
Lacédémone et Carthage ont bien péri. Il périra lorsque la 
puissance législative sera plus corrompue que 1 * exécutrice«'^2)
nevertheless we find him boldly reaffirming in his introduc­
tory chapters both the transcendent reality of justice and 
its validity as a moral ideal ;
'Avant qu'il y eût des lois faites, il y avait des rapports 
de justice possibles. Lire qu'il n'y a rien de juste ni 
d'injuste que ce qu'ordonnent ou défendent des lois positives, 
c'est dire qu'avant qu'on eût tracé de cercle, tous les 
rayons n'étaient pas égaux.
Thus one is forced to conclude that in the conception of the 
Lois, whatever the logical philosophical and moral implica­
tions of his approach to positive law, some of which are 
indeed quite plainly expressed in the work, the desire to 
vindicate the idealism of the Traité des Devoirs remained a 
recognizably active force.
Such a conclusion is inescapable that is, and one must 
accordingly accept Book I on what appear to be Montesquieu's 
terms, as an integral part of the whole work, attempting by
(1) Nagel I, p.lx; Pléiade II, p.230.
(2) Nagel I, p.221; Pléiade II, p.407.
(3) Book I, ch.l; Nagel I, p.3; Pléiade II, p.233
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detailed analysis to illuminate its precise significance and 
thereby demonstrate its philosophical relevance to his central 
thesis, unless one credits certain fairly commonplace hypo­
theses issuing from a rigid psychological determinism, 
coupled to an oversimplified and somewhat anachronistic view 
of the 18tho century as an age when scientific materialism 
came into its own, which together create a Montesquieu whose 
narrow mental horizons scarcely correspond to the fertile and 
flexible intelligence which emerges from such records of 
research and speculation as the Pensées. Such hypotheses 
range between G. Davy's comparatively mild reduction of 
Montesquieu's preliminary philosophical discourse to an insipid 
expression of his
'intention de fonder sur une sorte d'instinct foncier vers le 
bien la recherche tâtonnante des lois les mieux adaptées aux 
conditions diverses dont elles doivent dépendre',^2)
and its outspoken dismissal by P. Martino as a satirically 
conceived hotchpotch of scholastic definitions, designed 
simply to pull the wool over the eyes of hostile and
(1) A German scholar, V. Klemperer, expounding the not
entirely convincing thesis that Montesquieu was really a 
poet in an unpoetical age, produced many years ago a stimu­
lating reappraisal of the entire corpus of his works as 
then known. In spite of a disregard, curiously reminiscent 
of the interpretations which he seeks to discredit, for the 
part that creative imagination plays in scientific work 
that leads him to overstate his case, it remains a useful 
antidote to such limited appreciations of his genius. See 
Montesquieu, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1914-15 (Band VI in the 
series Beitrage zur neueren literaturgeschichte).
(?) Art. cit. sbove p.575»
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suspicious theologians•
If however, while conceding that Montesquieu may in 
elaborating the theories of Book I have anticipated and 
attempted to forestall the kind of criticism which he was 
later obliged to answer in the Defense de l'esprit des lois, 
one rejects on historical, biographical and critical grounds 
such hypotheses, then perhaps the most immediately acceptable 
interpretation which leaves Montesquieu's scholarly integrity 
and his sincerity in Book I unscathed, and contrives to do 
justice to its ostensibly philosophical purpose, at the same 
time drawing solely on textual evidence, is that offered by 
Shackleton in his critical biography. 2^)
Shackleton concludes that Montesquieu does not in fact 
present us in Book I with a personal philosophy of law, which, 
while largely derivative, nevertheless achieves logical con­
sistency, but rather with a demolition of the deductive 
philosophical framework traditionally utilized by jurists, 
in whose place he introduces empirically derived first prin­
ciples better fitted to the sociological thesis of the Lois. 
Book I records his movement away from the Cartesian habits 
of mind characteristic of 17th, century political thought 
towards scientific materialism. Thus:
(1) 'De quelques résidus métaphysiques dans l'Esprit des Lois', 
Revue d'histoire de la philosophie d'histoire generale de 
la civilisation. Pas.43» (July-Sept. 194^), pp,235“243.
(2) Op.cit., above (p.^On.2.); ch,XI.
3 83
'The framework of his legal system, with its stress on the 
eternity of justice, has close terminological resemblances 
with the deductive systems of Grotius and Domat, and can 
legitimately be regarded as having Cartesian affinities.
Within this framework are found, as his starting point, 
natural laws reminiscent of Descartes's descriptive and 
scientific laws of nature. They are ascertained by the 
method of animal analogy, which (since beasts are machines) 
involves an exclusion of any rational element.
To this point Montesquieu remains, though not without 
inconsistencies, under the banner of Descartes.
But he proceeds to base his moral and political system 
on these rigid données of the physical world, and herein his 
departure, silent and unadmitted, from Cartesianism is sig­
nalized. He has become more of an anti-Cartesian than a 
Cartesian, and so he must finally be defined.
This summary is based on the enquiry which Shackleton con­
ducts in the foregoing sections of his chapter on Montesquieu's 
conception of law, into the probable sources of key notions 
in the first two chapters of Book I. Here he brings out 
Montesquieu's reliance upon philosopher-theologians like 
Malebranche and Clarke for his opening definition of law, 
rather than upon legal writers, and he contrasts such 
sources with the more conventional origin of his assertion 
of the transcendence of justice in the conceptions of the 
Natural Law school of jurists. This assertion is then 
characterized as the idealistic framework within which 
Montesquieu proceeds in chapter 2 to enclose, not the a priori, 
God-given precepts posited by this school, but purely descrip­
tive laws, isolated by a method for which he was indebted 
once again to sources largely unacceptable to the standard
(1) Op.cit., above (p.JO n.2.), p.260.
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juristic authorities of his day. The method concerned is the
same 'animal analogy' referred to in the above quotation, and
this he traces back through the concept of lex promiscua
found in the Origines iuris civilis of the Italian jurist
Gravina, to Ulpian's definition of natural law in the 
t
Instantes as that which nature has taught all animals,
His case for claiming that Montesquieu proceeded to 
identify basic natural impulses in human beings by analysing 
the instincts common to all animal creation, and that he then 
erected these impulses into a fixed natural foundation for 
positive law, in apparent ignorance of the illogicality of 
using descriptive laws as normative principles, rests on the 
restoration to book I chapter 2, Des lois de la nature, of 
three paragraphs found in the manuscript which never appeared 
in the published text:
'Les animaux (et c'est surtout chez eux qu'il faut aller 
chercher le droit naturel) ne font pas la guerre à ceux de 
leur espèce, parce que, se sentant égaux, ils n'ont point le 
désir de s'attaquer. La paix est donc la première loi 
naturelle.
Je sais bien qu'en disant ceci je contredis de très grands 
hommes mais je les prie de faire réflexion sur ce sentiment de 
plaisir que chaque animal trouve à l'approche d'un animal de 
même espèce que lui. Ils ne sont donc pas en état de guerre 
et vouloir les mettre dans cet état, c'est vouloir leur faire 
faire ce que les lions ne font pas.
(1) Reproduced in the Digest I,l,i: 'lus naturale est, quod
natura omnia animalia docuit: nam ius istud non huraani 
generis proprium, sed omnium animalium, quae in terra, 
quae in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc 
descendit maris atque feminae coniuncto, quam nos matrimo- 
nium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio.'
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Que si nous voyons des animaux faire la guerre à ceux de 
leur espèce, ce n'est que dans des cas particuliers et parce 
que nous les y instruisons pour notre commodité propre,
The sentence in parenthesis: 'et c'est surtout chez eux
qu'il faut aller chercher le droit naturel' is obviously the 
most important clue to his sources, and Shackleton cites the 
argumentation to be found in a fragment dating from 1725? 
Pensée 1266 (Bkn.615), as evidence that Montesquieu would in 
any case already have been sympathetic towards the adoption 
of this particular method even before he came across 
Gravina's work,
In judging the merits of Shackleton*s interpretation one 
must first pay tribute to its cogency and to the highly 
interesting nature of the source material upon which he draws 
But it is none the less open to serious objections, which, 
while they do not necessarily undermine the relevance of this 
material to certain features of Montesquieu's theory of natu­
ral law, would seem on the other hand to invalidate the con­
clusions to which it lends so much weight. These objections 
fall into two categories according to whether they stem from 
those aspects of Montesquieu's theories in chapters 1 and 2 
that Shackleton neglects, or from alternative interpretations 
of some of his supporting evidence.
(1) Nagel III, p.579; Pléiade II, p.996 (in part only).
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The most general criticism that can he levelled against 
his interpretation is its implication that Montesquieu's right 
hand was scarcely aware of what his left hand was doing.
Thus the assertion in chapter 1 of the transcendence and 
anteriority of justice is ultimately left unaccounted for; 
why, if Montesquieu's real object was to elaborate a close 
parallel between the laws of the physical universe and those 
of human behaviour, was it then included at all? Similarly, 
it is difficult to understand, if we accept Shackleton*s 
version of his philosophical purpose, why his most important 
points appear only in parenthesis, or were even omitted from 
the published work. It is almost impossible to credit the 
explanation which he offers for the deletion of those crucial 
paragraphs of chapter 2 where Montesquieu allegedly reveals 
his methodological device for the investigation of natural 
law.(i) The reason Shackleton suggests is that Montesquieu 
subsequently added reasonableness and the attainment of 
intellectual maturity to his list of natural laws, and then, 
realizing that the analogy with animal creation no longer 
held good decided to excise the whole passage. But his 
explanation, besides insinuating that the author of so vast 
and complex a work made little attempt to sort out his ideas 
before putting pen to paper, overlooks the important and 
extensive comparison, occupying at least a third of chapter 1, 
between the nature and laws of various orders of beings.
(l) Given in a footnote, op.cit. above, (p.JOn.^.)» p.259, n.l
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Here already Montesquieu emphasizes that man's distinguishing 
feature is his intelligence, and indeed also implies that 
while, as a sentient creature, he may be subject with the 
beasts to a certain order of law, just as he shares the 
invariable laws of motion with inanimate matter, an entirely 
different set of principles relative only to his intelligence, 
will govern his social existence.
Needless to say, Montesquieu was hardly likely to have 
forgotten this comparison when he embarked on chapter 2, It 
is indeed much more likely, since, from its context, the 
manuscript passage in question could as well have served to 
introduce an attack on Hobbes's conception of the state of 
nature, that Montesquieu omitted it because he decided it 
was more effective to argue from the same basis as his 
adversary, namely, from an analysis of human nature. This he 
does, citing Hobbes by name, and pointing out how anachron­
istic the characteristics he attributed to his pre-social man 
really were.
Moreover, almost the whole of chapter 2, with the 
exception of the short preamble situating the laws of nature 
in relation to other classes of law:
'Avant toutes ces lois, sont celles de la nature, ainsi 
nommées, parce qu'elles dérivent uniquement de la constitution 
de notre etre.'
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and the formal homage paid to belief in God as the most 
important of natural laws, consists of a systematized elabo­
ration of ideas first propounded in Pensée 1266, which 
Shackleton does indeed draw into his discussion, if only 
m a r g i n a l l y , a s  evidence that Montesquieu had previously 
'toyed with the notion of animal analogy in relation to 
natural law'.
This fragment was originally part of the unfinished 
Traité des Devoirs, though Montesquieu clearly indicates in 
a note that he later drew on it for the Lois. Every feature 
of the theory of chapter 2 is to be found there in embryo, 
the main difference being that after mentioning Hobbes's 
linking of natural right to the principle of self preservation, 
Montesquieu does not proceed to formulate his objections in 
terms of an alternative set of natural laws, but simply con­
centrates on demonstrating the falseness of Hobbes's notions 
concerning the natural state and primitive disposition of men. 
As in chapter 2, the main plank of his attack is the absurd 
anachronism of the motives and feelings with which Hobbes 
endows humans in their pre-social condition:
'il ne faut pas, comme il fait, supposer les hommes cornme^  
tombés du ciel ou sortis tout armés de la terre, à peu près 
comme les soldats de Cadmus, pour s'entre-détruire: ce n'est
point là l'état des hommes.'^2)
(1) Op.cit., above (p.JO n. Z .), p.258, n.l.
(2) Nagel II, p.344; Pléiade I, p.1139.
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In relation tothis criticism, Montesquieu goes on to present 
the key notion of chapter 2, the idea of a gradual and 
natural transition from the natural to the social state:
'Le premier et le seul ne craint personne. Cet homme 
seul, qui trouverait une femme seule aussi, ne lui ferait 
point la guerre. Tous les autres naîtraient dans une famille, 
et bientôt dans une société. Il n'y a point là de guerre; 
au contraire, l'amour, l'éducation, le respect, la 
reconnaissance : tout respire la paix,'^^
But this is developed no further; instead, to drive home his 
objections to Hobbes he imagines an extreme situation: 'deux
hommes tombés des nues dans un pays désert', and attempts, 
by reconstructing their emotional reactions, to predict its 
outcome. The progress he sketches here, from mutual fear and 
flight, through loneliness, to mutual attraction and the 
pleasure of companionship, corresponds to the stages set out 
in chapter 2 of the evolution of natural man and his laws, 
and it is only in passing that he makes a brief comparison 
with the behaviour of other animal species:
'Premièrement, la crainte les porterait, non pas à attaquer, 
mais à fuir. Les marques de crainte respective les feraient 
bientôt approcher. L'ennui d'être seul et le plaisir que 
tout animal sent à l'approche d'un animal de même espèce, les 
porteraient à s'unir, et plus ils seraient misérables, plus 
ils y seraient déterminés. Jusque-là on ne voit point 
d 'antioccupation. Il en serait comme des autres animaux, qui 
ne font la guerre à ceux de leur espèce que dans des cas 
particuliers, quoiqu'ils se trouvent tous les jours dans les 
forêts, à peu près comme les hommes de Hobbes. Les premiers 
sentiments seraient pour les vrais besoins que l'on aurait 
(prières naturelles), et non pas pour les commodités de la 
domination.....  Hobbes veut faire faire aux hommes, ce que
(1) Nagel II, p.344; Pléiade I, p.1139
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les lions ne font pas eux-mêmes. Ce n'est que par l'établisse­
ment des sociétés qu'ils abusent les uns des autres et 
deviennent les plus forts; avant cela, ils sont tous égaux.
Thus, while Montesquieu clearly regards mankind as being 
in various respects indistinguishable from other animal 
species, there is little evidence that he is here attempting, 
even tentatively, to use the instinctive behaviour of beasts 
as a special device for the discovery of man's primitive lav/s.^ )^
(1) Nagel II, pp.344-345; Pléiade I, pp.1139-1140.
(2) His case against Hobbes rests here as it does in the 
published version of chapter 2, primarily on the need to 
apply a degree of psychological and historical insight if 
one sets out to base first principles on the effects of 
certain circumstances on human nature. In any case, there 
exists a fragment of the early Pensées morales, subsequently 
incorporated into the Devoirs and into chapter 1 of the 
Lois, which constitutes almost a formal rejection of the 
case for arguing that Montesquieu ever entertained the 
notion that animal behaviour could provide the measure
of human law:
'Les actions humaines sont le sujet des devoirs. C'est 
la raison qui en est le principe, et qui nous rend 
propres à nous en acquitter, ce serait abaisser cette 
raison que de dire qu'elle ne nous a été donné que pour 
la conservation de notre être : car les bêtes conservent
le leur, tout comme nous. Souvent même, elles le 
conservent mieux: l'instinct, qui leur laisse toutes
les passions nécessaires pour la conservation de leur vie, 
leur privant presque toujours de celles qui pourraient 
la détruire. Au lieu que notre raison ne nous donne pas 
seulement des passions destructives, mais même nous fait 
faire souvent un très mauvais usage des conservatrices.'
(Pensée 220 (Bkn.597), Nagel II, p.93; Pléiade I, p.1126.)
The careful distinction between men and beasts made here 
must also be compared with later entries in the Pensees, 
e.g. 938 (Bkn.1097), 1747 (Bkn.366):
'....Les bêtes, qui ont toutes des intérêts séparés, 
s'entrenuisent toujours. Les hommes seuls, faits pour 
vivre en société, ne perdent rien de ce qu'ils partagent.', 
etc. (Nagel II, p.523; Pléiade II, p.1094.)
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The mention of lions towards the end of the passage, probably 
for stylistic effect alone, echoes the attack on Hobbes in 
Lettres Persanes LXXXIII, where Montesquieu imagines the 
terrible insecurity that would burden men, were they not 
assured of the justice of their fellow creatures:
'Sans cela nous devrions être dans une frayeur 
continuelle; nous passerions devant les hommes comme devant 
les lions, et nous ne serions jamais assurés un moment de 
notre bien, de notre honneur et de notre vie,'^^^
and sure enough, the whole attack on Hobbes in Pensée 1266 
forms part of a much wider discussion where Montesquieu 
defends the existence of God and of Providence, and not only 
hits out at the English philosopher for his voluntarist 
conception of law, but also decries Spinoza for his alleged 
hylozoisrn, and the moral indifference to which this leads.
In the light of his attitude to such wider issues it 
seems at least doubtful that Montesquieu was consciously 
concerned, either here or in related passages of the Lois, 
with the 'analogy of animals* as a device for determining 
specifically human laws of nature. Consequently, the whole 
interpretation of Montesquieu's philosophical purpose which 
Shackleton rests upon its adoption is laid open to question; 
for obviously it no longer follows that he was thereby sig­
nalling his rejection of a rationally based moral system, 
and proclaiming his espousal in its place of the tenets of 
scientific materialism.
(1) Nagel I, p.170; Pléiade I, p.257
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Indeed, even if Shackleton's thesis were valid, it 
would still be impossible to claim as he does,^^ that 
Montesquieu then proceeds even tacitly, to base his moral 
and political system on the descriptive laws established in 
chapter 2. A single quotation from book X illustrates more 
than adequately the multiplicity of criteria, moral and 
scientific, that Montesquieu could invoke in any one 
instance :
’Lorsqu'un peuple est conquis, le droit que le conquérant 
a sur lui, suit quatre sortes de lois: la loi de la nature,
qui fait que tout tend à la conservation des espèces; la loi 
de la lumière naturelle, qui veut g^ ue nous fassions à autrui 
ce que nous voudrions qu'on nous fit; la loi qui forme les 
sociétés politiques, qui sont telles que la nature n'en a 
point borné la durée; enfin la loi tirée de la chose même.
La conquête est une acquisition; l'esprit d'acquisition porte 
avec lui l'esprit de conservation et d'usage, et non pas
celui de destruction,* )
Yet clearly, providing one accepts that Montesquieu is 
in effect expressing the conviction in book I chapter 3, that 
the great diversity of positive laws can be traced back to 
a small number of principles which will contain them as 
individual phenomena and completely describe them, then the 
incentive, or dare one say obligation, to search for 
evidence of a consistently scientific approach in the rest 
of book I, particularly of an adequate method, explicable in 
terms of contemporary currents of thought, for the isolation 
of descriptive principles, remains strong, Shackleton
(1) Op.cit., above (p.JO n.2.), p.252; 260.
(2) Chapter 3; Nagel I, p.184; Pléiade II, p.378
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discerned the application of procedures deriving from 
Cartesian physics, though the evidence for this is at least 
debatable; yet it is possible to suggest an alternative 
interpretation of book I, which likewise contrives to credit 
Montesquieu with a degree of methodological consistency in 
his approach to the phenomenon of law.
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CHAPTER FOUR
JUSTICE AND LAW; AN ALLIANCE OF SCIENCE AND MORALS
*.•.1 'injustice est mauvaise 
ménagère,...elle ne remplit 
pas même ses vues.'
Considérations sur les 
Causes de la Grandeur des 
Romains. chapter IV.
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Once prudence, deviousness, a kind of pedantic frivolity, 
or the rhetorical sleight of hand at which Voltaire was so 
adept have been dismissed as credible explanations of the 
philosophical complexities of book I, and the entire serious­
ness of his enterprise from start to finish has been conceded, 
then it is not really the contents of chapter 1 which hold 
the greatest surprise for the reader familiar with an image 
of Montesquieu as the founder of ascience of legislations, 
but the inclusion and development of the ideas of chapter 2, 
Des lois de la nature. For as Montesquieu himself exclaimed 
in the Defense, the subject of his work is unmistakable;
'Ceux qui auront quelques lumières verront du premier coup 
d'oeil que cet ouvrage a pour objet les lois, les coutumes 
et les divers usages de tous les peuples de la terre.
and if, as a self-proclaimed idealist, he wished nevertheless 
to clear himself in the introduction to his study of any 
taint of materialism, of the faintest suspiecion that the 
relativism and causal determinism implicit in his theory of 
positive law had necessarily transformed him into a camp- 
follower of Spinoza or worse, a disciple of the infamous 
Hobbes, by confirming his belief in the anteriority of 
justice and in human freedom, while at the same time 
endeavouring to base his work, as a serious contribution to
(1) Part II; Nagel I, p.456; Pléiade II, p.1137
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scientific knowledge, on a conception of the universe as a 
structure regular and ordered even in its smallest details, 
subject to invariable laws and therefore accessible to reason, 
then he fulfilled both these objects more than adequately 
in chapter 1. In that case, what more was to be gained from 
dabbling even desultorily in the peculiar concepts of the 
apparently distinct and specialized discipline of jurists 
and political theorists, whose business it was to expound a 
philosophy of r i g h t , t o  lay bare the abstract foundations 
of authority rather than winkle out the uniform principles 
hidden beneath the endless diversity of statute law and 
unwritten custom; and from whom moreover, as we know from a 
rejet from the Preface, Montesquieu had been at one stage 
eager to dissociate himself formally?^2) As long as his 
scientific axioms and the universally valid criteria upon 
which he intended to found his value judgments were clear for 
all to understand, then there was surely no need to resurrect 
the odd hypothesis of a patently unhistorical state where 
the individual, 'tombé des nues*, exists in complete isola­
tion, in order to establish another, superfluous set of 
principles; unless we assume of course that Montesquieu was 
as much in thrall to tradition in the matter of content as 
Lanson would have us believe he was as regards the presenta­
tion of his work.
(1) See below p.4-19.
(2) See above p.JJ’l.
(3) See above p.375*
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Thus since its main purpose appears to he the provision 
of a platform from which an attack directed specifically 
against Hohhes could be launched, chapter 2 would seem to 
possess all the qualities of a classic digression, hut 
nothing more. Even this attack on Hobbes seems strangely 
misdirected, for whereas one might reasonably suppose that 
Montesquieu's opposition to absolutism would have prompted 
him to select as his special target the other's use or abuse 
of the theory of contract to justify tyranny, he actually 
makes no mention of it at all.^^) His primary concern is 
obviously the rehabilitation after Hobbes of the original 
benevolence of mankind, and the direct bearing of the hypo­
thesis of the state of nature on the theoretical mode and 
political consequences of the establishment of society carried 
no interest for him. One may object at this point that once 
Montesquieu had set out to explain scientifically the 
diversity of positive laws, then it was naturally incumbent 
upon him to account also for their origin; and that the solv­
ing of this problem would, given the intellectual climate of
(1) A fragment of the Pensees morales shows that this feature 
of Hobbes's doctrine had at one time preoccupied him:
'C'est un principe bien faux que celui de Hobbes: que,
le peuple ayant autorisé le prince, les actions du prince 
sont les actions du peuple, et, par conséquent, le peuple 
ne peut pas se plaindre du prince, ni lui demander aucun 
compte de ses actions: parce que le peuple ne peut pas 
se plaindre du peuple. Ainsi Hobbes a oublié son principe 
du droit naturel: Facta esse servanda. Le peuple a
autorisé le prince sous condition; il l'a établi sous une 
convention. Il faut qu'il l'observe, et le prince ne 
représente le peuple que comme le peuple a voulu ou est 
censé avoir voulu qu'il le représentât.'
(Pensée 224 (Bkn.601); Nagel II, p.94; Pleiade I, P.1127).
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the age, almost automatically involve him in some discussion, 
however brief, of the origin of society and the idea of 
natural law. This may just possibly have been the case, 
though it hardly serves to transform chapter 2 from a 
digression into an essential element of book I. For 
Montesquieu's main theories would still be just as valid, 
and his work surely better planned, if he had passed imme­
diately from the concluding sentence of chapter 1, which, by 
implying that man is naturally a social creature, apparently 
obviates the necessity of drawing on the hypothesis of the 
state of nature:
'Fait pour vivre dans la société, il y pouvait oublier les 
autres; les législateurs l'ont rendu à ses devoirs par les 
lois politiques et civiles',
to the general definition of positive lav/ which he gives in 
the middle of chapter 3:
'La loi, en général, est la raison humaine, en tant qu'elle 
gouverne tous les peuples de la terre; et les lois politiques 
et civiles de chaque nation ne doivent être que les cas 
particuliers où s'applique cette raison humaine',
having delayed the preceding analysis of the basic political 
structure common to all societies until the beginning of 
book II, where it would have constituted the logical preamble 
to his classification of governments.
Yet although logic and economy would appear to favour 
such a reorganization of the material of book I, it is in
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turn open to objections which contrive to re-establish the 
complete seriousness of Montesquieu's intentions, and the 
validity in scientific terms of the inclusion of chapter 2.
The first of these arises from the Defense de l'Esprit 
des Lois, where Montesquieu, explaining his dismissal of the 
natural law linking mankind to God, confirms that his use of 
the hypothesis of the state of nature in chapter 2 was a 
deliberate choice:
'II ne lui a pas été défendu, pas plus qu'aux philosophes et 
aux écrivains du droit naturel, de considérer l'homme sous 
divers égards: il lui^  a été permis de supposer un homme comme
tombé des nues, laissé à lui-même et sans education, avant 
l'établissement des sociétés.
Now this confirmation, considered in the light of certain 
other reflexions bearing on the usefulness of the hypothesis 
of the state of nature in political science, rather than 
vindicating Montesquieu's philosophical integrity, appears 
to undermine it. For, as general appreciations of his con­
tribution to political thought almost invariably stress, the 
basic tendency of his social theory was anti-contractualist, 
being exemplified in Lettres Persanes XCIV where the notion 
of the state of nature is dismissed outright as irrelevant 
to all discussion of the origins of society:
'Je n'ai jamais oui parler du droit public, qu'on n'ait 
commencé par rechercher soigneusement quelle est l'origine des 
sociétés; ce qui me paraît ridicule. Si les hommes n'en 
formaient point, s ’ils se quittaient et se fuyaient les uns
(1) I, Réponse à la sixième objection; Nagel I, p.446; 
Pléiade II, p.1131.
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les autres, il faudrait en demander la raison, et chercher 
pourquoi ils se tiennent séparés: mais ils naissent tous
liés les uns aux autres; un fils est né auprès de son père, 
et il s'y tient: voilà la société, et la cause de la
société. *
On the basis of this evidence, and the implications of the 
myth of the Troglodytes, )  at least one critic has argued 
strongly that Montesquieu had, as early as the composition 
of the Lettres Persanes, already abandoned the hypothesis of 
the state of nature in favour of a properly scientific 
approach to the beginnings of social o r g a n i z a t i o n . I f  
this was indeed the case, then the open acknowledgement of 
its readoption in the Lois cannot fail to mystify, even 
though it is clearly no part of Montesquieu's intention to 
combine it with a contractualist view of the origin of 
society, this being presented here on the contrary as the 
inevitable outcome of the sociability characteristic of 
intelligent creatures. Fortunately however, Montesquieu left 
other material bearing on his conception of the beginning of 
social organization, which, while it leaves intact the con­
clusion based on the Lettres Persanes that his attitude there
(1) Nagel I, p.187; Pleiade I, p.269.
(2) Lettres Persanes XI-XIY.
(3; S. Gotta in Montesquieu e la scienza della société,
Torino, 1953. Cotta maintains that the myth of the 
Troglodytes does not comprise two contrasted views of the 
state of nature, but a study of the possible evolution of 
society according to whether it is governed by the prin­
ciple of egoism or by that of virtue (ch.3, p.152). The 
hypothesis of the state of nature is then implicitly 
rejected, and 'I'abbandono di questa ipotesi a favore di 
uno studio limitato all'orrizonte della realtà effettuale, 
segna il punto di passaggio da una impostazione filosofica 
del problema dello Stato et della société ad una 
impostazione scientifica. E questa una preziosa indicazione 
offertaci dalle Lettres, forse la piu preziosa sul piano 
__metodolo2ico.' Ten. ^ 0.165)._______________________________ .
40 1
reveals a nascent sociological approach to the problem, 
nevertheless provides valuable clues to the reasons for his 
perplexing retreat in the Lois to the doctrine of Grotius 
and Pufendorfo
In Letter XGIV we encounter the substitution of the 
notion of a natural organic origin for society, the family 
group, for the idea entrenched in the thinking of most 
Natural Law School jurists that individual isolation 
necessarily precedes social cohesion. But significantly, 
although this central principle of natural law theory is 
rejected, no direct reference is made to the closely related 
hypothesis of the state of nature. When we turn then to the 
fragments of the Devoirs refuting Hobbes’s theory of natural 
aggression and the patriarchalist arguments in favour of 
despotism, both of which were extensively exploited for 
book I of the Lois, we find Montesquieu alluding quite 
happily to ’l ’état naturel des hommes’, and to ’les hommes 
avant l ’établissement des sociétés’. However, while he is 
prepared for the purposes of argument to accept Hobbes’s 
case on its own terms:
’II n ’est pas meme vrai que deux hommes tombés des nues dans 
un pays désert, cherchassent, par la peur, à s ’attaquer et
à se s u b j u g u e r . . ^2)
he objects beforehand that the whole hypothesis of isolated
(1) Pensées 1266 (Bkn.615), and 1267 (Bkn,6l6); see above
(2) Nagel II, p.344; Pleiade I, p.1139,
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individuals coming together solely for the purposes of mutual 
destruction is unacceptable in itself:
* il ne faut pas, comme il fait, supposer les hommes comme 
tombés du ciel ou sortis tout armés de la terre, à peu près 
comme les soldats de Cadmus, pour s’entredétruire : ce n ’est
point là l ’état des hommes.
Taking up the theme of Letter XGIV, he maintains instead that 
a state of complete individual isolation would be of short 
duration, rapidly giving way before natural sociability in 
its instinctive form and the emergence of the family group:
’Le premier et le seul ne craint personne. Get homme 
seul, qui trouverait une femme seule aussi, ne lui ferait 
point la guerre. Tous les autres naîtront dans une famille, 
et bientôt dans une société. Il n ’y a point de guerre; au 
contraire, l ’amour, l ’éducation, le respect, la reconnaissance: 
tout respire la paix,*^2)
Two important and permanent features of Montesquieu's 
thinking about the origin of society are illuminated by this 
counter-argument. The first is that he retains the hypothe­
sis of a state of nature, but gives it a content not only 
radically different from that of Hobbes’s notion, but also 
largely at variance with that generally favoured by Natural 
Law theoreticians. In Montesquieu’s hands, as the idea of 
a natural state characterized by the existence of primitive 
social groups, it ceases to be a hypothesis whose sole 
validity lies in its purely logical necessity, and which was 
often openly acknowledged by its most enthusiastic exponents
(1) Hagel II, p.344; Pleiade I, p.1139
(2) Ibid.
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as being quite unrelated to historical probability.
Instead it acquires some of the qualities of a genuine 
scientific thesis. Por empirical evidence would indeed suggest 
that the complex institutional structure of a mature community 
could be traced back ultimately to the most basic form of 
social organization - the family group. In consequence of 
this changed conception, the transition, in Montesquieu’s 
theory, from a state of nature to a properly social state is 
no longer abrupt, nor artificially contrived. As we have 
mentioned, he shows no interest whatsoever in incorporating 
the notion of a social contract into his work. The old 
antithesis between a hypothetical world of isolated sovereign 
individuals and organized sovereign states made up of subject 
citizens thus disappears; and although it is quite clear from 
his outline of the complex factors which govern positive law 
in book I of the Lois for instance, that the inception of 
society properly speaking, marks the transition to a com­
pletely new level of social existence, this development 
nevertheless represents the fulfilment of all the latent 
potentialities of the state of nature, and of the individual 
in that state. Thus in the counter-argument to Hobbes, the 
implied evolution from family to society is linked with 
’1 ’amour, l'éducation, le respect, la reconnaissance’, fostered 
in the state of nature; and again at the end of the debate,
(1) E.g. Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, ch.13.
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Montesquieu indicates a natural continuity of development 
from one condition to the next:
'S'ils établissent les sociétés, c'est par un principe de 
justice. Ils l'avaient donc.'
Por him then the contrast between the state of nature and 
organized society is really the contrast between the primi­
tive and the mature form of the same phenomenon, not that 
between one phenomenon and another completely different.
The modifications which he imposes on the hypothesis 
of the state of nature are reflected in the fragment of the 
Devoirs incorporating his refutation of the patriarchalist 
justification of despotism that later found its way into 
Lois I, 3.(2) Here again his introduction to their argument 
makes it clear that he disputes not their recourse to the 
hypothesis of the state of nature as such, but the inferences 
that they draw from it.
'En considérant les hommes avant l'établissement des 
sociétés, on trouve qu'ils étaient soumis à une puissance que 
la nature avait établie: car l'enfance étant l'état de la
plus grande faiblesse qui se puisse concevoir, il a fallu que 
les enfants fussent dans la dépendance de leurs pères, qui 
leur avaient donné la vie, et qui leur donnaient encore les 
moyens de la conserver.
Ce que l'on dit n'est pas juste, sur le pouvoir sans 
bornes des pères: il ne l'est pas, et il n'y en a pas de tel. 
Les pères ont la conservation pour objet, comme les autres 
puissances, et encore plus que les autres puissances(2)
(1) Pensée 1267 (Bkn.616).
(2) Nagel II, p.345; Pléiade I, pp.1140-1141.
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The patriarchalist theoreticians erred not by faulty 
intuition of the probable nature of primitive existence - 
they traced society back to the family group, not to the 
individual - but by the inadequacy of the procedures used in 
the further elaboration of their theories. They drew an ana­
logy between the structure of the original social group, the 
family with its paternal head and dependent children, and 
the state with its monarchic ruler and dependent subjects.
Now although, as with Hobbes, Montesquieu’s real target is 
their justification of absolutism, the manner in which he 
discredits their argument is most significant for what it 
reveals about his own concepts and methods. Thus the use of 
analogy as a device for investigating the field of morals and 
politics is rejected because it is here unhistorical, and, 
by inference, time is a dimension that cannot be ignored in 
the truly scientific examination of social phenomena. Such 
an analogy is invalid because it assumes that the family is 
a static group, ignoring its inevitable and natural growth 
and fragmentation,
’La nature elle-même a borné la puissance paternelle en 
augmentant, d ’un côté, la raison des enfants^ ^t, de l ’autre, 
la faiblesse des pères; en diminuant, d ’un coté, les besoins 
des enfants, et augmentant, de l'autre, les besoins des pères,
Les familles se sont divisées; les pères étant morts ont 
laissé les collatéraux indépendants. Il a fallu s'unir par 
des conventions et faire par le moyen des lois civiles, ce 
que le droit naturel avait fait d'abord.
4 0  6
^Le hasard et le tour d'esprit de ceux qui ont convenu 
ont établi autant de différentes formes de gouvernements 
qu'il y a^eu de peuples; toutes bonnes, puisqu'elles étaient 
la volonté des parties contractantes.
Oe^qui était arbitraire est devenu nécessité; il n'a 
plus été permis qu'à la tyrannie et à la violence de changer 
une forme de gouvernement, même pour une meilleure: car,
comme tous les associés ne pouvaient point changer de manière 
de^penser en même temps, il y aurait eu un temps entre 
l'établissement des nouvelles lois et l'abolition des 
anciennes, fatal à la cause commune.
Il a fallu que tous les changements arrivés dans les lois 
établies fussent un effet de ces lois établies: celui qui a
aboli d'anciennes lois ne l'a pu faire que par la force des 
lois; et le peuple même n'a pu reprendre son autorité que 
lorsque cela lui a été permis par la loi civile ou naturelle.
Ce qui n'était que convention est devenu aussi fort que 
la loi naturelle; il a fallu aimer sa patrie comme on aimait 
sa famille; il a fallu chérir les lois comme on chérissait la 
volonté de ses pères.
Mais comme l'amour de la famille n'entraînait pas la 
haine des autres, aussi l'amour de sa Patrie ne devait point 
inspirer la haine des autres sociétés.'
The final paragraph of Montesquieu's counter-argument 
makes it clear that he himself did not reject outright the 
use of analogical methods in ethics; but equally obviously, 
its content is tailored to meet the requirements of the prin­
ciple invoked by his original objections, namely that an 
analogy is only valid when a real basis for comparison exists 
between the terms involved. The analogy drawn by the Patri- 
archalists was false because it left out of account the 
trans ience of paternal authority; as Montesquieu later para­
phrases himself in Lois I, 3:
(1) Nagel II, p.346; Pléiade I, pp. 1141-1142.
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'Mais l'exemple^du pouvoir paternel ne prouve rien» Car, si 
le pouvoir du père^a du rapport au gouvernement d'un seul, 
après la mort du père, le pouvoir des frères ou, après la 
mort des frères, celui des cousins germains ont du rapport 
au gouvernement de plusieurs.*
Now this condemnation of the abuse of the analogical 
method has a certain significance, if of a largely negative 
kind, for such interpretations of book I, as seek to demon­
strate its employment there for the isolation of normative 
principles.(2) In view of Montesquieu's insistence on a 
proper basis for comparison between the factors involved, it 
is most unlikely that he himself would have accepted the 
instinctive behaviour of animals as a valid criterion for 
judging the conduct of intelligent creatures. Apart from 
this indirect methodological relevance, the outline of the 
transition from family to society which he opposes to the 
patriarchalist case clearly proceeds from his own special 
conception of the state of nature, its basic assumption being 
that an embryonic form of society exists prior to the 
establishment of society in its true sense. Similarly, the 
causes which occasion the latter event are shown to originate 
in the very nature of the primitive community.
In passing it is perhaps also worth pointing to other 
important features of Montesquieu's political and social 
doctrine anticipated in this fragment. For example, again in
(1) Nagel I, p.8 ; Pleiade II, p.237.
(2) See above pp.5^2-58?'
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relation to book I of the Lois, the idea behind much of what 
he has to say about positive law in chapter 3 , indeed the idea 
that lies at the root of the work as a whole, namely that 
the political state of man constitutes an entirely new order 
of existence governed hy its own very complex laws, is already 
present here:
'Ge qui n'était que convention est devenu aussi fort que 
la loi naturelle; il a fallu aimer sa patrie comme on aimait 
sa famille; il a fallu chérir les lois comme on chérissait la 
volonté des pères.'
And already allied to this, as one might expect, one discerns 
the notion of the overriding significance for the description 
and analysis of the political order of the 'esprit général' 
behind the explanation he advances, anticipating the cautious 
conservatism of the Lois, of the dangers attendant upon 
reform of political institutions:
'car, comme tous les associés ne pouvaient point changer de 
manière de penser en même temps, il y aurait eu un temps 
entre l'établissement des nouvelles lois et l'abolition 
anciennes, fatal à la cause commune.'
»
des
Although details of the actual mechanics of the transition 
from the natural to the social state are largely missing 
from the Lois, perhaps because Montesquieu wished to avoid 
associating his account with the conventional theory of a 
social contract, nevertheless chapter 3 reflects the idea 
expressed here that governments are established by a voluntary 
convention, for he there defines the civil state as 'la
reunion des volontés', and makes political organization
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conditional upon it.
These fragments from the Devoirs do indeed provide 
important evidence of a high degree of consistency in 
Montesquieu’s ideas concerning the origin and structure of 
political society, and also of a coherence in his social and 
moral theory in general which is easily overlooked. But 
concerning the particular concept of the state of nature, it 
is rather the Essai sur les causes qui peuvent affecter les 
esprits et les caractères which provides the most important 
if also most unusual clues to the transformation which it 
undergoes in his work.^^)
The second part of the Essai, which as a whole is of 
major significance for the genesis of the theory of causation 
embodied in the Lois, is devoted to a study of moral influ­
ences on the formation of individual and national character*
Of these the first and most extensive is education, of 
crucial significance Montesquieu explains, for perfecting 
the union of mind and body, and for developing the faculty 
of reason. Education however is virtually the exclusive 
property of civilized societies:
'nous la trouvons chez les nations policées. Là comme j'ai 
dit, nous en recevons une particulière dans notre famille, 
et une générale dans la société',(g)
(1) Shackleton dates the composition of the Essai between 1756 
and 1745, and that of books I-III of the Lois between 1741 
and 1745 (op.cit. above, p.^o n.2.; pp.258-259; 514).
(2) Nagel III, p.415; Pleiade II, p.54.
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and to prove his point, Montesquieu examines the mental 
equipment of barbarian.nations. The ideas of such peoples, 
he asserts, are restricted to those concerning self-preser­
vation; and the intellectual poverty and crudeness universal 
among them is demonstrated by the sterility of their 
languages :
'Ceux qui naissent chez un peuple barbare n'ont 
proprement que les idées qui ont du rapport à la conservation 
de leur être; ils vivent dans une nuit eternelle à l'égard 
de tout le reste. Là, les différences d'homme à homme, 
d'esprit à esprit, sont moins grandes: la grossièreté et la
disette d'idées les égalisent en quelque manière.
Une preuve qu'ils manquent d'idées, c'est que les langues
dont ils se servent sont toutes très stériles: non seulement
ils ont peu de mots, parce qu'ils ont peu de choses à exprimer, 
mais aussi ils ont peu de manières de concevoir et de sentir.
The American natives are singled out as an example; experience 
shows these tribes to be incapable of discipline or correction, 
quite closed in fact to any kind of instruction. To all 
intents and purposes, such peoples are practically indistinguish­
able from wild beasts, so great is their mental stupopir:
'La grossièreté peut aller à un tel point chez ces
nations que les hommes y seront peu différents des bêtes: 
témoin ces esclaves que les Turcs tirent de Oircassie et de 
Mingrélie, qui passent toute la journée la tête penchée sur 
leur estomac, sans parole et sans action, et ne s'intéressent 
à rien de ce qui se passe autour d'eux.
Des cerveaux ainsi abandonnés perdent leurs fonctions: 
ils ne jouissent presque pas de leur âme, ni elle de son 
union avec le corps.'(2)
(1) Nagel III, p.414; Pléiade II, p.53.
(2) Nagel III, p.414; Pléiade II, pp.53-54.
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Two points which Montesquieu makes in this description 
of the mental capacities of primitive nations link it with his 
accounts of the condition of men in the state of nature.
These are that primitive people are very limited, and that 
such ideas as they do possess are restricted to the business 
of self-preservation. In addition, the comparison between 
savages and beasts anticipated the notion implicit in 
Lois I, 1, and understood as regards I, 2, that man shares 
with other animals the characteristics and behaviour which 
arise from the purely sensuous part of his nature. Now 
these points of contact again suggest that the essential 
features of Montesquieu's account of the state of nature, 
at least as it appears in chapter 2 of the Lois, if not in 
the earlier fragments (although the intimate connection 
between these two is beyond question), rested on a scientific 
foundation. Once one conceeds the significance of this part 
of the Essai sur les causes, not perhaps as the primary 
stage in the gestation of his ideas about the primitive con­
dition of mankind, but certainly as representing more 
directly, in view of the straightforward scientific design of 
the whole, the empirical origins of his thinking, then one 
can reasonably maintain that the conclusions provided by the 
analysis of more theoretical materials are confirmed. The 
psychological grounds for the distinction he draws in the 
Essai between primitive and civilized peoples coincide 
exactly with those characteristics which he attributes to man
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in the natural state in the fragments of the Devoirs and in 
the Loiso Moreover, not only is there evidence in the 
theoretical passages of the Devoirs that the state of nature 
is seen not as a condition of complete individual isolation, 
but as a time when the most basic forms of communal life are 
already in being, but there also exists a short fragment 
devoted to the inestimable value of scholarship, where the 
contrast drawn between barbaric and civilized peoples seems 
to anticipate the very theories later developed in the Essai, 
as well as the way in which they are reflected in the account 
of the origin of political society given in the Lois:
*La seule difference qu'il y a entre les peuples polices 
et les peuples barbares, c'est que les uns se sont appliqués aux 
aux sciences; les autres les ont absolument négligées*
C'est peut-être à ces connaissances que nous avons, et 
que les peuples sauvages ignorant, que la plupart des nations
doivent leur existence.
It therefore seems justifiable to conclude that Montesquieu 
derived his conception of the state of nature from a picture, 
pieced together at an early date from the accounts of tra­
vellers and missionaries, of the condition and mentality of 
barbarian peoples*
further evidence of such an origin is to be found in a 
variety of other fragments, noted down in the Pensées over 
quite a lengthy period, where barbarian peoples are consist­
ently presented as devoid of any political attributes. Time
(1) Pensée 1263 (Bkn.613); Nagel II, p.338; Pleiade I, p*1134.
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and again Montesquieu describes them as destitute of laws 
and civil institutions, ignorant of any duties, in short, 
'hommes et non pas citoyens'; and here also his observations 
appear to have been inspired by documentary accounts of 
primitive tribes, )
Yet if it is indeed true that Montesquieu anticipated
social anthropology in the way he envisaged the state of
nature, intentionally transforming it from a dialectically
convenient conjecture into an empirically demonstrable phase
of man's existence as a social animal, as likely with some
tribes to have continued into the present as with civilized
nations to be unimaginably remote in time, then one may well
wonder why his presentation of it in the Lois is so styled
as to almost completely obscure such crucial modifications
of meaning, for example its denotation of a primitive,
a-political, but ^ ^essentially social or communal condition
is only faintly discernible in the turns given to one or two
(l) Two of the fragments in question. Pensée 498 (Bkn.567) and 
Pensée 1555 originated in the lost Histoire de la Jalousie, 
written some time before 1732$ Pensë'e 498 comprises 
material roughly paraphrased from Herodotus's Histories 
Bk.IV, dealing with the customs of Libyan tribes. 
Montesquieu's comment upon them: 'Pour les peuples de
l'intérieur, ils étaient si barbares qu'ils n'avaient point 
de lois. Hommes,et non pas citoyens, ils respiraient l'air 
et ne vivaient pas. La plupart ne connaissaient point le 
mariage et ne trouvaient les enfants qu'à la ressemblance,' 
(Nagel II, p.175; Pléiade I, p.1070), was renoted at 
Pensée 1555 in vol,II soon after 1741 when the composition 
of the first books of the Lois was underway; cf. Pensée 
1379 (Bkn.1754) which also appears in vol.II: 'Par
l'éducation, on apprend aux hommes leurs devoirs, à
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(2) mesure qu'ils sont en état de les connaître; on leur
apprend, en quelques années, ce que le Genre humain n'a 
pu savoir qu'après un très grand nombre de siècles, et 
ce que les peuples sauvages ignorent encore aujourd'hui,' 
(Nagel II, p.408; Pléiade I, p,1419.)
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apparently insignificant phrases. Thus eventually one may 
perceive that the initial association of natural law with the 
condition of *un homme avant l'établissement des sociétés', 
and not with that of 'l'homme avant l'établissement de la 
société', together with the closing reference to intelligence 
as a link between men which, unlike feeling, is not shared 
with other animals and which consequently constitutes 'un 
nouveau motif de s'unir', can only point to the presence of 
the idea that human beings in the natural state already 
display certain forms of sociability, and that this state 
anticipates, not the establishment of community where pre­
viously nothing even remotely like it had existed, but the 
transition to distinct and separate societies, each endowed 
with its peculiar political institutions. More obviously of 
course, the factors which Montesquieu links with the insti­
tution of the third natural law; mutual apprehension, 
natural gregariousness, and so on, also presuppose some kind 
of community between individuals. But as regards the empi­
rical foundation of his theories, one notices only the 
passing reference to the timidity of 'les hommes sauvages', 
coupled with a brief footnote explaining that a typical 'wild' 
man had been found in the forests of Hanover and brought to 
England during the reign of George 1st.
Apart from Montesquieu's natural and almost self-defeat­
ing terseness, the evident explanation for the singular
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presentation of the chapter on natural laws is that it is 
dominated by the need to rebut Hobbes's theory of internecine 
war. Although the passage attacking Hobbes by name has 
every appearance of a digression, Montesquieu prepares for 
it at considerable length in so short a chapter, setting out 
the psychological basis of his counter argument from the 
assertion,
'L'homme, dans l'état de nature, aurait plutôt la faculté de 
connaître, qu'il n'aurait des connaissances',
onwards. Moreover, the style of his refutation, with its re­
peated references to man in a state of nature as if he were 
an isolated individual, culminating in the not entirely 
accurate recapitulation,
'J'ai dit que la crainte porterait les hommes à se fuir',
is obviously reminiscent of its original presentation in 
Pensée 1266 within an overtly hypothetical framework, the 
fantasy of two men popping up from nowhere in a desert. 
Montesquieu's preoccupation with Hobbes is also demonstrated 
in chapter 3 by the emphasis placed on the idea that the out­
break of war subsequent to the establishment of societies 
occasions the creation of positive laws, a notion again 
transferred from Pensée 1266. As we have already seen,^^) 
a related fragment contains an alternative explanation of 
their origin, namely the natural division and extension of
(l) See above pp. 405-4o6
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the family group. Now while this second theory is admittedly 
more closely linked to the subject of the actual mechanics 
of transition from a pre-social to a fully social state, a 
subject peripheral to Montesquieu's main theme, and while 
in any case the two explanations are by no means mutually 
exclusive, it would still have remained a perfectly viable 
alternative, even given Montesquieu's purpose of accounting 
in chapter 3 for international as well as civil and political 
laws. As it is, this valuable idea is merely acknowledged 
summarily at the end of the digression on patriarchalist 
theories: 'La puissance politique comprend nécessairement
l'union de plusieurs familles*.
The consequence of this anti-Hobbesian bias is thus a 
chapter on natural laws which whether incidentally or by 
design, retains something of the flavour of more orthodox 
prototypes to be found in the works of Grotius, Pufendorf and 
their numerous disciples. And quite apart from such distor­
tions as are attributable to polemical asides, it seems more 
than likely in view of his marked tendency to strive after a 
synthesis of traditional and modern c o n c e p t s , t h a t  at some 
stage Montesquieu consciously realized the possibility of 
reconciling certain elements of the conventional idea of the 
state of nature with his historical conception of social 
evolution. Por he shares such features of his thesis as the
(1) See above part II, chs. 1,2
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belief that the natural state, if not yet a fully social 
state, is at any rate one of sociability, not only with 
Grotius and Pufendorf, but with Thomasius, Boehmer and 
several other contemporary j u r i s t s . I t  is true that they 
simply recognized the illogicality of asserting the existence 
of a body of natural laws, unless it was conceded at the same 
time that natural legal obligation presupposed the existence 
of some kind of community; whereas for Montesquieu, the pro­
position was based at least in part on the empirical evidence 
of family and tribal life. But again, the most distinctive 
doctrine of all natural law theory, the idea that civil 
society could only be the artefact of intelligent individuals, 
also anticipates Montesquieu's psycho-sociological analysis 
of the development of primitive society, since the decisive 
factor in the transition from natural to political society re­
mained for him the ability to acquire and transmit knowledge.
These similarities however in no way undermine the 
essentially scientific nature of Montesquieu's thesis, even 
in the version of it that appears in the Lois. He envisages 
the state of nature not as a logical hypothesis, but as the 
simplest phenomenon to which complex societies may be 
reduced. Although it is difficult to estimate the extent of
(1) See 0. Gierke, Natural law and the theory of society, 
1500-1800, tr. E. Barker, Beacon Press, Boston, I960; 
ch.II, section 1, p.100 and p.290 n.l6.
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his acquaintance with the new empiricism, which after Locke 
and Newton,(2) gained more and more ground in the natural 
sciences, we know that he adapted its inductive methods and 
utilized them at least in part for his analysis of the incre­
dible diversity of laws and institutions to be found in t^e 
civilized world. But as he was at pains to point out at the 
very beginning of the work, social phenomena are far from 
possessing the same stability and uniformity as the physical 
universe; their analysis must be conducted in two dimensions 
at once, both the geopolitical and the historical. The 
dimension of time is not neglected in the Lois ; for instance 
there emerges from Montesquieu's analysis of positive laws 
an unmistakable distinction between the political forms 
characteristic of the ancient world and those of the modern. 
But ancient or modern, Asian or European, the admittedly 
scant and primitive documentation available suggested a
(1) E. Buss in her article Montesquieu und Cartesius, (see 
above p,376n.l.) made great play with the fact that 
Montesquieu's early scientific essays contain no reference 
to Locke and practically none to Newton either. The 
allusion in the Discours sur la cause de la transparence 
des corps (August 1720). repeated in the Observations sur 
l'histoire naturelle (November 1721), to Newton's experi­
ments to determine the relative opacity of bodies, does
not in her opinion outweigh the absence of any mention of
his theory of gravity in the Discours sur la cause de la 
pesanteur des corps (May 1720")1 But even if his knowledge 
of Newton was for a time restricted to the Optics, (he 
possessed Coste's translation, Amsterdam, 1720; Catalogue, 
No.1509 (p.lll)), this could still have been of some 
importance for his philosophical formation since the con­
clusion of the work comprises a summary of the principles
of the empirical method,
Montesquieu also possessed Coste's translation of 
Locke's Essay concerning human understanding in the 1700 
edition, (see above p.l43j*
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common original form to which all societies at least in their 
historical aspect could be reduced. The state of nature was 
for Montesquieu, as far as could be established, a final 
phenomenon in something of the same way that gravity for the 
physicist, was, at least provisionally, an irreducible ele­
ment of nature.
However, at a certain point, the analogy with the 
physical sciences ceases to be fruitful, for as was implied 
most forcibly, for instance, in the exposition of historical 
causation in the Considérations, the processes of evolution 
revealed by historical analysis were essentially irreversible. 
The state of nature v/as to all intents and purposes a unique 
stage, a process within a continuing process, whereas gra­
vity on the other hand, was a phenomenon as general and uni­
versal as the matter to which it was indissolubly linked. 
Consequently, although the natural laws which Montesquieu 
inferred from the simple psychological resources and primitive 
social behaviour of men in this condition completely describe 
it, their scope is strictly limited, extending beyond this 
level of social evolution only in so far as certain human 
attributes may be seen to remain constant.
Thus, considered in relation to the conception of He 
1 'Esprit des Lois as a whole, book I chapter 2 may be regarded 
as a minor but integral part of Montesquieu's sociological 
thesis. The descriptive principles isolated there properly
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belong to his scientific analysis of social phenomena, and 
to establish this beyond reasonable doubt is to make a valu­
able step forward in the search for the moral framework of 
his thinking, for, temporarily disregarding the ideas con­
tained in chapter 1, and conversely, in the absence of sub­
stantial evidence in the body of the work that Montesquieu 
consistently, if tacitly, subscribes to the basic assumption 
of ethical naturalism, namely that men ought to do what they 
habitually or instinctively perform, as soon as it is clear 
in chapter 2 that his concern for natural laws is in inspi­
ration scientific rather than moral, then one may reasonably 
conclude that the naturalistic fallacy is not built into his 
philosophy.
II
But apart from this negative evidence, the imputation to 
him of a scientific materialist creed is of course ruled out 
paradoxically by the very findings arising from the application 
of his own empirical procedures. No matter how rudimentary 
his methods and debatable his conclusions by our standards, 
the evidence of such materials as the Essai sur les Causes 
is that he considered as simple facts of nature, first that 
two distinct phases exist in the evolution of the human 
intellect; secondly, that in its mature condition, the mind 
inhabits a conceptual world radically different from the
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narrow sphere of crude sensation to which in its infancy it 
is confined, namely a world informed by the intangible prin­
ciples of morals and aesthetics, )
Apart from being reflected in Montesquieu's conception of 
the laws of nature, these findings were plainly also involved 
in the genesis or confirmation of the allied notion recurrent 
in chapter 1 of a hierarchy of beings and a corresponding 
hierarchy of laws:
'Les lois, dans la signification la plus étendue, sont 
les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des choses: 
et, dans ce sens, tous les êtres ont leurs lois; la Divinité 
a ses lois; le monde matériel a ses lois; les intelligences 
supérieures à l'homme ont leurs lois; les bêtes ont leurs 
lois; l'homme a ses lois.'(g)
(1) That the sensationalist core of the Essai does not prevent 
Montesquieu from acknowledging the validity of such prin­
ciples is demonstrated at two crucial points: his 
description of the function of education in its individual 
aspect as, '1 à nous procurer des idées; 2 à les 
proportionner à la juste valeur des choses.' (Nagel III, 
p.415; Pléiade II, p.54); and his portrait of the homme
d 'esprit, 'Un hojmne d'esprit connaît et agit de la 
maniéré momentanée dont il faut qu'il connaisse et qu'il 
agisse; il se crée, pour ainsi dire, à chaque instant, sur 
le besoin actuel; il sait et il sent le juste rapport qui 
est entre les choses et lui.' (Nagel III, p.418;
Pléiade II, p.57»)
(2) Nagel I, p.l; Pléiade II, p.232. A late and rather curious 
entry in the Pensées may confirm the empirical basis of 
this theory:
'Je disais qu'il était très naturel de croire qu'il y avait 
des intelligences supérieures à nous: car, en supposant
la chaîne des créatures que nous connaissons,^et les 
différents degrés d'intelligence, depuis l'huître jusqu'à 
nous, si nous faisions le dernier chaînon, cela serait^la' 
chose la plus extraordinaire, et il y aurait toujours à 
parier 2,3,400 mille ou millions contre un, que cela ne
serait pas, et que, parmi les créatures, ce fût nous qui 
eussions la première place, et que nous fussions la fin
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(2) du chaînon, et qu'il n'y a point d'être intermédiaire
entre nous et l'huître, qui ne pût raisonner comme nous.
Il est vrai que nous sommes les premiers parmi les 
êtres que nous connaissons. Mais, quand nous en 
concluons que nous sommes les premiers des êtres, nous 
triomphons de notre ignorance, et de ce que nous ne 
connaissons pas la communication de notre globe à un 
autre, ni même tout ce qui existe dans notre globe.'
1676 (Bkn.2204), Nagel II, p.498; Pleiade I, p.1574. 
Raymond Aron's Les Etapes de la Pensée sociologique (see 
above p.375, n.TT) contains in the chapter devoted to 
Montesquieu, a lucid and convincing demonstration to which 
I am much indebted, of how he utilizes the idea of 
hierarchy in order to salvage the relevance and authority 
of value judgements in face of the deterministic 
implications of his sociological thesis; see Part I, 
pp.57-60.
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As it emerges from this chapter, he conceives of a chain of 
created beings ascending from inanimate matter, through 
plant life, to animals, man and the higher intelligences, 
with the nature of each group in the hierarchy overlapping 
to a certain extent that of the group below. Thus plant 
life shares to a degree the attributes of inanimate creation, 
being ini motion and devoid of intelligence; and man shares 
with beasts the faculty of feeling, although his limited 
intelligence links him on the other hand with superior beings. 
The laws of organization and conservation related to the 
given nature of each group foma a corresponding hierarchy. 
Simple matter is governed by necessary and invariable laws, 
and in so far as they are all physical bodies, plants, 
animals and men, are governed by the same laws; but in so far 
as beasts and men are also sentient creatures, they share 
additional laws, which Montesquieu calls natural laws; and 
man alone, as a creature endowed with both mind and senses, 
is subject to a further complex made up of the transcendent 
laws of reason and various classes of positive law. But in 
Montesquieu's view, it also follows from human nature, more 
specifically from the limitations of human intelligence, 
that this last group of laws differs radically from the first. 
Whereas the laws of the physical universe constitute the 
invariable and necessary principles of its organization, the 
universal law of reason, the positive laws of man's own making.
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and to a certain extent, natural laws as well, while con­
tinuing to operate as causal principles, loCse the quality 
of necessity. Thus, though the nexus in which they combine, 
the institutional structure of societies, may be subjected 
to scientific and historical analysis, considered in relation 
to the actions of individuals they remain simple imperatives. 
Rational precepts, legal conventions or instinctive drives, 
man can and does ignore or contravene them. It is implicit
in what Montesquieu says in chapter 1 of God and man and
their laws, that given the freedom inseparable from intelli­
gence, the necessity and invariability characteristic of the 
physical universe could only reproduce themselves in the 
moral world if human reason imitated in every way the per­
fection of the divine. Invariable principles of conduct 
exist, but their recognition and implementation are condi­
tional upon men's intelligence and will, both imperfect.
Of God alone can it be declared:
*11 agit selon ces règles, parce qu'il les connaît; il les 
connaît parce qu'il les a faites, parce qu'elles ont du
rapport avec sa sagesse et sa puissance
Thus no matter how sterile the notion of a hierarchy of 
beings remains in itself as regards its relevance to juris­
prudence proper, it obviously constitutes the centrepiece of 
the philosophical foundation on which Montesquieu deliberately 
erected his study of laws. It enabled him to bring the
(1) Nagel I, p.2; Pléiade II, p.232.
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relationship of his scientific and moral principles into 
clear perspective; for through it the function and sphere of 
each kind of law is delimited, while at the same time they 
are all drawn back to his central concern with the human 
social predicament. If the evidence of the Essai sur les 
Causes for the empirical basis of the real burden of the 
theory of hierarchy, namely the idea of an autonomous intel­
lectual world incorporating knowledge of transcendent prin­
ciples, is accepted as valid, then the real measure of 
his only partially explicit determination in book I to meet 
and counter the exponents of ethical naturalism and legal 
positivism on their own ground can be gauged. At the same 
time, the conception of human intelligence embodied in the 
theory lendsweight to his own scientific aims, and illumi­
nates the limitation he imposes on them.^2) While on the 
one hand it enables him to vindicate the law of reason and 
the freedom of the individual as a moral agent, on the other, 
it prepares the way for the virtual apotheosis of the various 
kinds of positive law and precepts that he isolates. For 
they are presented as the means of salvation at the disposal 
of a creature of limited intelligence ;
(1) One may profitably compare the logic behind the empirical 
groundwork of Montesquieu's counter-argument with that 
which inspired the procedure adopted by Thomas Reid in 
his refutation of Hume in the Essays on the Active Powers, 
7, 7. Reid perceived that Hume's critique of rational 
idealism in the Treatise of Human Nature, III,l,i, could 
be countered by affirming the self evidence, self suffi­
ciency, and non-deductive nature of first moral principles.
(2) See above Pp, 3/8-^SO.
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’Un tel être pouvait, à tous les instants, oublier son 
créateur; Dieu l ’a rappelé à lui par les lois de la religion. 
Un tel être pouvait à tous les instants, s ’oublier lui-rntrae; 
les philosophes l ’ont averti par les lois de la morale.
Fait pour vivre dans la société, il y pouvait oublier les 
autres; les législateurs l ’ont rendu à ses devoirs par les 
lois politiques et civiles.
and these claims naturally enhance the value and significance 
of his own scientific analysis of the laws of society. Con­
versely, the very same postulate of a limited intelligence 
adds force to the cautious conservatism of the Preface;
'Chaque nation trouvera ici les raisons de ses maximes; et 
on en tirera naturellement cette conséquence, qu'il 
n'appartient de proposer des changements qu’à ceux qui sont 
assez heureusement nés pour pénétrer d'un coup de génie 
toute la constitution d'un État.'^2)
The close link which Montesquieu establishes between 
the faculty of reason and moral and positive laws also illumi­
nates in retrospect the versatility of his general definition 
of law. As various scholars have been eager to point out,^^\ 
Montesquieu broke new ground by incorporating in the defini­
tion set at the head of a political treatise, the idea that 
all knowledge is a knowledge of relations. Now the idea that 
justice and law were theoretically bound up with interpersonal 
relationships was a commonplace of jurisprudence which could 
be traced back to,Aristotle and b e y o n d ; i t  thus seems that
(1) Nagel I, p.4; Pléiade II, p.234.
(2) Nagel I, p.lx; Pléiade II, p.230.
(3) E.g. Ernst Cassirer, op.cit. above (p.280n.2.), ch.VI, 
part 1; pp.242-243; C.E. Vaughan, Studies in the History 
Qf Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau, 
Manchester U.P., 1923,vol.I,ch.3, p.2^0.
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(4) The notion is frequently present in Aristotle's references 
to justice and law, e.g.. Ethics, Bk.V, ch.6: 'Political
justice is manifested between persons who share a common 
way of life which has for its object a state of affairs in 
which they will have all that they need for an independent
existence as free and equal members of the society......
justice can exist only among those whose relations to one 
another are governed by law, and law exists only among 
those who may be guilty of injustice.'
G. del Vecchio in his historical study of the idea 
of justice traces its juridical formulation back to the 
Pythagoreans who added the idea of correspondence between 
opposite terms, and, by extension, of proportion in 
society, to the primitive Greek notion of order and har­
mony; see. Justice, an Historical and Philosophical Essay, 
trans. Guthrie, Edinburgh, 1952, ch.V.
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Montesquieu, in accordance with the aims avowed in the 
Preface, contrived to amalgamate the basic tenets of his 
creed both as scientist and as jurist. At some point the 
conceptual affinities between certain characteristic episte- 
mological assumptions associated with current methodological 
procedures, whether inductive or deductive, and this tradi­
tional axiom of his chosen discipline must have impressed 
ifsalf on his mind, and in consequence, his striking defini­
tion fits any and all of the categories of law to which he 
alludes in this first book.^^) First and foremost of course, 
the scientific laws governing the nature and evolution of 
societies may be envisaged in terms of the manifold relation­
ships between the environmental factors upon which positive 
laws are conditional; but it is equally possible to apply 
his definition of law as a necessary relationship to positive 
laws themselves, seen as symptoms of the life of men in mutual 
interrelation, or to the laws of the physical universe under­
stood as the invariable mathematical formulae which express
(1) Lettres Persanes XCVII suggests that Montesquieu may already 
have glimpsed some kind of analogy between the concepts of 
scientific and of positive law; *11 y a ici des philosophes 
qui, à la vérité, n'ont point atteint jusqu'au faite de la
sagesse orientale..... mais, laissés à eux-mêmes, ils
suivent, dans le silence, les traces de la raison humaine.
Tu ne saurais croire jusqu'où ce guide les a conduits. 
Ils ont débrouillé le cahos; et ont expliqué, par une
mécanique simple, l'ordre de l'architecture divine Que
les législateurs ordinaires nous proposent des lois pour 
régler les sociétés des hommes; des lois aussi sujettes au 
changement, que l'esprit de ceux qui les proposent, et des 
peuples qui les observent; ^ceux-ci ne nous parlent que des 
lois générales, immuables, éternelles, ^qui s'observent sans 
aucune exception, avec un ordre, une^régularité, et une 
promptitude infinie, dans 1'immensité des espaces.'
(Nagel I, pp.193-194; Pléiade I, pp.274-275.;_______________
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the structural and dynamic relationships of its parts; and 
indeed this is exactly what he invites us to do:
•les lois.... sont les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de 
la nature des choses: et dans ce sens tous les êtres ont
leurs lois •
Finally Montesquieu's definition anticipates his conception 
of positive law as the special property of the intelligent 
creature. For, if it proceeds from the assumption that 
relationship is an irreducible element of intelligence, then 
it follows that positive law, considered as an artefact of 
the human mind, will reflect those relationships, metaphysical, 
moral and physical, which it can encompass.
These remarks point to one inescapable conclusion with 
regard to the ontological basis of the argument in chapter 1. 
Every kind of law reflects indirectly or directly the way in 
which the nature of things is ordered. This conclusion 
Montesquieu himself puts into words when he writes,
'il y a donc une raison primitive; et les lois sont les 
rapports qui se trouvent entre elle et les différents êtres, 
et les rapports de ces divers êtres entre eux.'
The nature of things, even if not identical with rational 
thought as the Cartesians would have it, in that the clear 
and distinct idea epitomizes reality, is nonetheless con­
structed in such a regular way as to correspond exactly to 
it. In this Montesquieu undoubtedly aligned himself with 
classical rationalism. The peculiar logic embodied in his 
opening volley against materialism:
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'Ceux qui ont dit qu’une fatalité aveugle a produit tous les 
effets que nous voyons dans le monde, ont dit une grande 
absurdité; car quelle plus grande absurdité qu'une fatalité 
aveugle qui aurait produit des êtres intelligents?'
is not so very far removed from that of the cogito, for both 
imply that the evidence of coherent thought is the sign and 
guarantee of the nature of existence. For Montesquieu 
undoubtedly, as would befit a thinker acquainted with the 
theories of sensationalist epistemology, it is the mode as 
well as the fact of intellection which, rather than simple 
experience of lucid consciousness, carries most metaphysical 
significance. The orderly sequence of our ideas is proof of 
the regular and invariable structure of external nature from 
which they are formed. On the basis of this reasoning he 
thus suggests that existence without harmony and uniformity 
is inconceivable:
'si l'on pouvait imaginer un autre monde que celui-ci, il 
aurait des règles constantes, ou il serait détruit';
similarly, he defines these rules as
'un rapport constamment établi',
adding the rider,
'chaque diversité est uniformité, chaque changement est 
constance.'
Here perhaps it would be even more apt to draw a com­
parison between Montesquieu's thinking and the primitive
(1) Nagel I, p.2; Pléiade II, p.232
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Cartesian intuition of a fundamental correspondence between 
the laws of nature and the laws of mathematics embodied in 
the Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, w h i c h  antedates the 
cogito though its repercussions on the progress of science 
were more profound and enduring. This postulate was indeed 
carried over into Newtonian physics, in so far as Newton and 
his disciples, though eager to reject the inference that the 
real structure of the physical world could be produced by 
mathematical deduction operating in a void, still recognized 
no divorce between the world of fact and the world of ideas. 
Newton presupposed the existence of universal law, and indeed 
set out to put empirical procedures to work in demonstrating 
it.(2) To a certain extent therefore, the speculation which 
Montesquieu allows himself in chapter 1 is explicable and 
acceptable in terms of the most fundamental philosophical 
assumptions of the two scientific traditions with which he 
was in contact, and hence also, it goes almost without saying, 
compatible with his own scientific aims and methods.
Further to this however, it is worth elaborating the 
point that in spite of the Cartesian affinities of Montesquieu's 
thinking in chapter 1, it can have been no part of his design 
to exploit the full resources of Cartesian epistemology for 
the purpose of establishing the invariability of the moral law.
(1 ) See above pp. 12.-15*
(2) See Cassirer, op.cit.t. above (p.280n,2.), ch.l.
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This he achieves by positing a structural analogy between the 
physical and the moral world: logically, the uniformity and
invariability exhibited by the one will be equally character­
istic of the other, and presumably, the intelligibility of 
the nature of things which supports the postulate of a primi­
tive reason, will guarantee both. Thus he writes:
'Dire qu'il n'y a rien de juste ni d'injuste que ce qu'ordon­
nent ou défendent les lois positives, c'est dire qu'avant 
qu'on eût tracé de cercle, tous les rayons n'étaient pas 
égaux. '
Just as the invariable laws of mathematics express the struc­
ture of the universe, so also the invariable relationships 
between intelligent creatures express the archetypal struc­
ture of the moral world, for it is as impossible to conceive 
of the existence of society without laws, as of that of the 
material world:
'Avant qu'il y eût des êtres intelligents, ils étaient 
possibles; ils avaient donc des rapports possibles, et par 
conséquent des lois possibles. Avant qu'il y eût des lois 
faites, il y avait des rapports de justice possibles.'^2)
Now Montesquieu identifies these invariable laws of the moral 
world, it is true, by a deductive process; working from the 
premise of essentially intelligent, and therefore essentially 
equal beings, he infers for example that they will be bound 
together in society by relationships of mutual respect and 
gratitude, which in their various forms will constitute its 
necessary laws:
(1) Nagel I, p.3; Pléiade II, p.233.
(2) Ibid.
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'suppose qu'il y eût des sociétés d'hommes, il serait juste 
de se conformer à leurs lois; que s'il y avait des êtres 
intelligents qui eussent reçu quelque bienfait d'un autre 
être, ils devraient en avoir de la reconnaissance ; que si un 
être intelligent avait créé un être intelligent, le créé 
devrait rester dans la dépendance qu'il a eue dès son origine; 
qu'un être intelligent, qui a fait du mal à un être 
intelligent, mérite de recevoir le même mal, et ainsi du 
reste. '
It is difficult to describe such a procedure as anything but 
Cartesian, in that Montesquieu is apparently convinced that 
knowledge of the particular nature of the moral world can be 
derived from general concepts. But it is essentially a 
Cartesian excursion in an argument which in Montesquieu's 
estimation may well have possessed a solid empirical ground­
work. For his notion of human intelligence takes into account 
the paradoxical experience of human error and human incon­
sistency, against which he checks his own conjectures. Thus 
in the text, hypothesis gives way to description:
'Mais il s'en faut bien que le monde intelligent soit 
aussi bien gouverné que le monde physique. Car, quoique 
celui-là ait aussi des lois qui, par leur nature, sont 
invariables, il ne les suit pas constamment comme le monde 
physique suit les siennes. La raison en est que les êtres 
particuliers intelligents sont bornés par leur^nature, et par 
conséquent sujets à l'erreur; et, d'un autre coté, il est de 
leur nature qu'ils agissent par eux-mêmes. Ils ne suivent 
donc pas constamment leurs lois primitives; et celles même 
qu'ils se donnent, ils ne les suivent pas toujours,’ 2^)
The laws of the moral world, though invariable, are demonstrably 
not necessary.
(1) Hagel I, p.3; Pléiade II, p.233.
(2) Hagel I, p.3; Pléiade II, pp.233-234
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And. entirely in keeping with his acknowledgement of 
human limitations, Montesquieu himself never claims that the 
validity of these laws resides in their self-evidence, or in 
their universality as innate principles. In book I he 
implies consistently that knowledge is but a secondary and 
precarious possession of the human animal; and indeed perhaps 
most significant of all is his preference when refering to 
man's rational capacities for such terms as connaissances and 
la faculté de connaître over raison or lumière naturelle.
On this point his epistemology is completely compatible with 
the sensationalist psychological theories of the Essai sur 
les Causes, and one infers therefore that he remained in full 
agreement with his master Locke in regarding knowledge of the 
law of reason as something essentially acquired and not 
necessarily universally d i s t r i b u t e d . A s  his drily humo­
rous allusion to the law of the Iroquois in chapter 3 demon­
strates, he could not have endorsed that kind of unqualified 
idealism most strikingly illustrated at the turn of the
(1) When in chapter 3 he refers for the first time to la 
raison, the context reveals plainly that he here regards 
it as a discursive faculty: 'La loi, en général, est la 
raison humaine, en tant qu'elle gouverne tous les peuples 
de la terre; et les lois politiques et civiles de^chaque 
nation ne doivent être que les cas particuliers où 
s'applique cette raison humaine.'
(2) See above pp. 409-412 and pp. 146'147
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century in the writings of the mainstream apologists of 
natural religion:
’Toutes les nations ont un droit des gens; et les Iroquois 
même, qui mangent leurs prisonniers, en ont un. Ils envoient 
et reçoivent des ambassades; ils connaissent des droits de la 
guerre et de la paix: le mal est que ce droit des gens n'est
pas fondé sur les vrais principes.
He would no doubt have confirmed the references to ordo and 
convenientia in the definition of natural laws produced for 
example by the Genevan theologian J.A. Turrettini:
'Nihil sunt igitur leges Naturales, nisi Rationis ipsius 
dictamina, quae ex ipso rerum ordine et convenientia tamquam 
ex fonte deducuntur, suaraque secum demonstrationem et 
confirmationem ferunt.'^^^
but surely little else besides.
Thus although there remains an obvious and important 
metaphysical element in Montesquieu's moral as in his natural 
philosophy, the speculative rôle of reason is severely 
limited. Indeed, bearing in mind the primary importance of 
an analogy between the structure of the world of human rela­
tionships and that of the material universe, not only in 
establishing the invariability of the moral law, but also in 
determining his approach to positive laws, one is hardly
(1) For accounts of their works see among others A. Monod,
De Pascal à Chateaubriand, Paris, 1916, chs.I-V; P.A. Sayous, 
Histoire de la Littérature française à 1 'Étranger, vol.I, 
bk.l, chs. 5,6; and C.L. Thijssen-Schoute, 'Le Cartésianisme 
aux Pays-Bas', in Descartes et le Cartésianisme hollandais, 
Paris, 1950. ^
(2) Nagel I, pp.7-8; Pléiade II, p.237.
(3) Cogitationes et Dissertationes theologicae, Geneva, 1737; 
VIII, 'De Theologia naturali'«
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surprised when he imposes the major burden of redeeming human 
imperfection upon reason applied discursively in the art of 
the legislator. Moreover, the metaphysical premiss which 
underpins both his scientific and moral vision, namely that 
the structure of things is dependent on primitive reason and 
is therefore constant and intelligible, was as we have already 
noted, as much an axiom of natural science for Newton as it 
had been for Descartes, or indeed for Kepler and Galileo.
This very presupposition seems to have inspired the conviction 
expressed in the closing paragraphs of the Optics that the 
perfecting of natural philosophy would in turn extend the 
boundaries of moral science:
'For so far as we can know by natural philosophy what is
the first Cause, what power he has over us, and what Benefits
we receive from him, so far our duty towards him, as well as 
that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of 
Nature
Montesquieu infringes the Newtonian canon only in so far as 
he refuses to abandon his moral hypotheses when they fail 
the test of experience; but in his defence it must be said 
that to have done so would have been to sabotage at the same 
time, by a denial of primitive reason, the very foundations 
of his science of law. The only solution open to him, apart 
from introducing as he does the notion of the imperfection of
the moral world, would have been to adopt an essentially
(1) Optics, London, 1719, trans. S. Clarke; Bk.III, quest.31,
p.381.
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Spinozist standpoint, positing the identity of the ideal and 
the natural, however imperfect the latter according to con­
ventional standards.
However it is virtually impossible to accept that such 
a retreat into rigorous determinism could ever have been con­
templated by Montesquieu as a deliberate and conscious devel­
opment of his premisses, at least as long as one credits his 
sincerity when condemning Spinoza's alleged immorality in the 
Traité des Devoirs, and declaring in the Defense de l'Esprit 
des Lois his intention of refuting such nefarious doctrines.
When Charles Bonnet a decade after the Lois objected in 
his Essai analytique sur les Facultés de l'ime to Montesquieu's 
definition of laws as 'des rapports', on the grounds that he 
was in fact really concerned with the results of relation­
ships between the essences and qualities of objects as fixed 
by a 'raison primitive',^2) ùis objection originated in the
(1) cf. Pensée 1266 (Bkn.615): 'II (Spinoza) m'ote le motif 
de toutes mes actions et me soulage de toute la morale.
Il m'honore jusqu'au point de vouloir que je sois un très 
grand scélérat sans crime et sans que personne ait le droit 
de le trouver mauvais.' (Nagel II» p.343 ; Pléiade I, 
pp.1138-1139), and Défense, 'Réponse à la première 
objection': 'L'auteur a dit que les lois étaient un
rapport nécessaire: voilà donc du spinosisme, parce que
voilà du nécessaire. Et ce qu'il y a de surprenant, c'est 
que l'auteur, chez le critique, se trouve spinosiste à 
cause de cet article, quoique cet article combatte 
expressément les systèmes dangereux.' (Nagel I, p.436; 
Pleiade II, p.1123.)
(2) Op.cit. (1760), 2nd. ed. 1769, Copenhagen and Geneva; 
ch.27, art.856.
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awareness of a similarly deterministic development. Bonnet’s 
idea is that the laws governing intellectual behaviour can be 
isolated in exactly the same way as the laws governing the 
organization of matter, human psychology being sufficiently 
uniform and human experience sufficiently homogenous :
'Le monde intelligent est donc gouverné par des lois 
invariables; car il n ’est point d ’être intelligent qui 
n ’agisse d ’une manière conforme à son Essence intellectuelle, 
ou aux idées qu’il se fait des choses.
But this is precisely to overlook the crucial distinction which 
Montesquieu draws between the way men do behave and the way 
they should; for although Bonnet’s criticism admittedly 
proceeds from a more faithful application of empirical prin­
ciples in the field of ethics, Montesquieu, while forced to 
conceed that the moral law cannot be considered necessary in 
the same way as physical laws, does succeed by conserving the 
traditional notion of human imperfection, essentially theolo­
gical maybe, but in itself only too frequently confirmed by 
experience, in salvaging the autonomy of reason and the 
transcendence of first principles.
Montesquieu’s definition of laws as ’les rapports 
nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des choses’ is rooted 
then in a particular vision of the structure of the universe, 
originating in, and largely guaranteed by a profoundly
(1) Essai analytique sur les Facultés de 1’Ane, ch.27, art.857, 
p.313.
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mathematical conception of the processes of reason and the 
form of knowledge. This view of intelligence as the percep­
tion and reconstruction of the relationships linking things 
together in a regular and harmonious manner, in fact enables 
him to establish the interdependence of their ideal structure 
and their existence as phenomena, to posit the homogeneity of 
moral or metaphysical and scientific knowledge.
Just as the discovery and demonstration of the order of 
the material universe leads to the formulation of physical 
laws, so also he aims to show, the infinitely more complex 
phenomena of that part of the intellectual world which com­
prises man's existence as a political creature may be reduced 
to regular patterns wherein we shall discern '1'esprit des 
lois'. To this point nothing in fact stands between 
Montesquieu's thinking and that which lay behind Bonnet's 
criticism, except the terms in which Montesquieu chooses to 
formulate his definition of laws. But the very evidence of 
active intelligence provided by human capacity for ratio­
cination seems to have constituted decisive proof in 
Montesquieu's mind, of the age old assumption that as regards 
the intellectual world, in traditional terms, as regards his 
historical destiny, man is engaged in a more creative role 
than that of a simple pawn. That is not to say that he is 
increate in the sense that omniscience equips him to shape 
himself with complete freedom; on the contrary, all evidence
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points to the fact that he is involved in a process the 
dynamics and purpose of which are largely inaccessible to 
him; in the words of the remarks in the Spicilege which anti­
cipate the description of the human condition in chapter 1 of 
the Lois :
'La liberté est en nous une imperfection: nous sommes 
libres et incertains, parce que nous ne savons pas certainement 
ce qui nous est le plus convenable. Il n'en est pas de même 
de Lieu: comme il est souverainement parfait, il ne peut
jamais agir que de la manière la plus parfaite.
But on the other hand human beings are far removed from the 
complete passivity of inanimate matter; they are not, to 
borrow a metaphor from Lettres Persanes LXIX, simply billiard 
balls set on a collision course by some unseen hand. They are 
consciously involved in their destiny, and some if not all of 
its mechanisms are accessible to them. Thus the world of 
intelligence, or, seen from a different angle, the phenomenon 
of history, is not only a scientific object of the human mind, 
but the very element of its own existence and activity.
Furthermore, the nature and purpose of this activity 
will be determined by the nature and extent of the knowledge 
at its disposal. This falls into two categories; intelligence 
of the individual predicament, and knowledge of the historical, 
cultural and physical environment. Given the classical notion 
of human nature as a stable entity, immutable in its essential
(1) Op.cit. M S . 336; Nagel II, p.787; Pleiade I, p.1542
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elements, and the common acceptance of mathematics as the 
prototype of all knowledge, then the former in an ethical 
context, emerges as a vision of the individual hound to his 
peers in society by fundamental relationships of reciprocity. 
These are understood as invariable moral laws, precepts 
inseparable from the very condition of humanity, and they 
must be distinguished from the causal principles constituting 
the second category of knowledge, which, though they also 
bear upon individual actions as part of the historical process, 
govern a vaster, more intricate and fluctuating pattern of 
relationships, linking the various phenomena of human orga­
nization with those of the material universe, a pattern still 
in the making, and consequently comprehensible only in part 
and in retrospect. These are the principles and causes which 
necessarily determine the context of actions and the forms of 
institutions, and knowledge of them is indeed an essential 
prerequisite of just behaviour; but in themselves they are 
amoral forces operating upon human destiny, and even where 
they are discovered and systematized, they cannot be erected 
into criteria of the justice or injustice of our deeds. This 
can only be decided by reference to the moral imperatives 
associated with human nature, which nevertheless demand to be 
fulfilled within the actual circumstances imposed by external 
causes.
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Knowledge of the moral and scientific laws relative to 
the real predicament of human agents boils down then to 
knowledge of a variety of relationships either ideal or 
actual; and the transformation of this knowledge into just 
action requires the perfect harmonizing of the two. Justice 
may thus be said to consist in the realization or conservation 
within the causal nexus of the essential or ideal structure 
of society; to borrow the terms of Montesquieu’s definition 
in Lettres Persanes LXXXIII, it does indeed consist in the 
perception of a 'rapport de convenance'.
A further explanation beyond the perfectly natural 
appropriation of a dominant feature of contemporary scientific 
epistemology, accordingly suggests itself for Montesquieu's 
controversial definition of laws as relationships. It can 
clearly be related to the moral impetus behind his scientific 
investigations, which induces him to eschew any formula too 
closely identifying the ideal with the real order of things.
As it stands, Montesquieu's definition: 'les lois, dans la
signification la plus étendue, sont les rapports nécessaires 
qui dérivent de la nature des choses', conveniently fits both 
moral and scientific categories of law. 'La nature des 
choses* signifies not just order of being, but by extension 
also the horizon of man's knowledge of the structure of the 
ideal as of the real world; so that the statement as a whole
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becomes on reflection an introduction to the central discussion 
of the moral predicament of the human being as an intelligent 
agent.
For this reason the provocative interpretation of the 
definition presented by Roger Mercier in an article on the 
notion of moral lav/ in Montesquieu's works is virtually 
impossible to a c c e p t . Mercier's ingenious thesis is that 
Montesquieu combines in his definition two elements: neces­
sity, and the notion of relationship, which provide the key 
to his philosophical attitudes at various stages of his 
development, as well as symbolizing the methods employed in 
his investigations. Necessity is the notion central to his 
early idealism as expounded in the Traité des Devoirs.
There then followed a discernible transfer of emphasis to 
relativist conceptions, after his travels had broadened his 
intellectual horizons, a change reflected in a diminishing 
reliance on a priori methods, and an increased use of obser­
vation and experiment. This change is echoed in the defini­
tion by the presence of the notion of relationship, which 
anticipates the materialistic determinism and legal positivism 
implicit in the main sociological thesis of the Lois.
(1) 'La Notion de la Loi morale chez Montesquieu', published 
in Literature and Science, Blackwell, 1955, being the 
proceedings of the 6th. triennial congress of the 
International Federation for Modern Language and Literature, 
held in Oxford, 1955.
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Clearly to ignore the presence of a partly scientific 
attitude to ethics in the Lois would amount to a preposterous 
denial of the work's originality; nevertheless the signifi­
cance which Mercier attributes to the introduction of this 
idea of relationship seems basically misconceived. For not 
only does he overlook the fundamental importance of the notion 
of mathematical relationship in orthodox Cartesian thinking, 
and perhaps even more significant for Montesquieu, its ready 
association in Malebranche with the notion of necessary 
universal law; but also the possibility that defining law as 
a relationship was in fact one of the most important means which 
Montesquieu employed to avoid, by the exclusion of arbitrary 
or descriptive connotations, conveying the impression of a
rigid determinism.
(l) Mercier*8 documentation is in part also open to question. 
For instance, it is doubtful whether Pensée 1946 which is 
made up of early fragments, constitutes valid proof that 
after 1730 sensationalism dominated Montesquieu's philoso­
phical outlook. Quite apart from the awkward presence 
there of a passage which contradicts basic sensationalist 
assumptions: 'Lieu nous trompe-t-il parce que les sens,
ces infidèles témoins nous déçoivent a chaque instant?
Non, sans doute.....', the fragments as a whole reflect 
the preoccupations of an earlier period, such as the con­
troversy over the respective merits of paganism and 
atheism. Similarly, other evidence put forward to illu­
strate the trend towards empiricism - the Observations sur 
l'Histoire naturelle, for example, can be dated before 
1725, and simply illustrate Montesquieu's interest in 
natural science and to a certain extent his application of 
Cartesian mechanist principles in this sphere. It is 
perhaps important when evaluating such material to bear in 
mind that the Cartesians were not averse to experimentation 
as such; they simply rejected its primary importance in 
science. The mathematician Pierre Varignon's Nouvelles 
Conjectures sur la Pesanteur, Paris, 1690, contains an
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(1) amusing illustration of their prejudices; Mersenne,
experimenting with a vertically aimed canon, and persi­
stently losing the ball, refers the enigma to Descartes: 
'cependant, M, Descartes, qui était accoutumé aux choses 
extraordinaires, n'en fut point surpris; du moins, il le 
dit, et mande au Père Mersenne, que cette expérience 
s'accommode le mieux du monde avec sa manière d'expliquer 
la pesanteur.' (p.11.)
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However such criticisms do not detract from the validity 
of Mercier's final verdict that Montesquieu's doctrine of 
liberty betrays an overriding metaphysical optimism, an opti­
mism which he describes in terms of faith in the power of 
knowledge to perfect the universal order;
'le déterminisme qui règne dans le monde réel ne rend pas 
vain le désir de promouvoir un monde idéal, car celui-ci ne 
pourrait être qu'un monde où l'obéissance aux lois de la nature 
serait parfaite, et c'est la science qui, en définissant ces 
lois, rend possible le progrès.
How while the logical consequence of Montesquieu's 
equation of liberty with imperfection is indeed that perfec­
tion and necessity, invariability and omniscience hang together- 
one recalls the description of the act of creation in Lois 1,1,
'Ainsi la creation, qui paraît être un acte arbitraire, suppose 
des règles aussi invariables que la fatalité des athées' -
it is difficult in view of his contrasting emphasis on human 
imperfection, and of the historical pessimism which pervades 
his examination in the Lois of the fortunes of states, to 
envisage this optimism in terms of a belief in the perfecting 
of the natural order simply through scientific progress. 2^)
(1) 'La Notion de la Loi morale chez Montesquieu'^, p. 192.
(2) In his article 'Montesquieu et l'Esprit cartésien' (see 
above p . 251^.2.) G.J. Beyer's account of the nature of 
Montesquieu's optimism and its relation to his analysis 
of the nature of things seems much closer to the truth:
' ce qui distingue la justice du mécanisme,^ c'est
qu'elle est un ordre idéal, qui demande à se réaliser dans 
l'ordre temporel par l'activité libre des volontés humaines. 
Les 'rapports de convenance' qui la constituent ne 
s'expriment pas automatiquement; et, en passant par les
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(2) limitations humaines, la perfection de la justice s ’altère; 
les rayons des cercles traces de main d ’homme ne sont 
jamais parfaitement justes, ni entièrement injustes.
Mais nos imperfections ne prouvent rien contre la 
géométrie, ni contre la morale; au contraire, c ’est la 
perfection de ces dernières qui seule confère quelque 
valeur à nos réalisations.' (p.169.)
This opinion complements R. Hubert's conclusion in 
'Le Devenir historique chez Montesquieu' (see above p.221 
n. 2 ), that Montesquieu's philosophy adds up to a theory 
of 'devenir' but not of progress.
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Montesquieu's optimism is much more traditional in mould, 
moral rather than scientific, in the sense that he persists 
in analysing the human condition partly in terms of individual 
decisions and actions. Thus it must be defined in terms of 
a belief in the capacity of the individual to emulate divine 
perfection by acting justly, though of course such achieve­
ment does indeed depend upon knowledge - knowledge of the 
moral as well as the natural order. One may infer from this 
the possibility of a kind of personal scientific progress, 
but by no means the wholesale transformation, through the 
invention and application of techniques which imitate natural 
processes, of the destinies of nations.
A key passage from the Essai sur les Causes demonstrates 
the humanistic individualism of Montesquieu's approach to 
morals and also confirms the importance for him of that 
imponderable criterion proportion or harmony. He does not 
conceive of the intelligence which would characterize human 
perfection solely in terms of the possession of boundless 
erudition, but in terms of the rare capacity to impose a 
proper order upon acquired knowledge; 'l'éducation', he says, 
'consiste à nous donner des idées, et la bonne éducation à 
les mettre en proportion'. And he goes on to describe the 
singular attributes of the 'homme d'esprit';
'Un homme d'esprit connaît et agit de la manière 
momentanée dont il faut qu'il connaisse et qu'il agisse; il 
se crée, pour ainsi dire, à chaque instant, sur le besoin
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actuel; il sait et il sent le juste rapport qui est entre les 
choses et lui. Un homme d'esprit sent ce que les autres ne 
font que savoir. Tout ce qui est muet pour la plupart des 
gens lui parle et l'instruit. Il y en a qui voient jusqu'à 
l'àme. On peut dire qu'un sot ne vit qu'avec les corps; les 
gens d'esprit vivent avec les intelligences^^
This passage completes Montesquieu's moral theory by 
providing pointers to the way in which he would reconcile his 
vision of the ideal structure of things, epitomized in the 
definition of justice given in Lettres Persanes LXXXIII,
'la justice est un rapport de convenance qui se trouve 
réellement entre deux choses',
with the determination implicit in his definition of laws as
'les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des 
choses'
to discover and exploit the principles governing historical 
reality. Now and then the ideal is realized by the perfec­
ting of human intelligence. Knowledge of the natural and 
moral laws, the 'rapports nécessaires', is essential but not 
sufficient for this achievement, since it depends rather on 
a process of active synthesis. This consists in the brief 
glimpsing of the transcendent design of the universal order 
of things, of the totality of those 'rapports de convenance' 
which forms the object of divine intelligence, the very ground 
and purpose of being, and which includes and completes the 
imperfections of the purely human order. Justice is then, 
not an imitation of the determinism apparent in the processes
(1) Nagel III, p.418; Pléiade II, p.57.
45 1
of nature, but of the necessity of perfect wisdom to which 
God himself is subject. Thus Montesquieu presents the 
’homme d ’esprit’ as one equipped to create himself within the 
grand scheme of things:
’II se cree, pour ainsi dire, à chaque instant, sur le besoin 
actuel; il sait et û  sent le juste rapport qui est entre les 
choses et lui’.
The inspiration of Montesquieu's idealism is then basic­
ally metaphysical and little resembles the kind of faith in 
the powers of scientific knowledge, seen as a product of human 
intelligence, more characteristic of the convictions of his 
19th. century successors. However, his belief in a transcen­
dent harmony at the very origin of all being need not be con­
strued as a declaration of solidarity with orthodox theology; 
on the contrary, with its roots firmly planted in the pagan 
tradition of Platonic philosophy, the idea possessed a long 
and honorable history as a major stimulus of scientific 
endeavour often undertaken in defiance of the entrenched 
opposition of established authority. As a presupposition, 
it hardly constituted an insuperable obstacle to the employ­
ment of empirical methods as Montesquieu understood them; 
moreover, aside from its relevance to his conception of 
science and his general theory of knowledge, it must be allowed 
that the system of ethics which it sustains provides a more 
satisfactory complement to his actual scientific achievement.
(1) See E. Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern 
Physics, Yale U.P., Hew Haven, 1956; ch.11*
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his theories of political and historical causation, than the 
various scientific and naturalistic creeds often attributed 
to him, and more or less incompatible with the pessimism of 
his conclusions• Perhaps his acute historical awareness 
itself persuaded him that a rigorous empiricism would only 
transform reason from the source into the product of society, 
and moral rules into the results rather than the moderators 
of our instincts, What he wrote of the design of man-made 
laws would serve as well to justify and to explain the 
derivation of his moral principles from an abstract ideal:
’Parce que les hommes sont méchants, les lois sont obligés 
de les supposer meilleurs qu’ils ne sont,’ 2^)
(1) R. Aron remarks most pertinently in his monograph on 
Montesquieu (op,cit, above p,375 n.l.), that a placid 
acceptance of rigorous determinism is almost always 
compensated by faith in historical progress:
’En fait, les uns dépassent la philosophie déterministe 
par l ’appel à l ’avenir, les autres grâce à des critères 
universels de caractère^formel, Montesquieu a choisi 
la deuxième voie pour^dépasser la particularité. Il ne 
me paraît nullement démontré qu’il ait eu tort,’ (p.60,)
(2) Pensée 824 (Bkn,1945); Hagel II, p.245; Pléiade I,
pp.1470-1471.
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III
The reconciliation of a rationalistic moral idealism 
with the determinism implicit in the analysis of causation 
central to the Lois which can be constructed from book I of 
this work, supported by the evidence of the equally scienti­
fically orientated Essai sur les Causes, tends then to con­
firm those assumptions concerning the nature and structure of 
reality, which were isolated in the foregoing chapter from 
key passages in the Lettres Persanes and the Traité des 
Devoirs, together with allied fragments from elsewhere in the 
Pensées. There emerges from book I as a whole the same 
general rather than particular determinism, as can be inferred 
from Letter LXIX for example; the equation in Letter LXXXIII 
of human imperfection with human liberty in contrast to the 
omniscient perfection and fixity of the divinity is reproduced 
exactly in chapter 1, as is also, at least by extension, the 
theory intimately related to this conception of the human 
condition, of an ideal and transcendent order of justice, 
which man as an intelligent creature may aspire to realize in 
the context of his moral and social existence. Furthermore, 
just as Montesquieu implies in Letter LXXXIII, by invoking 
the insufficiency arising from the interdependence with which 
men are burdened, that the perfection of the divinity may 
only be paralleled in the moral world at a corporate level,
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so also in chapter 1 of the Lois, he specifies the various 
categories of law which provide the means of realizing this 
ideal.
A certain continuity of philosophical method accompanies 
this consistency of ideas. As we have seen in chapter 1, the 
metaphysical argument is underpinned by tv/o or three major 
premisses which have the weight of empirical evidence on 
their side: the existence of primitive reason is deduced
from the example of human intelligence; the invariability of 
the laws which originate in it from the spectacle of organized 
matter; the status and rûle of man in creation from experience 
of his limitations. The same careful selection of concepts 
acceptable to scientific intelligence which are subsequently 
linked together in a web of speculation, was the outstanding 
characteristic of Montesquieu’s procedures in Lettres 
Persanes LXXXIII and LXIX, procedures which could be related 
to the scientific epistemological stance adopted for the 
criticism of pagan religions in such early works as the 
Essai sur la Politique des Romains dans la Religion. A s  
in the early metaphysical texts also, the use in the Lois of 
this bizarre philosophical method would seem to connect with 
a conscientious avoidance in the doctrines which take shape 
of any emphatic reference to reason, particularly considered 
as a speculative faculty. In Letter LXXXIII the principle
(1) See above pp. 289 ' 291.
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of reason as the source of man’s moral being is never expli­
citly mentioned, though Montesquieu’s doctrine is largely 
incomprehensible unless the fact of human intelligence is 
taken for granted. Similarly, here in the Lois, although the 
intimate connection between intelligence and the perception 
and creation of laws is stressed, Montesquieu eschews a facile 
reliance on the notion of direct intuition in order to prove 
the anteriority and invariability of moral law; which again 
seems to confirm that he envisaged reason as an essentially 
discursive faculty, combining scientific, philosophical and 
moral f u n c t i o n s . I n d e e d ,  while acquiring knowledge of 
moral and positive laws remains the special business of intel­
ligence, in his theory, perception of the first or natural 
laws of human behaviour becomes the distinctive property of 
feeling rather than thinking creatures. Bearing in mind the 
origins of this theory in a fragment of the Traité des 
Devoirs (Pensée 615), where the main issue at stake is the 
demonstration of mutual tolerance and attraction, if not of 
active benevolence in man, it is possible to link the reha­
bilitation of the senses which is involved, not only with 
the formal sensationalist epistemology revealed in the Essai 
sur les Causes, but with the appeal to ’sentiment intérieur* 
rather than ’evidence’ typical of Montesquieu’s excursions 
into religious apologetics, and also with his awareness
(1) See above pp.4?2-3^«
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of the importance of habit and constitution to morality in 
general,
Hot surprisingly, associated with this continuity of 
philosophical method and the interlocking of ideas which 
accompanies it, one discovers a continuity of probable sour­
ces and parallels. Shaftesbury, whose likely influence on 
the Lettres Persanes and the Devoirs has already been men­
tioned, again comes to mind when reading book I, particularly 
the second c h a p t e r . I n  something of the same manner as 
Montesquieu, he tended to allow the attributes of sense, sen­
timent, judgement and perception of right and wrong to overlap 
each other. More important, his opposition to Hobbes was 
founded on the conviction that some kind of natural sympathy 
bound men together prior to the formal establishment of 
society, a sympathy without which no contract, convention or 
law could be established.  ^ Similar ideas underpin
(1) See above pp.29^-f. Certain remarks addressed to Warburton 
(letter of May 1754, Hagel III, p.1509), on the subject
of natural religion help to confirm this link:
’II n'est pas impossible d ’attaquer une religion révélée, 
parce qu’elle existe par des faits particuliers, et que 
les faits, par leur nature, peuvent être une matière de 
dispute. Mais il n ’en est pas de même de la religion 
naturelle: elle est tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont
on ne peut pas disputer, et du sentiment intérieur de 
l ’homme dont on ne peut pas disputer encore.’
(2) See above Part I, ch,4, pp. 158- 64-
(3) For a discussion of the bases of Shaftesbury’s moral and 
political theory, see E. Cassirer, The Platonic 
Renaissance in England, trans. J.P. Pettegrove, Nelson, 
1953, ch.VI.
457
Montesquieu's attack on Hobbes and his account of the origin 
of society and of natural laws.
Yet again, the idea carried over from Lettres Persanes 
LXXXIII to chapter 1 that divine actions are subject to a 
necessity as complete as ’la fatalité des athées’ can be 
traced back to Samuel Clarke’s Discourse concerning the Being 
and Attributes of God, which may also have been the source of 
Montesquieu’s proof of the intelligence of the First Cause 
from the existence of intelligent creatures.
The ancestry of Montesquieu’s idea of a hierarchy in 
creation, not clearly formulated until the Lois, but crucial 
there for the differentiation of physical, moral, natural and 
positive laws, is more difficult to trace, though of course 
the antiquity of the traditional theological notion is beyond 
doubt. It may be that Montesquieu as P. Martino suggests, 
found the idea in certain contemporary philosophical trea­
tises which retained marked Scholastic traits, such as Edrne 
Pourchot’s Institutio Philosophica (1700), though Martino 
cites no textual evidence to support this p a r e n t a g e . C e r ­
tainly, without specifying particular works, one can justi­
fiably assume in Montesquieu at least a working knowledge of 
Scholastic philosophy, since the religious and philosophical 
instruction which he received at Juilly undoubtedly continued.
(1) See above Part I, ch.4, p.172; and Part II, ch.2,p.
(2) See article cited above p.217, n,2.
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for all the liberal eclecticism of the Oratory, to be firmly 
based upon it. The notion of a hierarchy of beings to be 
found in Aquinas or his innumerable commentators was a not 
unpromising candidate for adoption. In spite of Orthodoxy’s 
belief in divine goodness as the ultimate reality and origin 
of the created order, and its deliberate avoidance of theories 
of primitive reason, the idea of natural law as the natural 
tendencies of non-rational creatures, by which they partici­
pated in the eternal law, was a central feature of its doc­
trine of creation. The Scholastic scale of being and value, 
beginning with inert matter, then climbing upwards through 
orders of life endowed with a vegetative soul, a sensitive 
soul, a human soul, until the pinacles of supernatural 
existence were reached, obviously corresponded to an order of 
intelligence. Thus animals were esteemed capable of a certain 
degree of knowledge, although it was limited to material 
things and acquired exclusively through the functioning of 
material organs. Man emerged significantly as a creature 
still closely bound to the terrestrial order, though his 
proper role in creation was defined by his limited intelligence, 
which opened knowledge of the moral law, of the simple dictates 
of right reason to him.
An adaption of Scholastic theory was to be found in the 
work of the Italian Cartesian Gravina, with which Shackleton
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reveals, Montesquieu was well a c q u a i n t e d . I n  his Origines 
luris Oivilis (1708), Gravina distinguishes two orders of law: 
the common law of nature, ’lex promiscua’, and the law of 
reason, ’lex solius mentis’; the first order governs the 
whole creation, man included, at least as concerns his physi­
cal existence; on the other hand, as a partly intelligent 
being, man, unlike other animals, is equally subject to the 
’lex solius mentis’, A similar distinction between man and 
beast is also sketched in the second part of S. Clarke’s 
Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God.
Clarke maintains that the more perfect the creature, the more 
closely it follows the law of reason, recognition of which 
constitutes in nature the special characteristic of human 
beings.
Equally accessible to Montesquieu, and as we have already 
seen, of major importance for his definitions both of justice 
and of law, were the works of Malebranche. Although his 
chief legacy was for Montesquieu as well as for posterity in 
general, the placing of the notion of a constant relationship 
between cause and effect at the very axis of metaphysics, he 
retained and utilized in his ontological as in his moral 
theory, the idea of a scale of value and b e i n g , T h e  general 
laws of reason were conceived as relationships, but fell into
(1) Op.cit. above, p.^O n.2 ; ch.XI, section 3«
(2) In Part II, A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable 
Obligations of Natural Religion, etc.
(3) See above Part I, ch.2, pp.J4”55**
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two categories: ’les rapports da grandeur’ and ’les rapports
de perfection’; the latter, existing between the archetypal 
ideas of the divine intelligence, constituted the order 
governing creation:
’les rapports de perfection sont des vérités et en même temps 
des lois immuables et nécessaires: ce sont les règles
invariables de tous les mouvements des esprits...... Ainsi ces
vérités sont l ’ordre que Dieu même consulte dans toutes ses 
opérations. Car aimant toujours toutes choses à proportion 
qu’elles sont aimables, les différents degrés de perfection 
règlent les différents degrés de son amour, et la 
subordination qu’il établit entre ses créatures
Now while certain features of any or all of these ver­
sions of the notion of a hierarchy in nature may have influ­
enced the genesis of Montesquieu’s own particular conception, 
none of them fully account for it. Thus the intimate asso­
ciation of the idea in Malebranche with the notion of trans­
cendent reason, might seem, despite the completely abstract 
mathematical style of its formulation, to possess a special 
significance for Montesquieu in view of his desire to estab­
lish the invariability of the moral law, similarly defined in 
terms of relationships, by reference to primitive reason.
But at the same time there is little trace in chapter 1 of the 
Lois of the essentialism characteristic of Malebranche’s 
theory* On the other hand, the old Scholastic notion, once 
removed from its theological context, would seem with its 
obvious reliance on an attempted classification of the actual
(1) Meditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, Lyon,1707, IV, 8; 
pp.57-58.
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qualities and attributes of things, to have provided a more 
likely source of useful detail. Whatever weight one allots 
to potential influences however, all comparisons point to one 
general conclusion regarding Montesquieu’s conception of a 
hierarchy in nature, namely, that it was designed to answer 
the requirements of a moralist and scientist, not those of a 
metaphysician. The main focus of interest for him is clearly 
not the relative importance of classes of creatures in a grand 
scheme of things, nor the varying degrees of perfection which 
separate them from the infinite majesty of their creator. He 
is only concerned to establish the imperfection of human 
intelligence relative, one infers, to that of superior crea­
tures and God, in order to explain the problem confronting him 
as a scientist and perhaps to a lesser degree as a moralist, 
of human inconsistency. Indeed the scale which emerges from 
his account of the order of creation, rather than being one 
of increasing perfection and value, appears as one of ascending 
imperfection, a feature attributable without doubt to his 
scientific preoccupation with the invariability of physical 
laws. As regards conformity to the laws governing their 
organization, inanimate matter and simple plant life are both 
shown to be considerably superior to mankind; but in reverse, 
one looks almost in vain for some compensatory indication of 
man’s superior status or of the greater intrinsic worth of 
his laws. The cryptic:
4 62
’Les bêtes n ’ont point les suprêmes avantages que nous avons: 
elles en ont que nous n ’avons pas’,
is Montesquieu’s only gesture in the direction of a theocen- 
tric interpretation of the order of things. In accordance 
with the overall design and purpose of the Lois he has already 
adopted an objective approach to each part of nature and its 
laws. Concerned primarily to describe and explain, and only 
secondly to evaluate, convinced of the usefulness of scientific 
knowledge, but aware of the limitations of its human inventors, 
he is content to establish that they are also equipped to 
discover certain absolute values, a transcendent moral order, 
in order that they may guard against or remedy their natural 
inconsistencies.
By far the most controversial candidate for inclusion in 
the ranks of thinkers to whom Montesquieu owed some if not all 
of the ideas welded together in book I is Spinoza. The Defense 
reveals the importance that Montesquieu himself attached to 
scuttling the allegations of ’spinozisme’ that his overzealous 
and none too scrupulous critics had levelled against him, 
though his impassioned rhetoric has failed on several sub­
sequent occasions to convince his scholarly judges of an entire 
innocence of any conscious design to model certain features of
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his thinking on the notorious s y s t e m . Y e t  in Montesquieu’s 
favour it must he allowed that nothing in the bare text, no 
singular and revealing twist to an idea, no incriminating 
formula, betrays the presence of any such intention. Since 
we are no longer victims of a hysterical fear of Spinozism, 
it is impossible, as R. Shackleton points out in his sober 
appraisal of those philosophical affinities between the two 
thinkers that can be established, to believe that Montesquieu 
was a deliberate disciple of S p i n o z a , W h e t h e r  or not he 
became one unintentionally, through unfamiliarity with his 
works or through incautious logic, is another question, and 
one whose final answer depends on a careful weighing of the 
premisses and implications of his philosophy of law.
First of all, although at the beginning of the 18th, 
century Spinoza’s ideas were still often misrepresented or 
abused rather than seriously debated, the suggestion that 
Montesquieu was likely to know them only by hearsay cannot be 
accepted without qualification. His personal acquaintance with 
the eminent mathematician and scientist Dortous de Mairan, the
(1) Charles Gudin’s curious work Le Spinozisme de Montesquieu, 
Paris, 1911, sets out to prove Montesquieu a disciple, 
often at the price of unreliable textual interpretation,
P. Vernière’s Spinoza et la Pensée française avant 
la Revolution, (see above Part I, ch.2, p. 50 n. 1.) 
contains (Part II, ch.3) a much sounder study of the 
doctrinal similarities in the Lois and of the significance 
of Montesquieu’s allusions to Spinoza elsewhere.
(2) Op.cit. above (p.^O n.2.), ch.XI, section 4, p.261.
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same liairan who shocked Malebranche by declaring his system 
to be well nigh indistinguishable from Spinoza’s, is well 
establishedo^ Mairan became a convert to Spinozism, and 
remained so; his case is cited by P. Verniere as confirmation 
of Spinoza's gradual rehabilitation as an authority, and gra­
dual assimilation into the mainstream of philosophical dis­
cussion. ^ 2) Quite possibly, during his first stay in Paris 
from I709-I713, Montesquieu also met through his friendship 
with Freret the eccentric and mysterious Boulainviller' , who, 
as the author of a work purporting to be a refutation of 
Spinoza though in fact more of an exposition of his theories, 
was one of the few Frenchmen of the foregoing generation with 
any real understanding of the Dutch philosopher. Any 
impressions which Montesquieu may have gained in discussion 
with these acquaintances could moreover have been consolidated 
by first hand study of selected works. For the post mortem 
inventory of his library in Paris lists a copy of the 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the Academy of Bordeaux 
also possessed in addition to this, the Opera Posthuma and its 
French version Traité des cérémonies superstitieuses des Juifs^^
(1) See above p. ?7.
(2) See oppit. above (p.30 n.l.). Part I, ch.5, p.287.
(3) See Shackleton, op.cit. above (p.^^ n.^ ), pp.12-13.
Vernière (op.cit., p.451) also mentions certain ’amateurs
du spinozisme’ like the Comte de Plélo and the parlementaire 
Pérelle, whom Montesquieu may have known at the Club de 
l ’Entresol, assuming that he did in fact belong to it.
(4) See Catalogue de la Bibliothèque de Montesquieu, p.243; 
and Vernière, op.cit.. Part II, ch.3, p.4&3.
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Such evidence actually proves nothing; it merely suggests 
a possible acquaintance with those works of Spinoza where 
criticism of religious belief accompanied by political theo­
rizing outweigh metaphysics in importance, an order of pre­
ference which would have corresponded exactly to Montesquieu's 
own preoccupations. In his ov/n works however, references to 
Spinoza are invariably hostile in tone, and his criticisms 
never venture as far as detailed technical discussion. In the 
Spicilege he touches on the parallelism of motion and thought 
which is the weak point in Spinoza's s y s t e m ; a n d  in the 
Pensées he attacks him on the one hand for the arid abstraction 
of his metaphysics;
'Cette philosophie (Gartesianism)  diminue le goût que
l'on a naturellement pour la poésie. Ce serait bien pis si 
quelque peuple allait s'infatuer du système de Spinoza; car, 
outre qu'il n'y aurait point de sublime dans l'agent, il n'y 
en aurait pas seulement dans les actions
and on the other for the materialism and amoral determinism 
implicit in his p h i l o s o p h y . S u c h  attacks do indeed reveal 
little more than a rudimentary knowledge, and, as we have 
already remarked, Montesquieu seems never to have noticed any 
inconsistency between the stance adopted in them, and certain 
unorthodox speculations, with implications dangerously remi­
niscent of Spinoza's thinking, actually published in the 
Lettres P e r s a n e s . _____
(1) Article 399, MS . 346-347, ' ■ ■ ■'
(2) Pensée 112 (Bkn.446). Nagel II, p.38; Pléiade I, p.1019.
(3) Pensée 1266 (Bkn.615).
(4) See above Part II, ch.2, pp.311-514.
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As far as those metaphysical theories in this work, the 
Devoirs, and associated fragments in the Pensées, which fall 
into a consistent and coherent pattern are concerned however, 
no evidence is to be found of any unconscious adoption or 
indirect confirmation of a doctrine of immanent reason. The 
'rapports de convenance' of Letter LXXXIII constitute a trans­
cendent order of justice, related to the perfection of God, 
and certainly not immanent in the created order, whose prin­
cipal adornment, man,is pitifully ensnared by his own limita­
tions .
Almost the same theories are brought together at the 
beginning of the Lois to form the philosophical groundwork for 
Montesquieu's study of positive laws, and they are fitted to­
gether we have argued, in such a way that the premisses of 
moral idealism are satisfactorily reconciled with the deter­
ministic implications of the scientific analysis which ensues. 
Even the enigmatic definition of laws in general as necessary 
relationships which derive from the nature of things, has 
been shown to facilitate this reconciliation, as long as its 
epistemological as well as its metaphysical significance is 
taken into account.
The question is, did the very ingenuity displayed by 
Montesquieu in his metaphysical juggling inadvertently produce 
the partial outlines of a general philosophy whose implications 
were far more radical than he himself ever recognized? Does
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the juxtaposition of his conception of laws as necessary 
relationships deriving from the nature of things, and the 
assertion that there exists an immutable order of justice 
anterior to positive laws, not add up, as long as the nature 
of things is not clearly distinguished from the material 
universe, to a doctrine of immanent as opposed to transcendent 
reason? J.S. Spink argues that such a doctrine could be 
explained as the unforeseen result of a gradual interpenetra­
tion in Montesquieu's mind of the rational principles common 
to philosophical and political thought in the late 17th. cen­
tury, typically expressed in a widespread enthusiasm for the 
idea of natural law, and the assumptions underlying the 
methods of contemporary science.
Spinoza had consciously and systematically preached the 
identity of reason and nature, the exact coincidence of is 
and ought, freedom and obligation, in an attempt to overcome 
certain difficulties arising out of orthodox Cartesian meta­
physics. Rejecting, like Malebranche, the principle that 
order was dependent upon an arbitrary and transcendent divine 
will, he asserted instead the basic rationality and intelli­
gibility of the universe. God, reason and the universe are 
one and the same self-caused, self-limited substance, con­
taining all finite modes, or imperfect objects, in an immutable
(l) French Free Thought from Gassendi to Voltaire, London, 
1960, ch.XII, p.251.
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and necessary o r d e r , R e a s o n ,  natura naturans is the imma­
nent generative principle of all finite things, natura naturata 
Thus mechanical causation is replaced by immanent necessity 
and immanent teleology combined: reason equals the living
purposes of the organism, and also equals freedom. This is 
the basic equation of Spinoza’s t h o u g h t . A l l  things are 
constantly present in their absolute totality, and every con­
ceivable possibility is actualized in the universe, with the 
result that time and number must be regarded as fictions of 
a limited human imagination.^ Similarly, the imperfect mode, 
or finite object is simply that which expresses more or less 
reality, and therefore moral judgements are equally consta­
tations of deficiency, although our imaginative limitations 
cause us to make artificial comparisons, transforming them 
into notions of good and bad.^^^ No moral law can accordingly 
exist distinct from natural law. The good for each thing is 
that which helps it to exist, and the ability to secure this 
good is virtue; similarly, divine providence is nothing but 
the striving found in the whole of nature and in individual 
things to maintain and preserve their existence, ^
But although Spinoza in the Tractatus states plainly 
that natural right is co-extensive with the determinate power
(1) Ethioa I, 26-27.
(2) Ibid. V, 35-36.
(3) Ibid., Appendix I.
(4) Politics, 2,8; Tractatus XVI,i,4.
(5) Sthica IV, 20.
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of the individual object to preserve itself without regard to 
anything else, it must be remembered that he saw reason as 
both the measure and the source of this power. It is impos­
sible to assert that his concept of jus naturale is divorced 
from the notion of universal reason in its fullest sense.
Each finite mode uses its determinate power in accordance with 
its determinate nature, which varies according to the amount 
of reality it embodies; as we have seen, this was the reason 
why human judgements of good and bad had no general validity. 
But it is clear from the Preface of Ethica IV, that they have 
validity within their own bounds:
'by good, therefore, I understand in the following pages 
everything which we are certain is a means by which we may 
approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature which 
we set before us.'
Man's specific nature is rationality, and his moral 
utility lies in his development as a thinker. Consequently, 
both freedom and virtue consist in the conscious realization 
of this nature. In political terms it follows from this that 
the individual in society foregoes his right to follow his 
individual physical desires. Spinoza readily accepts for 
instance Hobbes's assertion of human imperfection; but he 
differs fundamentally in his conception of the state as a 
means to the realization of the rational life, not an alien 
force imposed from without. The sovereign is an objectiviza- 
tion of the intrinsic nature of man; accordingly, as soon as
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the state ceases to serve this end, the individual has the 
right to reform it,^^
Natural law, political law, and scientific law all reflect 
the determinate nature of things, and are necessary expressions 
of an immanent and universal reason; moral law is at once 
descriptive and normative.
Now certain points of contact between the doctrines of 
Lois I, and important features of Spinoza's system can be 
established. For example, the description of natural laws in 
chapter 2 does seem to draw on the conception of them as those 
laws proper to the determinate nature of each part of the 
created order. Similarly, one can argue that Montesquieu like 
Spinoza sees intelligence or rationality as the specific 
nature of the human being, and considers that his moral dignity 
depends on his development as a thinker. Furthermore, both 
maintain that political organization is the natural outcome 
of this intelligence.
Nearer to the heart of the matter, Montesquieu's defi­
nition of law presupposes the fundamental intelligibility of 
the universe and the dependence of the material order upon 
necessary reason. But here we reach the nub of the question; 
it does not presuppose their identity. God himself may have 
his laws; he is equally subject to reason. He may indeed be
(l) Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ch.XVI.
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nothing more than primitive reason itself, yet Montesquieu 
still clings to the notion of creation, to a distinction 
between the source of order, and the order realized. The 
proof of this and the decisive evidence against the hypothesis 
that book I as it stands conceeds the central principle of 
immanentist rationalism, is precisely if paradoxically that 
as Montesquieu surveys reality, its order reveals itself in 
at least one crucial case as incomplete. Human nature is 
irregular and inconstant in both its sensitive and its intel­
lectual aspects so that its perfection is always virtual not 
actual.
This point leads on to another fundamental difference 
between the two thinkers: Montesquieu's conception of reason
remains essentially mathematical and scientific, whereas 
Spinoza's is organic. Reason for him was an immanent genera­
tive principle, and consequently, although he could talk of 
creatures embodying more or less reality, and define moral 
judgements as constations of deficiency, to posit, as 
Montesquieu does, a real antithesis between their behaviour 
and its laws was simply impossible in the terms of his thought.^^ 
The way in which Montesquieu insists as regards both law and 
justice on defining them as relationships is another more
(1) cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ch.XVI: 'Whatsoever, 
therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway of 
nature) thinks useful to himself, whether led by sound 
reason or impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign 
right to seek and to take for himself as best he can, 
whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any other means,'
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obvious sign of his consistently mathematical conceptions; 
and he maintains his style even with regard to natural and 
positive laws. Thus the natural laws of chapter 2 are defined 
not in terms of the human instincts of preservation from which 
they derive, but in terms of the personal relationships which 
these instincts promote. Such definitions are absent in 
Spinoza,
The principles of Book I of the Lois constitute then as 
inadequate a defense of rigorous rationalistic determinism as 
of its materialist counterpart. This simple comparison does 
however leave out of account those critical passages from the 
Spicilege and the Essai sur les Causes which show how 
Montesquieu would probably ha.ve chosen to develop the positive 
aspects of his moral t h e o r y . T h e s e  passages, by implying 
that human imperfection is a relative rather than an absolute 
condition, and that if it is defined only in terms of limited 
knowledge, may in fact, at least in the case of exceptional 
individuals, be overcome, might support a modified conclusion. 
While they do not in any way alter Montesquieu's conception 
of reason, one could argue taking them into account, that by 
conceding that the gap between God and man can be abolished, 
and the order of perfection made actual, so that the 'rapports 
de convenance' become immanent rather than transcendent, he 
has indeed gone half way to admitting the central principle
(1) See above pp,449-'45^*
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of Spinozism.
Nicolas Fréret, one of his earliest eminent acquaintances, 
and the likely author of the clandestine Lettre de Thrasihule 
à Leucippe, there sets out a Spinozist conception of the 
nature of things, using the phrase 'rapport de convenance' in 
his definition of necessary law:
'Cette loi nécessaire, qu'est-elle elle-même?.......  N'est-ce
que la perception des rapports de convenance ou de disconvenance 
qui sont entre les choses, ou leurs idées?'
This furnishes certain evidence that mechanist terminology 
could be fitted to Spinoza's organic concepts. Yet there is 
still precious little evidence to suggest that Montesquieu 
set out to compose his introductory chapters even faintly 
suspecting that the ideas he was setting down, could or would 
be construed as an ill-disguised adaptation of the notorious 
system. Their natural development from earlier works and 
fragments, where thinkers like Shaftesbury, Clarke and 
Leibniz were the likeliest influences, is easily traced.
The outstandingly different characteristic of the finished 
philosophy, which is captured immediately in the opening for­
mula, is indeed Montesquieu's greatly increased emphasis on 
the ontological and scientific significance of the notion of 
necessary primitive reason. But this again could be, if not 
the direct outcome of his own scientific research, simply a
(1) See above Part I, ch.3, p.123.
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belated legacy from Malebranche, whose dizzy metaphysics 
concealed a rationalism ruthless enough to provoke comment 
even from that arch-sceptic Bayle.^j The assertion that 
science is impossible unless the laws of reason are assumed 
to be necessary and independent of God,^^) that understanding 
the rational order is more important for the attainment of 
virtue than f a i t h , a n d  the other radically subversive 
pronouncements that not without justification, brought down 
the wrath of Bossuet and Arnauld upon him, should not be 
ove rl ook ed.Voltaire's judgement of him as usual goes 
straight to the point:
'Pour réduire le système de Malebranche à quelque chose 
d'intelligible, on est obligé de le réduire au spinozisme
One need hardly add that what Spinozism there is in 
Montesquieu could as well be laid at his door.
(1) 'A proprement parler, Malebranche suppose que la bonté et 
la puissance de Dieu sont renfermées dans des bornes assez 
étroites, qu'il n'y a aucune liberté en Dieu, gu'il est 
nécessité par sa sagesse à créer, et^puis à creer 
précisément un tel ouvrage, et puis à le créer précisément 
par de telles voies. Ce sont trois servitudes qui forment 
un fatum plus que stoïcien.', Réponse aux Questions d'un 
Provincial, vol.III, ch.OBI.,
(2) Recherche de la Vérité 10e. Eclaircissement,
(3) Traité de Morale II,Tl,12o
(4) See above Part I, ch.2, pp.5^■"39.
(5) Traité de Métaphysique, ch.III.
CHAPTER FIVE
JUSTICE AS A 'LEITMOTIF
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'Une chose n'est pas juste parce 
qu'elle est loi; mais elle doit 
être loi parce qu'elle est juste,'
Pensée 460 (Bkn.1906),
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Montesquieu’s conception of justice manifests itself in 
his works in two distinct ways. First of all, certain theore­
tical and technical details of his political doctrines can he 
related to the metaphysical and epistemological apparatus 
which supports it; and, secondly, the moral idealism which 
through it is renewed and reconciled with historical and 
environmental determinism, reveals itself both directly in the 
form of a literature of ethics, and indirectly thou^ no less 
distinctively, in the criteria which inform his judgement of 
laws and institutions.
The framework supporting Montesquieu’s theory of justice 
may be reduced to a few elementary notions concerning the 
nature and organization of the universe, which for the most 
part coincide, fortuitously if unsurprisingly, with certain 
assumptions at the very origin of the Western tradition of 
speculative thinking. We rediscover for instance, the invalu­
able notion of the correspondence of the form of human thought 
to the order governing the nature of things; the same postu­
late, reached by an analogy with the idea of the harmoniously 
regular workings of nature, of the invariability of justice; 
the conviction that the theories of the intellect should be 
given reality within the life of the community. As we have 
already noted, even specific elements of Montesquieu’s
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definition of justice can be traced back to Greek sources: 
thus the idea of rapport, even though actually adopted from 
Cartesian physics, may be compared to the peculiarly 
Pythagorean contribution to juridical t h e o r y . S i m i l a r l y ,  
if one takes it that the familiar word which Claude Pleury 
selects in his Traite des Etudes to characterize the short­
comings of Plato's method in the Timon:
•étant accoutumé à raisonner moralement en morale, il a 
raisonné de même en physique et a voulu expliquer toute la 
nature par des convenances',
(1) See above Part I , J-nbro. , p. 9. • For the nature and 
origins of the idea of justice in Greek philosophy see
P. Guerin, L'idée de Justice dans la Conception de 
l'Univers chez les premiers Philosophes grecs, Paris, 1934; 
and E. Cassirer, Logos, Dike, Kosmos in der Entwicklung der 
griechischen Philosophie, Goteborgs Hogskolas Arsskrift 
XLVII, 1941.
The essence of the Greek tradition lianded down to 
the West is summarized in two well known passages from 
Aristotle :
'He who asks law to rule is asking God and Intelligence and 
no others to rule; while he who asks for the rule of a 
human being is bringing in a wild beast,' Politics, III, 
16, and:
'In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in 
accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, 
even if there is neither communication nor agreement 
between them. This is what Antigone in Sophocles evidently 
means when she declares that it is just, though forbidden 
to bury Polynices, as being naturally just:
(Antigone 456) "For neither today nor yesterday, but from 
all eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth 
whence they came."' Rhetorica 1373, b ,
(2) See above Part II, ch.l, p.jA), and op.cit., 'Discours 
sur Platon', p.316»
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was a common term in the discussion of Greek philosophy, then
the philosophical heritage with which Montesquieu endowed him­
self simply by alluding to fitness in his definition, is seen 
to extend far beyond a mere handful of late 17th. century 
scholars and theologians,
I'Tow despite the complex significance of the term rapport,
Montesquieu's definition of justice was in a juristic context
strictly speaking inadequate. For while it incorporated the 
essential notion of reciprocity, the equally fundamental con­
cept of parity between subjects was ignored. It is true that 
both ideas are included in Montesquieu's account of primitive 
justice as it appears in Lois 1,1:
'II faut donc avouer des rapports d'équité antérieurs à la
loi positive qui les établit etc *,
but even so, the whole drift of his thinking on the subject of 
law runs counter to the traditional direction of juridical 
enquiry. The concrete problem for 18th. century jurisprudence 
remained what it had been for the Romans, namely the delimi­
tation of mutual claims between persons. As a trained magi­
strate Montesquieu could not have ignored the classic formula,
'justitia est constans et perpétua voluntas jus suum cuique 
tribuens *,(p)
which also provided most contemporary dictionaries with their 
definition of justice.^2)* importance of the Roman
(1) The section Morales in the Catalogue of the library at La 
Brede is headed by a similar quotation from Justinian,
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Notes from p.4/8 continued»
(1) 'Honeste vivere alterum non laetere suum cuique tribuere,' 
Montesquieu mentions the traditional definition of 
distributive justice in a discussion of Aristotle’s defence 
of the right of personal vengeance (Ethics V,5); typically, 
he considers action according to the principle of rendering 
to each his just deserts to be the exercise of a magistra­
ture existing only in a state of nature; in civil society 
this magistrature belongs only to appointed tribunals and 
not to individuals. See Pensée 469 (Bkn»1944).
( 2) E.go Be Dictionnaire Universel Français et Latin, Trévoux,
1704 : ’Justice........on la définit en Droit, Volonté
ferme et constante de rendre à chacun ce qui lui appartient.'
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contribution to jurisprudence lay precisely in the positive 
developments, the idea of right, and its corollary, the wilful 
pursuit of a claim, which it brought to the Greek notion of 
justice as that which is fitting. In the essentials of his 
theory of justice however, Montesquieu remained closer to 
this juristically less sophisticated concept, for the obvious 
if paradoxical reason that, in order to reconcile moral 
idealism with his scientific insights, he relied upon meta­
physical ideas very similar to those used by the Ancients in 
its original elaboration.
The neglect of a theory of rights anticipated by his on 
balance non-juristic concepts of justice and of law is revealed 
in his treatment of the civil and political condition of the 
individual. This is not to say that Montesquieu has to be 
interpreted as a Machiavelli in 18th. century clothes, since 
his political doctrine embodies nothing beyond the time 
honoured equation of salus populi with raison d'etat. P a r  
from it, for the briefest glance at his exposure of the 
injustice of slavery and his plea for religious toleration in 
the Lois, will amply demonstrate his championship of basic 
moral rights against the advocates of expediency and of the 
superior interest of the state.^2) But as B. Groethuysen
(1) Henri See's L'Évolution de la Pensée Politique, Paris, 1925, 
contains in the introduction to the 17th. century an 
interesting study of the relative evolution of the notion 
of popular sovereignty and the principle of individual 
rights. Montesquieu's conception of liberty he concludes, 
remains 'nettement etatiste'.
(2) See Bk.XV, chs.2-5; Bk.XXV, ch.13.
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concludes in the first of two articles devoted to defining the 
quality of Montesquieu's liberalism, his conception of liberty 
is basically that of a historian of laws and institutions; 
through his understanding of the manifold forms of human 
organization he respects the collective personality of peoples 
and the individual personality of the c i t i z e n . B u t  he is 
not concerned as is Rousseau for instance, or any other poli­
tical thinker, who in elaborating his doctrines remained within 
the traditional framework of enquiry, to define in the abstract 
the limits of individuals' powers of voluntary action vis-à-vis 
each other and the community at large. As Groethuysen writes:
'La liberté, telle que l'envisage Montesquieu, est une manière 
de sentir et d'agir, de se comporter envers les autres et 
envers soi-même, plutôt qu'un droit bien acquis et bien défini. 
G'est souvent l'esprit de la liberté, plutêt que la liberté 
elle-même, un sentiment plutêt qu'une réalité,'^2)
Already with regard to Montesquieu's conception of 
natural laws, we noted how in contrast to Spinoza, he does 
not go beyond isolating the laws which describe man's primi­
tive relationships; there is no progression in 1,2 from the 
recognition of instinctive drives to the affirmation that 
natural right is co-extensive with the individual's power to 
satisfy them,^^j In this he may also be contrasted with 
Hobbes, who in chapter XIV of Leviathan for instance, carefully
(1) 'Montesquieu et l'Art de rendre les Hommes libres', Fontaine, 
vol.10, Nov. 1946, pp.505-519; and 'Le libéralisme de 
Montesquieu et la liberté telle que l'entendent les 
républicains', Europe, 27e. année, No.57, Jan. 1949, pp.2-l6c
(2) Ibid., p.514.
(3) See above Part II, ch.4 , p. 4/2.
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distinguishes between right and law;
'For though they that speak of this subject use to confound 
jus and lex, right and law: yet they ought to be distinguished; 
because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; 
whereas LAV/, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that
law, and right, differ as much as obligation and liberty; 
which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.'
For Hobbes as for Spinoza, the logical concomitant of 
unchecked freedom in the state of nature is unlimited rights.
Montesquieu does not conceive of the natural condition 
of man as one of anarchy however; in his account of the state 
of nature it is already implied that liberty is in effect the 
security which the laws of his own nature guarantee him. His 
conception of political liberty is basically similar: liberty
and obligation, right and duty, coincide exactly. The extent 
of the citizen's freedom depends on the moderation of the laws 
incorporated in each particular constitution, and it is main­
tained by his observation of them. Considered from the angle 
of what the individual actually enjoys, it does then consist 
simply of the common security gained through a common accept­
ance of duty. The one supreme right of Montesquieu's citizen 
is his right to be protected by and judged according to the 
law.
In contradistinction, the distribution of political 
power, the measure of the participation of the individual or 
class in the process of legislation does not in Montesquieu's 
opinion constitute the special yardstick of freedom. Thus
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introducing his theory of the separation of the powers in 
book XI, he dismisses the common misconception that liberty 
resides solely in the democracy;
'Enfin, comme dans les démocraties le peuple parait à 
peu près faire ce qu'il veut, on a mis la liberté dans ces 
sortes de gouvernements; et on a confondu le pouvoir du 
peuple avec la liberté du peuple,
He continues in chapter 4:
'La^liberté politique ne se trouve que dans les gouvernements 
modérés. Mais elle n'est pas toujours dans les Etats modérés; 
elle n'y est que lorsqu'on n'abuse pas du pouvoir,'^2)
and this holds the key to the real significance of his theory 
of the separation of the powers. The importance of his famous 
analysis of the English constitution is not that it provides 
a model of how the powers of government may be effectively or 
justly distributed between the various orders of the realm, 
still less that it is a first class example of mixed govern­
ment, or constitutional monarchy, but rather that it demon­
strates how constitutional laws may be so composed that 
authority is restrained from oppressing the individual. As 
Montesquieu puts it:
'Une constitution peut être telle que personne ne sera 
conM:raint de faire les choses auxquelles la loi ne l'oblige 
pasT^et à ne point faire celles que la loi lui permet,
(1) Chapter 2; Nagel I, p.205; Pleiade II, p.394.
(2) Nagel I, p.206; Pléiade II, p.395.
(3) Book XI, cho4; Nagel I, p.206; Pleiade II, p.395.
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His definition of political liberty does not make its 
first appearance in the Lois, but seems on the evidence of 
one of the earliest entries in the Pensées, to have been in 
his mind from the time of his early meditations on justice. 
Indeed it may owe its origin to the austere notions of civic 
duty derived from his reading of the Stoics, which inspired 
some of his earliest literary endeavours.^^ More important, 
while it is obviously compatible with the relativistic 
approach to political institutions adopted in the Lois, it 
also appears to answer the logical demands of Montesquieu's 
theory of justice. For with its starting point in the notion 
that perfect reason and perfect freedom together constitute 
perfect necessity, and its conclusion that justice consists 
in the imitation of this necessity in the context of social 
existence, this would seem to imply that the attainment of 
moral perfection depends to a certain extent on the freedom 
of each human being to fulfil his role as a citizen through 
observance of the law. His idea of liberty may therefore be 
taken as further evidence that the evolution of Montesquieu's
(1) A fragment of the Pensées Morales later incorporated into 
the Devoirs begins for example:
'Les actions humaines sont le sujet des devoirs. G'est la 
raison qui en est le principe et qui nous rend propres à 
nous en acquitter.'
(Pensée 220 (Bkn.597).)
In yet another fragment which probably belonged to the 
Devoirs (Pensée 1252 (Bkn.603)), one finds: ^
'II n'y a pas de bon sens de vouloir que l'autorité du 
Prince soit sacrée, et que celle de la Loi ne le soit pas,*
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scientific thought and that of his moral ideas were at every 
stage closely interconnected.
The main definition given in Lois XI,3:
'Dans un État, c'est-à-dire dans une société où il y a des 
lois, la liberté ne peut consister qu'à pouvoir faire ce que 
l'on doit vouloir, et à n'être point contraint de faire ce 
que l'on ne doit pas vouloir.
Il faut se mettre dans l'esprit ce que c'est que l'indé- 
pendence, et ce que c'est que la liberté. La liberté est le 
droit de faire tout ce que les lois permettent; et si un 
citoyen pouvait faire ce qu'elles défendent, il n'aurait plus 
de liberté, parce que les autres auraient tout de même ce 
pouvoir. '
can be traced back to a surviving fragment of a lost manuscript 
entitled La Liberté Politique;
'Un peuple libre n'est pas celui qui a une telle ou 
une telle forme de gouvernement, c'est celui qui jouit de la 
forme de gouvernement établie par la Loi...... De là, il faut
conclure que la liberté politique concerne les monarchies
modérées comme les républiques et tout homme est libre qui
a un juste sujet de croire que la fureur d'un seul ou de 
plusieurs ne lui êteront pas la vie ou la propriété de ses 
biens•*(q)
This in turn develops the main theme of the early entry in 
the Pensées mentioned above :
'Le seul avantage qu'un peuple libre ait sur un autre, 
c'est la sécurité où chacun est que le caprice d'un seul ne 
lui êtera point ses biens ou sa vie. Un peuple soumis, qui 
aurait cette sécurité-là, bien ou mal fondée, serait aussi 
heureux qu'un peuple libre \ 3 )
(1) Nagel I, pp.205-206; Pléiade II, p.395.
(2) Pensée 884 (Bkn.631); Nagel II, p.256; Pléiade I, p.1152; 
on the basis of this entry in the Pensées Shackleton 
suggests an approximate date of 1734 t o i T the work,
(3) Pensée 32 (Bkn.1802); Nagel II, p.12; Pleiade I, p.1431.
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Elsewhere allied notions are expressed in more vivid 
terms. In the Voyage en Italie for example, Montesquieu
dismissed the kind of liberty enjoyed by the citizens of Venice
as repugnant to honest people, and continues;
'il faut être gêné: l'homme est comme pn ressort qui va
mieux, plus il est bandé.
And in the Pensées again, a curious sequence of entries occurs
where one can follow stage by stage, the gradual tailoring of 
a single image until it exactly expresses his conception of 
political liberty. The period of their composition, 1734-1738, 
corresponds roughly with the dates of the notebook Geographica 
II, which contains lengthy extracts of contemporary works on 
China, as well as a redraft of the original notes of 
Montesquieu's conversations with the Chinaman Hoange in 1712 
or 13,(2) was undoubtedly in one of these sources that
Montesquieu found a proverb which expressed some of his own 
thoughts on the subject of justice and human freedom. It con­
sisted of a striking comparison between justice and a fishing 
net :
'Admirable idée des Chinois, qui comparent la justice de 
Dieu à un filet si grand que les poissons qui s'y promènent 
croient être en liberté; mais réellement ils sont pris. Les 
pécheurs croient de même, qu'ils ne seront pas punis de Dieu; 
mais ils sont dans le filet.
(1) Nagel II, p.481.
(2) See Nagel II» P. Weil, 'Introduction aux Geographica', 
p.lxxvii.
(3) Pensée 434 (Bkn.2124); Nagel II, p.164; Pleiade I, pol552.
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The image of the net fascinated Montesquieu, and he took it 
up again four times, each time altering it slightly. First 
the subjects of a well regulated monarchy are compared to 
the captive fish; then the simile is developed into a compa­
rison between the state of men in a democracy seen as fish 
swimming freely in the sea, and that of men in a despotism 
where they resemble fish confined in a tight net; then the 
whole thing is reduced to a simple comparison between free 
government and despotism symbolized as fishnets large and 
small respectively; and finally, the complete theory of 
liberty emerges;
'La liberté pure est plutôt un état philosophique qu'un 
état civil. Ce qui n'empêche pas qu'il n'y ait de très 
mauvais gouvernements, et même qu'une constitution ne soit 
plus imparfaite à mesure qu'elle s'éloigne plus de cette idée 
philosophique que nous avons.
Un ancien a comparé les lois à ces toiles d'araignée qui 
n'ayant que la force d'arrêter les mouches, sont rompues par 
les oiseaux. Pour moi, je comparerais les bonnes lois à ces 
grands filets dans lesquels les poissons sont pris, mais se 
croient libres, et les mauvaises à ces filets dans lesquels 
ils sont si serrés que d'abord ils se sentent pris.'^^)
The repercussions of the conception of reason revealed in 
the analysis of Montesquieu's idea of justice and subsequently 
confirmed by the account of the origin of society which he 
gives in the Lois, are, like those of his conception of law, 
visible in other aspects of his political and sociological 
doctrine.
(1) Pensée 943 (Bkn.1798); Nagel II, pp.267-268; Pleiade I, 
p.1430. See also Pensées 597 (1800); 828 (1801); 874.
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Lettres Persanes LXXXIII and book I of the Lois point, 
as we have seen, to a conception of reason as an essentially 
discursive faculty which equips the individual to acquire both 
moral and scientific knowledge. Furthermore the evolution of 
society proper is presented as a direct result of the develop­
ment of this latent faculty in primitive human creatures, of 
the aquisi^tion of 'connaissances'. Thus there is no real 
psychological or moral divide between natural man or the savage, 
and the fully fledged citizen, the latter having merely pro­
gressed a stage further.
Since then the crucial factors in the process of advance­
ment to political and moral maturity, as undergone not only by 
entire primitive communities but aleo by young people in 
established societies, are the awakening of the intellect and 
the furnishing of the mind with ideas, that Montesquieu is 
elsewhere at pains to emphasize the central importance of 
education in the life of a nation goes without saying.
'Ceux qui commencent à faire usage de leur raison se 
trouvent chez un peuple barbare, où l'on n'a aucune sorte 
d'éducation, ou bien chez un peuple policé, où l'on reçoit 
une éducation générale dans la société.
Education plays a vital role not only as the means of progress 
beyond the state of nature, but equally, one assumes, as a 
mainstay of civilization, a bulwark against the forces of 
corruption. In the Pensées Montesquieu describes its function
(l) Essai sur les Causes, Part II; Nagel III, pp.413-414;
Pléiade II, p.33.
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as safeguarding and transmitting the accumulated experience 
of centuries. Already in one of the earliest fragments he 
had declared reason to be the principle of duty, the means 
by which we acquit ourselves of it;^^^ now he presents educa­
tion as the means by which we first acquire a knowledge of 
the duties of a citizen;
'Par l'éducation, on apprend aux hommes leurs devoirs, à 
mesure qu'ils sont en état de les connaître; on leur apprend 
en quelques années ce que le Genre humain n'a pu savoir 
qu'après un très grand nombre de siècles, et ce que les 
peuples sauvages ignorent encore aujourd'hui.'(g)
And if one goes back to the famous allegory of the Troglodytes 
in the Lettres Persanes, or dips almost at random into the 
Lois, one finds over and over again the paramount importance 
of education for the wellbeing of society and its members con­
firmed. The virtuous Troglodytes pay special attention to 
their paternal duty of education, illustrating their moral 
precepts with the sad example and pitiful fate of their unjust 
compatriots. The sequel to the four letters, excluded from 
the published work, drives home the lesson of the allegory 
even more clearly. The Troglodytes, having already instituted 
monarchic government under the pressure of increasingly com­
plex social relationships, decide it is time also to intro­
duce commerce and industry into the state; in their assembly, 
the king voices his fears that the people are about to abandon 
virtue for wealth, but a citizen replies that the morals of
(1) Pensée 220 (Bkn.597).
(2) Pensée 1579 (Bkn.1754); Nagel II, p.408; Pleiade I, p.1419
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the nation will depend, now as never before on the example 
set by the king himself and on the force of education:
'Vous connaissez, Seigneur, la base sur quoi est fondée la 
vertu de votre peuple: c'est sur l'éducation. Changez cette
éducation, et celui qui n'était pas assez hardi pour être 
criminel rougira bientôt d'être vertueux.’ ^
The point at issue in the dispute with Hobbes which is 
dramatized in the myth is not the precise mechanisms by which 
society is established, or even Hobbes's justification of 
absolutism, but the nature of the psychological and moral 
resources of human beings, and the way in which these govern 
the destinies of a community.(2) Montesquieu believes that 
there is no innate justice in men, though it may be acquired 
along with other virtues and deliberately cultivated by example 
and education; its neglect or deliberate rejection in favour 
of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest, far from ushering 
in even the arbitrary justice of Leviathan as Hobbes would 
have it, will in fact only lead to chaos and eventual destruc­
tion; furthermore, even if civic virtue has been a formative
1) Pensee 1616 (Bkn.120); Nagel II, p.464; Pléiade I, p.378.
2) Of. S. Cotta's interpretation of the allegory in 
Montesquieu e la scienza della societa (see above p.400 n.^ . ] 
ch.3. He sees in it not the contrasting of two contradic­
tory ideas of the state of nature, but a study of the 
avenues of development open to societies according to the 
moral principles which flourish in them. By the weight 
this gives to the influence of external causes, it antici­
pates the sociological thesis of the Lois.
(3) In his article 'Ciceron, Hobbes et Montesquieu*, Annales 
Universitatis Saraviensis, Phil-Lettres, No.l, 1952, 
pp.19-47, P. Bimoff presents a detailed analysis of those 
facets of Hobbes's political theory which are dramatized 
in the allegory.
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influence in the growth of a nation, the need for it and for 
the education which conserves and strengthens it, can only 
increase as the gradual sophistication of economic and poli­
tical institutions gives rise to ever growing dangers of 
corruption.
Letter GXXIX on the characteristic shortcomings of legis­
lators reasserts the fundamental interdependence of education 
and morality; a few of them, Montesquieu is happy to recall, 
have in the past shown proof of their wisdom by institutionali­
zing paternal authority:
'Rien ne soulage plus les magistrats; rien ne dégarnit plus les 
tribunaux; rien, enfin, ne répand plus de tranquillité dans un 
état, où les moeurs font toujours de meilleurs citoyens que 
les lois.'
The same theme obviously inspires book IV of the Lois, devoted 
to the laws of education and given a prominent position imme­
diately following the book where Montesquieu sets out his 
theory of the moral principles which characterize each type of 
government. He begins by declaring roundly that the laws of 
education prepare men for citizenship, and must therefore 
accord with the moral force which upholds the state. They are 
naturally of outstanding importance in the particular type of 
government whose very principle is virtue, namely the republic. 
Here, where the passions are no longer conveniently harnessed 
to the principle of the government as in the monarchy, and 
where education has not been rendered superfluous by the
(1) Nagel I, p.258; Pleiade I, p.323.
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combination of servility and ignorance indispensable for the 
conservation of the despotism, for the state to endure, it is 
essential that they teach men to conquer their selfish passions 
and to love the law above all things. In Montesquieu's mind 
education clearly constitutes a specific activity of the 
republic, considered as the historical embodiment of the ideal 
of justice; and the definition which he gives it, echoing that 
of the most important virtue of all, is hardly surprising:
'L'education..... consiste principalement à vivre avec les 
autres.
The rêle which Montesquieu allots reason in the pursuit 
of justice by the individual corresponds in some respects to 
that with which he endows it with regard to the conservation 
of the state by the legislator. We know from the details of 
his theory of political liberty and from his definition of 
the republic, that he considers reverence for the law to be an 
essential prerequisite of just behaviour; furthermore, at the 
end of Lois 1,1, the legislator is presented as the moral 
saviour of the citizen:
'Fait pour vivre dans la société, il ^ pouvait oublier les 
autres; les législateurs l'ont rendu a ses devoirs par les 
lois politiques et civiles.'
Such points suggest that Montesquieu conceived the creation 
and preservation of a moral climate in which the citizen might 
fulfil his moral and political calling, as an essential part
(1) Book IV, ch.3.
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of the legislator's job of conserving the state. The notion 
of the purpose fulfilled by the law that he reveals in a rejet 
from the Lois would seem to confirm such a hypothesis:
'C'est une pensée admirable de Platon, que les lois sont 
faites pour annoncer les ordres de la raison à ceux qui ne 
peuvent la recevoir immédiatement d'elle.
The laws must take into account the causal forces governing 
the life of the nation, they must be fashioned according to 
its history and geographical situation, but they must also aim 
to be just.
Thus, like the individual seeking to attain perfect 
justice through the comprehension of the sum of relationships 
linking his existence to the rest of his moral, historical and 
physical universe, the legislator must in his lawmaking endea­
vour to reconcile the demands of the moral law with the dic­
tates of environment. This is surely the true significance of 
the deceptively platitudinous introduction of book XXIX on the 
science of legislation:
'Je le dis, et il me semble que je n'ai fait cet ouvrage 
que pour le prouver: l'esprit de modération doit être celui
du législateur; le bien politique, comme le bien moral, se 
trouve toujours entre deux limites. En voici l'exemple.
Les formalités de la justice sont nécessaires à la liberté. 
Mais le nombre en pourrait être si grand qu'il choquerait le but 
des lois mêmes qui les auraient établies: les affaires
n'auraient point de fin: la propriété des biens resterait
incertaine; on donnerait à l'une des parties le bien de l'autre 
sans examen, ou on les ruinerait toutes les deux à force 
d'examiner.
(1) Pensée 1859 (Bkn.208); Nagel II, p.555; Pléiade II, p.1042
494
Les citoyens perdraient leur liberté et leur sûreté, 
les accusateurs n'auraient plus les moyens de convaincre, ni 
les accusés le moyen de se justifier.
Gecilius, dans Aulu-Gelle, discourant sur la loi des 
Douze Tables,qui permettait au créancier de couper en 
morceaux le débiteur insolvable, la justifie par son atrocité 
même, qui empêchait qu'on empruntât au-delà de ses facultés.
Les lois les plus cruelles seront donc les meilleures? Le 
bien sera l'excès, et tous les rapports des choses seront 
détruits? *(2)
Here Montesquieu's examples are not simply designed to illu­
strate the well worn dictum, ne quid nimis, as one might well 
infer from his allusion to '1'esprit de moderation*, but rather 
the idea that the legislator who ignores either material or 
practical considerations on the one hand, or the exigences of 
justice on the other, imperils the safety and happiness of 
his subjects. Justice is no less mocked by well-intentioned 
attempts to safeguard it by cumbersome legislation, than it 
is by brutally repressive laws. It is clear that the ideal 
which Montesquieu is proposing resembles a mean or even a 
compromise, but the more important point is that the limits 
between which it lies are again 'les rapports des choses', the 
whole complex of moral and physical relationships which sustain 
the life and evolution of a society.
Yet another fragment from the Pensées throws light upon 
the immensely intricate and constantly changing materials of 
the legislator's trade:
(1) Ghapters 1 and 2; Nagel I, pp.269-270; Pleiade II,
pp.865-866.
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*11 faut que chaque monarque ajoute à cet ouvrage car 
cet ouvrage (des lois) n'est jamais fini; parfait aujourd’hui, 
demain il est imparfait parce qu’il est soumis aux circonstances 
comme toutes les autres choses de l ’univers, parce que chaque 
société d'hommes est une action, composée de l'action de tous 
les esprits. Le monde intellectuel, aussi en mouvement que 
le monde physique, change comme le monde physique.
Alongside this notion that it is imperative for the legis­
lator to discover the mainsprings of 'le monde intellectuel’, 
and adapt his laws to them, one can place various references 
in the Lois to his duty to recognize and uphold the moral law; 
from these one can deduce moreover, that in Montesquieu's 
eyes, this function if anything outweighs in importance the 
purely scientific aspect of the law-giver's work.
Seeking to define the nature and forms of climatic influ­
ence on laws, he describes the complete inertia to which ex­
tremes of heat reduce Indian peoples; but to explain is not to 
justify, rather to forewarn, and from his description a general 
principle of legislation emerges:
'Plus les causes physiques portent les hommes au repos, plus 
les causes morales les en doivent éloigner*'(g)
In contrast to India, where legislation has simply confirmed 
the vices engendered by climate, Chinese legislators,
'considérant les hommes dans l'action propre à leur faire
remplir les devoirs de la vie',
have seen to it that all social and moral forces, religion.
(1) Pensee 2266; Nagel II, p.677.
(2) Book XIV, ch.5; Nagel I, p.312; Pleiade II, p.480.
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philosophy and the lav/ issue in practical a c t i v i t y . I n  
the ensuing discussion of the institutions of domestic slavery, 
largely determined according to Montesquieu by climatic influ­
ence, he restates this golden rule of legislation in even 
plainer terms. Having decided that modesty in sexual relation­
ships is the law of nature and of reason, he concludes:
'Quand donc la puissance physique de certains climats 
viole la loi naturelle des deux sexes et celle des êtres 
intelligents, c'est au législateur à faire des lois civiles 
qui forcent la nature du climat et rétablissent les lois 
primitives•*(2)
(1) Book XIV, ch.5. ,
(2) Book XVI, ch.12; Nagel I, p.361; Pleiade II, p.518.
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II
It is impossible to restrict a discussion of 
Montesquieu's ideas on the moral duties of the citizen to 
those works, essays of comparatively early date for the most 
part, whose titles announce an immediate concern with this 
subject. The Eloge de la Sincérité (1717), the Discours sur 
1 'Équité (1725), De la Considération et de la Réputation 
(1725), or of course the most important of all, the Traité 
des Devoirs (1725) in its sadly fragmented state, besides 
standing in an almost contrapuntal relationship to each other, 
echo ideas sketched out in the Lettres Persanes, or in the 
Pensées, and anticipate themes which reappear, fully 
orchestrated, in the Lois.
Taking as a starting point justice considered as the 
highest of moral duties, one finds the following definition 
in the Analyse du Traité des Devoirs;
(1) The arguments put forward by X. Védère (Nagel III,
pp.175-178), and P. Dimoff ('La place dans I'oeuvre de 
Montesquieu de l'Essai touchant les lois naturelles',
RHLF, 1957, 57e. année, 4, pp.481-493), for attributing the 
Essai touchant les lois naturelles et la distinction du 
juste et de l'injuste, published in Nagel III, pp.175-199, 
to Montesquieu are, as R. Shackleton maintains, (op.cit. 
above (p.30 n.2.) p.249, n.l), virtually impossible to 
accept. Apart from stylistic incompatibility, there is a 
marked contradiction between the main doctrines of the 
essay and Montesquieu's ideas on law and justice; it pre­
sents for instance a crudely voluntarist conception of law: 
'La loi suppose un supérieur (jui commande et des inférieurs 
qui lui obéissent..... Le supérieur c'est Dieu, et les 
inférieurs sont les hommes.' (p.180); and morals are made
to depend on the principle of self interest aided by 
'la religion de l'instinct'.
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_*La plupart des vertus, ne sont que des rapports 
particuliers, mais la Justice est un rapport général ; elle 
concerne l'homme en lui—même; elle le concerne par rapport à 
tous les hommes.
From the terms he uses here, it is easy to guess that all 
other virtues will be presented as the offspring of justice, 
and so it proves. The passing reference to this idea in the 
Analyse(2) is confirmed by an entry in the Pensées apparently 
unconnected with the Devoirs itself:
'Presque toutes les vertus sont un rapport particulier 
d'un certain homme à un autre; par exemple: l'amitié, l'amour
de la Patrie, la pitié, sont des rapports particuliers. Mais 
la justice est un rapport^général. Or, toutes les vertus qui 
détruisent ce rapport général ne sont pas des vertus.
As one would expect from the austere portraitist of 
republican democracy revealed in books III and IV of the Lois, 
who defines political virtue as voluntary self-renunciation 
for the sake of the common good, Montesquieu rejects in his 
formal theory of morals all false divisions between public and 
private conduct; just as justice is envisaged elsewhere in the 
Devoirs as the moral foundation of political society in 
g e n e r a l , s o  it is inevitably held at the same time to con­
stitute the cornerstone of personal morality.
The definition proposed here, 'un rapport général', 
distils the element of reciprocity central to any idea of
Nagel III, p.157; Pléiade I, p.110, ^
Summary of ch.Ill of the original Traite ; Nagel III, p.159; 
Pléiade I, p.109. .
(3) Pensée 1008 (Bkn.1214); Nagel II, p.282; Pléiade I, p.1304.
(4) Pensée 1266 (Bkn.615).
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justice, that was presented in a metaphysical framework in 
Lettres Persanes LXXXIII, and juxtaposed at the beginning of 
the Lois with the notions of structural and functional rela­
tionship implicit in the ideas of scientific and social laws. 
But here it is no longer a question of relationships within 
a supernatural design, still less of the laws of mechanical 
necessity; envisaging it in the context of morals pure and 
simple, Montesquieu strips his definition down to bare essen­
tials; the single idea of undifferentiated reciprocity. For 
the proper limits of the sphere of justice are now set down, 
and they extend no further than inter-personal relationships:
'Le chapitre III traite de nos Devoirs envers les hommes. 
Ces devoirs sont de deux espèces, selon l'auteur. Ceux qui se 
rapportent plus aux autres hommes qu'à nous, et ceux qui se 
rapportent plus à nous qu'aux autres hommes. Il met parmi les 
devoirs de la première espèce tous ceux qui tirent leur origine 
de la justice.' ^
Thus although simple reciprocity logically constitutes an 
irreducible element of particular virtues and duties, like 
friendship and patriotism, it is entirely absent from the 
relationship which links men and God. According to the 
compte rendu of the Devoirs Montesquieu does not there place 
religious duties in the same category as those derived from 
justice, for the former are completely one-sided:
'nos devoirs envers Dieu sont d'autant plus indispensables 
qu'ils ne sont pas réciproques, comme ceux que les hommes se 
rendent, car nous devons tout a Dieu et Dieu ne nous doit 
rien.*(2)
(1) Analyse, Nagel III, p.159; Pléiade I, p.109.
(2) Ibid.
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Similar ideas about justice considered from this more 
strictly moral or even juristic standpoint, are to be found as 
one would expect, in the Discours sur l'équité qui doit régler 
les jugements et l'exécution des lois, which Montesquieu pro­
bably wrote shortly after the Devoirs (read 12th. November, 
1725), for the edification of the members of the Parlement of 
Bordeaux at the beginning of a new session. The definition of 
the Devoirs is echoed for example in the words he uses here to 
describe equity;
'cette affection generale pour le genre humain, qui est la 
vertu de l'homme considéré en lui-même.
And indeed the idea implied in its definition as a general 
relationship, of the universality of justice, of its virtual 
identity as the fount of all virtues, with common humanity, 
receives particular emphasis in the Discours;
'la justice doit être en nous une conduite générale. Soyons 
justes dans tous les lieux, justes à tous égards, envers 
toutes personnes, en toutes occasions.'(g)
The judge above all must eschew the example of Cato, just in ' 
the tribunal but not in his family.
Such entreaties doubtless appear as platitudinous as they 
were ineffectual, not that Montesquieu's sincerity is thereby 
in any way impugned. They were clearly inspired however by 
the classical humanism which was so marked an influence upon
(1) Nagel III, p.213; Pléiade I, p.47.
(2) Nagel III, p.214; Pleiade I, p.48.
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Montesquieu*s moral thought, and indeed in various disguises, 
upon that of his generation as a whole, notwithstanding the 
relativist cross currents to which he himself contributed. 
Descartes, Malebranche and Clarke before him, to name but 
a significant handful, had all been moved by a similar respect 
for the integrity of human nature and the dignity of mankind 
as a whole, to express their conviction that the duties of man 
took precedence over any particular a l l e g i a n c e . T h e  hierar­
chy of values which Malebranche establishes in the Traité de 
Morale in order to demonstrate the low priority of purely 
sectional interests;
*11 faut être homme, chrétien, français avant que d*être 
grammarien, poète, historien, étranger.*
anticipates by its universalist spirit, the personal credo 
confided by Montesquieu in the Pensées ;
*Si je savais quelque chose qui me fût utile, et qui fut 
préjudiciable à ma famille, je la^rejetterais de mon esprit.
Si je savais quelque chose utile à ma famille et qui ne le fût 
pas à ma patrie, je chercherais à l ’oublier. Si je savais^ 
quelque chose utile à ma patrie, et qui fût préjudiciable à 
1*Europe, ou bien qui fût utile à 1*Europe et préjudiciable au 
Genre humain, je la regarderais comme un crime.*^g)
The cosmopolitanism sustaining this declaration again descends 
in a straight line from the Devoirs, where it is expressed in 
the form of a general maxim reminiscent of his definition of 
justice, and rounded off with an impeccably Ciceronian refrain;
(1) See Descartes, Lettre à la Princesse Élisabeth, 15th. Sept. 
1645, in Correspondance IV, ed. Adam and Tknnery, Paris, 
1901; Malebranche, Traité de Morale, Part II, ch.X, para,14; 
S. Clarke, De l'Existence et des Attributs de Dieu, 1717, II, 
ch.III, p.531 "
(2) Pensée 741 (Bkn.ll); Nagel II, pp.221-222; Pleiade I, p.981.
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* tous les devoirs particuliers cessent lorsqu'on ne peut
pas les remplir sans choquer les devoirs de l ’homme le
devoir du citoyen est un crime lorsqu’il fait oublier le 
devoir de l ’homme. L'impossibilité de ranger l ’univers sous 
une même société a rendu les hommes étrangers à des hommes, 
mais cet arrangement n ’a point prescrit contre les premiers 
devoirs, et l ’homme, partout raisonnable, n ’est ni Romain ni 
Barbare.’^^
As ail other virtues are to justice as a ’rapport 
particulier’ is to a ’rapport général’, so the idea of reci­
procity, central to its definition seems to colour 
Montesquieu’s treatment of all its ramifications. Society in 
the abstract is seen as a complex of inter-personal relation­
ships established for the sake of mutual utility and comfort, 
and the assumption underlying such widely separated studies as 
the Fable of the Troglodytes and book I, chapters 2 and 3 of 
the Lois is explicitly confirmed in certain fragments of the 
Devoirs. When writing of friendship for example, he says;
’Rous passons une espèce de contrat pour notre utilité commune, 
qui n'est qu’un retranchement de celui que nous avons passé 
avec la société entière, et semble même, en un certain sens,
lui être préjudiciable.
and more directly, describing the spirit of citizenship, he 
speaks of the kind of magistrature which membership of the 
body politic confers on everyone;
’il n ’y a personne qui ne participe au gouvernement, soit dans 
son emploi, soit dans sa famille, soit dans l ’administration 
de ses biens.'
(1) Analyse, Nagel III, p.160; Pléiade I, p.110. Cf. Cicero,
De officiis, III; vi.
(2) Pensée 12$3 (Bkn.604); Nagel II, p.335; Pléiade I, 
PP.1I29-II3O. .
(3) Pensée 1269 (Bkn.618); Nagel II, p.349; Pleiade I, p.1144.
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Since each individual is thus bound indissolubly to his 
fellows, patriotism will obviously occupy first place among 
those virtues derived from justice.
On this second most general virtue, Montesquieu has a 
great deal to say; indeed, taking all his works together, there 
is no doubt that it constitutes one of the major themes. In 
the Lettres Persanes, it is already given pride of place after 
justice, when Montesquieu develops the argument in Letter XLVI 
that respect for the laws, love of one’s fellows and filial 
piety, are the first duties of religion. Gratitude to God 
can best be shown by loving his creatures; and the most effec­
tive expression of this love
’est d ’observer les règles de la société et les devoirs de 
1 ’humanité.’
But in the Devoirs, inspired at least according to Montesquieu, 
by the writings of the neo-Stoics, nostalgia for the ancient 
republics colours his treatment even more markedly, as if his 
essay were the prelude to the great lament for the passing of 
republican virtue developed in the Considérations and the 
early books of the Lois.
After deploring the treachery, cruelty and bloodshed 
which characterized the Spanish conquest of the Empires of 
South America, and witnessed only too eloquently to a crude 
colonialism masquerading as religious zeal, Montesquieu pleads
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the cause of true patriotism, the patriotism celebrated in 
the histories of Greece and Rome. While it is on the one 
hand true, he says, that the abuse of this virtue has engen­
dered the greatest crimes, on the other, once properly con­
trolled, it honours and sustains the whole nation. He finds 
overwhelming proof of this in the depressing spectacle pre­
sented by contemporary morals when they are set against the 
soaring spirit of Antiquity:
^ 'Quand je pense à la petitesse de nos motifs, à la 
baaesse de nos moyens, à l ’avarice avec laquelle nous 
recherchons de viles récompenses, à cette ambition si diffé­
rente de l ’amour de la gloire, on (sic) est étonné de la 
différence des spectacles, et il semble que, depuis que ces 
deux grands peuples ne sont plus, les hommes se sont raccourcis 
d ’une coudée.’ 2^ )
Similarly, while he begins his description of the spirit of 
true citizenship with a stern warning against aggressive 
nationalism:
’L ’esprit du citoyen n ’est pas de voir sa patrie dévorer 
toutes les patries. Ce désir de voir sa ville engloutir 
toutes les richesses des nations, de nourrir sans cesse ses 
yeux des triomphes des capitaines et des haines des rois, tout 
cela ne fait point l ’esprit du citoyen.
its details confirm the supreme importance of true patriotism 
for the moral and political health of the nation. For the 
patriot will cherish its laws as custodians of the general 
good, even in such cases as might not favour his personal
(1) Pensée 1268 (Bkn.598); Nagel II, p.348, Pleiade I, p.1127.
(2) Pensée 1269 (Bkn.618;; Nagel II, pp.348-349. Pléiade I, 
p.1145.
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interests; and beyond this he will desire and rejoice in 
public order and tranquillity, the stringent administration 
of justice, the dignity and prosperity of magistrates and 
rulers, in short, the complete stability of the monarchy or 
republic.
This ideal of patriotic virtue is strongly reflected in 
several minor essays related to the Devoirs. Montesquieu 
embodies it in particular in the character of Xanthippus, the 
Spartan hero of his Dialogue de Xantippe et de Xénocrate 
(1727), who puts duty to mankind before any purely national 
allegiance, and seeks happiness and honour only in exact obe­
dience to the laws of his country. Taking a realistic look at 
a subject much nearer to the hearts of his contemporaries.
De la Considération et de la Réputation (1725), he still insists, 
if in a somewhat wry tone, that virtue is the surest means to 
conserve a reputation, and will even compensate for its loss, 
and that love of our fellow citizens is the very best means 
of acquiring one.
Whether loving one's fellow citizens is actually feasible 
however, or consists in anything more positive than the remote, 
paternalistic benevolence which emerges from the pages of this 
essay is another question. In the Devoirs he concedes that 
for practical purposes, friendship is the main and regrettably 
partial form which this love takes.
(1) Pensée 1253 (Bkn.604).
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If men were perfectly virtuous, they would indeed have 
no friends, for they would cherish a total stranger as their 
dearest friend, having no need of external tokens or emotional 
props, as long as they were sustained by their sense of com­
munity. But men are not made of such stuff, neither is it 
physically possible to know all one’s fellow citizens; there­
fore, after the fulfilment of civic duty, which we know 
Montesquieu regarded as the special province of reason, friend­
ship, defined as a kind of sub-contract with a select group 
of citizens, constitutes the second among particular virtues, 
and the highest affective form of the social bond:^^^
’....ces liens qui détachent l ’homme de lui-même pour 
l ’attacher à autrui faisaient faire les grandes actions. Sans 
cela tout est vulgaire, et il ne reste qu’un intérêt bas, qui 
n ’est proprement que l ’instinct animal de tous les hommes.’ 2^)
Friendship was of course the great strength of the Romans, and 
Montesquieu does not overlook the opportunity to digress upon 
its central importance to the constitution of their government, 
which inevitably leads him back to the perennial subject of 
the decay of contemporary morals, but presented this time with 
a significant political twist;
(1) On the evidence of a comment on Fenelon’s Explication des 
Maximes des Saints sur la Vie intérieure (1697), it is 
perhaps surprising that Montesquieu did not also politi­
cize love:
’Je disais: "Le livre de M. de Cambrai détruit en
trois mots: l ’amour est un rapport.’” Pensée 1054
(Bkn-902), (Nagel II, p.290; Pleiade I, p.1247).
(2) Pensee 1253 (Bkn.604;; Nagel II, p.334, Pleiade I, p.1130.
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’Les citoyens^tenaient aux citoyens par toutes sortes de 
chaînes: on était lié avec ses amis, ses affranchis, ses
esclaves, ses enfants. Aujourd’hui, tout est aboli jusqu’à 
la puissance paternelle: chaque homme est isolé. Il semble
que l ’effet naturel de la puissance arbitraire soit de parti­
culariser tous les intérêts.
This analysis of political degeneracy in terms of the 
isolation of individuals within the community, of the breaking 
of all social bonds, anticipates the major features with which 
Montesquieu endows the despotism in the Lois. I n d e e d ,  as 
the logic of his original definition of virtue would demand, 
he seems to have regarded the breakdown of social relation­
ships on every level as the main symptom of decadence. Thus 
in a rejet from the Lois he notes that the word which charac­
terizes the good republic where high moral standards prevail, 
is nous, as opposed to the moi typical of the monarchy. 
Describing in his Réflexions sur le Caractère de quelques 
Princes (1731-3) the state of affairs leading to civil war 
which religious fanaticism often induces, he again has recourse 
to such terms :
’C ’est pour lors que tous les esprits sont outrés; que 
les intérêts de l ’État sont sacrifiés au succès de l ’idée de 
chacun, qu’il ne reste plus de liens dans la société que ceux 
d ’une haine et d ’une fureur commune ; que les gens les plus 
faibles s ’emparent du pouvoir pour mettre à leur tête les plus 
fourbes qui se présentent; que toute extravagance est écoutée, 
et que l ’hypocrisie prend la place des moeurs, des vertus et 
des lois.’
(1) Pensée 1253 (Bkn.604); Nagel II, p.334, Pléiade I, p.1130.
(2) See especially Book IV, ch.3.
(3) Pensée 1891 (Bkn.233).
(4) Nagel III, p.549; Pléiade I, pp.529-530.
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And in yet another rejet from the Lois, under the stern heading 
Moeurs Corrompues he sums up the lot of the honest man living 
in a corrupt society in the same vein:
’C ’est pour lors qu’un honnête homme passe sa vie dans 
une espèce d ’étonnement; qu’il est, pour ainsi dire, seul dans 
le monde; que tous les liens d ’humanité l ’effarouchent, parce 
qu’il ne trouve aucun homme dont il voulût être le protecteur, 
aucun homme sociable qu’il voulût avoir pour ami, aucune femme 
dont il voulût être le mari, aucun enfant dont il voulût être 
le père.’^j
But although Montesquieu’s honnête homme would not feel 
out of place dressed in a tunic or toga, his austerity is 
moderated by his creator’s sophisticated intelligence. His 
sociological insight into politics in general enables him to 
appreciate the manners which foster and facilitate the prac­
tice of virtue. Thus his emphasis on bienséance seems less a
homage to antiquity than an admission of the need to reconcile,
if not to adapt, the inflexible ideal to the ever changing
character of nations. As he concedes in the Devoirs :
’telle est la disposition des choses et des esprits dans une 
natioh polie qu’un homme, quelque vertueux qu’il fût, s’il 
n ’avait dans l ’esprit que la rudesse, serait presque incapable 
de tout bien et ne pourrait qu’en très peu d ’occasions mettre 
sa vertu en pratique.
In the Discours sur l ’Équité, bienséance is presented as 
an integral part of justice, but it is in the Devoirs that 
Montesquieu explains how and why. In addition to justice and
(1) Pensee 1921 (Bkn.327); Nagel II, p.576; Pleiade II, p.1078.
(2) Pensée 1270 (Bkn.619); Nagel II, p.350; Pleiade I, p.1145.
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honesty, men demand from their close associates deference, 
attention, affection and understanding;
*11 y a done certains devoirs différents de ceux qui viennent 
directement de la justice et ces devoirs sont fondés sur la 
bienséance et ne dérivent de la justice qu'en ce sens qu'il 
est juste, en général que les hommes aient des égards les uns 
pour les autres, non seulement dans les choses qui peuvent 
leur rendre la société plus utile, mais aussi dans celles qui 
peuvent la leur rendre plus agréable.
The kind of behaviour that we demand from our closest fellows 
should be the model for our manners towards all others, the 
only limit to the duties of politeness and civility being 
regard for our own probity. As a result of fulfilling them, 
social intercourse is greatly facilitated and general happi­
ness and contentment consequently increased.
Manners always take the form of an external and rigid 
ceremonial,
'une espèce de code de lois non écrites que les hommes ont 
promis d'observer entre eux*;
and as such, he explains elsewhere, they clearly derive from 
the communal rather than the individual conscience, 
although they utilize to general advantage, the egotism which 
would otherwise undermine social s t a b i l i t y . T h e  ceremonial 
varies however in form and complexity from nation to nation, 
ranging from the scant and rudimentary customs of barbarian 
peoples to the tyrannic rituals of the Chinese.
(1) Op.cit., Nagel II, pp.349-350; Pleiade I, pp.1144-1145.
(2) Pensée 1904 (Bkn.334).
(3) Pensée 464 (Bkn.1042).
(4) Pensée 1271 (Bkn.620).
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For Montesquieu happiness in general was linked in a most 
intimate way to the pursuit of virtue and the fulfilment of 
duty. 2^ ) The idyllic condition of his virtuous Troglodytes is 
proof enough of this, and elsewhere one encounters scattered 
aphorisms on this subject which clearly reflect the idea of 
reciprocity at the heart of his definition of justice. In 
Arsace et Ismenie for example, the hero describes the true 
happiness which reigned in his household in terms of the 
reverence for, and active enjoyment of natural equality:
(1) For a full account of the relation between Montesquieu's 
conception of happiness and his moral idealism see 
M.W. Rombout, La Conception stoïcienne du bonheur chez 
Montesquieu et chez quelques-uns de ses contemporains, 
Leiden, ^ 1958; Part III. In his L'idée du bonheur d ^ s  
la littérature et la pensée française au XVIIIe. siècle, 
Armand Colin, Paris, I960, R. Mauzi studies Montesquieu's 
account of the experience of happiness rather than his 
ideas on the moral conditions which favour it. However, 
the conception of happiness summarized in the following 
comment upon Maupertuis's Essai de Philosophie Morale 
(1751), as the enjoyment of habitual wellbeing rather 
than transitory pleasure, accords well with his insistence 
on the fulfilment of duties as the necessary prerequisite 
for happiness;
'M. de Maupertuis ne fait entrer dans son calcul que 
les plaisirs et les peines, c'est-à-dire tout ce qui 
avertit l'âme de son bonheur ou de son malheur. Il^ne 
fait point entrer le bonheur de l'existence et la félicité 
habituelle, qui n'avertit de rien, parce qu'elle est 
habituelle. Nous n'appelons plaisir que ce qui n'est pas 
habituel. Si nous avions continuellement le plaisir de 
manger avec appétit, nous n'appellerions pas cela un 
plaisir; ce serait existence et nature. Il ne faut pas 
dire que le bonheur est ce moment que nous ne voudrions 
pas changer pour un autre. Disons autrement; le bonheur 
est ce moment que nous ne voudrions pas changer pour le 
non-être.' Pensée 2010 (Bkn.994); Nagel II, pp.620-621; 
Pléiade I, p.1267.
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*^ Nous descendions avec plaisir à l'égalité de la nature; 
nous étions heureux, et nous voulions vivre avec des gens qui 
le fussent. Le bonheur faux rend les hommes durs et superbes, 
et ce bonheur ne se communique point. Le vrai bonheur les 
rend doux et sensibles, et ce bonheur se partage toujours.
Arsace's advice is echoed in the Pensées ; neither the winged 
horse of Ariosto, nor yet the ring whose wearer may pass 
unseen would bring a man more happiness, unless he also 
possessed the shield which turns all other men to stone; 'pour 
être heureux', in short, 'il ne faut pas désirer de l'être 
plus que les autres.
Truth no less than the pursuit of justice and the safe­
guarding of communal prosperity and individual contentment, 
is in Montesquieu's eyes an important object of virtue. In 
the Éloge de la Sincérité (1717) he disputes the efficacy of 
the method of self-examination recommended by the Stoics for 
acquiring self-knowledge, on the grounds that self-esteem 
invariably constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to impartial 
self-appraisal. Consequently in the discovery of truth, as 
in every aspect of moral life, men are interdependent; as 
members of society, they have a duty to reveal all faults and 
shortcomings to each other, a duty of honest sincerity:
'Les hommes, vivant dans la société n'ont point eu cet 
avantage sur les bêtes pour se procurer les ^ moyens de vivre 
plus délicieusement. Lieu a voulu qu'ils vécussent en commun 
pour se servir de guide les uns aux autres, pour qu'ils 
pussent voir par les yeux d'autrui ce que leur amour-propre 
leur cache, et qu'enfin, par un commerce sacré de confiance, 
ils pussent se dire et se rendre la vérité.
(i; Nagel III, p.488; Pléiade I, p.471.
(2) Pensée 2046 (Bkn.1004). .
(3) Nagel III, pp.60-61; Pleiade I, p.100.
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The theme of sincerity reappears in the Devoirs, albeit 
in a slightly different form. Just as men have a duty to 
reveal the truth to each other, so they also bear an obligation 
to judge their forbears; with this in mind, Montesquieu sings 
the praises of historians, and recommends the reading of
history, particularly national history. This he sees not so
much after the Classical tradition as a study of morals in 
itself, than as a tribute to those heroes whose good example 
has encouraged virtue, and a punishment or condemnation of the 
wicked. Thus the publication of historical truth could be 
compared to the administration of justice, just as the virtue 
of sincerity was deemed indispensable for its practice;
'Le sentiment d'admiration que leurs belles actions 
excitent en nous est une espèce de justice que nous leur 
rendons, et l'horreur que nous avons pour les méchants en est
une autre. Il n'est pas juste d'accorder aux méchants l'oubli
de leur nom et de laisser les grands hommes dans ce même oubli 
que les méchants ont paru souhaiter.'
As regards the actual acquisition and propagation of 
virtue, Montesquieu naturally sets great store by example and 
education. The virtuous Troglodytes of the Lettres Persanes 
devote the whole of their attention to inculcating through 
precept and the example of their wretched forbears the notion 
of the absolute priority of justice into the heads of their 
children.^2) Example is a most powerful moral agent, whether 
for good or for evil, as Usbek's ominous portrayal in letter 
CXLVI of the pestilential corruption with which John Law's
(1) Pensee 1260 (Bkn.611); Nagel II, p.337; Pléiade I, p.1133.
(2) Letter XII*
5 1 3
financial manipulations infected France, eloquently demon­
strates:
'J'y ai vu une nation, naturellement généreuse, pervertie en 
un instant, depuis le dernier des sujets jusqu'aux plus grands, 
par le mauvais exemple d'un ministre......le mal se communiquer,
et n'épargner pas meme les membres les plus sains; les hommes 
les plus vertueux faire des choses indignes; et violer les 
premiers principes de la justice, sur ce vain prétexte qu'on 
la leur avait violée.
With characteristic psychological penetration, Montesquieu saw 
that reason alone, although equipping us to grasp first prin­
ciples and supporting argumentation, was insufficiently strong 
to combat the pernicious influence of such bad examples;
!il y a certaines vérités qu'il ne suffit pas de persuader, 
mais qu'il faut encore faire sentir. Telles sont les vérités 
de morale.
Consequently he returns again and again to the important rôle 
not just of emotional response to moral ideas, but more 
especially of the development of this response into an ingrained 
habito In the early Pensées Morales he explains that the best 
way to acquire a perfect sense of justice is to make a habit 
of observing it in the slightest things - 'qu'on y plie jusqu'à 
sa manière de penser.' The faculty of judgement can be excer- 
cised on subjects not necessarily connected with morals or 
society, since any kind of practice prepares it for more impor­
tant d e c i s i o n s . A c c o r d i n g  to the compte rendu, this
(1) Nagel I, p.307; Pleiade I, p.361.
(2) See above pp. 293-293:
Lettres Persanes XI; Nagel I, p.26; Pleiade I, p.145. 
Pensée 220 (Bkn.597).
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recommendation was later incorporated in the Devoirs, but for 
an account of the results of such therapy, one must go back to
Rica's eulogy in Lettres Persanes L of those people,
'chez qui la vertu était si naturelle qu'elle ne se faisait pas 
même sentir; ils s'attachaient à leur devoir sans s'y plier 
et s'y portaient comme par instinct,
The ideal of spontaneous perfection presented here, anti­
cipating the special qualities which distinguish the 'homme 
d'esprit' in the Essai sur les Causes;
'(il) connaît et agit de la manière momentanée dont il faut
qu'il connaisse et qu'il agisse; il se crée pour ainsi dire, à
chaque instant, sur le besoin actuel,
has a certain affinity with the peculiarly Stoic concept of 
decorum, the virtue in which the notions of propriety and 
grace are c o m b i n e d . Decorum characterized the external 
aspect of human conduct in so far as it revealed its internal 
excellence; and when it is considered in conjunction with the 
theory of persona, of the special role which, according to the 
Stoics, each individual played in the scheme of things by vir­
tue of his particular attributes, the presence of a notion akin 
to Montesquieu's idea of perfect integrity effortlessly 
expressed in individual conduct is revealed.
(1) Nagel I, p.lO€T; Pleiade I, p.203.
(2) Nagel III, p.418; Pléiade II, p.57. See above p.
(3; For the origins of this notion and its,definition in
Cicero's De Officiis, see E. Bréhier, Etudes de Philosophie 
Antique, P.Ü.F., Paris, 1955; XIV, 'Sur une^des origines de 
1 *humanisme moderne: le De Officiis de Ciceron*.
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This resemblance is hardly surprising in view of the many 
tributes to Stoicism which he contrived to include in his 
works, 2^) a]:id of his special enthusiasm for Cicero in parti­
cular. ^ 2 ) Tt is true that in the case of the Traité des 
Devoirs, some doubt has been expressed as to the significance, 
if not the reliability, of Montesquieu's own account of his 
models in his letter of October 1750 to Monsignor de 
Fitz-James.^2) Shackleton suggests that analysis of the sur­
viving fragments of the essay points to Pufendorf's short 
treatise. De Officio Hominis, in Barbeyrac's French translation, 
Les Devoirs de l'Homme et du Citoyen, rather than to Cicero's 
De Officiis, as his chief guide . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  even in the 
Devoirs, although there is no trace of the Ciceronian plan, 
Montesquieu refers specifically to his definition of honestas^ 
and touches on several of the moral attributes included in 
the De Officiis. While he naturally treats Cicero's abstrac­
tions in terms relevant to contemporary society, in essence, 
the nobility of mind, modesty in deportment and appointments, 
gravity of disposition and fidelity in formal relationships, 
which he r e c o m m e n d s , a r e  the same dignitas, frugalitas, 
gravitas and fides, that grace the Stoic pantheon. Beyond 
this, the portrait of the republic, sustained by virtue, or by
(1) See for example. Analyse du Traité des Devoirs, Nagel III, 
p.160; Pléiade I. p.109; and Lois XXIV, ÏÔ.
( 2 )  See above pp. 25+"2'56.
(3) See above p.Z73.
(4) See op.cit. above (p.50 n.2.), pp.71-72; and Shackleton,
'La Genèse de l'Esprit des Lois', RHLF, 1952.
(5) Pensée 1263 (Bkn.613T.
(6) See Pensées 1256 (Bkn.607); 1257 (Bkn.608); 1262 (Bkn.543); 
1251 (Bkn.602).
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that kind of patriotism defined as love of the laws, of equal­
ity and of frugality, which emerges from the early books of 
the Lois, c o n s t i t u t i n g ,  in spite of the emphatic declara­
tion in the Avertissement that conventional virtue has 
nothing to do with the 'vertu politique' which he intends to 
treat, a great synthesis of the themes scattered through 
Montesquieu's moral writings, immortalizes the spirit of 
Antiquity of which Stoicism was the quintessential expression.
(1) See especially Books IV, ch.5 and V, ch.3. At various 
times Montesquieu expressed a strong attachment to the 
ideal of economic equality, although he maintains that 
its existence in a monarchy is contrary to the moral 
principle of this form of government. The theory of 
distributive justice hardly preoccupies him in his moral 
writings, but certain isolated references to equality 
stand out; e.g. Lettres Persanes GXXII:
'L'égalité même des citoyens, qui produit ordinairement 
de l'égalité dans les fortunes, porte l'abondance et la 
vie dans toutes parties du corps politique et la répand 
partout.' (Nagel I, p.244; Pleiade I, p.313) and Pensée 
2084 (Bkn.1130):  ^ ,
'Les richesses sont un tort que l'on a à reparer, et 
l'on pourrait dire; "Excusez-moi si je suis,riche".' 
(Nagel II, p.638; Pléiade I, p.1290.) A '
5 1 7
III
A nostalgic adaptation of the moral ideals of Antiquity 
was far from being the only form in which Montesquieu's love 
of justice found expression. Although his field of study in 
the Lois was positive law rather than theoretical jurisprudence, 
details of legislation and established institutions are some­
times judged as well as e x p l a i n e d , a n d  judged with humani­
tarian as well as utilitarian considerations in mind. Indeed 
these two seem to overlap each other to a certain extent, 
though the overlap is not just attributable to the age-old 
assumption by which the virtuous Troglodytes set so much store:
'la justice pour autrui est une charité pour nous*,
but rather to Montesquieu's profound conviction that the pur­
suit of justice is the natural end of rational beings, and its 
realization essential to the conservation of any society 
worthy of the name. Injustice survives, even becomes
(1) In the Defense de l'Esprit des Lois, (2e, partie), he 
declares openly that his purpose was to do both:
'On peut dire que le sujet en est immense, qu'il embrasse 
toutes les institutions qui sont reçues parmi les hommes; 
puisque l'auteur distingue ces institutions.......qu'il
en cherche l'origine; qu'il en découvre les causes 
physiques et morales; qu'il examine celles qui ont un 
degré de bonté par elles-mêmes, et celles qui n'en ont 
aucun.....'
Nagel I, p.456; Pléiade II, p.1137.
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institutionalized in despotism, but the tranquillity of this 
state, he reminds us, is that of a city awaiting the sack of 
the e n e m y . T h e r e  are few exceptions indeed to the general 
rule tacked on to a reference in the Considerations to 
Carthaginian oppression in Spain:
'L'injustice est mauvaise ménagère......elle ne remplit pas
même ses vues.'^^)
One of the most striking examples of Montesquieu's refu­
sal at all times to take refuge in a nice scientific imparti­
ality, is his treatment of the related topics of the right of 
conquest and the institution of slavery.
On the evidence of the Lettres Persanes his hostility to 
both accepted theories and the practices they legitimized had 
early beginnings. In Letter XCV he sets out the principles 
which in his estimation should govern international law, 
supplanting the politics of prestige and aggrandizement com­
monly pursued. They issue from the premiss that the rules 
appropriate to this field of relationships are basically no 
different from those which apply to civil law. Thus parallel
(1) Lois 7,14. Montesquieu's treatment of despotism is the 
subject of an exhaustive study by B. Kassem, Decadence et 
Absolutisme dans l'Oeuvre de Montesquieu, Études d'Histoire 
économique, politique et sociale, XXXIV, Droz, Geneva and 
Paris, 1960.
(2) Chapter 4; Nagel I, p.374; Pléiade II, pp.86-87.
(3) Montesquieu's treatment of slavery has been dealt with at 
some length by R.P. Jameson in his thesis entitled 
Montesquieu et l'Esclavage, étude sur les origines de 
l'opinion anti-esclavagiste en France au XVIIIe. siècle, 
Paris, 1911. Though some points of his interpretation
5 1?
Notes to p.318 continued:
(3) of Montesquieu's theories are debatable, the work is
valuable for its review of traditional juridical sources, 
and for its thorough examination of the economic and moral 
climate in which Montesquieu wrote.
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to the individual citizen's right of self-defence, nations may 
have recourse to war when they are threatened by an aggressor* 
The only just war is the defensive war, and Montesquieu is at 
pains to show that even this is an extreme resort:
'comme la declaration de guerre doit être un acte de justice, 
dans laquelle il faut toujours que^la peine soit proportionnée 
à^la faute, il faut voir si celui à qui on déclare la guerre 
mérite la mort: car faire la guerre à quelqu'un, c'est
vouloir le punir de mort.'^^
If as in civil law, the punishment is to fit the crime, then 
offences which carry no threat to the very existence of a 
nation, merit reprisals on a lesser scale, such as the cur­
tailment of concessions and agreements, or the severance of 
alliances.
Finally, Montesquieu declares that conquest in itself 
confers no rights, for it effectively dissolves the defeated 
society, and the victor himself can only establish tyranny in 
place of government. Peace treaties are just only when the 
reparations imposed are in proportion to the losses suffered; 
otherwise the party attached by their clauses is entitled to 
seek redress in further violence.^2)
Book X of the Lois, Les lois dans le rapport qu'elles ont 
avec la force offensive proceeds from exactly the same assump­
tion as Letter XCV, namely that the principles governing the
(1) Nagel I, p.189; Pleiade I, p.271.
(2) In the 1721 editions. The supplement to the 1754 edition 
introduced a new conclusion, more closely related to the 
text of Lois, X,3. It replaces the valid but inconsequen­
tial assertion of the earlier version, that conquest dis­
solves the vanquished society, with the much more powerful^ 
idea that the survival of the defeated nation is, in itself,
 a guarantee of redress._______________________________________
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lives of states are analogous to those governing the lives of 
men; similarly, Montesquieu's target is yet again those great 
blood-letting pretexts,
'les principes arbitraires de gloire, bienséance, d'utilité'.
As before he isolates the defensive war as the sole legitimate 
form of violence, but brackets with it a sub-species, arising 
indirectly from the right of self-defence, the preventive war, 
undertaken to pre-empt attack by a threatening neighbour.
/
Here however, unlike Letter XCV, Montesquieu identifies 
the origin of the right of war. Like the citizen's right of 
self-defence, it arises in the natural law of conservation.
Now 'natural law' is apparently used here as a generic term 
embracing all those fundamental unwritten laws originating in 
human attributes of thought and feeling, by which man regu­
lates and therefore perpetuates his existence as a social 
being; for the specific origin of the right of war lies in the 
notion of parity between subjects, generally held to be an 
essential element of any valid conception of justice. Though 
strictly speaking absent from Montesquieu's own definition of 
justice, here it is precisely this element which constitutes 
his criterion.
'Dans le cas de la défense naturelle, j'ai droit de tuer, 
parce que ma vie est à moi. comme la vie de celui qui 
m'attaque est à lui: de meme un Etat fait la guerre, parce que
sa conservation est juste comme toute autre conservation.'
(1) Book X, ch.2; Nagel I, p.182; Pleiade II, p.377.
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The logic of parity can be seen at work also in his restric­
tion of the right of engaging in preventive war to small 
nations; since their size renders them naturally insecure, 
the possession of this right to some extent restores the 
balance between them and their more powerful neighbours.
Montesquieu concludes that the right of war as he defines 
it, derives from necessity and rigid justice, and his argu­
ments certainly recall the idea expressed in book I, chap­
ter 1 of invariable rules of justice, describing the basic 
relationships of social beings, upon whose observance politi­
cal and moral survival ultimately depend.
As far as the right of conquest is concerned, in book X 
chapter 3, after insisting that, as a direct consequence of 
the right of war, it must also follow its spirit, Montesquieu 
enumerates four kinds of law which govern it;
'la loi^de la nature, qui fait que tout tend à la conservation
des espèces; la loi de la lumière naturelle, qui veut que^ 
nous fassions à autrui ce que nous voudrions qu'on nous fit; la 
loi qui forme les sociétés politiques, qui sont telles que la 
nature n'en a point borné la durée ; enfin la loi tirée de la 
chose même. La conquête est une acquisition; l'esprit 
d'acquisition porte avec lui l'esprit de conservation et 
d'usage, et non pas celui de destruction.'
Here Montesquieu confirms the distinction implicit in
chapter 2 between the law of nature understood as the body of
original or primitive laws, whose function viewed from the
(1) Nagel I, p.184; Pléiade II, p.378,
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standpoint of a sociologist, is indeed 'la conservation des 
espèces*, and the law of reason, or indeed of justice,
*qui veut qi^ nous fassions à autrui ce que nous voudrions 
qu'on nous fît*',
whose effects could be grouped, if that standpoint were main­
tained, among the natural laws, but which is now considered, 
not scientifically, but morally, as a precept, from the stand­
point of the rational being actively involved in the social 
predicament. The third kind of law which he cites, the law 
governing the formation of political societies, seems but a 
particular version, historical perhaps, of the natural law of 
conservation isolated by the scientist; while in the fourth, 
the curious 'loi tirée de la chose même', he seems to isolate 
yet another, still more specific instance, namely one of the 
basic psychological principles at work within the social con­
sciousness. This is perhaps no more than a scientific version 
of what the moralist would doubtless see in terms of the 
application of the rational principle of fitness.
Of these four different kinds of law, which, one feels, 
really represent four different ways in which the subject may 
be approached, the one he relies on most heavily for his demo­
lition of the traditional account of the right of conquest, is 
the 'loi de la lumière naturelle', the law which harks back to 
the rigid law of justice upon which he founded the principles 
of the right of war in the foregoing chapter.
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His argument against the jurisconsults;
*Ils ont donné dans l'arbitraire; ils ont supposé dans les 
conquérants un droit,^je ne sais quel, de tuer; ce qui leur 
a fait tirer des conséquences terribles comme le principe, et 
établir des maximes que les conquérants eux-mêmes, lorsqu'ils 
ont eu le moindre sens, n'ont jamais prises,
starts from the assertion that they generally confused the 
dissolution of a society with the anihilation of its members; 
but, Montesquieu objects;
'La société est l'union des hommes, et non pas les hommes ; le 
citoyen peut périr et l'homme rester.
The right to destroy the conquered nation has no foundation in 
any law, for quite clearly killing is only justified as long 
as the necessity of engaging in defensive war persists; the 
conqueror, as opposed to the combat^ént, is no longer fighting 
for his life and consequently on an equal footing with his 
antagonist.
With the right to kill, the right to reduce the vanquished 
to slavery, usually considered as a legitimate and humane 
alternative, falls also. Montesquieu is of the opinion, an 
opinion which reveals his sociological awareness of the effects 
of defeat on national character, as well as his humanitarian 
concern, that slavery is ohly ever legitimate as a means of 
facilitating the preservation of the defeated nation by allow­
ing it a space of time to adapt to the victor's habits and
(1) Nagel I, pp.184-185; Pleiade II, p.379
(2) Ibid.
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culture. The onus, he believes, and here one notes a distinct 
change of emphasis from Lettres Persanes XCV, where the con­
queror's right to reparation was tacitly conceded, lies always 
with the victor to emancipate his victims. In chapter 4 
indeed, indulging his idealism, he elaborates on those advan­
tages in the way of moral regeneration, political renewal, 
enlightenment and even freedom, which the right of conquest, 
properly used, can bring, concluding unequivocally;
'C'est à un conquérant à réparer une partie des maux 
qu'il a^faits. Je définis ainsi le droit de conquête; un 
droit nécessaire, légitime et malheureux, qui laisse toujours 
à payer une dette immense, pour s'acquitter envers la nature 
humaine•*
In his later treatment in book XV of the institution of 
slavery itself, the role played by moral idealism and the 
logic of his idea of justice is if anything even more striking, 
though at the same time also more ambiguous.
The theoretical and polemical half of the book, is largely 
a reworking of materials drawn from the Pensées and the Lettres 
Persanes. The last of these is of course from beginning to 
end a wholehearted condemnation in allegorical form of dome­
stic slavery, whose laws, as implemented in Usbek's harem, are 
overthrown by Roxane in the name of freedom and nature.^2)
00; r ±  '~ '
(2) Letter CLXI.
(1j Nagel I, p.188; Pleiade II, p.381.
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It also contains explicit attacks on the political and civil 
slavery resulting from conquest and maintained for the purposes 
of colonial exploitation, together with the associated trade 
in Negroes promoted by the need to replenish the stock of 
slave l a b o u r * I n  them, the iniquities of the Spanish con­
quest of South America, ever at the front of his mind when 
examples of barbarism, religious bigotry, Christian hypocrisy, 
and economic madness were called for,^^) rather than the 
methods used in developing the West Indian sugar colonies, 
methods in which the merchants and shipowners of Bordeaux were 
deeply involved, are singled out:
*11 n*y a rien de si extravagant que de faire périr un 
nombre innombrable d'hommes pour tirer du fond de la terre 
l'or et l'argent: ces métaux d'eux-mêmes absolument inutiles,
et qui ne sont des richesses que parce qu'on les a choisis 
pour en être les signes.
In addition to the barbarous injustice of transportation 
and slave labour, Montesquieu objects to the sheer waste of 
human life involved, yet surprisingly, it is the theme of 
depopulation which occasions his one favourable comment on the 
institution. The Romans and their benevolence towards slaves 
are, less surprisingly, the subject of his enthusiasm. In 
Letter CXV he praises the laws which, he imagines, by assuring
(1) See Letters LXXV, CXVIII, ^ CXXI.
(2) See also for example Pensee 1268 (Bkn.617); Oonsiderations 
sur les Richesses de l'Espagne (1726-27); Lois X,4 and 
XXI,22.
(3) Letter CXVIII; Nagel I, p.237; Pleiade I, p.307.
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Roman slaves of a secure, even comfortable living, and a fair 
chance of rapid emancipation, provided the republic with an 
inexhaustible supply of citizens and wealth. However, the 
favourable impression left by the Romans was to prove short­
lived; the Considerations brought a complete reversal of atti­
tude :
'les Romains, accoutumés à se jouer de la nature humaine, 
dans la personne de leurs enfants et de leurs esclaves, ne 
pouvaient guère connaître cette vertu que nous appelons 
humanité. D'où peut venir cette férocité que nous trouvons 
dans les habitants de nos colonies, que de cet usage continuel 
des châtiments sur une malheureuse partie du genre humain? 
Lorsqu'on est cruel dans l'état civil, que peut-on attendre de
la douceur et de la justice naturelle?'
A vivid and fiercely rhetorical fragment from the Dossier of 
this work reveals an even harsher judgement:
'Les Romains avaient une manière de penser qui distingait 
entièrement les esclaves des hommes.
Ils les faisaient combattre contre les bêtes farouches. 
Ils s'en servaient comme des gladiateurs et les obligeaient 
pour leurs plaisirs de s'entredétruire. Ils les mettaient la 
nuit dans des fosses, où ils les faisaient descendre, et, 
ensuite, retiraient l'échelle qui les avait descendus. Ils 
les mettaient à mort à leur fantaisie. Lorsque le maître
avait été tué dans la maison, on menait au supplice tous les
esclaves, coupables ou non, en quelque nombre qu'ils fussent. 
Lorsqu’ils étaient malades ou vieux, ils les abandonnaient et 
les faisaient porter au temple d'Esculape. Ils les privaient 
de tous les sentiments naturels les plus chers: ils les
privaient de la vertu de leurs femmes, de la chasteté de leurs 
filles, de la propriété de leurs enfants.
Pourquoi dégrader une partie de la nature humaine? 
Pourquoi se faire des ennemis naturels? Pourquoi diminuer le 
nombre de ses citoyens? Pourquoi en avoir qui ne seront 
retenus que par la crainte?
(1) Chapter XV; Nagel I, p.451; Pléiade II, p.148.
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Guerre servile! La plus juste qui ait jamais été entre­
prise, parce qu'elle voulait empêcher le plus violent abus que 
l'on ait jamais fait de la nature humaine.
The actual material of debate which in Lois XV gives 
substance to this moral indignation is to be found in an early 
entry in the Pensées. Here he is solely concerned to demon­
strate the logical incompatibility of traditional expositions 
of the right of slavery with his idea of natural law, by which 
he declares, all men are born free and independent.
In his view only two kinds of dependence are compatible 
with natural law: that of infants, and that of citizens upon
their magistrates. His explanation of the latter confirms that 
once again the initial basis of his reasoning is a conception 
of natural law as the summary of those processes by which human 
beings conserve themselves. Por he founds the legitimacy of 
civic dependence on the notion that anarchy is contrary to 
natural law, since anarchy conduces to the destruction rather 
than preservation of mankind. This amounts more or less to 
a restatement of the idea of the natural origins of society, 
and brings to mind the fourth natural law of book I, chapter 2 
of the Lois.
(1) Pensée 2194 (Bkn.171); Nagel II, p.659; Pléiade II, p.220.
(2) Pensée 174 (Bkn.1935); in volume I, probably entered before 
1728.
(3) Here and in Lois XV,2, Montesquieu singles out Roman 
jurisprudence for attack. But, as Jameson points out,
(op.cite (p. 518 n.5-) I, 4) in the Institutes (Bk.I,tit.3, 
para.ii) slavery is described as an institution of conven­
tional law, subjecting one man to the domination of another, 
but against natural law. Its justification lies in the 
right Of conquest, (para.iii).
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Slavery has nothing in common with the natural dependence 
of citizens upon their magistrates; it is illegitimate, because 
it has no legitimate cause. The first argument put forward by 
the Roman jurisconsults in its defence, namely that a man 
might sell his own freedom, falls down because such a civil 
contract obviously violates the original laws of human freedom 
and rationality. In addition, the transaction which it embo­
dies is manifestly unjust, since by the cession of his person 
and his goods to the master, the slave in effect loses any 
theoretical payment he may have received. It also cancels 
itself automatically, for a slave can neither make nor be bound 
by any form of contract; thus, all in all, it is absurd to 
suppose that men who are naturally citizens can enter into a 
contract whose self-invalidating conditions involve the loss 
of their citizenship.
Against the second of the traditional justifications, the 
argument from the right of conquest, Montesquieu presents the 
same reasons as were later incorporated into book X of the 
Lois, summed up here in a comparison between the act of redu­
cing the vanquished to slavery and the murders in cold blood 
committed by looting soldiers. The third justification, the 
argument that children may be born into slavery, is, he main­
tains, as fallacious as the others, and falls for identical 
reasons; if a man cannot sell himself nor a prisoner of war 
loose his freedom, still less can their unborn children.
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In short the institution of slavery flies in the face of 
all the laws by which men organize and conserve their existence, 
either as simple human beings, or as citizens; and appropriately, 
Montesquieu sums up his demolition of the arguments in its 
favour by comparing its function with that of all other insti­
tutions of society. To represent them, he takes a law which 
superficially at least, embodies the harshest penalty that 
society can inflict, and which in spirit seems completely 
counter to the principle of conservation. But this law, the 
law that punishes a murderer with death, in fact favours its 
subject in a way which the law of slavery never favours the 
slave. The criminal's death is just because the same law 
that condemns him has previously protected and sustained him.
The same cannot be said for the law of slavery, always disad­
vantageous for the slave, which, Montesquieu avers, perfectly 
justifies flight or any other means the oppressed may employ 
to regain their liberty. The slave is outside society, unpro­
tected and therefore unconstrained by civil law.
The dialectic of Pensee 174 is incorporated almost down 
to its last detail in chapter 2 of book XV. Montesquieu even 
carefully transcribes such clever points as his reductio ad 
absurdum of the argument that the transaction between master 
and slave must be valid since the latter is fed and kept in 
return for renouncing his freedom. Logically, one should then 
restrict slavery to those incapable of earning their own living.
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'mais on ne veut pas de ces esclaves-là*.
In chapter 1 he makes the additional point, carried over from 
Lettres Persanes XXXIV and the passages from the Considerations 
denouncing the barbarous way in which the Romans abused their 
slaves, that the practice of slavery is morally corrupting.
The master looses all his virtue, while the slave, deprived 
of his citizenship, and therefore it is understood, of his 
liberty and humanity, is rendered incapable of acting virtu­
ously, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are devoted to an ironical treat­
ment of the other 'origins of the laws of slavery', which 
Montesquieu without much difficulty isolates as racialism, 
religious bigotry, greed and luxury, and colour prejudice. 
Chapter 5 in particular is a masterly parody of conventional 
apologies for white dominance:
*Si j'avais à soutenir le droit que nous avons eu de 
rendre les nègres esclaves, voici ce que je dirais:.... *.,.
Ceux dont il s'agit sont noirs depuis les pieds jusqu'à 
la tête; et ils ont le nez si écrasé qu'il est presque 
impossible de les plaindre.
On ne peut se mettre dans l'esprit que Dieu, qui est un 
être très sage, ait mis une âme, surtout une à,me bonne, dans 
un corps tout noir................................. ........
Il est impossible que nous supposions que ces gens-là 
soient des hommes ; parce que, si nous les supposions des 
hommes, on commencerait à croire que nous ne sommes pas 
nous-memes des chrétiens.
But if half of this book is so obviously inspired by the 
conviction that:
(1) Nagel I, pp.330-331; Pléiade II, p.494,
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'Les connaissances rendent les hommes doux; la raison 
porte a 1 'humanité: il n'y a que les préjugés qui y fassent
renoncer',
what is one to make of the completely serious volte-face with 
which we are presented in chapter 6? Without a trace of 
irony Montesquieu concedes in his very first sentence that 
slavery does indeed possess a true origin, and adds that it 
must be founded on the nature of things which he intends to 
examine. The manuscript version continues ominously,
'et par là nous verrons s'il y a des cas où il n'était pas 
contraire au Droit civil, et s'il y en a où il n'était point 
opposé au Droit naturel.*^2)
One wonders what has become of the categorical assertion of 
Pensée 174:
'Pour le droit des maîtres, il n'est point légitime, parce 
qu'il ne peut point avoir eu une cause légitime.
If the nature of things serves to justify slavery, what 
becomes of the elaborate condemnation built on principles 
reached by a careful consideration of the nature of men as 
rational, social creatures, whose observance Montesquieu, 
acutely aware of the importance of morals in the life of a 
people, also saw as an essential prerequisite not only of 
individual fulfilment, but of national survival?
Chapter 3; Nagel I, p.329; Pleiade II, p.493*
De l'Esprit des Lois, ed. J. Brethe de la Gressaye, vol.II, 
Paris, 1955, p.415, note 29.
(3) Nagel II, p.57; Pléiade I, p.1467.
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The nature of things in fact provides Montesquieu with 
only two causes which in his estimation would justify the 
institution of slavery. These 'natural' causes are the state 
to which a despotism reduces its subjects, and the moral 
repercussions of the enervating physical effect of hot cli­
mates. In the despotism, political servitude to all intents 
and purposes automatically entails the destruction of civil 
liberty; for the subjects, deprived by the regime of the spi­
ritual and material advantages, the freedom and security of 
true citizenship, are only too ready to sell themselves in the 
hope of thereby enjoying at least a semblance of the benefits 
denied them:
'Dans ces États, les hommes libres, trop faibles contre le 
gouvernement, cherchent à devenir les esclaves de ceux qui 
tyrannisent le gouvernement.
C'est là l'origine juste, et conforme à la raison, de ce 
droit d'esclavage très doux que l'on trouve dans quelques 
pays; et il doit être doux parce qu'il est fondé survie choix 
libre qu'un homme, pour son utilité, se fait d'un maître; ce 
qui forme une convention réciproque entre les deux parties.
In torrid climates, slavery is much more crudely, the only 
means of forcing the demoralized inhabitants to work, 2^)
What is to be made of the apparent abdication of his 
moral stance for a position beyond even the studied imparti­
ality of the true scientific observer?
(1) Nagel I, pp.331-332; Pléiade II, p.495. 
(2; Chapter 7.
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First of all, the contradiction between one of the justi­
fications which he slips into chapter 6 for the 'esclavage 
très doux' of the despotism, namely that it is the free choice 
of a citizen, and the forthright assertion in chapter 2 that 
liberty is inalienable seems so clear cut and fundamental as 
to be inexcusable, as well as inexplicable in the midst of so 
much careful logic. Similarly, the notion that the prospec­
tive slave enters for his personal advantage into a recipro­
cal agreement with the master, surely makes nonsense of his 
previous attacks on those jurisconsults who had attempted to 
justify slavery by likening it to a commercial transaction.
But these inconsistencies should not be allowed to ob­
scure the genuine moral concern which really accounts for 
Montesquieu's perplexing acceptance of slavery as justifiable 
in certain circumstances; nor indeed are they wholly confirmed 
once certain features of the text of the first seven chapters 
are taken into account.
Pensée 174 began:
'L'esclavage est contre le Droit naturel, par lequel tous 
les hommes naissent libres et indépendants'
(1) Probably represented here by Pufendorf. In the Droit de la 
Nature et des Gens, (trad. Barbeyrac, Amsterdam, 1706J, 
III,ii,8, he rejects the idea of natural slavery, but later 
(VI,iii) goes on to locate its origin and justification in 
the contract between master and slave, by which in return 
for voluntary submission, the slave receives the basic 
necessities of life.
(2) Nagel II, p.57; Pleiade I, p.1467.
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and in chapter 7 of hook XV, after setting out the relation­
ship between servitude and climate, Montesquieu still insists 
that in spite of its natural causes, it remains in conflict 
with nature:
'Mais, comme tous les hommes naissent égaux, il faut dire 
que l'esclavage est contre la nature, quoique dans certains 
pays, il soit fondé sur une raison naturelle; et il faut bien 
distinguer ces pays d'avec ceux où les raisons naturelles 
même les (sic) rejettent, comme les pays d'Europe, où il a été 
si heureusement aboli,
Significantly the essential characteristic of the natural 
state which is now emphasized is neither liberty nor indepen­
dence, but equality. It is also worth noting that from the 
very beginning of the book, the despotism is treated as an 
exception, whereas no mention appears in Pensee 174 of any 
variations in political conditions. Chapter 1 gives us a 
foretaste of what is to come:
'Dans les pays despotiques, où l'on est déjà sous 
l'esclavage politique, l'esclavage civil est plus tolérable 
qu'ailleurs. Chacun y doit être assez content d'y avoir sa 
subsistance et la vie. Ainsi la condition de l'esclave n'y 
est guère plus à charge que la condition du sujet.
Even where Montesquieu confounds the supporters of the contract 
theory, the question of constitutional variations is not 
entirely absent from his mind:
'La liberté de chaque citoyen est une partie de la liberté 
publique. Cette qualité, dans l'État populaire, est même une 
partie de la souveraineté. Vendre sa qualité de citoyen est 
un acte d'une telle extravagance, qu'on ne peut pas la 
supposer dans un homme.'(^)
(1) Nagel I, p.332; Pléiade II, p.496.
(2) Nagel I, p.325; Pleiade II, p.490.
(3) Nagel I, p.327; Pléiade II, pp.491-492.
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Such passages surely indicate that consistent with the 
enlarged scientific horizons of the Lois as a whole, 
Montesquieu had realized since the composition of Pensee 174, 
that in certain cases liberty and independence could cease in 
practice if not in theory to be the birthright of citizens. 
Where this was the case, and political laws deprived citizen­
ship of its meaning, then a change in civil conditions, the 
institution of slavery, might redress the balance, better 
answering the demands of justice and in closer conformity with 
the overriding principle of conservation governing natural law 
as well as social organization.
Thus, as regards the despotism and tropical latitudes, 
it is clearly not the external environmental cause, political 
or climatic, which really serves to justify the institution. 
These causes are indeed important factors contributing to a 
scientific explanation of its establishment in certain regions 
and types of state, but in isolation they justify nothing.
The importance of 'raisons naturelles' is that they distort 
the moral conditions, and sap the resources necessary for the 
political and moral fulfilment of human beings: on the one
hand,
'leur liberté ne vaut rien*, 
and on the other.
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'la chaleur......affaiblit si fort le courage, que les hommes
ne sont portes à un devoir pénible que par la crainte du 
châtiment.'^^
In such predicaments then, recourse to slavery paradoxically 
constitutes the only means by which men may imitate, albeit in 
a limited way, the full life of the true citizen. The contract 
by which it is instituted is valid because here the slave does 
receive real benefits in exchange for the surrender of his 
nominal freedom.
(1) Commentators on both Montesquieu's moral ideas and on his 
economic ideas agree on his puritanical attitude to work. 
Labour was for him not only a virtue but an essential 
prerequisite of happiness. See P. Duprat, 'Les idées 
économiques de Montesquieu', Journal des Economistes,
3e. série, tome 18, no.31, April 1870; pp.18-37; and 
M.W. Rombout, op.cit. above (p.510n. 1.), part III, ch.l.
The suggestion in book XV,8 that the use of machinery dis­
poses of the need for slaves (see below p.f5#), should be 
compared to the sentiments expressed in book XXIII,15: 
'.....si les moulins à eau n'étaient pas partout établis, 
je ne les croirais pas aussi utiles qu'on le dit, parce 
qu'ils ont fait reposer une infinité de bras, qu'ils ont 
privé bien des gens de l'usage des eaux, et ont fait 
perdre la fécondité à beaucoup de terres.'
Nagel I, p.54; Pléiade II, p.692.
(2) It could be objected that if this is the case, Montesquieu, 
a lover of paradox, is unusually reluctant to make his 
point with characteristic force. However, the uncertain 
juggling of key tenus such as nature, raison, raison 
naturelle in chapters 6 and 7 surely betrays a struggle to 
find terminology adequate for expressing his idea. In the 
Réponse à des observations de Grosley sur l'Esprit des Lois, 
he apologizes for such obscurities;
'Ce qui rend certains articles du livre en question obscurs 
et ambigus, c'est qu'ils sont souvent éloignés d'autres qui 
les expliquent, et quelles chaînons de la chaîne que vous 
avez remarquée sont très souvent éloignés les uns des 
autres.'
Pléiade II, p.1197.
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Thus it is the dictates of the law of nature which in 
these instances justify the institution of slavery, rather 
than the climatic or historical causes that actually occasion 
it. And the opinion that the proper end of men is the fulfil­
ment of this law, certainly owes more to the apriori assump­
tion of a moralist than the objective constatations of the 
scientist. Hence Montesquieu's dogmatic reply to the suggest­
ion made by a contemporary critic, Grosley, that in chapter 6 
he was really justifying feudalism, not true slavery;
^'Je n'ai point cherché l'origine de l'esclavage qui
a été, mais l'origine de l'esclavage qui peut ou qui doit 
être. '
need cause no surprise; for the origin that he indicates, 
somewhat obscurely, is indeed 'juste, et conforme à la raison.'
Another point to be made is that even in these two 
exceptional cases, Montesquieu's justification remains reluc­
tant. Chapter 8, where he is at pains to emphasize the com­
plete irrelevance of slavery in countries where no special 
environmental factors predispose towards it, brings in the 
example of European mineworkers to illustrate his conviction 
that even the harshest work can be performed by free labour.
The provision of material incentives, and more important, human 
ingenuity applied to the production of mechanical aids, in 
harness with human reason applied to legislation, might in 
every case overcome natural obstacles;
(1) Op.cit. abov^n.2; Pleiade II, pp.1196-1197.
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'Je ne sais si c'est l'esprit ou le coeur qui me dicte 
cet article-ci. Il n'y a peut-être pas de climat sur la terre 
ou l'on ne pût engager au travail des hommes libres. Parce 
que les lois étaient mal faites on a trouvé les hommes 
paresseux: parce que ces hommes étaient paresseux, on les a
mis dans 1 'esclavage.'
In his study of Montesquieu's treatment of slavery,
R.P. Jameson found it impossible to exonerate him from a cer­
tain lack of rigour in the application of his principles, and 
concluded ruefully that he was a humanitarian perhaps, but not 
a reformer.^2) Fart of his disappointment was undoubtedly due 
to a failure to recognize that as a sociologist and historian 
of positive law, Montesquieu deliberately devoted half of 
book XV to describing rather than criticizing the institution 
of slavery.^2) As we have seen Montesquieu struggled to 
uphold his principles, but the Preface of the Lois bears wit­
ness from the outset to a practical wisdom which would certainly 
never have mistaken polemics for the sound knowledge on which 
effective legislation must be based. If the last sentence of 
chapter 8, attributing ultimate responsibility for the exi­
stence of slavery, not to climatic determinism but to bad laws, 
is unconvincing evidence of Montesquieu's fidelity to a view 
of man as a conscious moral agent alive to absolute values, 
and able to incorporate them in his own laws, then the plain
;i) Nagel I, p.334; Pleiade II, p.497.
2) See oncit. above (p.518n. ^ . ), Part II, ch.4, pp.318-319.
3) He suggests for example, that Montesquieu's discussion of 
historical cases conceals a criticism of the slave trade.
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words of his final judgement in book XVI on polygamy when it 
occurs as a prominent feature of domestic slavery, must be 
left to speak for themselves;
'Toutes les nations se sont également accordées à 
attacher du mépris à 1 'incontinence des femmes; c'est que la 
nature a parlé à^toutes les nations. Elle a établi la 
défense, elle a établi l'attaque; et, ayant mis^des deux 
cotés des désirs, elle a place dans l'un la témérité, et dans 
l'autre la honte. Elle a donné aux individus, pour se 
consoler, de longs espaces de temps, et ne leur a donné, pour 
se perpétuer, que des moments.
Il n'est donc pas vrai que 1 * incontinence suive les lois 
de la nature; elle les viole au contraire. G'est la modestie 
et la retenue qui suivent ces lois.
D'ailleurs il est de la nature des êtres intelligents de 
sentir leurs imperfections; la nature a donc mis en nous la 
pudeur, c'est-à-dire la honte de nos imperfections.
Quand donc la puissance physique de certains climats 
viole la loi naturelle des deux sexes et celle des êtres 
intelligents, c'est au législateur à faire des lois civiles 
qui forcent la nature du climat et rétablissent les lois 
primitives. *
(1) Chapter 12; Nagel I, pp.360-361; Pléiade II, pp.517-518.
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CONCLUSION.
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In the first part of this work Montesquieu’s definition 
of justice was presented against the background of a range 
of assumptions current during the last decades of the 17th. 
century and the first of the 18th., concerning the structure 
of reality, the epistemological groundwork of scientific 
enquiry and metaphysical speculation and the purpose and mean­
ing of existence, in the formulation of which the key phrase 
rapport de convenance or one or other of its elements, was 
commonly involved. We discovered that in spite of its being 
one of the most characteristically recurrent phrases in moral 
and philosophical debate, its connotations were by no means 
fixed; that in fact it was almost'., infinitely adaptable 
within the wide limits set by the Cartesian and Newtonian tra­
ditions, fitting as easily into a sensationalist-materialist as 
into an idealist-essentialist analysis of the nature of things.
In the second part our purpose has been twofold: to
reconstitute (as far as existing texts allow) Montesquieu's 
personal philosophy and its methods, and thereby to situate 
him in the context of contemporary speculation; and also, 
using this reconstruction as a framework of reference, to 
demonstrate the central importance of his idea of justice in 
the genesis and elaboration of some of his most characteristic 
political and social doctrines. His definition of justice as
'un rapport de convenance, qui se trouve réellement entre deux 
choses',
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emerges from this study as the formula which, re-echoing 
through his works, facilitated by virtue of the metaphysical 
and epistemological associations of its key elements, the 
integration of a body of moral theory, venerable in the anti­
quity of its sources and strongly idealistic in orientation, 
into an original and disconcertingly deterministic analysis 
of historical causation and the life and fortunes of societies.
Taking both parts of the work together, once the rôle of 
the idea of justice as catalyst and dynamic of Montesquieu's 
historical and social doctrines is established, one is able 
to appreciate its full significance in the wider context of 
contemporary moral and political debate. On the one hand 
justice, defined as a constant and immutable relationship of 
fitness, successfully harnessed some of the resources of 
rational idealism and metaphysical optimism in the campaign 
against the l?th. century tandem of absolutism and raison 
d 'état, without in so doing, ceding an inch of the ground that 
jurisprudence had painfully wrested from theology. Convenance, 
no matter how vague and indefinable a concept in itself, was 
nonetheless accepted as the mark and sign of reasoned order, 
and as such constituted a criterion of surpassing and univer­
sal authority. What was the mere will of kings in its shadow, 
when even the heavens were subjected to it?
On the other hand, the equally crucial presence in 
Montesquieu's definition of the notion of relationship, not
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only mediated by virtue of its epistemological associations, 
between the ancient neo-Platonic tradition of transcendent 
moral truths and a new scientifically based empiricism, but 
also, and in a sense paradoxically, offered the same episte­
mological resources stemming from the tradition of Cartesian 
rationalism, to a later generation for use as a counter to 
the facile materialism in ethics fostered by sensationalism. 
Against the school of thought represented for instance by 
Quesnay in the article Évidence of the Encyclopédie ;
'il y a une correspondance certaine entre les corps et les
sensations qu'ils nous procurent d ’où résulte une
évidence et une certitude de connaissances à laquelle nous ne 
pouvons nous refuser, et par laquelle nous sommes continuelle­
ment instruits des sensations agréables que nous pouvons nous 
procurer, et des sensations désagréables que nous voulons 
éviter. C'est dans cette correspondance que consistent, dans 
l'ordre naturel, les règles de notre conduite, nos intérêts, 
notre science, notre bonheur, notre malheur, et les motifs 
qui forment et dirigent nos volontés,
Rousseau was to argue in Emile that there existed a real struc­
ture of moral relationships between beings, and that the per­
ception of these relationships constituted the substance of 
moral life:
'L'étude convenable à l'homme est celle de ses rapports. 
Tant qu'il ne se connaît que par son être physique, il doit 
s'étudier par ses rapports avec les choses: c'est l'emploi de
son enfance; quand il commence à sentir son être moral, il 
doit s'étudier par ses rapports avec les hommes: c'est
l'emploi de sa vie entière, à commencer au point où nous
voila parvenus.'^2)
}1) Op.cit., vol.VI, 1756, p.149.2) Op.cit.. Part IV; Paris, Garnier, 1961, p.249.
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It is not simply the corpus of his own political works, that, 
through the richness and complexity of its associations, 
Montesquieu's idea of justice illuminates, but the moral 
thought of a whole century.
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APPENDIX
MONTESQUIEU'S AESTHETIC THEORIES.
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vie examined in Part I, chapter 5 some of the terms and 
ideas characteristic of aesthetic thought during the second 
half of the 1?th. century, and sketched in the main lines of 
their development during Montesquieu's lifetime. A .cursory 
glance at the Essai sur le Goût reveals the fact that idealism 
in this field at least, had little meaning for Montesquieu; 
the influence of the works it inspired seems to have been con­
centrated in his moral t h o u g h t . T h e  idea that he does 
develop in the essay is, as we mentioned in connection with 
Nicole's Traité de la vraie et dé la fausse beauté, that of 
conformity between human psychology and artistic activity.
In this sphere he seems to have been fully aware of the neces­
sary anthropomorphism upon which both judgement and creation 
are based: the good, the true and the beautiful, existing as
some compound metaphysical entity closely allied to reason, 
have no place in his thinking:
'Les sources du beau, du bon, de l'agréable, etc. sont donc 
dans nous-mêmes; et en chercher les raisons, c'est chercher 
les causes des plaisirs de notre âme.'^^^
Taste, and the rules of composition are entirely dependent 
upon the arbitrary constitution of the mind and its given 
relationship to the body:
(1) In 'Montesquieu et les Beaux Arts', Atti del quinto 
Congresso internazionale di lingue e letterature moderne, 
Florence, 1955, p.249 seq. Shackleton develpps the theory 
that the sensationalism of the first chapters of the Essai 
gives way to a priori arguments drawn from Crousaz an3 
Hutcheson.
(2) See above p. 193.
(3) Essai sur le Goût dans les Choses de la Nature et de l'Art, 
Nagtili, p. 612; pléiade II, p.1240.
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^'Notre manière d'être est entièrement arbitraire; nous 
pouvions avoir été faits comme nous sommes, ou autrement.
Mais, si nous avions été faits autrement, nous aurions senti 
autrement; un organe de plus ou de moins dans notre machine 
aurait fait une autre éloquence, une autre poésie;,.....par 
exemple, si la constitution de nos organes nous avait rendus 
capables d'une plus longue attention, toutes les règles qui 
proportionnent la disposition du sujet à la mesure de notre 
attention, ne seraient glus; si nous avions été rendus 
capables de plus de pénétration,^toutes les règles qui sont 
fondées sur la mesure de notre pénétration, tomberaient de 
même; enfin toutes les lois établies sur ce que notre machine 
est d'une certaine façon, seraient différentes, si notre 
machine n'était pas de cette façon.
If the object of the study was to discuss these laws 
dependent on our actual constitution, then the question of the 
causes, or cause of this constitution was largely irrelevant, 
and Montesquieu did not comment upon it. Among the fragments 
of the Essai which remained undiscovered until the end of the 
18th. century,^2) there are sections entitled Des Règles and 
Plaisir fondé sur la raison; but these reveal no substantial 
evidence of rational idealism. In the first, Montesquieu 
simply sets limits to the applicability of the rules of compo­
sition laid down by theorists:
'Tous les ouvrages de l'art ont des règles générales, qui sont 
des guides qu'il ne faut jamais perdre de vue. Mais comme les 
lois sont toujours justes dans leur être général, mais presque 
toujours injustes dans 1 'agplication, de même les règles, 
toujours vraies dans la théorie, peuvent devenir fausses dans 
1 'hypothèse....•
(1) Op.cit., 'Des plaisirs de notre âme'; Nagel I, pp.613-614; 
Pléiade II, pp.1241-1242.
(2) The chapter, 'Des Règles', was first published in the 
Oeuvres Posthumes of 1798; the other fragments in Baron 
Walckenaer's Annales littéraires 1804, vol.II, p.301; for 
further details, see Nagel III, p.530.
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Quoique chaque effet dépende d'une cause générale, il 
s'y mêle tant d'autres causes particulières que chaque effet 
a^ en quelque fajon, une cause à part: ainsi l'art donne les 
regies, et le gout les exceptions; le goût nous découvre en 
quelles occasions l'art doit soumettre, et en quelles 
occasions il doit être soumis.
This throws interesting light on Montesquieu's understanding of 
the relationship between the real and the ideal, but it adds 
little to his conception of beauty. In the second fragment, 
he simply states his opinion,
'que ce qui nous fait plaisir doit être fondé sur la raison',
without comment on anything beyond the second half of his 
opening proposition,
'et ce qui ne l'est pas à certains égards, mais parvient à 
nous plaire par d'autres, doit s'en écarter le moins qu'il est 
possible.'^2)
Thus Montesquieu's work reveals a surprisingly empirical 
approach to aesthetics, and, as we shall see, the basis of 
this empiricism was laid down very early. Here it is perhaps 
worth noting that Montesquieu never belonged to the ultra­
rationalist party in literature, which counted Fontanelle, 
Terrasson and La Motte among its advocates. As regards the 
dispute between the Ancients and the Moderns, Montesquieu was 
a moderate:
'J'aime à voir les querelles des Anciens et des Modernes: cela
me fait voir qu'il y a de bons ouvrages parmi les Anciens et 
les Modernes. * ________
(1) Nagel III, p.531; Pléiade, II, p.1260.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Pensées 111 (Bkn.445); Nagel II, p.37; Pleiade I, p.1018.
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After his return from England, he dismissed all the opinions 
put forward by the French protagonists in favour of Pope's 
estimation of Homer's greatness, condemning Mme. Dacier for 
pedantry, La Motte for insensibility, pettiness and ignorance, 
and Terrasson for complete s e n s e l e s s n e s s . T h e  fragments on 
literature and criticism found in the Pensées leave no doubt 
of his avowed liking for Classical literature ; ^ 2) he was 
aware of the need to judge a work in its correct historical 
context :
'Mais pour juger des beautés d'Homère, il faut se mettre dans 
le camp des Grecs, non pas dans une armée française,
rather than superimposing upon it the features and merits of 
works produced by later ages. On the other hand, Montesquieu 
seems to have been very alive to the harmful effects which the 
philosophic tendencies of his own age might produce; while pagan 
literature breathed simplicity and grandeur, the modern world 
was destroying the sublime by its infatuation with arid abstrac­
tion and systématisation:
'...ce qui achève de perdre le sublime parmi nous et nous 
empêche de frapper et d'être frappés, c'est^cette nouvelle 
philosophie qui ne nous parle que de lois générales et nous 
Ote de l'esprit toutes les pensées particulières de la 
divinité.'
(1 ) Pensées, 894 (Bkn.848), 895 (Bkn.849); Nagel II, p.259; 
Pléiade I, pp.1231-1232.  ^ ,
(2) 'J'avoue mon goût pour les anciens. ^Oette antiquité 
m'enchante, et je suis toujours porté à dire avec Pline: 
'C'est à Athènes que vous allez. Respectez leur Dieux.' 
(110 Bkn.444).
(3) Pensées, 126 (Bkn.460); Nagel II, p.42; Pleiade I, p.1023.
(4) Ibid., 112 (Bkn.446); Nagel II, p.37; Pléiade I, p.1019.
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Pedantry, and all its attendant evils, in particular the ten­
dency towards hypercritical judgements and malicious satire, 
was in the process of stifling talent; and the utilitarianism 
encouraged by scientific progress held an even greater threat 
to literary activity.
Many of these reflections are found in the first book of 
the Pensées written between 1722 and 1728, and in the same 
place we find the key to the empiricism of the Essai sur le 
Goût. The text of the Essai that appeared in the Encyclopédie 
contains the following passage:
*....lorsque nous trouvons du plaisir à voir une chose avec 
une utilité pour nous, nous disons qu'elle est bonne; lorsque 
nous trouvons du plaisir à la voir, sans que nous y démêlions 
une utilité présente, nous l'appelions belle.
Les anciens n'avaient pas bien démêlé ceci; ils 
regardaient comme des qualités positives toutes les qualités 
relatives de notre âme; ce qui fait que ces dialogues où 
Platon fait raisonner Socrate, ces dialogues si admirés des 
anciens, sont aujourd'hui insoutenables, parce qu'ils sont 
fondés sur une philosophie fausse: car tous ces raisonnements
tirés sur le bon, le beau, le çarfait, le sage, le fou, le dur, 
le mou, le sec, l'humide, -^ités comme des choses positives,
(2)ne signifient plus rien.'
(1) A fragment in Book II of the Pensées makes these points, 
1006 CBkn.542): 'Le savoir....a pris parmi nous un air
aisé....qui fait que tout le monde se juge savant ou bel- 
esprit, et avoir acquis le droit de mépriser les autres.
De là, cette négligence d'apprendre ce qu'on croit savoir. 
De là, cette sotte confiance dans ses propres forces..... 
De là, ce ton continuel qui consiste à tourner en ridicule 
les choses bonnes et même les vertueuses....etc.'
(2) Essai sur le Goût, Nagel I, p.612.
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The argument that attributes of things have meaning only in 
relation to perception, and not in themselves, is drawn from 
two entries in the Pensées. The textual similarity between 
the second of these and the passage from the Essai make this 
certain:
'Les termes de beau, de bon, de noble, de grand, de parfait, 
sont des attributs des objets, lesquels sont relatifs aux 
êtres qui les considèrent.
Il faut bien se mettre ce principe dans la tête: il est
l'éponge de la plupart des préjugés. C'est le fléau de toute 
la philosophie ancienne, de la physique d'Aristote, de la 
métaphysique de Platon; et si on lit les dialogues de ce 
philosophe, on trouvera qu'ils ne sont qu'un tissu de sophismes 
faits par 1 'ignorance de ce principe. Le père Malebranche est 
tombé dans mille sophismes pour l'avoir ignoré.
This in turn summarizes the first entry, where the parti­
cular fault of Malebranche is dealt with in some detail:
'Substance, accident, individu, genre, espèce, ne sont qu'une 
manière de concevoir les choses, selon le différent rapport 
qu'elles ont entre elles. Par exemple, la rondeur, qui est un 
accident du corps, devient l'essence d'un cercle, et la 
rougeur, qui sert de coloris à un cercle matériel, devient 
l'essence d'un cercle rouge. ^Idem, l'idée du genre, qui n'est
rien en elle-même ; l'idée de l'infini, à qui le père
Malebranche trouve tant de réalité qu'il croit que les idées 
particulières viennent de celle-là, en faisant une espèce de
soustraction arithmétique : au lieu que ce n'est qu'en
ajoutant sans cesse au fini, sans trouver de bornes, que je 
fais l'idée de l'infini. C'est ainsi que je pense a une 
étendue où j'ajoute toujours, à un être dont je bornerai si 
peu les perfections que je pourrai toujours, par ma pensée, en 
ajouter de nouvelles. Mais je n'ai l'idée d'une matière, ni 
d'un être, auxquels je ne puisse rien ajouter, non plus que^ 
d'un temps, ni d'un nombre. Il est bien vrai que Dieu a été 
de toute éternité: car aucune chose ne peut être faite de
rien; de manière qu'il y a eu une durée infinie. Mais je n'ai 
pas pour cela d'idée de cette durée, et je ne la vois que par 
des conséquences que je tire de certains principes.
(1) Pensées 410 (Bkn.2062); Eagel II, p.158; Pléiade I, p.1557.
(2) Pensées 156 (Bkn.2061); Nagel II, pp.49-50; Pléiade I, 
pp.l55é-1557.
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This partial rejection of rational idealism, partial in so far 
as it stops short of a complete denial that ideas may possess 
any universal significance, was probably drawn from the Jesuit 
Claude Buffier's Traité de Premières Vérités (1724). Buffier 
was something of an eclectic, but the notes on contemporary 
philosophers which end this work disclose a strong preference 
for Locke, whose thought is described as being as superior in 
comparison with that of Descartes and Malebranche, as history 
is to romance. Buffier accepted the universality and truth of 
general ideas derived from observation, while emphasizing that 
the information provided by the senses is relative to men, and 
gives no precise indication of the qualities of objects; 
on this basis, he accepted that one may arrive at a general 
idea of infinity in power, but advanced the same argument as 
Montesquieu to demolish the idea of infinity in number, as 
used by Malebranche to demonstrate the existence of God. 2^)
Here then is the possible source of the philosophical criticism 
upon which Montesquieu based his aesthetic theory in the Essai 
sur le Goût ; yet strangely enough, Montesquieu makes no mention 
in this work of the definition of beauty elaborated by Buffier 
from the same basis, and reported at length in the Pensées ;
'Le père Buffier a défini la beauté: l'assemblage de ce qu'il
y a de plus commun. Quand sa définition est expliquée, elle 
est excellente, parce qu'elle rend raison d'une chose très 
obscure parce que c'est une chose de goût.
(1) Op.cit.. Part I, ch.xv, para.115. 
(2; Ibid., Part II, ch.xii.
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Le Père Buffier dit que les beaux yeux sont ceux dont il 
y en a un plus grand nombre de la mime façon; de même, la 
bouche, le nez, etc. Ce n'est pas qu'il n'y ait un beaucoup 
plus grand nombre de vilains nez que de beaux nez; mais c'est 
quelles vilains sont de bien différentes espèces; mais chaque 
espèce de vilains est en beaucoup moindre nombre que l'espèce 
des beaux. C'est comme si, dans une foule de cent hommes, il 
y a dix hommes habillés de vert, et que les quatre-vingt-dix 
restants soient habillés chacun d'une couleur particulière: 
c'est le vert qui domine.....
Ce principe du père Buffier est excellent pour expliquer 
comment une beauté française est horrible à la Chine, et une 
chinoise, horrible en Prance.
Enfin, il est excellent peut-être pour expliquer toutes 
les beautés de goût, même dans les ouvrages d'esprit. Mais 
il faudra penser là-dessus
The President's future reflections were however to be 
strongly coloured by his travels in Italy; and Buffier's defi­
nition, too crudely scientific in its purely statistical foun­
dation, was replaced by a conception of beauty which drew 
instead on a more subtle appreciation of the elements of 
Classical art. The Jesuit's definition is mentioned once more 
very briefly in the Pensées, but it is clearly of little 
significance in comparison with the idea of a correspondence 
between the natural constitution of the mind and the simple, 
but varied proportion exemplified in Greek architecture and 
Italian music and painting. Montesquieu recounts how the 
determination to elaborate this idea arose out of a conversa­
tion on the merit of French architecture which took place 
during his visit to Milan;
(1) Pensées. 272 (Bkn.956); Hagel II, pp.112-113; Pléiade 1, 
pp.1256-1257.
(2) 1449 (Bkn.957): 'Ce qui fait la beaute, c'est la régularité 
des traits, ce qui fait une femme jolie, c'est l'expression 
du visage.'
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'les Anciens ont découvert que le plaisir que l'on a lorsqu'on 
voit un bâtiment, est causé par de certaines proportions 
qu'ont entre eux les différents membres d'architecture qui le 
composent. Ils ont trouvé qu'il y avait cinq différentes 
sortes de proportions qui excitaient ce plaisir, et ils ont 
appelé cela ordres....... Quelques ornements que l'on mette à
ces ordres, quelque déguisement que l'on y fasse, cela ne les
change jamais.....  Cela fait qu'il est impossible de changer
les ordres, d'en augmenter le nombre ou le diminuer, parce que 
ce ne^sont pas des beautés arbitraires qui puissent être 
suppléées par d'autres. Cela est pris dans la nature, et il 
me serait facile d'expliquer la raison physique de ceci, et 
je le ferai quelque jour.'^^
The essential condition of beauty as Montesquieu generally 
sees it, is a kind of natural rhythm within the limitations of 
subject and medium.
'Les peintres et les sculpteurs ont établi les proportions 
qu'il faut donner au corps humain, et ont pris pour mesure 
commune la longueur de la face; mais il faut qu'ils violent à 
chaque instant les proportions, à cause des différentes 
attitudes dans lesquelles il faut qu'ils mettent les corps: 
par exemple, un bras tendu est bien plus long que celui qui 
ne l'est pas.'^^)
Over-stylization, complete uniformity, absolute regularity, 
these are characteristic of decadence in art, of the Gothic 
style that Montesquieu sees as the antithesis of beauty. He 
returns to this point time and time again: in the first
reflections on painting and sculpture in the Spicilege, he 
remarks that too much ornamentation produces a monotonous uni­
formity, and is very bad t a s t e . A m o n g  the fragments added
(1) Op.cit., 882 (Bkn.982), Nagel II, pp.254-255; Pleiade I, 
p.1264.
(2) Essai sur le Goût, 'Des règles', Nagel III, p.531; 
Pléiade, II, p.1260.
(5) Op.cit., 461; manuscript 413-420.
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to this outline in the Pensées he includes a note on the 
necessity of movement and grace in sculpture:
'Le sculpteur.....n'a que la ressource de mettre du feu et 
du mouvement dans ses ouvrages, en mettant ses figures dans 
de belles attitudes et leur donnant de beaux airs de tête. 
Ainsi, quand il a mis les proportions dans ses figures, que 
ses draperies sont belles, il n'a rien fait s'il ne les met 
pas en action, si la position est dure: car la sculpture est
naturellement froide.
La symétrie dans les attitudes y est insupportable..... 
Mais les contrastes trop contrastes souvent le sont autant ; 
comme quand on voit qu'un bras en contraste fait exactement 
tout ce que l'autre fait, et qu'on voit qu'on a étudié de 
faire précisément l'un comme l'autre.
The same theme reappears in the short sketch De la Manière 
Gothique ;
'Lorsque l'art commence à décliner, on ne connaît plus ce 
qu'on appelle la grâce. Bientôt, on ne sait plus donner de 
mouvement aux figures. Ensuite,^on ignore la variété des 
attitudes. On ne songe plus qu'à faire bien ou mal des 
figures, et on les met dans une position unique. C'est ce 
qu'on appelle la manière gothique.
Cette position unique est celle qui se présente d'abord 
à ceux qui ignorent l'art: de la raideur, de la duretéç de
la symétrie dans les diverses parties du corps, et comme, 
pour en venir là, il faut aussi avoir peu de connaissance du 
dessin, aucune proportion dans les parties du corps.
Ail of this naturally finds its way into the Essai sur le 
Goût,^2) but it is best summarized in an entry in the Pensées, 
where Montesquieu expresses a conception of beauty far removed 
from that of his early mentor, le Père Buffier:
(1) Op.cit., 399 (Bkn.969); Nagel II, pp.154-155; Pléiade I,
pp.1259-1260; other fragments 397 (Bkn.967) - 407 (Bkn.977).
(2) This sketch draws largely on Montesquieu's notes on 
Florence (Nagel III, pp.1313-1356; Pléiade I, pp.923-965; 
Shackleton dates its composition around 1734, but it 
received its title from its first editors in the Bordeaux
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Notes from p, 556 continued.
(2) edition of 1896. Passage quoted, Nagel III, p.276;
Pleiade I, p.967.
(3) See especially the chapters, ‘Des plaisirs de la variété*, 
and, ‘Des contrastes*.
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'La trop grande régularité, quelquq^fois et même souvent 
désagréable. Il n'y rien de si beau que le ciel; mais il est 
semé d'étoiles sans ordre. Les maisons et jardins d'autour 
de Paris n'ont que le défaut de se ressembler trop: ce sont
des copies continuelles de Le Notre. Vous voyez toujours le 
même air, qualem decet esse sororum. Si on a eu un terrain 
bizarre, au lieu de l'employer tel qu/il est, on l'a rendu 
régulier, pour faire une maison qui fût comme les autres.
Nos maisons sont comme nos caractères,'
Much of what Montesquieu has to say on artistic matters 
is based purely on observation, but if one attempts to draw 
theoretical conclusions from his scattered remarks, then an 
interesting pattern begins to emerge. One must bear in mind 
the partial demolition of idealism at the beginning of the 
Essai sur le Goût, and the largely sensationalist thesis upon 
which the rest of it hinges: these procedures are largely
peculiar to Montesquieu's aesthetic thought. Yet it is clear 
that he does conceive of certain necessary rules, founded in 
the nature of things, be it the natural constitution of man, 
or the nature of a particular artistic medium, which it is 
imperative to observe, if only to discover those cases where 
they must be modified in practice. Here the proposition at 
the beginning of the chapter 'Des règles' is helpful:
'Tous les ouvrages de l'art ont des règles générales, qui sont 
des guides qu'il ne faut jamais perdre de vue. Mais comme les 
lois sont toujours justes dans leur être général, mais presque 
toujours injustes dans leur application, de même les règles, 
toujours vraies dans la théorie, peuvent devenir fausses dans 
1 'hypothèse.*
(1) Op.cit., 1131 (Bkn.985), Nagel II, p.306; Pléiade I, p.1265.
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Montesquieu does not really indicate whether he considers the 
rules to depend ultimately on reason; the chances are that he 
would in any case have declared the nature of things to he 
manifestly reasonable. This omission does not obscure the 
tension between the general and the particular, the necessary 
law.and the relative instance, visible in his aesthetic 
thought, and, as we have seen, also characteristic of his 
moral theory.
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